In light of the latest school shooting in Illinois, commentary by Security Debrief contributor Mary Ficke seems relevant. Ficke recently retired as the top agent (Special Agent in Charge) of the Department of Homeland Security’s ICE field division in New York, the largest of Homeland Security’s criminal investigation divisions. Ficke now serves as the Director of Operations for SES Resources International, a private security firm. In this capacity, he put together a blue ribbon commission of local, state and federal law enforcement officials and experts to analyze what went wrong with security operations during the tragic Virginia Tech shooting. The findings of this law enforcement summit were included in the Virginia Tech Commission chaired by Virginia Governor Tim Kaine.

Of particular interest was the finding that campus police officials are not included in most university school security and safety committees, an oversight that led to a number of seemingly minor obstacles preventing campus police from acting quickly and decisively.

In a commentary subsequently published by Ficke, he wrote:

Law enforcement officers also had their hands tied – neither the Virginia Tech Police nor the Blacksburg Police had the unilateral authority necessary to order campus closures and block off classroom buildings. They were also unable to send out a warning alert to the student body after the first set of shootings. Instead, Virginia Tech’s emergency management procedure dictated that the police coul only make recommendations to a committee of University officials who had the final call. In this case, the ultimate decision not to err on the side of caution and send an emergency alert to students was a failure that likely made Cho’s subsequent classroom rampage even deadlier.

The Police’s inability to blast out an email to a campus listserv, post an announcement on the Virginia Tech web site or prevent students from entering a classroom is likely attributable to nothing more than a bureaucratic oversight. But it is an important one that is often overlooked by universities across the country. Virginia Tech’s police chief was not directly represented on any of University’s campus safety committees and did not have an active role in developing its emergency management plans – an oversight that made the emergency notification process unnecessarily complicated.

This is just one example of the kind of multi-layered, complex bureaucracy that reflects the misguided approach many universities have taken to campus safety. Security officials have become bogged down in attempts to follow chains of command and adhere to ever-present privacy concerns to a point that student safety, campus security and common sense law enforcement procedures are ignored. As a result, their ability to respond to emergencies in a timely and effective manner has suffered – ultimately making campuses and students more vulnerable.