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	<title>Comments for Security Debrief - a blog of homeland security news and analysis</title>
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	<description>Homland security news and analysis</description>
	<pubDate>Thu, 03 Jul 2008 23:33:56 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>Comment on Former DHS IG Ready for More Spending! by Sam</title>
		<link>http://securitydebrief.adfero.com/former-dhs-ig-ready-for-more-spending/#comment-11</link>
		<dc:creator>Sam</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 19 Dec 2007 21:28:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://securitydebrief.adfero.com/former-dhs-ig-ready-for-more-spending/#comment-11</guid>
		<description>This is an idea that some Israeli security ‘expert’ has been advocating for years; the guy who ‘predicted 9-11’, blah, blah.  His argument is that you shouldn’t let the bomb into a crowded area.  As any first year student of operations will tell you, or any kindergartener who has ever competed with his peers to get an ice-cream from the ice-cream truck, people congregate at the chokepoint – all he is doing is moving the chokepoint.  Of course, if we put the early warning devices at the entrance, and the robust search further in the airport, then we would have what is known as defense in depth, and would prevent massive queues in areas not designed for them, and so maximizing the value of the target.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is an idea that some Israeli security ‘expert’ has been advocating for years; the guy who ‘predicted 9-11’, blah, blah.  His argument is that you shouldn’t let the bomb into a crowded area.  As any first year student of operations will tell you, or any kindergartener who has ever competed with his peers to get an ice-cream from the ice-cream truck, people congregate at the chokepoint – all he is doing is moving the chokepoint.  Of course, if we put the early warning devices at the entrance, and the robust search further in the airport, then we would have what is known as defense in depth, and would prevent massive queues in areas not designed for them, and so maximizing the value of the target.</p>
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		<title>Comment on 100 Percent Scanning &#038; Air Cargo Security by Jim Wallace</title>
		<link>http://securitydebrief.adfero.com/air-cargo-security-considerations/#comment-10</link>
		<dc:creator>Jim Wallace</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 18 Dec 2007 21:26:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://securitydebrief.adfero.com/air-cargo-security-considerations/#comment-10</guid>
		<description>Kevin:

I agree that screening 100% of air cargo is a non-starter.  We do not have the resources to accomplish anywhere near this level of inspection.  Developing a system to assess the risk of a particular shipment is the way to proceed.  

We might consider borrowing another concept from business.  Do you think it is possible to apply the principles of statistical analysis, like the methods used for improving quality in Six Sigma, to intelligently predict which shipments to intercept or inspect?  This type of process could form the basis of a predictive intelligence system to provide indications of where to apply the scarce inspection resources.  

In a sense, a suspect shipment in the “just in time” global shipping system is like a defective product on a manufacturing line.   The principles of Six Sigma are based on improving the manufacturing system, reducing the likelihood that defects can occur.  The same principle could be applied to improving the global shipping process to reduce the possibility of terrorist shipments.  Qualitative analysis would use information to suggest improvements to the overall system, eliminating the need to inspect every package, just as it has eliminated the need to inspect every part on a particular manufacturing line.   

I agree totally that technology can be applied to the challenge of global air cargo security.  In addition to better detection and inspection technology, we need to use information and analysis technology to improve the overall quality of the air cargo security system.  A higher quality shipping system will reduce the opportunities for terrorists and criminals to infiltrate the system with “defective” shipments. 

Jim Wallace</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Kevin:</p>
<p>I agree that screening 100% of air cargo is a non-starter.  We do not have the resources to accomplish anywhere near this level of inspection.  Developing a system to assess the risk of a particular shipment is the way to proceed.  </p>
<p>We might consider borrowing another concept from business.  Do you think it is possible to apply the principles of statistical analysis, like the methods used for improving quality in Six Sigma, to intelligently predict which shipments to intercept or inspect?  This type of process could form the basis of a predictive intelligence system to provide indications of where to apply the scarce inspection resources.  </p>
<p>In a sense, a suspect shipment in the “just in time” global shipping system is like a defective product on a manufacturing line.   The principles of Six Sigma are based on improving the manufacturing system, reducing the likelihood that defects can occur.  The same principle could be applied to improving the global shipping process to reduce the possibility of terrorist shipments.  Qualitative analysis would use information to suggest improvements to the overall system, eliminating the need to inspect every package, just as it has eliminated the need to inspect every part on a particular manufacturing line.   </p>
<p>I agree totally that technology can be applied to the challenge of global air cargo security.  In addition to better detection and inspection technology, we need to use information and analysis technology to improve the overall quality of the air cargo security system.  A higher quality shipping system will reduce the opportunities for terrorists and criminals to infiltrate the system with “defective” shipments. </p>
<p>Jim Wallace</p>
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		<title>Comment on 100 Percent Scanning &#038; Air Cargo Security by Irvin Varkonyi</title>
		<link>http://securitydebrief.adfero.com/air-cargo-security-considerations/#comment-9</link>
		<dc:creator>Irvin Varkonyi</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 14 Dec 2007 00:45:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://securitydebrief.adfero.com/air-cargo-security-considerations/#comment-9</guid>
		<description>Well said, Kevin. In the interest of full disclosure, I spent nearly three decades in international cargo and express services going back to the days before the aviation industry was deregulated during the Carter administration. This industry has strengths and weakness in the handling of hazardous cargo. Precedents in the regulation of Hazmat, which are reviewed (perhaps not frequently enough) by the FAA, have not played a sufficient role in Congressional action to prevent an intentional act of terrorism. 

Why not? Why apply a piece meal approach to securing the airlines, such as 100% scanning, under the purview of TSA; HazMat regulations under the purview of FAA/DOT; and international regulations via international bodies? There is a real difference between layering security as Kevin and other experts have pointed out and just adding layer upon layer of overlapping, even contradictory regulations, similar to painting layer after layer upon your house. After a while, it's just not very pretty.

So instead, why not examine all regulations which relate to the safety and security of air cargo, strip away excess and unnecessary paint (so to speak) and bring about the minimum amount of interlocking layers that reasonably maximize prevention of incidents? Carriers must be responsible to insure that airline personnel are properly vetted and trained to handle cargo before they are loaded onto aircraft but we can not ask carriers to focus so many resources beyond those reasonably required by responsible risk assessment.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Well said, Kevin. In the interest of full disclosure, I spent nearly three decades in international cargo and express services going back to the days before the aviation industry was deregulated during the Carter administration. This industry has strengths and weakness in the handling of hazardous cargo. Precedents in the regulation of Hazmat, which are reviewed (perhaps not frequently enough) by the FAA, have not played a sufficient role in Congressional action to prevent an intentional act of terrorism. </p>
<p>Why not? Why apply a piece meal approach to securing the airlines, such as 100% scanning, under the purview of TSA; HazMat regulations under the purview of FAA/DOT; and international regulations via international bodies? There is a real difference between layering security as Kevin and other experts have pointed out and just adding layer upon layer of overlapping, even contradictory regulations, similar to painting layer after layer upon your house. After a while, it&#8217;s just not very pretty.</p>
<p>So instead, why not examine all regulations which relate to the safety and security of air cargo, strip away excess and unnecessary paint (so to speak) and bring about the minimum amount of interlocking layers that reasonably maximize prevention of incidents? Carriers must be responsible to insure that airline personnel are properly vetted and trained to handle cargo before they are loaded onto aircraft but we can not ask carriers to focus so many resources beyond those reasonably required by responsible risk assessment.</p>
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		<title>Comment on 100 Percent Scanning &#038; Air Cargo Security by james campbell</title>
		<link>http://securitydebrief.adfero.com/air-cargo-security-considerations/#comment-8</link>
		<dc:creator>james campbell</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 13 Dec 2007 16:58:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://securitydebrief.adfero.com/air-cargo-security-considerations/#comment-8</guid>
		<description>Well stated Mr. McCarthy -- your prescriptive measures, albeit, from a 50,000 view, are spot on.  And while technology coupled with sound, pragmatic business and workflow processes  can certainly be developed to address the challenges posed by stringent screening requirements, success relies on the public and private sector working together to develop mutually agreed upon operational and information sharing practices -- east to say, not necessarily easy to do.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Well stated Mr. McCarthy &#8212; your prescriptive measures, albeit, from a 50,000 view, are spot on.  And while technology coupled with sound, pragmatic business and workflow processes  can certainly be developed to address the challenges posed by stringent screening requirements, success relies on the public and private sector working together to develop mutually agreed upon operational and information sharing practices &#8212; east to say, not necessarily easy to do.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Pakistan: Civil War? by Choudhry</title>
		<link>http://securitydebrief.adfero.com/pakistan-civil-war/#comment-7</link>
		<dc:creator>Choudhry</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 13 Dec 2007 07:43:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://securitydebrief.adfero.com/pakistan-civil-war/#comment-7</guid>
		<description>are you not a freemason, in fact Grand Master of the Grand Lodge of Freeemasons in Washington, DC? To have a Christian and a Freemason give advice on a Muslim country is certainly not to the benefit of the Muslims of Pakistan.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>are you not a freemason, in fact Grand Master of the Grand Lodge of Freeemasons in Washington, DC? To have a Christian and a Freemason give advice on a Muslim country is certainly not to the benefit of the Muslims of Pakistan.</p>
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		<title>Comment on To Issue or Not to Issue…the Question of Issuing Driver’s Licenses to Illegal Immigrants Hits the Presidential Campaigns by Razorback</title>
		<link>http://securitydebrief.adfero.com/drivers-licence-immigrants-presidential-election/#comment-1</link>
		<dc:creator>Razorback</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 19 Nov 2007 17:57:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://securitydebrief.adfero.com/drivers-licence-immigrants-presidential-election/#comment-1</guid>
		<description>Wait until the public finds out that Mike Huckabee supported licenses for illegals while Governor of Arkansas.  It was too liberal for Hillary and Spitzer, but not too liberal for Huck.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Wait until the public finds out that Mike Huckabee supported licenses for illegals while Governor of Arkansas.  It was too liberal for Hillary and Spitzer, but not too liberal for Huck.</p>
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