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Archive for the ‘Transportation Security’ Category

Breaking: US investigates potential terrorist test run

Tuesday, August 31st, 2010

The news of two men arrested in Amsterdam on suspicion of terrorism is making its way across the news wire. Here’s the latest from AP.

US investigates potential terrorist test run – Associated Press

Two men arrested in Amsterdam may have been conducting a dry run for a potential terrorist attack, U.S. officials said Tuesday after a cell phone taped to a Pepto-Bismol bottle and a knife and box cutters were found in one of the men’s luggage.

U.S. investigators are pursuing leads in Detroit, Birmingham, Ala.; and Memphis, Tenn., according to officials speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss the ongoing investigation.

The arrests come at a time of heightened alert just days before the ninth anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks.

On Sunday, authorities found the suspicious items — a cell phone taped to a Pepto-Bismol bottle, multiple cell phones and watches taped together, and a knife and box cutter — in one of the men’s checked luggage in Virginia. The man and his luggage were headed to separate international destinations, which also raised concerns.

GAO says TSA May Miss Air Cargo Screening Mandate

Friday, July 16th, 2010

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently released its review of the Transportation Security Administration’s Air Cargo Screening program. The report, requested by several members of Congress, audits the TSA’s program for achieving the Congressional mandate to screen 100 percent of all cargo carried on passenger aircraft by August 2010. For anyone in the business or closely following the issue, the report offers no surprises. (For those unfamiliar with this security challenge, check out the roundtable discussion on air cargo screening that I moderated in May.) If anything, the report illuminates the major hurdles TSA continues to face in achieving the 100 percent screening threshold.

What the report doesn’t do – what it wasn’t intended to do – is determine whether TSA’s program to screen all air cargo improves security. Assuming that the directive to screen every single piece of cargo improves aviation security may be a misplaced assumption.

What the report doesn’t conclude may be more illustrative of the problem with our government’s attitude towards homeland security. A more instructive use of the time and resources that went into generating this report would have been for the GAO to audit the quality of the nation’s air cargo screening program.

One way to accomplish this would be to start with a risk assessment – threat, vulnerability and consequence. Indentifying the weaknesses in the existing process for sending freight by air on passenger aircraft would instruct TSA where to focus its resources. It would also ensure that any weaknesses could be strengthened. And it could also help to develop objective metrics to test the security measures’ effectiveness.

Of course, the law is the law, and GAO’s audit merely considered whether TSA would meet the mandate. Not surprisingly, TSA most likely will not meet the mandate. And even if it does, there are still problems with key areas of the program, like the certification of screening technology, the authenticity of the methodology for calculating the percentage of cargo screened, and the screening of cargo coming from outside the United States.

The report found that TSA’s voluntary Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) has failed to attract most of the shippers that would benefit from participation. The CCSP isn’t well populated and participation levels aren’t what they should be to inoculate the industry against more invasive and harmful regulations. A strong showing by shippers over the next several months will be needed to provide evidence that the industry is serious about achieving the mandate.

The report certainly hits on all the areas where TSA needs to make improvements to satisfy the law. Overall, this is instructive for complying with the law. Whether each of these efforts reduces the risk of passenger’s being harmed is uncertain.

The Value of Aspen

Friday, July 9th, 2010

As we continue to swelter in the ongoing summer heat wave, it is easy for me to reminisce about my recent visit to Aspen, Colo. Tucked amongst the Rockies with its clean air, fervent green and majestic views, a town known primarily for its skiing with the rich and famous was home to what was, simply put, the best conference program I have ever attended.

The first annual Aspen Security Forum put forward a program that I can only describe as pleasant, informational waterboarding. By the time each of the presenters and panelists were done, my hand was dead from writing so much and my head hurt from being given the firehouse treatment of a candor and content  overload.

With a venerable “who’s who” of notable names in the national security arena attending the two and a half day program, attendees had the opportunity to hear first-hand from the men and women who have served or continue to serve in some of the most demanding positions in the world. It was literally very hard to turn around and not see a face that you did not recognize from some recent event or news program, sharing insights on our country’s national and homeland security challenges.

While the presented content was outstanding, the best part about the entire program was that the overwhelming majority of notable speakers and presenters made themselves available to engage with the attendees. All too often, speakers rush in, deliver their canned pitch, say thanks to the crowd and are whisked away by their aides to get back to the office, leaving actual human contact an afterthought. To have the many distinguished speakers stick around and engage in that lost art-form of “CONVERSATION” was an absolute pleasure.

Hosted by Clark Ervin and the Aspen Institute, this was the first time they had put on a program with this particular focus. You can call it beginner’s luck if you want, but they put together a top notch effort that literally became a “must attend” for anyone who is interested in national and homeland security issues. Fortunately, for those who weren’t able to attend the program, it was taped for later broadcast by C-Span, hopefully sometime this summer. I have to tell you, there is a significant portion of C-Span’s programming that can cure insomnia, but when they broadcast the presenters and panels from the Aspen Security Forum, it will be as NBC used to call it, “Must See TV!”

To understand why I write that, here’s a rundown of some sessions (with video hyperlinks):

Adm. Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

When your opening speaker travels all the way from Kabul to Tel Aviv to Aspen to take part in the program, it’s a pretty good indicator that the organizers are up to something big. That was especially true with Adm. Mullen. Coming off a week where Gen. McChrystal was taken out by a large Rolling Stone and replaced by Gen. Petraeus, and then traveling to Afghanistan and Israel to assuage any fears and concerns they may have about the big changes, Mullen made news by essentially not making news. While his comments about the state of the nation’s counter insurgency policy dovetailed those of the White House’s, the plainspoken manner in which they were delivered conveyed the gravity of the situation our military forces are faced with in Afghanistan. His comments about Iran’s nuclear ambitions – “They’ve given us no reason to trust them” – also spoke volumes about what few measures the Administration has left at its disposal in dealing with them.

Aviation Security Panel

There is probably no other facet of the post-9/11 world that Americans gripe about more than dealing with aviation security, but as the CEO of the Air Transport Association (ATA), Jim May, said, “What’s your alternative?” Joined by Erroll Southers of USC’s CREATE Program (and the first Obama Administration nominee to lead TSA) and Christopher Bidwell of the Airport Council International, this panel laid on the table the very real threats and frustrations that accompany this portion of the security environment. One of the most interesting things discussed was the use of full-body imaging devices by airports to screen passengers. While recognizing the civil rights and privacy concerns that people have about them, Jim May of ATA shared that he thought they should be mandatory. When it came to addressing the Government Accountability Office’s recently issued criticisms of TSA’s Behavioral Detection efforts, May and the other panelists pointed out that this program was part of many layers of security, and there was no one-size-fits-all solution or silver bullet that would reduce the aviation risks faced today.

Fran Townsend, former Homeland Security Advisor to President Bush

There are many things that have been written and said about Fran Townsend, the former Homeland Security Advisor to President Bush (43), but the word “shy” is not one that would be used to describe her. The only thing that could possibly surpass the candor of her public comments when she was working as a government employee was her candor in being a former government employee. With no holds barred, Townsend explained that, “We have a reason to expect we can connect the dots this time” given all of the post 9/11 work that has been done.

In a more than hour-long conversation with Walter Isaccson, the CEO of the Aspen Institute, and the Security Forum audience, Townsend pounded on the fact that much still needs to be done to improve information sharing amongst intelligence and law enforcement agencies across the board. Her declaration that there still needed to be a senior level official or “Cabinet Agency,” but “not a czar,” to “pound these government agencies into submission to do information sharing.” Her proposal that an NGO, public-private partnership, rather than a solely government-led approach to address the growing cyber security risks, was also interesting.

Bill Bratton, former Chief, Los Angeles Police Department

Dubbed by many media outlets as “America’s Top Cop” for having led the police departments of Boston, New York City and Los Angeles, I think Bill Bratton surprised everyone at the program when he explained how the terror attacks in Mumbai, India caused him to change the entire structure of the LAPD. His interview with CNN’s Jeanne Meserve detailed how 60 days after those attacks, he was able to transform his police department with new training, exercises and more. The relatively simply trained Mumbai terrorists were not interested in holding hostages; in fact, they were using so-called negotiations to buy time to kill more people. This showed Bratton that he had to change how his department was positioned to respond to a similar event, should it occur in Los Angeles.

Michael Leiter, Director of the National Counter Terrorism Center

For a man that much of Washington thought would have his head handed to him following the failed information sharing efforts surrounding the failed Christmas Day attack, Michael Leiter, the Director of the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), displayed all of the skill and confidence that make him one of a few Bush Administration appointees to successfully transition into the Obama Administration. His description of his job, his work with the President to report on the range of threats to the country and how he thinks information sharing needs to work made this particular presentation one of the most revealing and compelling of the entire program.  Interviewed by Michael Isikoff, a former Newsweek reporter and now Chief Investigative Correspondent for NBC News, ended up producing some great back and forth between the two men that was as revealing as it was humorous. This session again explained more about Leiter’s job and the mission of the NCTC than any government report or Congressional hearing to date.

Border Security Panel

Despite the countless GAO and IG reports and the many hearings before the U.S. House and Senate, there was no better overview of America’s border security than a panel made up of:

  • Bob Mocny, Director of DHS’ US VISIT Program;
  • Mark Borkowski, Director of CBP’s Secure Border Initiative (SBI); and
  • Steve Oswald, Vice President of Boeing.

These three gentlemen described what worked, what didn’t, what could be better and what the future may look like on programs that have regularly been making news for years. In presenting the details of these newsworthy programs, they did so with none of the drama or hysterics that are so often associated with the Congressional hearings that have exhaustively covered the respective programs. What each of them said frankly offered more substantive insight than any of the previous Congressional hearings have produced to date. That was an observation made not just by the conference attendees but also by the first-tier media, congressional staff and others who have observed each of these respective programs closely. Truth be told, if you want to know what is really happening with US VISIT and the Secure Border Initiative (minus the belligerent questions and political posturing), spending 90 minutes watching this panel when it is aired on C-Span will be time well spent.

Attending News Media

As I mentioned, the conference was a literal “who’s who” of notable current and former national and homeland security leaders, and the same could be said for the attending members of the media.  With CNN’s Jeanne Meserve, Fox News’ Catherine Herridge, the Washington Post’s Spencer Hsu, Newsweek’s/NBC News’ Michael Isikoff, and more, it seemed as if there was a representative from every major news outlet, print and broadcast media in attendance. While many of them were there to serve as session/panel moderators for the various parts of the program, the entire forum was a reservoir of information for them on today’s security concerns and a background on the actions of the past. It was also a treasure trove for journalists in developing future sources for national and homeland security news stories.

Michael Chertoff, former Secretary of Homeland Security

After consecutive 12-hour days of literally (albeit pleasantly) waterboarding attendees with tons of substantive content, it’s hard to figure out how to end a program such as that in Aspen, but they picked a great closer in former DHS Secretary Chertoff. Whether it was the fact that he’s been out of office for almost a year and half and doesn’t have to worry about a 2 AM phone call from National Operations Center about someone doing something vile to the homeland, Chertoff’s candor and demeanor crystallized for everyone the seriousness of the threats we face while also assuring we should continue to go about our regular lives. As one of the very few “senior statesmen” on homeland issues that we have in this country, his conversation with Fox News’ Catherine Herridge conveyed the balance that we need to have when planning for and operating against the range of risks we face.

A wondering disappointment

I can say without doubt that I loved every moment at the Aspen Institute, but I can’t sign off without discussing the one disappointment that I and many others had in the presentation by DHS Deputy Secretary, Jane Holl Lute. Whether it was her discomfort at the conversational interview format led by CNN’s Jeanne Meserve, her fear in the week after the McChrystal debacle, not wanting to say anything to cause problems for herself or the Administration, or the fact that maybe she was having a bad day, her presentation left the overwhelming majority of attendees scratching their heads in wonder as to the real story at the Department.

All of the questions that were asked by Meserve were fair and nothing was out of the ordinary, but Lute’s responses were defensive, sometimes evasive and could have been dramatically better.  Time and time again in her hour long session there were questions to which she could have responded with hard and fast examples of the Department’s accomplishments. Instead, she offered simplistic, almost apple-pie like anecdotal responses that left the audience wondering why she wouldn’t answer the most basic of questions.

When she stated, “the [U.S.] border has never been more secure,” and offered no facts to prove that statement, portions of the audience looked around at one another in shock while others openly chortled at the declaration.

When it came time for Q&A with the audience, the tenor of her responses seemed to be even more defensive. When Michael Isikoff asked her about her statement on the border’s security and her metrics to prove that it had never been more secure, Lute seemed to bristle at the question. She firmly retorted, “The Secretary has been very clear on what those metrics are,” and effectively cut him off.

Lute’s response referred to the speech Secretary Napolitano delivered at CSIS the week before, when she declared, “the U.S. border has never been more secure…but there is more work to be done” and that “no one is satisfied with the status quo.”

In that speech, Secretary Napolitano detailed a series of metrics to back up her statement, but none of those were shared by Lute with Isikoff or the observing audience. In speaking with Isikoff and some of the other attendees after her remarks, none of them were aware of the CSIS speech and the metrics behind the powerful declaration. To the credit of the Department, Bob Mocny and Mark Borkowski did an exceptional job during their joint appearance on the Border Security panel explaining why DHS leadership is stating things have improved on the border.

It is certainly a debatable point to make a declaration like the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary have made in recent forums about border security. When you back it up with information and facts, it provides some measure of credibility and fosters informed debate. When you state it and don’t want to defend it with facts, it leaves people wondering why you would state something like that and not be able to prove it. After her appearance in Aspen, a lot of people were left wondering about the Deputy Secretary, and after viewing her session either on-line or on C-Span, I expect there will be a lot more.

Final thoughts

All of our time is valuable, and God knows we don’t have enough of it, but if you can set your DVRs to record the Aspen Security Forum or go to the Aspen Institute webpage and download panels for your Ipod/MP3 player – DO IT. Think of each of the respective sessions as graduate level courses shared by esteemed faculty who have the real life scar tissue and experiences to tell you what happened and what we can all do better.  If you do, I’m confident you will walk away from each session with a lot more knowledge and a bit of a mild headache too. That’s what pleasant informational waterboarding will do to you, but I have to say, it is much more enjoyable amongst the mountains and beautiful vistas of Aspen.

Finally, a TSA Administrator – Pistole is IN!

Friday, June 25th, 2010

This morning by voice vote, the US Senate confirmed the nomination of John Pistole to be the next Administrator of DHS’ Transportation Security Administration (TSA). In what has been a grueling odyssey for everyone involved, from former nominees and their families, the White House Office of Personnel, US Senate Members and staff, the people of TSA, and many more, permanent leadership is now in place at TSA.

While there have to be sighs of relief in Secretary Napolitano’s Office over Pistole’s confirmation, probably no one will be happier than Gale Rossides who has been serving as the Acting Administrator for more than a year and a half. Between the collapsed nominations of Southers and Harding; the Christmas Day underwear bomber and the day-to-day grind in one of the toughest jobs in the country, she has been at the helm. Her service has frankly been underappreciated and under-acknowledged by the Administration, Congress, the media and many others.

For too long, the charge that TSA has been leaderless has gone unanswered and been very inaccurate. The truth is TSA was never without leadership. It had Gail and many other senior career persons taking care of business day in and day out around the country. Amidst the celebration of having a distinguished public servant like John Pistole to be the Agency’s new Administrator, I hope someone will take the time to recognize her for all that she has done during this strenuous time. I also hope she gets to pop open a tall, cold one this weekend. She’s earned it.

An Air Cargo Screening Roundtable – Not too little, hopefully not too late

Tuesday, June 15th, 2010

A couple weeks ago, air cargo industry representatives came together in Washington, DC, to hold an informational roundtable on the upcoming Congressional deadline mandating that 100 percent of all cargo carried on passenger aircraft be screened for explosives. The roundtable was broadcast live from the Newseum and the recorded version is available for viewing on UStream.

When I served at the Transportation Security Administration as Assistant Secretary Kip Hawley’s principal adviser for congressional relations and legislative strategy, I worked closely with the “9/11 Commission Recommendations Act,” which is where the air cargo mandate originated. That is one of the reasons I agreed to serve as moderator for the roundtable, because I understand the potentially severe ramifications of the mandate. And I am not alone. Talking with the aviation security leaders who participated in the roundtable, we delivered the message that time is of the essence, and over 10,000 people logged on to view the webcast. This is both good and bad.

It is bad because thousands of shippers have not prepared for the impending deadline on August 3, 2010. It is good because since the webcast, hundreds have responded by signing up for the Transportation Security Administration’s Certified Cargo Shipper Program (CCSP). This voluntary program offers the only efficient plan to guarantee that cargo will be shipped without overly intrusive and sometimes harmful screening measures.

At this point, TSA confirms that 75 percent of all cargo shipped on passenger airliners is screened. This includes cargo shipped via CCSP. The last 25 percent of the cargo that must be screened before August 3, however, represents the most challenging segment of the mandate. This includes shipments that are banded or shrink-wrapped on pallets. These palleted shipments, if not shipped by CCSP certified shippers, must be disassembled or opened to be screened.

One of the problems for those late to the party may lie with the misunderstanding of the invitation. Sure, the government sets deadlines all the time, but when the regulatory or enforcement agency finally realizes the onerous effects of their regulation, it builds an escape clause for those unwittingly caught unaware; so the conventional thinking goes. However, this deadline is set by statute without a provision for an extension. TSA possesses no authority to extend the deadline or soften its affects. Reality bites when shippers realize that by not being CCSP certified, their products must be screened at the airport. And if that product can’t be screened because the air carrier doesn’t possess screening equipment or the packaging can’t be opened, the product is not shipped.

TSA continues its outreach plan with town hall meetings and other informational products. Realizing that this isn’t an exam they can cram for (the CCSP process takes several weeks), many shippers are starting to take notice. TSA has seen applications for CCSP quadruple over the last month, and industry participation will determine the viability of the voluntary CCSP.

If industry fails or refuses to participate, it can expect a boot on its throat in the not too distant future. In less threatening verbiage, this means that shipping cargo on passenger aircraft may soon find its place in a corner of the Smithsonian’s Air and Space Museum.

Security – Noticeably Absent from the Future of Aviation

Thursday, May 13th, 2010

Noticeably absent from the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Future of Aviation Advisory Committee’s roster is an aviation security representative. The Advisory Committee, named yesterday, has been charged by the Secretary “to provide information, advice, and recommendations to the Secretary on ensuring the competitiveness of the U.S. aviation industry and its capability to address the evolving transportation needs, challenges and opportunities of the U.S. and global economy.”

An omission of a security expert fails to heed the lessons learned after 9/11, the most catastrophic human and economic event in aviation history. The industry suffered billions of dollars in asset losses and capital. On top of that, no one wanted to fly. The airlines’ economic recovery struggled under the perception that air travel wasn’t secure. In the world of risk management, perception is often reality, as irrational as that perception may be.

The industry has barely recovered since 9/11. The aviation industry must embrace that its economic vitality is tied to the security of its product. Every attempted airliner attack since 9/11 is a reminder of the vulnerability that passengers face. The effects of these reminders only perpetuate those harmful perceptions.

It will be the Advisory Committee’s task to identify and recommend solutions to the ills plaguing the industry. Security will certainly be discussed. Without a security expert on the Advisory Committee, however, reasonable, necessary security solutions are likely to be overlooked.
Years ago, the industry embraced safety as one of those variables affecting its bottom line and public perception. It integrated safety into key design, construction and operational decisions. The industry must do the same with security or its future may be the victim of its past.

Moscow on our Metro: How Would We React?

Tuesday, March 30th, 2010

It’s amazing how events halfway around the globe can change the daily life for us here in the United States. That was the case for anyone who rode DC’s Metro system yesterday, as its police force was very visible following the double suicide bombings in Moscow that killed more than three dozen people. For DC Metro riders, the visible presence of uniformed police officers with canine units was meant to offer assurance that they were on top of things. While Metro police leaders were quick to state that they had no actionable intelligence that the nation’s capital subway system was under immediate threat of attack, they wanted the public to know how committed they were to making the system as safe as possible.

For all of Metro’s visible and public troubles, security is one area where they are taking nothing to chance. As commendable as those efforts are, I think it goes unspoken that all of us in this region know it is not “if” but rather “when” a similar suicide-bombing occurs here. Let’s face facts – there is really little that can be done if someone hell-bent on killing themselves with a disguised explosive device decides to board a train and push the button. The horror of that moment will truly shatter whatever innocence and naivety is left in the National Capital Region to those who think it won’t happen here.

In speaking with several friends and colleagues yesterday who know Moscow and its subway system quite well, they all said the same thing: “They’ll have things back to normal for Tuesday morning,” and “They’re much more resilient than us when it comes to stuff like this because they’ve dealt with it before.”

Hearing responses such as those begs the question, “How would we react if that happened here?”

Despite the recent (and embarrassing) collapse of DC’s emergency communications architecture, we know the nation’s capital has one of the best equipped public safety operations in the country.  We also know they do quite a bit of training with surrounding jurisdictions on various disaster scenarios, including terrorist strikes. Unfortunately, we’ve had to see these skills and equipment put to use in response to some of Metro’s recent tragic accidents. With all of these assets in our corner, I can’t help but feel this region would not react the way my friends and colleagues said Moscow would.

If a terror strike did occur on our Metro, there is a good chance the entire system would shut down for a period of time. Whether for a full day or several, investigators from multiple jurisdictions would be crawling all over the scene trying to reconstruct what happened; all the while, Metro itself would be trying to repair the damaged system and get it back into operation.  On top of that, hordes of media would be all over the site of the attack, filling airwaves with non-stop coverage. Culturally, the transportation system’s customers would be understandably spooked – something they associated as an action that only occurs in foreign places had taken residence in their own community.

For all of our usage of the word “resilience”, we are not the resilient society we need to be. We’ve made big strides towards becoming that community in many ways, but there is still a cultural weathering that has to take place for the resilient attitude and character to take firm root.  As Americans, we are still adapting to the threats now on our shores. Acts of terror have always been something that occurred someplace else, but we now know (without a doubt, given the recent arrests of Al Qaeda sympathizers here in the United States) that they have our public transportation systems in their crosshairs.

Cities like Tel Aviv, Moscow, London and others have endured attacks for years. We fortunately haven’t had to deal with that carnage, but as stated earlier, it is only a matter of “when” and “where” for that to change. While there is much to learn from each of these terror-experienced cities, it will be up to us as individuals and as community members to push our political leaders, law enforcement personnel, and transportation system operators to have our cities, transportation systems, and businesses “back to work” the day after a tragic event occurs.

That is how you beat back the attackers. Ensuring that life and liberties continue is at the heart of resilience, and if terrorists break those wills, they succeed. I’m not prepared to surrender anything to any attack, and I’m confident the region or any other locale in America isn’t either, but we are going to have to match that emotional and heartfelt resolve with responsive and strategic action when that fateful time comes.

I’m not sure we’re there yet, but I do know that time may not be on our side when the day comes that we are truly tested.

An Addendum

Special thanks go to Denise Loeber of Catalyst Partners who shared with me a link from the Arlington Virginia Network that shows how the Arlington Fire Department has used UASI grant dollars to support Metro in responding to future emergencies.

The video speaks for itself.  Great job Arlington, and THANK YOU Denise!

Erroll Southers ill treated — TSA nominee collateral damage in the fight over unions

Wednesday, January 20th, 2010

Right off the bat, let me give full disclosure: I am working with Erroll Southers in his media and communications responses related to his decision to withdraw his nomination as TSA Administrator. However, the opinions I express in this blog post are entirely my own; Erroll Southers has not even seen this post at the time of publication.

That said, I was glad for the opportunity to work with Erroll because I think he’s gotten a bum deal, and I think it’s a disaster for the country to have the TSA continue on – for more than a year now – without Senate-confirmed permanent leadership at a time when the agency needs such leadership more urgently than ever.

Yes, there is a professional and dedicated crew at TSA working hard to execute the agency’s day-to-day functions. In my government experience, however, it is impossible for such an agency to take bold action and consider significant reforms without a long-term political appointee in place. Nobody wants to be the one to get out on a limb, only to discover that you are at odds with the new boss. Better to manage things as best you can and not rock the boat.

But there is probably some boat-rocking that needs to be done. This isn’t a dig at TSA. It’s simply a realization that, after the systemic failures we witnessed during the Christmas terror incident, multiple government agencies need to engage in top-to-bottom reviews and consider potential reforms, including TSA.

In the midst of this urgency, is now the time to play politics with the nominee when so much is on the table?

And, seriously, this is about politics. Now, it’s legitimate politics. Well, legitimate policy anyway. It’s unfortunate politics, but I happen to agree with those who argue that we should not unionize a federal homeland security agency that is on the front lines in the fight against terror. We need to be highly flexible and adaptive and not get bogged down in negotiating everything from uniforms to the placement of coffee stands when our national security is at stake.

But why go after Erroll Southers? Southers isn’t the guy who will make that decision, and Senator DeMint knows it.

The fight over unions is one between Congress and the White House, and it is the White House that will set policy on something as high profile as unionization, not Southers. He may offer his opinion, but, in the end, the only opinion that matters is the one coming from the White House.

Southers became a political scapegoat for DeMint to send a message to the White House. It’s unfortunate. Southers has more than thirty years of experience in the law enforcement and homeland security environment. Unfortunately – and ironically – he may be too apolitical to know how to expertly maneuver through Washington’s often perilous political landscape. He’s a law enforcement professional, not a politician. Nor is he the first to become collateral damage in the bloodsports of Washington.

As for the hullabaloo over an incident in which Southers improperly used his position as an FBI agent for personal reasons – and, yes, it was improper – that is political spin and eye-candy, cover for the real agenda regarding unions.

Reports that Southers “mislead” Congress is an overstatement. Southers was fully transparent about this incident in his written statement submitted during his first congressional hearing (before the Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee). Senator DeMint voted against Southers even at that early point, before anybody had raised any questions about the FBI incident. Even after Senator Collins quizzed him on it during the Homeland hearing, the Committee voted on a bipartisan and unanimous basis to approve Southers.

Should Southers have gotten a copy of the FBI citation letter and provided it to the Committee? Yes. And even more important, should he have gotten a copy for himself and refreshed his memory before speaking off the cuff? Absolutely. Again, being unschooled in the politics of Washington, maybe he didn’t think it was that important, considering it was something that happened twenty years ago and was a minor disciplinary action – the FBI’s equivalent of a slap on the wrist. He was wrong. That was a mistake; however, Southers immediately called Senator Collins with the information once he obtained a copy of the letter. But sensing blood, DeMint went in for the kill.

This isn’t about anything other than the contentious policy issue of unions and their role in government agencies dealing with national security.

It’s an issue that needs to be addressed. Congress has every right to debate this.

Making Erroll Southers the fall guy, though, is cheap politics.

TSA’s Decision to Intrusively Screen Every Passenger from ‘Countries of Interest’ Ill-Considered

Monday, January 4th, 2010

By Edward Alden, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations

The TSA’s decision to begin intrusive screenings of every passenger boarding a U.S.-bound flight from so-called “countries of interest” is an ill-considered response to the failed Christmas bombing attempt, and one that will do more to discourage friends of the United States than to deter its enemies.

Al-Qaeda is an adaptable enemy, and patting down every grandmother arriving from Saudi Arabia or Pakistan is not likely to be much of a deterrent. Have we already forgotten that Richard Reid, the shoe bomber, carried a British passport and would not have been picked out under such a scheme?

The failure to identify Adbulmutallab before he boarded Northwest Airlines Flight 253 resulted from a breakdown in intelligence and targeting schemes that should have led to his visa being revoked and to his name being placed on the “no-fly” or “selectee” lists for special scrutiny by TSA. The administration needs to review what went wrong in this case and enhance its ability to target those who pose a terrorist threat.

Instead, these new measures are crude ones will simply give students and business travelers and tourists from these countries one more reason not to come to the United States. In a long struggle that requires winning friends as well as defeating enemies, such a response will do far more harm than good.

Edward Alden is the author of The Closing of the American Border: Terrorism, Immigration and Security Since 9/11, which tells the story of the development and impact of U.S. visa and border security measures since the 9/11 attacks.

More Questions on Homeland Security and Flight 253

Sunday, January 3rd, 2010

Never one to pass up sticking my nose in the middle of an argument I can’t resist commenting on fellow bloggers Stewart Baker’s, David Olive’s and Sam Rosenfeld’s posts. Continuing the “questions” theme, policy musing and debates, like Stewart and David’s, are necessary for oversight committees and policy staff.

My opinion is that most of these questions, in one form or another, have been asked. We’ve academically explored them for eight years.

What we haven’t solved are the less glamorous logistical problems, the unpopular questions about risk, and the truth about what technology can or can’t do for us. These are issues that need to be solved or answered before realizing a robust security system.

How can technology facilitate and encourage information sharing?
Intelligence analysts piece through thousands of pieces of information from hundreds of sources. Connecting the dots is much easier after an incident. But there is technology to help with this effort. For example a company called Kestrel Enterprises Inc created a software program used by several agencies to piece together information by perpetually vetting information against several hundred sources. Traders on Wall Street, cell phone companies, and credit card companies are able to track hundreds of thousands of transactions a day and detect anomalies.

Body scanning machines are being used in over a dozen airports in the US for secondary screening. But can every airport in the country accommodate these machines? Can foreign airports accommodate or afford these machines?

Their weight, size and electrical needs create logistical nightmares for airports. Current and past Administrations’ budgets and the spending bills passed by Congress have never provided enough money for the infrastructure changes needed for new equipment.

Is the concoction the Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab ignited an explosive?

If we are honest about a risk-based security system we have to ask this question. Dutch officials have been public in doubting this “bomb” could have done much more than creating hot pants.

What was the actual threat to the aircraft and its passengers?

The Salahis made it through White House security without an invite but the actual threat to the President was non-existent. They may not have had an invite but other security protocols were followed – ID check and physical screening. An analogy can be drawn to this incident depending on what is discovered about the amount of PETN used, the detonation device, the location on the plane and other variables. Politicians will avoid considering this dynamic of the attack, but it is essential to the functioning of a risk-based security program.

The point of these questions is to show how complicated solving these problems can be. The truth of the matter is that we have the technology and intelligence to stop these types of attacks. That is probably what angers the public and Congress. These hurdles aren’t meant to excuse the failure to nab the underware bomber. But we have to be honest that the concept of operations for these policies take time and an expertise to implement them successfully.

So instead of exploring the same policy questions, Congress and the Administration need to focus their efforts and money on finding solutions to the less obvious, least publicized problems.

The System Worked? Government Blinders on Homeland Security

Sunday, December 27th, 2009

I was dismayed by the Obama Administration’s claim that our security apparatus worked in terms of foiling the intended attack by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab on Detroit-bound Northwest Flight 253. To quote Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, “One thing I’d like to point out is that the system worked.”

The system most assuredly did not work.

I am disappointed to have to take this stance. As I have watched gotcha media stories over the years about how the Department of Homeland Security “failed” because a reporter or GAO analyst snuck through one layer of security, I have become increasingly frustrated by the media’s lack of awareness that the nation’s homeland security strategy is based upon multiple layers of security. Getting through one layer doesn’t mean you’ll get through the next. Getting through even two layers still doesn’t mean you’ll be so lucky to get through a third. There is no such thing as 100 percent protection, which is why we need multiple layers of security.

However, in this case the system failed repeatedly. It shattered the confidence that the public should have that a layered system of security is at play. And for the Administration to come out and say that the “system worked” is to deepen – not strengthen – our sense of insecurity because of the outright foolishness of such a claim.

Let us count the ways in which the system failed:

The father of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab reported to the U.S. Embassy in Nigeria that his son was becoming increasingly radicalized and might pose a threat to the United States, the information was entered into the system at the National Counterterrorism Center and then largely dismissed with no follow up.

Next the terrorist was given a visa by the State Department, despite his name now being on a terrorist watch list. How that is even possible is beyond me. We interrogate and delay students simply looking to come to the United States to study in graduate school, but we hand out visas to individuals actually on a terrorist watch list?

Next the terrorist breezed through airport security with incendiary materials stitched into his underwear. One wonders where all the privacy groups are now. Probably hanging thinly to the Administration’s claim that everything worked great and there is nothing to see here. Napolitano actually went so far as to say, “There is no suggestion that he [Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab] was improperly screened.”

Huh? There is every suggestion that he was improperly screened.

Finally, the Administration falls back upon its now-trite argument that this was somehow the Bush Administration’s fault. The Washington Post reports on White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs comment that “White House officials struggled to explain the complicated system of centralized terrorist data and watch lists, stressing that they were put in place years ago by the Bush administration.” Good grief. At some point, the Administration is going to have to take responsibility for its own government.

Perhaps Napolitano meant that the “system worked” because this idiot managed to set himself on fire and several passengers leaped on him. Is this what we have come to? The government will no longer protect us from terrorists but we will have to protect it? There’s a confidence builder.

What we have here is a monumental failure of “the system.” This Administration’s claim to the contrary assumes that the American public is remarkably ignorant or that it simply isn’t worried about another terrorist attack and will accept such lame explanations.

Either of these suppositions is a dangerous place for the Administration. Dangerous for our country, from a counterterrorism perspective, at a time when international terrorists still view the United States as their greatest enemy. And, frankly, dangerous for the Obama team, from a political perspective, to assume that citizens and voters are intellectual slobs, which may create a lack of confidence by the public in this Administration’s grip on the terrorist threat to America.

After all, as this particular failed terrorist boasted: “There are many more like me.”

Update: On December 28th, Secretary Napolitano took back her claim that the system. See NPR’s report: “Our System Did Not Work,” Napolitano Concedes.

Erroll Southers: Optimism, Bathed In Caution

Thursday, October 15th, 2009

Erroll Southers, President Barack Obama’s nominee to head the Transportation Security Administration, kicked his new career off in a very encouraging way today at his confirmation hearing in front of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee. He was well-spoken, confident and clearly articulated his knowledge of the security business. And this is encouraging because a positive relationship with Congress may be the only criteria by which his tenure is judged.

Several of his predecessors made needed security improvements and implemented new ideas, but experienced short-lived careers. Two common factors in their demise was their inability to effectively communicate their plans and objectives to Congress and to know which battles to pick with Congress.

Mr. Southers immediate predecessor was particularly good at knowing when to stand firm, but more importantly HOW to stand firm. Everyone approaches diplomacy differently and Mr. Southers will need to find his approach quickly. A certain amount of acquiescence is required, particularly when Members’ parochial issues are at stake.

For the most part it looks as though he understands this given the manner in which he engaged the Committee, and the thoroughness with which he answered their questions.

Thankfully, Mr. Southers’ responses were far more interesting than the questions, which were un-noteworthy except for their lack of creativity.  Questioning during TSA hearings in general have not matured over the years and follow a predictable pattern: They remain parochial in nature. A specific customer complaint, usually involving the impoliteness of one Transportation Security Officer, is beaten over the witnesses head. Special interests plant word-for-word the same Registered Traveler query – usually posed thoughtfully by the Member who most recently took the oath of office.

However, Mr. Southers deftly used several mundane questions as an opportunity to express his vision for TSA and to expand on the ideas of “risk-based and intelligence driven” security. He gently and with diplomacy countered the myths of whole body imagers. He explained technology’s value in a risk-based security system. And he discussed the need for stakeholder outreach efforts, “organization values”, and public education.

This is just the beginning so the optimism expressed here should be bathed in caution. Mr. Southers, all the best. Keep smiling. Enjoy the honeymoon. And never forget to frequent Capitol Hill, as dull as it can be sometimes.

The Small Boat Threat In the U.S. Is Real

Tuesday, October 6th, 2009

The Department of Homeland Security’s Office of the Inspector General recently released a report on DHS’ strategy to address small boat threats in U.S. waters.  The report, “DHS’ Strategy and Plans to Counter Small Vessel Threats Need Improvement” (OIG-09-100), criticizes Customs & Border Protection (CBP), the Coast Guard and DHS policy for failing to write a complete strategy that includes measures of effectiveness and resource requirements.  The criticism may be technically deserved, but there may be a good reason for its shortcomings.

The threat of a small boat attack in the U.S is real.  Terrorist enemies are known to use means of attack that are tested and have proven effective in the past.  The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) guerrillas developed and perfected small boat attack methods that were emulated by terrorists around the globe.  The USS Cole attack is an example.  U.S. efforts to destroy al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups have prevented major attacks on the U.S. since 9/11 but the recent breakup of a domestic terrorist threat planning to use high explosives highlights the continuing danger.  Past performance and the desire to use high explosives suggests that a small boat might be a preferred method of delivery for a terrorist attack in the U.S.  The small boat could come from within the U.S., sail from a neighboring country or be launched from a mothership offshore.  Current migrant and contraband smuggling activities to the U.S. using small boats prove that this avenue of attack is viable.

DHS leadership knows that understanding and control of small boat activity in and around the U.S. is key to addressing the small boat terrorism threat.  But DHS leadership also understands that the small boating public is known for its vocal protection of privacy and independence, and the participation of the small boating public is absolutely critical to addressing the terrorist threat in our waterways.  A top down grand strategy with draconian requirements would be strongly resisted by the small boating public and doomed to failure.  Wisely, DHS leadership issued this first strategy as the first salvo in a long campaign to win the buy-in and participation of a group of loyal, but independent citizens desperately needed to be part of the solution.  That is why the DHS Inspector General did not find many of the elements you might expect to find in a top-down strategy.  The current DHS small boat threat strategy is the start of a bottom up solution.  In the long run, this approach will have more success than a traditional top-down strategy.  While this bottom up strategy begins to take shape, DHS must continue its aggressive implementation of Maritime Domain Awareness regimes and improve DHS operating agency coordination both internally and with State and local law enforcement to address the small boat attack threat.

TSA’s Certified Cargo Screening Program: The White Horse of Air Cargo Security

Wednesday, September 23rd, 2009

If you ship valuable merchandise via air cargo — and, really, what merchandise you pay to ship isn’t valuable? — then you need to know about the Transportation Security Administration’s cargo security program known as the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP). Shippers who don’t know about CCSP could end up losing millions. And there’s a lot of shippers who don’t.

The deadlines set by Congress mandating the screening of 100 percent of all air cargo shipped via passenger planes are rapidly falling into place. In February, the requirement that 50 percent of all cargo be screened came and went with little fanfare. Because the 50 percent requirement could be met by the airlines primarily through screening the low-hanging fruit of small packages, a false sense of serenity settled in among some shippers and even forwarders. The thinking runs like this: The airlines met the 50 percent deadline without too much difficulty, so how much harder could it be to hit the 100 percent deadline?

Ed Kelly, TSA’s General Manager of Air Cargo, has a concise answer: A lot.

Kelly notes that one of the primary differences between the current environment and that which descends on August 3, 2010 (when the 100 percent deadlines hits full force) is that the stacked and shrink-wrapped shipments known as ULDs — basically numerous smaller packages stacked and wrapped on pallets for shipments — will have to be broken down so that the packages can be screened individually and then restacked.

“This will present a challenge,” said the TSA cargo chief, with a nearly British level of understatement. He was speaking to a roomful of pharmaceutical manufacturers this morning as the keynote speaker during a supply chain conference in Philadelphia focused on the shipment of extremely valuable, climate-sensitive cargo such as pharmaceuticals.

Kelly also noted that cargo volume has been down significantly, causing less strain on screening resources at airports; as the economy rebounds, cargo volume will rise proportionately. Additionally, certain cargo that was previously exempt (medicines, technology products, film, certain agriculture, etc.) must, as of September 1 of this year, undergo full screening requirements, too.

In short, TSA’s message is this: There’s going to be a lot more cargo to screen when August 2010 comes, with no more resources than are now available to do it. Kelly suggested the airlines and freight fowarders are pretty much tapped out screening the volume of cargo they face now.

Finally, Kelly touched upon a point that was addressed by numerous speakers and panelists at this “cold chain” conference — what do you do with extremely valuable and equally extremely sensitive cargo that requires climate controls? That is, what do you do with “cold chain” products, such as life-saving drugs, that require exquisitely controlled temperature settings during the course of shipment to prevent the medicines from being ruined? If every piece of cargo must be screened individually, what happens to those products packaged and shipped in climate-controlled containers? Worse, what happens if one of them sets of an alarm — even if it’s only a false alarm?

That product will likely need to be opened up and inspected, said Kelly.

Now put yourself in the shoes of the drug manufacturers: If you open that container and expose those precious medicines to heat or some other climate corruption, you may as well throw them away.

This isn’t just millions of dollars you’re throwing away, in the form of expensive product; it’s life-saving medicine.

So the question kept popping up — sometimes asked aloud, sometimes just seen in the expressions of open-mouthed and incredulous faces: What do we do with multimillion-dollar shipments of highly sensitive medicines that absolutely must be delivered on time and without being opened and exposed to corruption?

Kelly seemed to be reading the minds in his audience: “I know what you need to do,” he said. “You need to screen your cargo yourself through CCSP.” He paused. “But you’re going to have to come to that conclusion on your own.”

Brad Elrod, the manager of Pfizer’s global supply chain, has indeed come to that conclusion for his company, one of the world’s leading drug producers. Elrod was one of the panelists sitting with Ed Kelly, and when his turn came to speak, he was able to be more direct. In effect, he said: Just do it.

If you’re shipping product like this, you need to join CCSP, Elrod told the audience of some 400-plus representatives from the pharmaceutical and transport industries. It’s the only sure way to control the integrity of your product, he said.

So what does CCSP offer? Any entity in the supply chain — from the shipper to the forwarder to third-party screeners — can apply with the TSA to get certified in the program. Once a facility is certified, the cargo leaving that facility can be screened on-site and delivered to the airlines without further screening.

Pre-screened cargo goes to the front of the line. No waiting, no x-ray machines, no opening of the shipment. No handling of the product inside. No corruption.

Some shippers may not feel the need to participate in the program. Perhaps they can ask their forwarders to become certified and work through them. (Though corruptible products such as pharmaceuticals face the same problem whether it’s the airlines or the forwarders doing the screening: If there’s a false alarm, there’s a chance that shipment will have to be opened.) Or maybe, if they are not concerned about potential delays or the likelihood of their shipments being opened, these shippers can skip the CCSP altogether and deliver their products to the airlines unscreened. The airlines are beefing up their screening capabilities to meet the expected spike in screening volume.

For any shipper that does have concerns about delays or third parties rummaging through their shipments, Brad Elrod’s assessment seems accurate. Seems like a no-brainer. Better contact TSA and get certified to participate in CCSP. This program is your white horse.

And you should probably do it soon. Time’s running out.

Cross posted on SafeCommerceCoalition.org.

Erroll Southers – Right Man for the Right Job

Friday, September 11th, 2009

In life you get to meet a lot of people, but there are very few that can do things that are extra-ordinary.  Erroll Southers is one of those people.  Nominated by the President to be the next Administrator of TSA, he takes on one of the most challenging and public-engaging entities anywhere in government.

TSA is in every sense the first-born child of the post 9/11 US Government.  From asking you to take off your shoes and empty your pockets before going through the airport X-ray machine, to monitoring rail and other transportation safety, the Agency has been target of jokes, poor press, second guessing by everyone (including yours truly), and contempt by a lot of people.   While there are a lot deserved and undeserved pokes at TSA, it is also an organization that has matured and improved dramatically over the past several years.  From improvements to passenger screening, dramatic reductions in worker turnover, employee training enhancements, use of new media and the TSA Blog to better connect to the public it safeguards, the Agency has shown with patience, time and investment it can fulfill the difficult charter it was given.

That being said, TSA remains one of the least popular government agencies.  When you have a thankless job, though, that’s to be expected.  That’s why Erroll Southers is the right man for TSA.

His background is phenomenally impressive – he’s been an FBI Special Agent, led critical infrastructure protection efforts for the State of California, been an educator at police academies as well as the University of Southern California, lectured around the world on counter-terrorism, and served as the counter-terrorism lead for the nation’s largest aviation law enforcement agency – the Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA) Police Department.

Everywhere this guy has gone he’s made a huge impact. TSA and DHS are getting one of America’s best and brightest.

My only complaint about his appointment is what the hell took the Administration so long to find him and put him in place?!

Erroll has been a known and substantial quantity for a lot of us in the homeland community for some time.  As such, he should have been on anyone’s short list of people from the very get go. There is no use over bemoaning that now – they’ve picked him (finally) and they got a winner.

Now, what can we expect from him?

TSA employees are going to find a stalwart supporter of them in Erroll.  He’s a guy not afraid of being in the trenches when there’s heavy fire underway and when appropriate he will return it when it is strategically warranted.  While it’s always great to have leadership that’s good in a fight, these same employees will find themselves challenged in ways they haven’t been before.  They will be expected to step it up a notch personally and professionally.  They can also expect focused accountability as well.

Want proof?

Talk to any of his students either in the classroom or police academies.

If you’re looking for further evidence look at the efforts he’s led as part of in his current job as the Assistant Chief for Intelligence & Counter-Terrorism at the Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA) Police Department.

In partnership with LAWA’s Director for Law Enforcement and Protective Services, James Butts, Jr., Police Chief George R. Centeno (another rock star like Erroll) and LAWA leadership, he helped lead a complete overhaul of the training and education of its police force.  The results speak for themselves.  What was once seen as a poorly trained and less than exemplary police unit is now one of the best trained, most professional, interdisciplinary and exceptionally skilled airport police departments in the world.

That’s exactly what you would want considering that LAX is one of the world’s biggest targets of opportunity for terrorists.  Southers and company have hardened that target and the surround airports, and made sure its people are ready for anything that might happen on their watch.  I would expect the TSA Training Department to have someone very interested in what they do in occupying the big chair in the front office for the foreseeable future.

What can Congress and the media expect?

They’ll get a straight shooter.  That might be considered either a poor choice of words or more than appropriate set to use considering Southers’ shooting qualifications as a former FBI Special Agent and member of the Bureau’s SWAT Team as well as an Assistant Police Chief.  He can and will be upfront and honest in his dealings with them.  He will tell it like it is.  Some will like it. Others won’t.  But his character and integrity will not allow him to blow smoke or sunshine on a situation.  His record shows that.

What can the homeland community, as a whole, expect?

They can expect not just a leader, but a listener.  You can’t be a decent educator or leader and not be a listener.  Erroll has traveled the world not just to share his own words and thoughts on security, counter-terrorism and other subjects but he has also sought to hear and observe those of others as well.  Whether it be in Israel, China, Hong Kong, London, New York City, the Pentagon or God knows where else, he knows people on the front lines and executive suites and treats them all the same way.  With open ears, open mind and open hand in wanting to work together.

As to his vision on these subjects, his May 6, 2008 testimony before the US House’s Homeland Security Committee in their hearing, “The Resilient Homeland – Broadening the Homeland Security Strategy” will give you a good idea of where his mind is at.

Let me summarize it this way, “He gets it.”

That’s a great thing to know when someone is taking on a difficult and thankless job.  He does get it and I’m more than confident he will do a great job.

Trucking, Tariffs, and the “North American Union”

Tuesday, August 11th, 2009

On Monday, President Obama concluded meetings with President Felipe Calderon and Prime Minister Stephen Harper at the Cabanas Cultural Institute in Guadalajara, Mexico during the North American Leaders Summit, leaving unresolved the need to undo the harm created by a policy he helped implement while in the United States Senate – a ban on cross-border trucking.

Under the often vilified 1994 North America Free Trade Agreement, the United States is required to allow Mexican trucks the ability to travel within our borders as long as the vehicles and drivers met identical safety standards applied to U.S.-based truckers. To address this requirement, in September 2007 the U.S. Department of Transportation implemented a one-year demonstration program authorizing a limited number of Mexican trucking companies to perform long-haul operations throughout the United States to test the feasibility and safety of a permanent program. Earlier this year, the program was effectively terminated by the current administration.

Despite a flawless safety record, an international treaty requirement and the positive economic effects, many fought the pilot program as a further assault on American jobs by foreign competitors and another incremental march toward the greatly feared (and utterly imagined) “North American Union.” Currently, goods driven from the interior of Mexico arrive at the border where they are transferred to another truck with driver that crosses the border and clears customs. The cargo is then transferred to a third – U.S. based – shipper and delivered to its final destination. My niece could spot the glaring inefficiencies in this current system. She’s seven.

Under the proposed cross-border trucking program, one driver would be able to take cargo from the interior of Mexico, all the way to any point in the United States without switching rigs or drivers. The increased efficiency for the consumer is obvious to all.

Well, maybe not to everyone. Under increasing pressure from domestic truckers and unions, last year Congress passed legislation prohibiting the creation or operation of any cross-border trucking program. Opponents latched onto concerns with the safety of Mexican trucks as a pretext for killing the program (despite rigorous standards implemented by the Departments of Transportation on both the federal and state levels). At that time, Senator Obama voted with the majority in the Senate to kill the program.

Inevitably- and as is their right under the NAFTA treaty – in March 2009 Mexico instituted devastating tariffs on a range of (mostly agricultural) U.S. goods in the amount of $2.4 billion. Affected industries have howled about these tariffs and it looks like the Obama Administration and the Senate are starting to realize that protectionism – which picks economic winners and losers – is unsound.

Domestic trucking operators fear (somewhat justifiably) the negative impact this trucking program will have on their business. They are concerned that foreign shippers with lower fuel and labor costs will take away jobs that domestic shippers previously handled. They also worry that in this rough economic time, flooding the market with more trucking competitors will harm all companies.

However, these fears don’t take into account the increased business gained with reverse shipments – delivering goods far into Mexico – something that was not allowed previously. Additionally, domestic shippers discount the possibility of increased business as more trade barriers fall and the border becomes a greater economic engine. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has estimated that these protectionist efforts cost American consumers in excess of $400 million a year. Oh, by the way, U.S. and Canadian trucks have crossed the northern border interchangeably for many years and there is still a robust domestic trucking industry in Michigan, New York, Washington and other northern states.

The Mexican tariffs – ironically characterized by free trade opponents as blackmail – have had an impact. Companies across the country are feeling the heat and demanding a solution, and people are taking note. Late last week, former U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills, former Commerce Secretaries Norman Mineta and Carlos Gutierrez, and former U.S. Ambassadors to Mexico James Jones, Tony Garza, and Jeffrey Davidow drafted a letter to President Obama imploring him to settle the trade dispute. The Obama Administration has (refreshingly) noted that the current limits are less about safety and more about protectionism, thus undercutting the primary argument for the restrictions. The Senate Appropriations Committee has taken up legislation to address the tariffs and allow more trucking, but likely no legal resolution will be in place until October.

In the current economy, America needs as much business as possible – particularly business with one of our most robust trading partners. Trade barriers, whether in the form of tariffs, regulations, or domestic preferences, hurt businesses in the long run. Efforts to limit trade, particularly those based on pre-textual erroneous safety arguments, are bound to failure.

From reports coming out of the North American Leaders Summit, it does not appear that there will be a quick solution to the issue. Let’s hope that Presidents Obama and Calderon stay on the ball and reach a solution sooner rather than later to help businesses further spur cross-border trade and travel, especially those already damaged by the tariffs and trucking ban.

Unregulated small boats pose greatest vulnerability to U.S. maritime security, says Coast Guard Commandant

Tuesday, August 11th, 2009

Admiral Thad Allen, commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, has been on a mission for going on three years now: To raise awareness of the security vulnerabilities presented by small boats on America’s largely unregulated and unrestricted waterways.

It’s a tougher mission than you might think. When the man responsible for protecting our waterways speaks about his number-one priority, people listen right? Well, that depends.

As Allen notes, recreational boating is big business in the United States. And boaters bristle at the notion of new regulations. Some, Allen observed, even seem to think the right to go where you want in a boat is carved right into the Constitution, part of the Bill of Rights up there with gun-ownin’ and free speechifying.

And just about every congressional district has its share of water – whether in the form of coastline, rivers, lakes, ports, gulfs, flooded streets or whathaveyou. Which means the politics of regulating small boats ain’t, as they say, bean bag. After all, what member of Congress in his or her right mind would want to go back to an angry district and take a stand on a potentially explosive national reform issue. …Er, okay, let’s rephrase that … what member of Congress in his or her right mind wants to go and take another whuppin’ from voters and constituents on something like recreational boating after the scars they’ve gotten in the health care debate?

So what’s the political answer? The usual … ignore the problem until you just can’t ignore it anymore. Toss in a red herring, if necessary. Congress has done both.

Despite repeated testimony from the Commandant about the need to address small-boat vulnerabilities in the United States, Congress has failed to even establish a serious conversation on this issue. Instead, the entire maritime and port security focus of the political class has been an unhealthy obsession with cargo security.  Not that cargo security itself is an unhealthy obsession – but the overly simplistic solution legislated out of Washington was to mandate the scanning of 100 percent of all cargo entering the United States. Yes, that’s right, every one of the 12 million or so containers entering the country’s ports every year.

Unlike telling weekend boaters that they may need to register their watercraft, telling the private sector that it must find a way to scan every piece of cargo is a politically popular position that comes with no (direct) cost to the federal government. Never mind that it would likely cripple the supply chain and result in less security over the long run.

As Allen has previously (and repeatedly) observed: Small boats pose a greater threat to port security than the “nuke in a box” scenario. “All of our threat and vulnerability assessments for the major ports around this country tell us that while containers are important, we may be thinking too container-centric since the events of 9/11, and the notion of a water-borne improvised explosive device needs to be dealt with,” Allen told an audience of the Surface Navy Association.

While Congress is urging that untold resources be dedicated to examining the contents of millions of cargo containers (regardless of the likely threat level of individual containers and shipments), a terrorist could simply motor an explosive device via a small boat right up to a liquid gas facility. Or just about anything else. Because there is no – none, nada, zip – regulatory infrastructure in place to prevent it.

Sound far-fetched? Remember the USS Cole?

Or how about this one: Mumbai? The Pakistani terrorists who rained gunfire on residents in the Indian city of Mumbai got into position by beaching a small watercraft in an unsecured area, guided by the kind of handheld GPS devices you could pick up at Radio Shack, and simply walked into the city to launch their attack.

During a Coast Guard media pen and pad hosted by Allen last week, he returned to this theme and noted several ways in which small boats could be easily used to inflict damage:

  • Using a shoulder-held rocket from a small boat strategically positioned. (Remember that rocket-propelled grenade launchers are a commonly used weapon among al Qaeda and its ilk.)
  • Delivering a weapon of mass destruction via a small boat
  • Using a small boat to deliver an improvised explosive device (as with the Cole)
  • Strategic landing of terrorists (as with Mumbai)

Allen compared to the regulation of the airways, which also have recreational users, to the lack thereof when it comes to the waterways. In aviation, practically everything is controlled; in maritime, practically nothing is.

The Commandant noted that there are a number of different approaches that could be considered, from the use of registration, as in the aviation sector, to less comprehensive tactics such as prohibiting waterway access near facilities of national security significance. He appears open to compromise and new ideas. He just wants to get the debate going.

“It shouldn’t take a public event to start a debate,” he said.

Indeed.

Watch out for Those Disney Toys in TSA Security Lines

Thursday, July 30th, 2009

Yet another embarrassing situation for TSA occurred earlier this week when TSA screeners at Fort Lauderdale airport decided to confiscate a toy sword and bright red wooden gun from two young boys on the way back home from Disney World.

To say that TSA’s reputation is tarnished from incidents like this one would be a significant understatement.  TSA officials will try to deflect the incident by pointing to a very large and dispersed workforce that makes mistakes from time to time.  I would agree with this statement – except for the fact that over the past several years TSA has boasted the professional nature of its workforce.  In fact, former Administrator Hawley was quick to point to extensive retraining requirements and a change in checkpoint operating procedures allowing screeners to be more analytical and less “checklist-oriented.”

I would argue that TSA still has a long way to go in this area and in restoring its reputation in the eyes of the American public.  In the early days of TSA, the agency had a number of loaned employees that helped establish the agency.  One such employee was from Disney – focused solely in determining how the new checkpoint queuing lines should be established (clearly Disney has some experience in this area).

Well, shortly after learning of the confiscated toys from the two young boys, Disney quickly agreed to replace the toys at no cost.  It appears that TSA still has some learning to do from Disney.

Security PLUS Facilitation – A Success Story

Tuesday, June 30th, 2009

Beginning on July 29, commercial airline traffic to the US from Shannon airport in Ireland will have the advantage of full preclearance.  That means that all US customs, immigration and agricultural clearances will be completed before the passengers leave Shannon.  And that, in turn, means that commercial traffic leaving Shannon can go to any airport in the US (at least any airport within range of the aircraft and big enough to handle its arrival).  No longer will passengers have to arrive at an American international airport, clear customs, and then make their onward domestic connections.

Better still, beginning in October 2009 the same preclearance service will be available for general aviation aircraft (smaller, non-commercial planes).  After clearing immigration and customs in Shannon, these planes will be allowed to fly direct to any general aviation airport in the US.

This is a win-win-win for everyone.  Passengers get convenience – they can make their travel plans direct from Shannon (or Dublin when the preclearance facilities open there in 2010) without any need to change planes at a busy US airport.

Shannon wins too – having a preclearance facility will attract traffic through the airport, and help build the economy in western Ireland.

And the US wins as well – preclearance of passengers overseas will help keep problems overseas.  Contraband and illegal goods will be interdicted before leaving Ireland.  Passengers who are not admissible to the US will be turned around and sent home before they depart, instead of making the sad return trip from the US.  Sophisticated radiological screening systems will help keep weapons of mass destruction off shore.

All of this will be a great boon to trade, to tourism, and to security.  Who could ask for anything more?  It isn’t often that a government policy makes this much sense.

Paul Rosenzweig, the founder of Red Branch Consulting, PLLC, formerly served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy and Acting Assistant Secretary for International Affairs at the Department of Homeland Security.

TSA: New Millimeter Wave Technology

Thursday, June 25th, 2009

Recently, I spoke with Francis Rose on Federal News Radio’s In Depth With Francis Rose, to discuss TSA’s new use of millimeter wave technology for the American rail system.  Millimeter wave technology is a creative solution to keeping people safe with little to no distruption to travelers.

Listen to the interview here.

TSA: New Millimeter Wave Technology

The old excuse “this is how we’ve always done it” doesn’t apply to one agency, says Wendell Shingler, former Executive Director of the National Incident Response Unit at Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and former Director of the Federal Protective Services. He believes the Transportation Security Administration’s passive screening equipment that uses millimeter wave technology is a sign the agency is trying to think in new ways. Mr. Shingler told me why he thinks so, and offered some background on TSA’s pilot program.

Read my recent blog post on the use of the new technology here.

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