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What is a Law Enforcement Fusion Center?

Monday, August 23rd, 2010

Fusion Centers are a fairly new concept in law enforcement, and many people don’t know the purpose they serve or how their local law enforcement agency should be engaging these centers. If you ask 20 people for a definition of “fusion center,” you’ll get 20 different answers. Some might even think these centers are making frozen coffee concoctions or protein drinks.

Fusion centers are an attempt to deal with the fact that clues related to criminal activity often remain undiscovered in disconnected law enforcement databases. These centers address that challenge by bringing the data into one place or making it accessible from one place, typically on one software platform where analysts can connect the dots.

Much of the rationale for developing these centers comes from the post-9/11 realization that we knew a lot about the terrorists, but the data points were scattered and didn’t raise any red flags in isolation. Many agencies had a piece of the jigsaw puzzle but not enough to form a picture of a credible threat.

So in recent years, as a national grassroots initiative developed, in part, from a joint project with the federal intelligence community, including DHS and DOJ, about 50 of these fusion centers have been created across the United States. Each is staffed with personnel from multiple agencies that help facilitate local, state, county and federal data sharing.

While almost every fusion center has a slightly different mission, most people agree the goal is to bring a lot of data together to form a complete picture of criminal activity.

Based on what I’ve seen working in over a dozen of these centers, some are simply amassing numerous data stores in one location for quick and efficient query used to support tactical investigative activity. This approach allows instant access to various data sources, but minimal analysis occurs. In contrast, some fusion centers focus on strategic analysis, with officers and analysts collecting and analyzing the data, and then making assessments of the threats posed and the potential for criminal activity.

Contrary to popular “blogosphere” opinion, these fusion centers are not “big brother.” The rules for private and protected personal data have really not changed. State and local police still need court authorization to access an individual’s telecommunications records, credit card transactions, Internet activity and similar confidential information.

Fusion centers that are doing strategic analysis are best positioned to prevent criminal acts. Trained intelligence analysts in these centers look at a local tip or Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) and then use advanced search tools across many databases simultaneously for indications that the tip could be part of a much bigger “iceberg” hiding below the surface. These analysts are trained to develop a hypothesis and test it through search, data analysis and proper vetting.

Often, an analyst determines there is no cause for concern, but occasionally, the outcome is a finding that there is a clear and present threat, in which case the analyst publishes a “product,” which is a finished intelligence report for review by law enforcement command. While analysis of this kind has been done for years, new technologies for unstructured data search, automated workflows, and better data sharing drive more efficiency and deeper results.

If you are working in law enforcement, it’s wise to know who to contact at your regional fusion center and designate a contact point within your agency. Also, by linking your local databases to these centers, it’s possible that a traffic stop in your area could possibly help crack a bigger case.

Posted in Homeland Security & the Internet; Gov't 2.0, Homeland State & Local, Intelligence, Law Enforcement, Science & Technology, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

For Victory over al Qaeda, Build the Mosque at Ground Zero

Monday, August 16th, 2010

By Justin Hienz

Radicalization and violent jihad are phenomena intimately linked to the United States’ homeland security efforts. Those who buy into transnational terrorism’s violent ideology are threats to America, but just as important to U.S. security is how the American public understands and responds to Islam.

On Friday, President Obama weighed in on the continuing debate over whether to allow construction of an Islamic Center near Ground Zero in New York City. Celebrating the Islamic holy month of Ramadan with invited guests during a Friday dinner, the president said:

“I believe that Muslims have the same right to practice their religion as everyone else in this country. That includes the right to build a place of worship and a community center on private property in lower Manhattan.”

A strong statement. A bold statement. A statement of leadership on our country’s values. In commenting on the proposed mosque (albeit indirectly), Obama sent a message to the country – the mosque should be built because our national principles demand it. Well said, Mr. President.

But then, on Saturday, Obama amended his statements for reporters. Quoted in the Wall Street Journal, he said:

“‘I was not commenting and I will not comment on the wisdom of making the decision to put a mosque” near Ground Zero. ‘I was commenting very specifically on the right people have that dates back to our founding.’”

Did I miss something? His position on Friday seemed fairly clear, particularly because the mosque-in-NYC issue had been made so salient by constant media coverage. What else could he have been talking about? Yet on Saturday, the President’s stance was far less sure.

For those unfamiliar with this matter, the debate revolves around whether an Islamic Center can be housed in a building planned for a location two blocks – 45 Park Place – from where the Twin Towers once stood. The building would be open to all faiths, and the proposed name, Cordoba House, refers to a Spanish city where Muslims, Christians and Jews once lived together in peace.

Nevertheless, headlines have focused on the key words “mosque” at “Ground Zero” because it grabs attention and sells. This has served to inflame a national debate, with known opponents of the mosque sticking dead on message, peppering remarks with dramatic key words. There have also been other instances throughout the country where communities have argued against the construction of a mosque in their neighborhood.

A CNN/Opinion Research report shows that 68 percent of those surveyed oppose the mosque. While the question’s wording is somewhat leading, 68 percent is still a significant number, even with a wide margin of error. The ongoing debate reveals a great deal about how some Americans view Islam.

To be sure, those objecting to the Islamic Center are opposed not simply to the new place of Muslim worship but to the idea that anything related to Islam can safely exist so close to the site of al Qaeda’s greatest victory, without dishonoring the dead. This viewpoint is flawed, because it is based on a misunderstanding of religion generally, Islam specifically.

Islam, like all other religions, is dynamic, not static and monolithic. It is diverse across regions and has changed throughout history. More importantly, the concept of “Islam” (much like the concept of “Christianity,” et al.) is not standard across the world. An individual’s religious beliefs are unique to themselves because how a person interprets their faith is guided, in part, by forces in their environment, such as economy, lawlessness, poverty, etc. No person’s belief is identical to another’s, and so, to understand Islam as a singular idea and motivator is incorrect.

There is no legal, ethical or American justification for refusing the right to build an Islamic Center at 45 Park Place. It is ridiculous to oppose a house of prayer on the grounds that it is Islamic, citing the terrorists who brought down the Twin Towers as evidence of Islam’s inherent problems.

Denying the Islamic Center is tantamount to denying the construction of a Christian church (of any denomination) near the site of the destroyed Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Timothy McVeigh (the man responsible for blowing up the federal building) was Christian, but do you expect we would hear the same outcry if the site of a proposed church was adjacent to where that building once stood?

What we are encountering here is an emotional response, fanned by the media, revealing that, even a decade after the attacks on September 11, some Americans still just don’t get it. They don’t understand that al Qaeda and other terrorists are the Timothy McVeighs of Islam. Radicalized believers draw no more support from Muslim communities than militant Christians do from the global Christian population.

Debate is healthy. It’s one of the best attributes of the American social tradition. But if this debate leads to either 1. An action that prevents the construction of the mosque or 2. Further anti-Islamic attitudes preventing an American Muslim’s basic rights, then we have dishonored the memory of those who died on 9/11.

It means we have allowed Osama bin Laden, his followers and other enemies of America to construct a false opposition between Islam and America. “The Narrative,” a monstrous ideology advocating an inherent conflict between Western society and the Muslim faith, is what al Qaeda and other enemies of America believe. We must not perpetuate this lie by suspecting and fearing Islam. We must see clearly that the tragedies on September 11 were the product of terribly misguided people. The bastardized interpretation of Islam that they used to justify their actions does not reflect what most of the world’s one billion Muslims believe. Period.

If this mosque is not built (or if it is protested after it is built), then Osama’s greatest victory was getting Americans to believe what he believes – that there is a war between America and Islam. But if the mosque is built, we honor those killed, because it shows that we are continuing to triumph over bin Laden’s lies. Neither he nor his ideology has a home in America.

Had the President not made those weak-willed statements on Saturday, his initial endorsement of the mosque would have been a step in the right direction for the American people’s perception of Islam. Now more than ever we need authoritative voices to take a consistent stand and guide the public towards a more nuanced and accurate understanding of the Muslim faith.

Justin Hienz is Managing Editor for Security Debrief and a Senior Account Executive at Adfero Group.

Justin Hienz is Managing Editor for Security Debrief and a Senior Account Executive at Adfero Group.

Posted in Ideology & Public Diplomacy, International, Management & Administration, Radicalization, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

Did Richard Clarke’s Cyber Book Miss It?

Wednesday, July 21st, 2010

You always feel a little shaky when you are planning on asserting that someone else is wrong. You feel more so when it is someone who is known as darn near a prophet in the particular field. However, no one has ever said that I was unwilling to express my opinions, so here goes.

Richard Clarke, former adviser to multiple presidents, the Cassandra who warned of a coming attack before 9/11, now has a hit book out on the threat of a coming cyber war, why we are unprepared for it and what we must do. The book, “Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to do About It” (written with Robert Knake), is now being widely read. One recent attendee at a major one-day cyber security symposium in Washington opined that it seemed every one of the speakers had referred to the book. I was there too, and this is a bit of hyperbole, but several did mention it. While not everyone agrees with Clarke, his opinions in the areas of infrastructure and cyber security cannot be easily discounted.

I will not attempt to do a complete review of the book, because several others have already done so and because so many people have already read it. I do want to point out, however, two areas where I think Clarke missed the mark in his thinking. I am also adding to the mix remarks and Q&A Clarke did at the very fine Aspen Security Forum at the end of June, which I had the pleasure of attending.

Truth in writing: these are two areas which might be considered my pet rocks. I have written and spoken on both, and while it is daunting to disagree with a “big guy,” in this case, I cannot be intellectually honest if I just let it go.

The first area is the usefulness of wide-spread cyber education and awareness for the American people. Clarke basically discounts this as a waste of time. He says the benefit of such an effort is about nil. You cannot properly train every grandmother and retired auto worker to be a computer scientist. Clearly he is right, but just as clearly (to me anyway), that is not the point.

Right now, experts say that nearly 80 percent of cyber incidents could be stopped if people would merely have good cyber personal hygiene. In other words, if they would understand where not to go, what in general not to open, why they should have protective software, and why it must be updated regularly, many would do it. Also, many of those same “everyman” folks could apply the same hygiene principles they would use at home in their jobs, thus giving us improvements on two fronts.

Look, we are obviously never going to stop the big sophisticated penetrations simply by intellectually arming the masses. The high-end 20 percent require a completely different approach. Nor are we going to get everyone who uses a computer to do all the “right things” anymore than we can get every driver to stop speeding or rolling through stop signs. People are people, and many will do unhelpful things, even if they are told how to avoid them. However, to give up on this front and dismiss all education and awareness efforts as of no use is intellectual conceit. We can better “arm” our population, and most of them will respond. Let’s close the doors we can and at least shrink the opportunities the bad guys have to attack. This is NOT a battle that will only be fought by our high-end “mounted cyber knights.” We have to engage all our citizen yeoman as well.

The second area Clarke dismisses is the possibility of a significant terrorist cyber event.  He, like many other experts, seem to think that it is simply impossible for a terrorist organization to have the wherewithal to pull off a “real” cyber event. Well, if you define it as only so large as to be an all-out cyber war, his position has validity. If you think, as I have written and spoken about, that a terrorist attack could focus on a specific geographic and single sector target, it is indeed quite feasible.

Terrorists no longer have to develop their own cyber army; they can rent one from the multiple criminal networks that exist and who regularly sell their services. By keeping their target restricted enough (one small city, the electrical grid in one part of the country, one specific bank, etc.), terrorists could pull it off. Terrorists do not have to bring down our entire system but only do enough to provoke fear and reaction. They could also use cyber as a significant enhancer for a more traditional attack. Police in many cities worry that someone will hack their dispatch systems and route responders to an ambush or route them away from real events, a tactic that might ensure more people die from an attack and one that will truly shake public confidence.

Clarke is “right” when he says public education will not solve the cyber problem and when he says that no terrorist group is capable of conducting cyber war on America. He is wrong to dismiss the value of that education and awareness in mitigating everyday dangers and difficulties, and he is wrong to give the impression that a terrorist cyber event would be of no consequence.

We cannot throw these babies out with the bathwater. Read Clarke’s book, particularly if you need to get a better understanding of the cyber threats we face. It is well written and a fairly easy read for a tough subject. But please do not think that because Clarke gives the two areas of education and terror short shrift that they are not significant. That would be a costly mistake.

Posted in Critical Infrastructure, Cyber Security, Homeland Security Industry & Private Sector, Homeland State & Local, Management & Administration, Science & Technology, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

The Value of Aspen

Friday, July 9th, 2010

As we continue to swelter in the ongoing summer heat wave, it is easy for me to reminisce about my recent visit to Aspen, Colo. Tucked amongst the Rockies with its clean air, fervent green and majestic views, a town known primarily for its skiing with the rich and famous was home to what was, simply put, the best conference program I have ever attended.

The first annual Aspen Security Forum put forward a program that I can only describe as pleasant, informational waterboarding. By the time each of the presenters and panelists were done, my hand was dead from writing so much and my head hurt from being given the firehouse treatment of a candor and content  overload.

With a venerable “who’s who” of notable names in the national security arena attending the two and a half day program, attendees had the opportunity to hear first-hand from the men and women who have served or continue to serve in some of the most demanding positions in the world. It was literally very hard to turn around and not see a face that you did not recognize from some recent event or news program, sharing insights on our country’s national and homeland security challenges.

While the presented content was outstanding, the best part about the entire program was that the overwhelming majority of notable speakers and presenters made themselves available to engage with the attendees. All too often, speakers rush in, deliver their canned pitch, say thanks to the crowd and are whisked away by their aides to get back to the office, leaving actual human contact an afterthought. To have the many distinguished speakers stick around and engage in that lost art-form of “CONVERSATION” was an absolute pleasure.

Hosted by Clark Ervin and the Aspen Institute, this was the first time they had put on a program with this particular focus. You can call it beginner’s luck if you want, but they put together a top notch effort that literally became a “must attend” for anyone who is interested in national and homeland security issues. Fortunately, for those who weren’t able to attend the program, it was taped for later broadcast by C-Span, hopefully sometime this summer. I have to tell you, there is a significant portion of C-Span’s programming that can cure insomnia, but when they broadcast the presenters and panels from the Aspen Security Forum, it will be as NBC used to call it, “Must See TV!”

To understand why I write that, here’s a rundown of some sessions (with video hyperlinks):

Adm. Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

When your opening speaker travels all the way from Kabul to Tel Aviv to Aspen to take part in the program, it’s a pretty good indicator that the organizers are up to something big. That was especially true with Adm. Mullen. Coming off a week where Gen. McChrystal was taken out by a large Rolling Stone and replaced by Gen. Petraeus, and then traveling to Afghanistan and Israel to assuage any fears and concerns they may have about the big changes, Mullen made news by essentially not making news. While his comments about the state of the nation’s counter insurgency policy dovetailed those of the White House’s, the plainspoken manner in which they were delivered conveyed the gravity of the situation our military forces are faced with in Afghanistan. His comments about Iran’s nuclear ambitions – “They’ve given us no reason to trust them” – also spoke volumes about what few measures the Administration has left at its disposal in dealing with them.

Aviation Security Panel

There is probably no other facet of the post-9/11 world that Americans gripe about more than dealing with aviation security, but as the CEO of the Air Transport Association (ATA), Jim May, said, “What’s your alternative?” Joined by Erroll Southers of USC’s CREATE Program (and the first Obama Administration nominee to lead TSA) and Christopher Bidwell of the Airport Council International, this panel laid on the table the very real threats and frustrations that accompany this portion of the security environment. One of the most interesting things discussed was the use of full-body imaging devices by airports to screen passengers. While recognizing the civil rights and privacy concerns that people have about them, Jim May of ATA shared that he thought they should be mandatory. When it came to addressing the Government Accountability Office’s recently issued criticisms of TSA’s Behavioral Detection efforts, May and the other panelists pointed out that this program was part of many layers of security, and there was no one-size-fits-all solution or silver bullet that would reduce the aviation risks faced today.

Fran Townsend, former Homeland Security Advisor to President Bush

There are many things that have been written and said about Fran Townsend, the former Homeland Security Advisor to President Bush (43), but the word “shy” is not one that would be used to describe her. The only thing that could possibly surpass the candor of her public comments when she was working as a government employee was her candor in being a former government employee. With no holds barred, Townsend explained that, “We have a reason to expect we can connect the dots this time” given all of the post 9/11 work that has been done.

In a more than hour-long conversation with Walter Isaccson, the CEO of the Aspen Institute, and the Security Forum audience, Townsend pounded on the fact that much still needs to be done to improve information sharing amongst intelligence and law enforcement agencies across the board. Her declaration that there still needed to be a senior level official or “Cabinet Agency,” but “not a czar,” to “pound these government agencies into submission to do information sharing.” Her proposal that an NGO, public-private partnership, rather than a solely government-led approach to address the growing cyber security risks, was also interesting.

Bill Bratton, former Chief, Los Angeles Police Department

Dubbed by many media outlets as “America’s Top Cop” for having led the police departments of Boston, New York City and Los Angeles, I think Bill Bratton surprised everyone at the program when he explained how the terror attacks in Mumbai, India caused him to change the entire structure of the LAPD. His interview with CNN’s Jeanne Meserve detailed how 60 days after those attacks, he was able to transform his police department with new training, exercises and more. The relatively simply trained Mumbai terrorists were not interested in holding hostages; in fact, they were using so-called negotiations to buy time to kill more people. This showed Bratton that he had to change how his department was positioned to respond to a similar event, should it occur in Los Angeles.

Michael Leiter, Director of the National Counter Terrorism Center

For a man that much of Washington thought would have his head handed to him following the failed information sharing efforts surrounding the failed Christmas Day attack, Michael Leiter, the Director of the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), displayed all of the skill and confidence that make him one of a few Bush Administration appointees to successfully transition into the Obama Administration. His description of his job, his work with the President to report on the range of threats to the country and how he thinks information sharing needs to work made this particular presentation one of the most revealing and compelling of the entire program.  Interviewed by Michael Isikoff, a former Newsweek reporter and now Chief Investigative Correspondent for NBC News, ended up producing some great back and forth between the two men that was as revealing as it was humorous. This session again explained more about Leiter’s job and the mission of the NCTC than any government report or Congressional hearing to date.

Border Security Panel

Despite the countless GAO and IG reports and the many hearings before the U.S. House and Senate, there was no better overview of America’s border security than a panel made up of:

  • Bob Mocny, Director of DHS’ US VISIT Program;
  • Mark Borkowski, Director of CBP’s Secure Border Initiative (SBI); and
  • Steve Oswald, Vice President of Boeing.

These three gentlemen described what worked, what didn’t, what could be better and what the future may look like on programs that have regularly been making news for years. In presenting the details of these newsworthy programs, they did so with none of the drama or hysterics that are so often associated with the Congressional hearings that have exhaustively covered the respective programs. What each of them said frankly offered more substantive insight than any of the previous Congressional hearings have produced to date. That was an observation made not just by the conference attendees but also by the first-tier media, congressional staff and others who have observed each of these respective programs closely. Truth be told, if you want to know what is really happening with US VISIT and the Secure Border Initiative (minus the belligerent questions and political posturing), spending 90 minutes watching this panel when it is aired on C-Span will be time well spent.

Attending News Media

As I mentioned, the conference was a literal “who’s who” of notable current and former national and homeland security leaders, and the same could be said for the attending members of the media.  With CNN’s Jeanne Meserve, Fox News’ Catherine Herridge, the Washington Post’s Spencer Hsu, Newsweek’s/NBC News’ Michael Isikoff, and more, it seemed as if there was a representative from every major news outlet, print and broadcast media in attendance. While many of them were there to serve as session/panel moderators for the various parts of the program, the entire forum was a reservoir of information for them on today’s security concerns and a background on the actions of the past. It was also a treasure trove for journalists in developing future sources for national and homeland security news stories.

Michael Chertoff, former Secretary of Homeland Security

After consecutive 12-hour days of literally (albeit pleasantly) waterboarding attendees with tons of substantive content, it’s hard to figure out how to end a program such as that in Aspen, but they picked a great closer in former DHS Secretary Chertoff. Whether it was the fact that he’s been out of office for almost a year and half and doesn’t have to worry about a 2 AM phone call from National Operations Center about someone doing something vile to the homeland, Chertoff’s candor and demeanor crystallized for everyone the seriousness of the threats we face while also assuring we should continue to go about our regular lives. As one of the very few “senior statesmen” on homeland issues that we have in this country, his conversation with Fox News’ Catherine Herridge conveyed the balance that we need to have when planning for and operating against the range of risks we face.

A wondering disappointment

I can say without doubt that I loved every moment at the Aspen Institute, but I can’t sign off without discussing the one disappointment that I and many others had in the presentation by DHS Deputy Secretary, Jane Holl Lute. Whether it was her discomfort at the conversational interview format led by CNN’s Jeanne Meserve, her fear in the week after the McChrystal debacle, not wanting to say anything to cause problems for herself or the Administration, or the fact that maybe she was having a bad day, her presentation left the overwhelming majority of attendees scratching their heads in wonder as to the real story at the Department.

All of the questions that were asked by Meserve were fair and nothing was out of the ordinary, but Lute’s responses were defensive, sometimes evasive and could have been dramatically better.  Time and time again in her hour long session there were questions to which she could have responded with hard and fast examples of the Department’s accomplishments. Instead, she offered simplistic, almost apple-pie like anecdotal responses that left the audience wondering why she wouldn’t answer the most basic of questions.

When she stated, “the [U.S.] border has never been more secure,” and offered no facts to prove that statement, portions of the audience looked around at one another in shock while others openly chortled at the declaration.

When it came time for Q&A with the audience, the tenor of her responses seemed to be even more defensive. When Michael Isikoff asked her about her statement on the border’s security and her metrics to prove that it had never been more secure, Lute seemed to bristle at the question. She firmly retorted, “The Secretary has been very clear on what those metrics are,” and effectively cut him off.

Lute’s response referred to the speech Secretary Napolitano delivered at CSIS the week before, when she declared, “the U.S. border has never been more secure…but there is more work to be done” and that “no one is satisfied with the status quo.”

In that speech, Secretary Napolitano detailed a series of metrics to back up her statement, but none of those were shared by Lute with Isikoff or the observing audience. In speaking with Isikoff and some of the other attendees after her remarks, none of them were aware of the CSIS speech and the metrics behind the powerful declaration. To the credit of the Department, Bob Mocny and Mark Borkowski did an exceptional job during their joint appearance on the Border Security panel explaining why DHS leadership is stating things have improved on the border.

It is certainly a debatable point to make a declaration like the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary have made in recent forums about border security. When you back it up with information and facts, it provides some measure of credibility and fosters informed debate. When you state it and don’t want to defend it with facts, it leaves people wondering why you would state something like that and not be able to prove it. After her appearance in Aspen, a lot of people were left wondering about the Deputy Secretary, and after viewing her session either on-line or on C-Span, I expect there will be a lot more.

Final thoughts

All of our time is valuable, and God knows we don’t have enough of it, but if you can set your DVRs to record the Aspen Security Forum or go to the Aspen Institute webpage and download panels for your Ipod/MP3 player – DO IT. Think of each of the respective sessions as graduate level courses shared by esteemed faculty who have the real life scar tissue and experiences to tell you what happened and what we can all do better.  If you do, I’m confident you will walk away from each session with a lot more knowledge and a bit of a mild headache too. That’s what pleasant informational waterboarding will do to you, but I have to say, it is much more enjoyable amongst the mountains and beautiful vistas of Aspen.

Posted in Aviation and airport security, Border Security, Congress, Politics & PR, Critical Infrastructure, Cyber Security, Homeland Security & the Internet; Gov't 2.0, Homeland Security Industry & Private Sector, Ideology & Public Diplomacy, Immigration & Visa Policy, Intelligence, International, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, Military & Homeland Defense, Private and Physical Security, Science & Technology, Supply Chain Security, Terror Finance, Terror Strategic Analysis, Transportation Security, WMD, Chemical & Biological, counterterrorism | Comments

Rich Cooper Reflects on Admiral Mullen at the Aspen Security Forum

Tuesday, June 29th, 2010

Security Debrief contributor Rich Cooper is in Colorado for the Aspen Security Forum. Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provided the forum’s opening remarks. Here’s what Cooper told Government Security News after the Admiral’s talk.


At Aspen: Diplomatic Admiral Mullen carefully avoids the inflammatory McCrystal script – Government Security News

Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, kicked off the Aspen Security Forum in front of a sold-out crowd of approximately 800 people on June 28, with observations and answers to audience questions that were so polite, so balanced, so calibrated and so devoid of news-making content that they set a new standard of excellence in this “button-your-lip” post-General Stanley McCrystal era…

…One observer, Rich Cooper, principal with Catalyst Partners, was impressed with Mullen’s tough comments on Iran. “Seeing a person in his position stating that Iran has given us ‘no reason to trust them’ spoke volumes to me,” said Cooper. “Here’s a military officer saying we’ve exhausted what we can do there.”

Posted in Homeland Security Industry & Private Sector, Management & Administration, Military & Homeland Defense, Private and Physical Security, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

A Need to Prioritize Intelligence Analysis at Fusion Centers

Monday, June 14th, 2010

By Steve Serrao

Having visited and worked in many fusion centers across the nation, I often wonder how much attention is given to a basic question:  Are we conducting analysis or not?

Fusion centers, which started as a project between the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, share information and intelligence with the federal government and within their local jurisdictions. The answer to the question of whether the centers conduct analysis varies widely, and it is partly dependent on whether the fusion center’s goal is to provide strategic-intelligence analysis or serve as a tactical operational data-sharing operation.

Several managers at the centers I visited told me they feel as if they are “flying by the seat” of their pants when it comes to analysis. For example, as Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) come in, the center’s limited personnel focus on a tactical response, and often times strategic analysis never occurs.

When the tactical mission overtakes the strategic mission, it becomes impossible for the fusion center to paint the “big picture” of major plots or threats.

Your center can be a data fusion center by simply amassing numerous data stores in one location so you can quickly and efficiently query for results tied to an investigation. This approach allows instant access to various data sources – but minimal analysis occurs.

In contrast, some fusion centers focus on strategic analysis, and those are generally the ones I define as intelligence centers. These centers collect information independent of the tactical case load from many sources, including investigations, informants, debriefings, physical and electronic surveillance, and by searching open sources. They have officers and analysts collecting and analyzing the data, making assessments of what threats are posed and what potential for criminal activity exists.

Fusion centers that have decided to perform both data fusion and analysis need the appropriate staff and resources assigned. Strategic analysts develop over years of training and work experiences; they aren’t hired right out of college. There must be a division of analytical labor. For example, it doesn’t make sense to have highly trained analysts working on tactical daily activity like “turning and burning” routine SARs.

If there is strategic analysis being done, fusion centers need to determine what content should be in their published bulletins and ensure that it gets to the appropriate audiences. Progress on these issues will continue to place fusion centers at the center of adding value to “all crimes, all hazards” law enforcement efforts.

Captain Stephen G. Serrao is a former New Jersey State Police Counterterrorism Bureau Chief and is currently Director of Product Management, Americas Region for Memex, Inc., a provider of intelligence management, data integration, search and analysis solutions.

Posted in Critical Infrastructure, Homeland Security Industry & Private Sector, Homeland State & Local, Intelligence, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

Defining Terrorism

Monday, November 9th, 2009

With the probable execution of John Allen Muhammad in Virginia this week and the tragic rampage at Fort Hood by U.S. Army Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, still fresh in the American public’s memory, the term “terrorism” is being used quite a bit by the news media.

While there are those who would seek to link the two very different incidents to one another, given that they were murderous rampages committed by two military-trained Muslim men, political, military, religious, law enforcement and other leaders have gone to great lengths to explain that these acts are indeed distinct and are not some larger plot by Muslims against those with other religious beliefs. Those are facts, but is it proper to use the word “terrorism” to accurately describe what these men did?

If you’re Sen. Joseph Lieberman (I/D-CT), the Chairman of the U.S. Senate’s Governmental Affairs and Homeland Security Committee, you’ve already made up your mind on the Ft. Hood shootings. In an appearance on Fox News Sunday, the independent and security-minded Senator stated that, “We don’t know enough to say now, but there are very, very strong warning signs here that Dr. Hasan had become an Islamist extremist and, therefore, that this was a terrorist act.”

The Senator further stated that if news reports were true, that Mr. Hasan had turned to Islamic extremism, “the murder of these 13 people was a terrorist act and, in fact, it was the most-destructive terrorist act to be committed on American soil since 9/11.”

In the case of John Allen Muhammad, the leader of the D.C. Sniper team that murdered 10 and wounded several others in the National Capital Region in October 2002, he was one of the first people convicted under the Commonwealth of Virginia’s anti-terrorism laws enacted shortly after 9/11. As a result of those convictions and baring clemency by VA Governor Tim Kaine or some last-minute action by the U.S. Supreme Court, Muhammad will pay the ultimate price with a lethal injection at the Greensville Correctional Center in Jarret, VA on the evening of November 10th.

As repugnant and horrific as the murderous actions of Hasan and Muhammad were, do they constitute “terrorism?”

If you were to stop someone on the street and ask them what is terrorism, chances are they would describe the 9/11 attacks or some sort of suicide attack. Furthermore, if you were to explain what an act of terrorism is, you might describe improvised explosive device (IED) explosions or a suicide car bombing like those that have killed thousands over the past two decades. If you’ve studied terrorism, you might even reference some of the more notable events and groups like the Achille Lauro cruise-ship hijacking by Abu Nidal or some of the other infamous attacks undertaken by the Irish Republican Army, Hezbollah and others.

Lone wolf actions and singular shooting sprees by deranged snipers and enraged misfits always seemed to be classified as something other than a formal act of terror – but that seems to have changed.

Nowadays, the term “terrorism” is used so often to describe horrific actions that the term’s meaning has expanded from what it was just a few short years ago. If history is any precursor, we’re about to see some further expansion of that definition beyond what it is today.

While “terror” is a more than appropriate word for describing what Muhammad and Hasan did to their victims, I can’t help but wonder in looking at these two different men and two different events why the term “terrorism” is used to describe their actions and it is not used to describe another recent tragic event.

When a mentally-deranged student, Seung-Hi Cho, killed 32 people at Virginia Tech in April 2007, the day’s carnage was as unprecedented as it was horrific, but I don’t recall it being described as “terrorism.”

Why?

Was it because Cho was mentally ill?

Was it because he didn’t spout off some hateful ideology?

Was it because he successfully took his own life and could not be prosecuted for his actions?

Was it because he wasn’t Muslim?

I don’t know the answer to these questions, but I do know that if investigators had gone into his dorm room and discovered a poster of Osama Bin Laden on the wall, militant Islamist Web sites all over his computer and had found he had shouted “Allahu Akbar” as he was shooting his victims, we would be looking at the tragedy at Virginia Tech much differently than we do today.

That brings us to our use of the word “terrorism.” There are strict legal definitions of what does and does not constitute terrorism. Those definitions have come into play in the completed and forthcoming prosecutions of Muhammad and Hasan, but in terms of the word’s public use, we run a risk of de-sensitizing the real meaning of the word when we use it so easily to label unspeakable acts.

By offering that thought, I am not saying that what Muhammad, Hasan, Tim McVeigh and others have done is not terrorism. Legally, as well as in the eyes of society, they have all committed murder via acts of terrorism. But this word has a sense of power that should reserve it for the worst of actions and means. The legal system and society have judged Muhammad and McVeigh as terrorists, and it may eventually add Hasan to those ranks, but for whatever reason, Cho has avoided the label.

I don’t know the reason why, but I know that the debate on the word’s meaning is going to be a long discussion, and I hope to learn a lot more along the way.

Posted in Law Enforcement, Military & Homeland Defense, Radicalization, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

U.S. Policy toward Cuba, Key Considerations for National Security

Wednesday, November 4th, 2009

On October 27, I participated in a panel on U.S. Policy toward Cuba: Key Considerations for National Security. The forum was sponsored by the Center for Democracy in the Americas and several congressmen, including Congressman Bobby Rush. While most of the panel and the audience were clearly in favor of a policy change, I tried to bring a pragmatic approach to the discussion. Our discussions on Cuba and the current debate over the country’s status were summed up in an article in the Havana Times on October 31. While the article clearly presents a Havana perspective, it is nevertheless worth a read for its take on the ongoing debate.

Posted in Homeland Security Industry & Private Sector, Immigration & Visa Policy, International, Management & Administration, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

Delta Settles with Imams Over Religious Profiling

Wednesday, October 28th, 2009

Recently, Delta Airlines (formerly Northwest) settled a lawsuit filed by six imams who claimed they were profiled for their religion rather than suspicious behavior. They were subsequently removed from a flight and questioned by authorities. In July, a federal judge sent a strong message that the airline lacked probable cause to remove the imams from the flight by ruling that Delta could be held liable for civil damages. Delta settled with the Muslim clerics out of court.

In my opinion, the airline should have stood firm and pursued the litigation to its end, including exhausting all appeals. The judge’s ruling undercut the airline’s partnership with the federal government to prevent another 9/11, and the pilots who had the imams removed from the plane deserved their employer’s support. The judge’s ruling creates two primary issues.

First, it is long settled policy that the pilot-in-command’s authority to determine who does or does not fly is absolute. This ruling interferes with that critical standard. In light of this ruling, pilots may be obliged to call the General Counsel instead of TSA or law enforcement authorities when they question whether their obligation to protect their passengers’ safety is jeopardized.

As a former senior TSA official who has testified before Congress on the obligations of the pilot-in-command, I don’t think very many airline pilots are satisfied with this ruling or the airline management’s need to respect the settlement. A similar event is likely to happen again, since I don’t see pilots at any time allowing their authority to be compromised.

Second, airlines are required by TSA to report instances of suspicious behavior as soon as practical after observing or becoming aware of it. The same principle applies. Does TSA want regulated parties to first call their General Counsel and debate the legal definition of suspicious behavior before making a report – potentially hours or even days later? Simply put, such delays are an invitation for new acts of terrorism in the aviation sector.

This settlement does nothing to enhance security and is a disservice to preventing new acts of terrorism. Everyone must be aware of the realities of using post-9/11 commercial air transportation and accept the need for certain security measures.
 

Posted in Aviation and airport security, Border Security, Homeland Security Industry & Private Sector, Law Enforcement, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy in Afghanistan

Thursday, October 22nd, 2009

Michael Braun, former Chief of Operations for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, testified before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control regarding the Taliban’s involvement in drug production and trafficking.

Mr. Braun is now a Managing Partner with Spectre Group International, LLC.  The company has offices in Alexandria, VA and Kabul, Afghanistan.

Statement for the Record

Chairman Feinstein, Co-Chairman Grassley, and Distinguished Members of the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the threat posed by drug trafficking and related security issues in Afghanistan.  The security challenges facing Afghanistan today, above and beyond drug trafficking and abuse are enormous.  I believe you will agree with me that the Taliban is at the root of most of those security threats, and I believe it will be abundantly clear by the end of this hearing that most of the security threats emanating from the Afghan drug trade now fall squarely in the lap of the same malevolent thugs—the Taliban. What is even more ominous are the broader strategic threats, the by-product if you will, this activity has, and will continue to produce.

Madam Chairman let me say up front that each of you on this Caucus, and your colleagues throughout Congress, should be praised for all that you have done to support the multi-faceted counternarcotics efforts of our nation, and many other countries around the globe.  I appreciate the fact that it is in that spirit you called us here today.

Before entering the private sector on November 1 of last year, I served for almost four years as the Assistant Administrator and Chief of Operations with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, and for one year as the Agency’s Acting Chief of Intelligence.  I also served in a number of DEA offices throughout the United States, including service on both our Southern and Northern borders, on both our East and West Coasts, in the Midwest, as well as approximately three years in various countries in Latin America and Iraq.

It is through my 34 years in law enforcement that I sit before you today, deeply concerned about drug trafficking and related security threats playing out in Afghanistan.  You will receive a career, Federal narcotic agent’s perspective on the Afghan drug trade, and how the trade will continue to destabilize the country if we do not become more aggressively involved in countering this major threat.  If left unchecked, funding from the Afghan drug trade will continue to fill the Taliban’s war chest in volumes unmatched by all other forms of illicit finance combined.  I will also provide you with my views on the continued evolution of the Taliban—from an insurgent group, to a designated terrorist organization, to a ‘hybrid terrorist organization.’

The Continued Evolution of the Taliban, And 21st Century Global Organized Crime

The Taliban is following in the footsteps of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and at least 20 other terrorist groups designated by our nation, into a ‘hybrid terrorist organization.’  The Taliban was merely an insurgent group just a few short years ago, but they are now clearly one part designated terrorist organization—and one part global drug trafficking cartel.

Just like the FARC, the Taliban got its start in the global drug trade by simply taxing poor farmers, which is one of the world’s oldest forms of organized criminal extortion.  They then began taxing the movement of drugs and precursor chemicals within Afghanistan, and across its borders.  Like the FARC, the Taliban formed ever-closer relations with traditional traffickers as they grew more accustomed and comfortable with each other, and the Taliban eventually started providing security at the traditional traffickers’ clandestine laboratories and cache sites.  In the private sector, it is called ‘outsourcing.’

About three years ago, the National Security Council asked the DEA to conduct a comparative analysis of the FARC and Taliban with respect to their evolution in the global drug trade.  What the Agency reported as I recall, was that the Taliban was on the exact same path as the FARC, but the Taliban was seven to ten years behind the FARC’s evolutionary development in the global drug trade.  What troubles me most about the study are not its findings; but the speed with which the Taliban is advancing their commitment and involvement in drug trafficking activity.  They are closing the seven to ten year ‘evolutionary gap’ with the FARC at a speed far faster than most care to admit or acknowledge.

The DEA reestablished its presence in Afghanistan in early 2003, after being forced from the country by the Soviet Union’s invasion in 1979.  By 2005, the DEA clearly identified the Taliban’s involvement in protecting clandestine laboratory and drug cache sites for traditional traffickers.  Flash forward just four short years.  The Agency has unmistakably determined that the Taliban is now managing and operating major clandestine laboratories, drug cache sites, and poppy bazaars.  They have morphed; they have become the manufactures and traffickers of heroin, opium, hashish and marijuana.

As an example, just two weeks ago the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan and Afghan Army Commandos, supported by the DEA and U.S. military Special Forces, raided a major laboratory in Southern Afghanistan and seized approximately 1.8 metric tons of opium and heroin—a major haul by anyone’s calculations.  It doesn’t stop there.  Sixteen Taliban were killed at the site, and the evidence clearly reveals the group was involved in the manufacture of heroin.

What is even more troubling is the fact that Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and IED bomb making materials were recovered at the scene, along with a host of other weapons and Taliban propaganda and training manuals.  Thanks to strong support from our military, raids like this are now taking place weekly.  IEDs and IED bomb making materials, suicide vests, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, other weapons, as well as Taliban propaganda and training manuals, are routinely located at these sites.  Nearly all of those labs, cache sites and opium bazaars are directly linked to the DEA’s High Value Targets (HVTs) in Afghanistan, and they provide a treasure trove of evidence that support future prosecutions.

The DEA is usually focused on building prosecutable cases against 15 to 20 HVTs in Afghanistan.  These are the ‘most wanted’ drug traffickers in the country and most, if not all, are members of the Taliban.  Those who aren’t Taliban are closely linked to the Taliban.  I am proud of the men and women of the DEA for their work with Afghan counterparts in bringing several of the most notorious Afghan traffickers to justice in the United States.  Traffickers like Haji Bashir Noorzai, who was the world’s single largest heroin trafficker before being arrested by the DEA in an elaborately complex undercover sting operation.  He was also one of the five original founding members of the Taliban Ruling Shura in Kabul, and was on Central Command’s ‘Top 10’ HVT list when we invaded Afghanistan and initially ousted the Taliban in 2002.  Noorzai got a taste of American justice in the Southern District of New York, and is now serving a life sentence with no hope of parole.  The DEA could not have successfully brought Noorzai or any of the other Afghan HVTs to justice without the powerful extraterritorial jurisdictions that you bestowed on the Agency when you passed legislation enacting the Title 21, 959 and 960(a) statutes.  From a retired federal narcotics agent—thank you.

The money generated by the Afghan opium and heroin trade is staggering, and most experts usually fail to consider how much money the Taliban derives from the hashish trade.  In June 2008, the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan and Afghan Army Commandos, supported by the DEA and U.S. military Special Forces, raided a Taliban hashish processing facility near Spin Boldak in Southern Afghanistan where they seized 235 metric tons of the drug—by far the largest drug seizure in world history.  The estimated Western European value of the drugs was over $600 million dollars.  If the Taliban’s profit was just 5 percent, which is being overly conservative, they stood to gain $30 million dollars from the stash.  Around the same time, the DEA and Afghan counterparts raided a HVT’s compound in Eastern Afghanistan and seized his drug ledgers, which clearly showed that $169 million dollars had moved through the traffickers hands for the sale of 81 metric tons of heroin over just a 10-month period.  He is unequivocally affiliated with the Taliban, and is facing American justice.

One important aspect of the Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade that I believe we are failing to exploit is their leadership’s growing level of greed.  The Taliban’s ‘corporate office’ has acquired an insatiable appetite for easy money over the past few years.  Just like the FARC, the Taliban leadership uses ideology as an effective means by which to recruit and indoctrinate the young warriors they rely on to do their dirty work, as well as the nasty fighting.  However, the Taliban leadership’s core beliefs are going right out the window as greed replaces ideology as their principle motivator.

As we witness the continued evolution of the Taliban, we must also recognize we are witnessing the evolution of 21st Century global organized crime.  It is becoming more and more difficult to distinguish the terrorist from the cartel member, because they are operationally and organizationally interbreeding and morphing into one and the same.  The indisputable convergence of terrorism and international drug trafficking is playing out before our very eyes in Afghanistan, and in many other places around the globe.

U.S. Military Support to Law Enforcement An Important Aspect of the Afghan Counter Insurgency

Our military has conclusively realized over the past couple years that we will not win in Afghanistan until we get the country’s drug trade in check, and law enforcement cannot effectively conduct counter-narcotics operations without the support of our military.  What was unsympathetically absent a few short years ago is now generously available—robust military support to counter-narcotics interdiction operations.  The types of interdiction operations I mentioned earlier are now supported in myriad ways by our military and all are jointly planned, coordinated, de-conflicted and executed by military and law enforcement personnel.

In support of drug enforcement operations, our military routinely provides airborne medical evacuation capability, and they dedicate heavily armed close air support and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) aerial platforms to provide airborne force protection.  They have purchased specialized field equipment for DEA and Afghan officers, such as night vision goggles, and they have purchased MI-17 heavy lift helicopters for dedicated vertical lift of agents and their equipment.  Our military has purchased and issued to DEA portable Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for dedicated use on drug enforcement operations.  They provide critically important encrypted communications equipment, and have purchased very costly telecommunications intercept equipment that Afghan police and DEA agents use to judicially tap traffickers communication devices.  They have invested in ISR technology for DEA aircraft, and have built training academies and other facilities to support Afghan and DEA personnel.  Moreover, our military has paid for virtually all aspects of the Interagency Operations Coordination Center, and the Afghan Threat Finance Cell, which is helping to identify and track the funds derived from the Afghanistan drug trade.  Most important—almost all operations are now executed with U.S. Military Special Forces operators working shoulder-to-shoulder with law enforcement agents.

When you fuse the unparalleled tradecraft that seasoned DEA agents bring to the fight with the exclusive war fighting techniques of highly experienced Special Forces operators, you create a counter-insurgency capability that is second-to-none.  More of this blend would definitely be better, and would be a wise investment of taxpayer dollars.

The Bottom Line

We are not going to win the fight in Afghanistan until we get the country’s drug production and trafficking activity in check, because it provides a limitless stream of funding directly into the Taliban’s war chest.

Professor James Fearon of Stanford University completed a study in 2002 entitled, “Why Some Wars Last Longer than Others.”  The professor identified and studied 128 civil wars and insurgencies from 1945 to 2000, and found that on average they lasted about eight years.  However, he identified and isolated 17 of the 128 that lasted on average about five times longer than the other 111—40 years or longer.  The common thread between the 17 was that the anti-government forces involved in the conflicts generated their own contraband revenue, most of which was through their involvement in one or more aspects of the global drug trade.

Finally, the Taliban and traditional drug traffickers both thrive in what our military calls ‘ungoverned space.’ In Afghanistan, they share a truly symbiotic relationship.  When traditional drug traffickers successfully destabilize government by corrupting officials—the Taliban benefits.  When the Taliban successfully destabilizes government through attacks on government forces or by intimidating the populace—the drug traffickers benefit.  They are both constantly working to destabilize government and create permissive environments in which to operate, because they flourish in areas of weak governance.  Consequently, if you fight one with any less passion and vigor than you fight the other, you are most likely doomed to fail.

Posted in Critical Infrastructure, Homeland Security Industry & Private Sector, Intelligence, International, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, Narcotics, Radicalization, Smuggling, Terror Finance, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

Legislating Water Security the Hard Way – via Compromise

Tuesday, October 20th, 2009

The House Energy & Commerce Committee is set to markup the Drinking Water System Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 3258) tomorrow.  The bill, which would regulate drinking water utilities through a “CFATS-like” regime under the Environemental Protection Agency (EPA), will require utilities to update their vulnerability assessments, develop site security plans, and evaluate their disinfection processes.  Were the bill to stop there, Congress could have avoided controversy – but we all know how Congress loves a good controversy…

Concerns regarding use of chlorine have led members from the majority to include a mandate within the bill requiring utilities to adopt so-called Inherently Safer Technologies (ISTs) if a switch can be made without impacting public health, shifting risk, or bankrupting a given system.  The “decision-maker,” or entity with final say as to whether a utility has to change processes, is the State (or the EPA if the State lacks primacy, such as in Wyoming or DC).  While other concerns exist, enabling someone beyond the local utility to be able to force a change in treatment process is by far the standout issue of this legislation.

For my money, I’d say the current language represents a perfect compromise in that neither side is completely happy.  Democrats on the Committee, like Chairman Waxman and SubCommittee Chairman Markey, wanted a bill that mandated all utilities to switch by giving EPA the authority to force them to banish chlorine.  Drinking water systems wanted to continue operating without new regulations, or at the very least, maintain decision-making authority regarding disinfection processes.  Neither side ran the table.

On this particular issue, the Energy & Commerce Committee gave “the people” what they claimed to want – compromise and thoughtful negotiation.  Too bad we’re living in an ”all or nothing” society…

Posted in Critical Infrastructure, Homeland State & Local, Intelligence, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, Private and Physical Security, Supply Chain Security, Terror Strategic Analysis | Comments

Corruption – Why Cartels and Terrorists Succeed

Tuesday, September 22nd, 2009

The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) conducted a survey of its top performing confidential sources a couple years ago, and asked them to list in order of importance the factors that allow global drug trafficking cartels [and terrorist organizations] to succeed.  At the very top of the list for every respondent was the single word— ‘CORRUPTION.’

Powerful Mexican and Colombian drug trafficking cartels, both of which now span the globe, invest billions of dollars a year to corrupt virtually every level of government in their respective countries.  And if United States policy and lawmakers think for a moment that the cartels are focused solely on their side of the border, they had better think again.  Richard Padilla Cramer, who not long ago retired as a Supervisory Special Agent with the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), was recently accused by the U.S. Government of comporting with Mexican drug cartels and selling out his former U.S. law enforcement colleagues.  It is important to remember that Cramer is innocent until proven guilty, but this recent drug corruption arrest should sound some alarm bells here in our country.

It’s also essential to understand that corruption within the ranks of law enforcement in our country is nothing new, especially along our Southwest Border.  There have been a number of employees of every three-letter agency in the U.S. Government’s law enforcement alphabet soup, the FBI, DEA, ATF, ICE, CBP and USMs (Marshals), who have succumbed to corruption at the hands of formidable drug cartels.  Local and state law enforcement agencies have fared worse, with some officers even arrested while transporting large loads of drugs in their squad cars for Mexican cartels.

The most significant difference between U.S. and Mexican law enforcement is our internal ‘policing’ capacity.  Federal and state law enforcement agencies in our country, as well as most local departments, have aggressive internal affairs divisions that work hard to identify, investigate and bring to justice those from within their ranks who have gone wrong.  And although American law enforcement has an accomplished track record of policing its ranks, the pressure being exerted on the cartels in Mexico by President Calderon will most certainly cause them to resort to ever more assertive attempts to permeate every nook and cranny of the entire judicial systems of both our countries.

Corruption within the ranks of law enforcement and judicial systems, as well as military and intelligence institutions, is like a cancer.  It is absolutely crucial, now more than ever, that these critically important institutions remain healthy.  In order to do so they must constantly undergo self-imposed preventive check-ups for the disease, and when a cancer is discovered it has to be aggressively cut out, and the margins continually checked.

Consequently, now is the time for policy and lawmakers, as well as Inspectors General, to vigorously examine and assess the strengths of anti-corruption and internal policing programs within our government’s law enforcement, intelligence and military departments, commands and agencies.  More importantly, now is the time to proactively identify and shore-up the weaknesses—before it’s too late.

Posted in Border Security, Congress, Politics & PR, Homeland Security Industry & Private Sector, Homeland State & Local, Ideology & Public Diplomacy, Immigration & Visa Policy, International, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, Smuggling, Terror Finance, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

Breaking: Secretary Napolitano outlines new Administration’s vision for counter-terror and homeland security

Wednesday, July 29th, 2009

Homeland Secretary discusses security plans – washingtonpost.com

U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano on Wednesday called for more public participation to guard against terrorist threats, part of the Obama administration’s strategy to keep the country safe.

The strategy involves cooperation of local law enforcement, the federal government and U.S. allies along with ordinary Americans in a collective fight, she said in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations.

The country’s counter-terror approach needs to be “more layered, networked and resilient to make it smarter, and more adaptive,” her prepared text said.

Posted in Congress, Politics & PR, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

Iran Now: The United States’ Next Move?

Tuesday, July 21st, 2009

The presidential elections of June have brought to the surface, like never before, the deep rifts that exist within Iranian society and its power structure.  What is really happening there? And more importantly, what should the United States do about it?  The delicate and serious nature of the current situation in Iran requires a very wise approach by the Obama Administration.  The stakes are very high and the opportunity is unique.  Let me explain.

Lack of Consensus from the Start
The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran gave birth to a form of government called velayat e faqih, a theocracy run by a council of Islamic jurists and a supreme leader.  The leader at the time was Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini who ruled from the spiritual base of the revolution, the holy city of Qom.  From day one, the Ayatollahs and Islamic leaders of the revolution were divided over the direction of the revolutionary government and the nature of the velayat e faqih theocracy.  The most influential Ayatollahs at the time of the revolution were: Ruhollah Khomeini, Mortaza Motahhari, Mohammad Beheshti, Sayyid Ali Hoseyni Khamenei (Ali Khameini), Abdul-Karim Mousavi Ardebili (Mousavi Ardebili), Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, Mahmoud Taleghani, and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.

•    Khomeini became the supreme leader until his death in 1989.  He advocated for a velayat e faqih with near absolute powers given to the supreme leader.
•    Motahhari’s influence, which was significant in the years preparing for the revolution, came to an abrupt end with his assassination on May 1, 1979, before he could influence the debate over the direction of the Islamic government.
•    Beheshti (assassinated in 1981) was close to Rafsanjani and influenced the thinking of Mohammad Khatami.  He had his doubts about the powers entrusted to the supreme leader.
•    Khameini was closest to Khomeini and succeeded the latter as supreme leader in 1989. He is opposed to reforming the current system but lacks his predecessor’s charisma and stature.
•    Mousavi Ardebili, who did some of his studies in Najaf, Iraq under the guidance of Ayatollahs Khoi (Khu’ee), Hakim and Shirazi, is currently the senior theologian of the Islamic republic.  He was the head of the judiciary until 1989 and founded Mofid University.  He has mixed views regarding the powers of the supreme leader.  (It is important to note that the Hawza of Najaf has historically consistently opposed the velayat e faqih system of government.)
•    Mahdavi Kani became an influential member of the Guardians Council and showed his more liberal political views when he declared the foreign trade nationalization bills and land reform bills in the 80’s to be against the teachings of Islam.  He too has mixed feelings about the powers of the supreme leader.
•    Taleghani was probably the most influential leader of the Islamic revolution.  He paved the way for Khomeini and was the chairman of the Revolutionary Council plotting for the revolution.  Upon the return of Khomeini to Iran, he became the most vocal opponent to the absolutist powers of the supreme leader and often ‘clashed’ with Khomeini on this issue leading to a major rift between them in April 1979.  His sudden death in September 1979 robbed the reformers of a powerful figure.
•    Rafsanjani along with Khameini were the closest Ayatollahs to Khomeni and held the most power.  He was instrumental in the founding of the most important institutions of power of the newly established theocracy, became Speaker of the Parliament and was elected twice to the Presidency.  Under his leadership, fundamental economic reforms were undertaken liberalizing Iran’s economy and major moves towards normalizing relations with the West were also initiated.  He opposes the absolutist powers of the supreme leader.

Of the seven original most influential Ayatollahs around Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, five (Beheshti, Mousavi Ardebili, Mahdavi Kani, Talleghani and Rafsanjani) while being strong supporters of the establishment of an Islamic Republic were opposed in varying degrees to the powers of the Supreme Leader (which include the power to remove an elected President from office) as advanced by Khomeini.

Iranian intellectuals and much of the middle class had a different vision and outlook in mind for the post-Shah Iran.  Most were contemplating the establishment of a secular constitutional republic and some had envisioned a more Marxist type of government.  In the end, however, Khomeini was so popular that the country overwhelmingly supported his call for establishing the Islamic Republic of Iran with an Islamic Constitution in an open referendum held in April 1979.

Given the divisions among the clerics vis-à-vis the powers of the supreme leader, it was a matter of time before these differences would come to the surface.  The major ‘crack’ in the system appeared following the election on January 25, 1980, of Abolhassan Banisadr as the first President of the Islamic Republic of Iran.  Banisadr, who was not a cleric, clashed with the clergy over his powers as President.  This had the potential of creating a rift within the country, a rift that could have been used by the reformers; but something else happened.

First Setback for Reformers
The one most important event that stopped the reform movement from gaining ground and more openly challenging the velayat e faqih system of government took place on September 22, 1980, when Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Iran.   Khomeini seized the invasion as an opportunity in the name of national security to get rid of Banisadr and his government and to consolidate his own power.  On June 10, 1981, Khomeini removed Banisadr as Commander-in-Chief and assigned the office to himself.  Eleven days later, Banisadr was impeached by Parliament and the order was signed by Khomeini the following day.  The war had a devastating effect on Iran.  Iranians suffered more than 300,000 casualties and were subjected to Iraqi mustard gas attacks.  The eight-year war came to an end when a ceasefire was reached on August 20, 1988.  Iranian national pride and the need for unity in facing Iraq’s assault muted the reformers’ voices and effectively barred them from openly challenging the system.  On the other hand, Khomeini and his conservative allies seized this opportunity to consolidate their hold on power.

Pendulum Swing
The two most powerful Ayatollahs in Iran were still Ali Khameini and Akbar Rafsanjani.  Khomeini appointed Ali Khameini to succeed him as supreme leader upon his death in 1989.  This presented an opening to Rafsanjani and his followers.  With Khameini lacking the charisma and popular stature that Khomeini enjoyed, Rafsanjani worked diligently to position himself as the other “pole” of power in the Islamic Republic.  He took the lead in pushing political and economic reforms, giving Parliament and the Presidency a greater role in governance, in an attempt to position those offices as counterweights to the office of the supreme leader.  The 90’s was an important period led primarily by Rafsanjani with the pendulum starting to swing in a direction away from the supreme leader.  This was a critical juncture for the reformers.  They had drawn an important lesson from the Iran-Iraq war.  As long as Iran was besieged by the outside world with sanctions, embargoes, and calls for regime change, Iranian domestic reforms could not go far for two major reasons:

a) Foreign investment in Iran’s infrastructure and industrial base, including oil and gas, were desperately needed to help them move the country forward.  In the absence of normalized relations with the United States that would not be possible.
b) The push by the reformers for change in the regime’s power structure while the country is under international siege will most definitely be labeled by Khameini and his conservative allies as undermining the national security of the country.  Conservatives would then exploit Iranian pride and nationalism to undermine their reform efforts.

With that in mind, as soon as Rafsanjani assumed the Presidency in 1989, he seriously explored ways to start a dialogue with the United States aimed at normalizing relations between both countries.  The United States, however, was pre-occupied with an increasingly belligerent and aggressive Iraq threatening its small and powerless neighbor Kuwait and testing US security commitments in the region.  The George Herbert Walker Bush Administration decided this wasn’t the time for discussing normalization of relations with Iran.  Saddam invades Kuwait on August 2, 1990.  The United States with the full support of the United Nations and key Arab states led a multinational force and launched Operation Desert Storm aimed at liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation.  The war was successfully executed and on February 26, 1991, Kuwait was liberated.  Iran remained isolated.

Iranian reformers had then hoped that President George H.W. Bush, when and if re-elected, would be ready and willing to engage in normalization talks.  In their calculus, given Iraq’s war waging against its neighbors and the need for long term security and stability in the Gulf region, the United States would be willing to see a potential positive role to be played by Iran in this equation.  Furthermore, Iranian reformers were very aware of the political and cultural pressures the Saudi government would be subjected to by Wahhabis and Salafis due to the heavy presence of American troops on Saudi soil and in the region.  Hopes were pinned by Iranian reformers on Bush’s re-election, but William Jefferson Clinton was elected President in 1992.

Second Setback for Reformers
The election of Bill Clinton as President of the United States was seen as a setback by Iranian reformers.  In their eyes, President H.W. Bush was a realist and pragmatist who put the US national interest above special interest such as that of Israel supporters in Washington.  The Clinton Administration, on the other hand, made Israeli security a primary objective and pursued a two-prong policy to achieve it.

Firstly, the Clinton Administration believed that peace with the Palestinians would better serve Israel’s long term security.  Efforts were exerted to promote an Israeli-Palestinian peace accord through direct negotiations between Israel and the PLO.  The Oslo Agreement of 1993 was signed and the Clinton Administration invested a lot of time and energy in managing the conflict between both parties and trying to bring them closer to one another through intense sets of negotiations.

Secondly, in the eyes of the Clinton Administration, the security of Israel also required a) containment of Iranian influence rather than an accommodation of Iranian concerns; and b) containment of Iraq’s rising influence and belligerence within the Arab world in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War (war to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation during which Iraq fired Scud missiles on Israel).  In order to achieve this security objective, the Clinton Administration announced its dual containment strategy.

With the priorities of the Clinton Administration set as described above, attempts in the 90’s by Rafsanjani to open up to the United States went nowhere because they ran counter to the Clinton Administration’s strategy of dual containment and its regional security policy framework.  This represented the second major setback to the reformers in Iran.

Opportunity Knocking
The terrorist attacks of September 11th against the United States sent political shockwaves through the US security and foreign policy establishments.  With Al Qaeda and Sunni Wahhabi/Salafi inspired Islamism striking at the United States, the Iranian reform establishment saw an opportunity for a possible rapprochement with Washington that could ultimately lead to normalized relations.  In their thinking, as explained earlier, improved relations with the US were necessary to help them push system reforms more successfully.  Under the leadership of Ayatollah and President Mohammad Khatami, a leader among the reformers and a close ally of Rafsanjani, Iran seized on the attacks of 9/11 and took the following steps all aimed at sending positive signals to Washington:

•    Condemnation of Al Qaeda: Iran was the first Moslem country to condemn the terrorist attacks of September 11th.  Furthermore, the only candlelight vigils to take place in a Moslem country expressing solidarity with the victims of 9/11 were held in Iran on September 18, 2001.
•    Cooperation on Afghanistan: Iran played a very constructive role in assisting the United States during Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 aimed at removing the Taliban from power.  It also played a pivotal role in supporting the establishment of a new democratically oriented government in Afghanistan.
•    “Facilitating” the Invasion of Iraq: The United States invaded Iraq on March 19, 2003, launching Operation Iraqi Freedom aimed at the removal of the regime of Saddam Hussein and the establishment of a pro-American and more democratically oriented government in Baghdad.   The invasion came from the south with US forces traveling northward towards Baghdad.  There was practically no resistance from Shiite Iraqis who constitute the majority of the population in southern Iraq.  “Understandings” had been reached prior to the invasion between US officials and exiled Iraqi Shiite religious leaders such as Khoi (Khu’ee) and Hakim, two of the three most prominent Iraqi Ayatollahs  at the time (the most influential being Grand Ayatollah Sistani).
•    Nuclear Program Freeze: Iran froze its nuclear program in yet another goodwill gesture towards Washington and Khatami sent a message to the George W. Bush Administration expressing Iran’s desire to have talks aimed at normalizing relations between both countries.

Divisions within the Bush Administration regarding US policy towards Iran paralyzed American response and by 2004, “hawks” within the Administration were advocating regime change in Iran.  The opportunity that the reformers had sought in the aftermath of 9/11 was missed.  Furthermore, conservatives in Iran capitalized on the US’s negative response to overtures by Iranian reformers likening it to a “kick in the butt” and presenting it to the Iranian public as unambiguous proof that Washington’s real objective was the destruction of the Iranian nation.  Given this national security perception, past negative experiences with the United States (refer to a Security Debrief on Iran published on May 29, 2009), the deteriorating security situation in Iraq with potential spillover effect into Iran, and the failure of the reformers over 15 years to produce substantial changes to the system, Ayatollah Khameini and conservative mullahs were able to “facilitate” the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President of Iran in August 2005.

Countering Regime Change
The Iranian government led by Ahmadinejad became very aggressive and quite belligerent in response to what they perceived as Washington’s aim of regime change in Iran.  From 2005 through 2008, conservatives rallied behind Ahmadinejad and exploited to the fullest advantage the policies of the Bush Administration’s second term (see Security Debrief on Iran published of May 29, 2009);  capitalizing on Iranian pride and sense of nationalism.  During this period of heightened US-Iranian tensions, the region became quite unstable with violence reaching new heights.

•    Religious strife between Sunnis and Shiites erupted in Iraq in 2006 threatening the Bush Administration’s stated goals in that country.
•    A 33-day war between Israel and Hezbollah was fought in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 causing numerous civilian casualties and leaving in its aftermath Hezbollah in a much stronger position.  Arab popular opinion rallied behind Hezbollah posing a threat to the credibility and legitimacy of the governments of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan.
•    A war between Israel and Hamas was fought in Gaza in November 2008 that ended with Hamas retaining power in Gaza and winning greater sympathy from Arabs and Moslems worldwide.  The war also put President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority between “a rock and a hard place” and threatened his credibility among Palestinians.
•    Iranian calls for the destruction of Israel and anti-Semitic rhetoric became quite intense.
•    Iran resumed its nuclear program much more aggressively in defiance of the United States and the international community.

During those very tense years, the reformers in Iran could not be seen as challenging their own system of government for fear of being undermined by the conservatives as ‘puppets’ of America.  The conservatives were very successful in painting a very bleak picture to the Iranian public wherein Iran’s existence was being actively threatened by the United States and Israel.  Given this environment, reformers in Iran got busy regrouping their forces quietly awaiting their “next opportunity”.

New Opportunity Knocking
The election of Barack Obama as President of the United States provided the reformers in Iran with another golden opportunity.  His rhetoric during the campaign, and more importantly, his actions since assuming the Presidency all pointed to his willingness to establish a dialogue with Iran.  His message to the Iranian government and people on March 19, 2009, on the occasion of the Persian New Year (Nowruz or Norouz) went a long way to point to Iranians that the United States was willing and ready to open a new chapter in US-Iranian relations based on mutual respect and dialogue.  Furthermore, President Obama delivered an address to the Moslem World in Cairo, Egypt on June 4, 2009, which was a resounding success from a public diplomacy perspective.  When the Obama Administration decided to engage Iran after and not before the June Presidential elections, a major race erupted between the reformers and conservatives in Iran.  Who would be in power to negotiate with the United States?

To the reformers, winning the Presidential elections would enable them to quickly engage the United States and normalize relations more expeditiously.  This would then give them the needed boost to pursue the reforms of the system of government and the role of the supreme leader in the Islamic Republic.  To the conservatives, Ahmadinejad’s retention of the Presidency would enable them to negotiate with the United States from a position of strength and help them contain and/or manage internal reforms more effectively.  All surveys and public opinion polls conducted about two weeks prior to the election were showing Ahmadinejad winning by a comfortable margin.  Reformers, on the other hand, made a major last minute push using modern technology and electronic social networks to rally support and enthuse the younger generation to participate in greater numbers in the election.  While no one can, at this point, assert with full knowledge who really won the election, one can safely state that the authorities working under Ahmadinejad did manipulate the election results (at least in Teheran) where the margin of victory (whether for Ahmadinejad or Mousavi) should have been very small.

What happened next?  Conservatives underestimated the resolve of the reformers and their determination to score a Presidential victory.  The reformers, having suffered repeated setbacks in the past, were determined this time around to go all the way pitting all their hopes on the persona of Barack Obama; who appears to them as more genuine and serious about a frank and open dialogue with Iran. They chose to defy the results as announced by the government and Mir Mousavi called for street protests and demonstrations.  Ahmadinejad and his conservative allies pressed Khameini to side with them in order to put an end to the protests.  Khameini, after much hesitation, came down on the side of Ahmadinejad with the hope that his stature would be sufficient to bring an end to the “chaos” and did so with the full realization that he might jeopardize the “Office of the Supreme Leader” by having it painted as “partisan” when it is supposed to be above all politics.  With Khameini taking sides with Ahmadinejad, the reformers decided to openly and publically challenge the legitimacy of the system and the power of the supreme leader.

“Those responsible for organizing the elections have obligations to the people. Unfortunately, events that have taken place after the election have caused turmoil in the Islamic Republic. We should not use force to pacify the protests. The issue must be resolved in a different manner,” stated Ayatollah Ardebili on June 27, 2009.

On July 17, 2009, Ayatollah and former President Rafsanjani spoke at Teheran University on the occasion of Friday mosque prayers and heavily criticized the government’s actions.  “Today is a bitter day,” he said at Tehran University. “People have lost their faith in the regime and their trust is damaged. It’s necessary that we regain people’s consent and their trust in the regime.”

This prompted a reply on Saturday, July 18, 2009, by conservative Ayatollah Yazdi:  “Legitimacy and acceptance are different in Islamic government,” Ayatollah Yazdi told the semi-official Fars news agency. “Votes alone do not create legitimacy.”

On Sunday, July 19, 2009, Ayatollah and former President Khatami called for a referendum on the legitimacy of the Iranian government stating that millions of Iranians had lost faith in the electoral system.

The lines have been drawn.  The real dispute is among the Ayatollahs over the power of the Supreme Leader and the velayat e faqih system of Islamic government with Rafsanjani and Khatami leading the charge.  Furthermore, the “weakening” of Khameini’s stature as Supreme Leader may boost among the clerics in Iran the influence of Grand Ayatollah Sistani (Najaf, Iraq) who had consistently opposed the velayat e faqih system of government.

Constitutional Reforms
The objective of the reformers at this stage is to keep pushing as far as they can with the final aim of ridding the system of the velyat e faqih and replace it with an Islamic system governed by three branches – Parliament, Presidency and Judiciary – wherein the Supreme Leader is stripped of his political powers and acts only as the spiritual leader of the faith.  This change would conform to the teachings and jurisprudence of Shiite traditions as advocated by the Hawza of NajafIraq and would radically transform the nature and operations of the Iranian government.  In reality, this has been the “secret” aim of the reformers among the Ayatollahs, especially Rafsanjani and Khatami.  They both experienced the Presidency and tried to steer the country down a progressive path to find the Supreme Leader blocking them at every turn.  They became fed up with the system and sought ways to change it but acted with a lot of prudence.   This explains why in the early days of the protests, they did not challenge the system directly (they let Mir Mousavi, a non-cleric, do so) and waited for the right moment.  The opportune moment came when Ayatotallah Khameini took sides favoring Ahmadinejad.  He was no longer “above politics” or “untouchable” as supreme leader.  Rafsanjani and Khatami decided then to openly challenge the system and the authority of the Supreme Leader.

What Should the United States Do?
Firstly, President Obama must be commended for exhibiting prudence and wisdom in his measured response to the developments in Iran since the June elections.   Many in Washington have been advocating a tougher stance by the United States to show solidarity with the demonstrators.  Some have even advocated to have the United States seize this moment to strike at Iran’s nuclear facilities or allow Israel to do it.  President Obama has wisely resisted these pressures because the stakes are very high for the United States and a “wrong” move at this juncture could, in time,  do irreversible damage to American national security interests.  Let me explain.

Non-Interference
The reformers in Iran do not want the United States, and definitely not Israel, to appear as directly interfering in this crisis.  As long as the US remains out of it, the reformers have greater chances for success.  As I explained earlier, conservatives in Iran have always exploited US calls for regime change, containment and tougher sanctions to undermine any serious effort for reform through open debate in the name of national security (i.e., this is not the time to show divisions when confronted by US anti-Iranian aggressive measures).  The reformers want the United States to stay out of this crisis and are betting on President Obama to help them carry the day by not interfering.  The conservatives cannot use President Obama as an excuse given his speeches and moves regarding US-Iranian relations.

Engage?
Should the Obama Administration engage Iran at this stage? How? When and under what circumstances?  These are very critical questions that demand serious answers especially in light of the September 28th deadline given to Iran on the nuclear issue (prior to the next G-20 meeting).  The inclination by many in Washington is to have the United States push for tougher sanctions through the UN Security Council if Iran fails to meet the nuclear conditions by that deadline.  That is exactly what the conservatives in Iran are hoping for, given the current crisis they’re facing domestically, and that is exactly what the United States should avoid doing.  The United States has too much to lose this time around if the Obama Administration falls into the same old cycle of “speaking tough” and advocating sanctions.  What is the alternative?  Before answering the questions above, it is important to analyze further the dynamics of the current situation on the ground in Iran.

The reformers having by now put everything on the line are trying to form a more solid coalition made up of them (clerics), prominent civilians, respected revolutionary leaders, representatives of the middle class, intellectuals, and students (18-25 years old).  This coalition is not yet in place and lacks a clear vision.  No one can predict whether, when and how this effort may succeed because the situation is very fluid and must be monitored on an hourly – not even daily – basis.  What is certain, however, is that the system has suffered irreparable damage to its credibility and legitimacy.  The reformers hope to force a referendum on the legitimacy of the current government which they foresee winning.  The conservatives, on the other hand, have already recognized that damage was done and are desperately trying to contain it.  I say contain it, because the conservatives are very weary of using deadly force against the reformers; they know that the rank and file of the Revolutionary Guards are divided over the current state of affairs in the country and may risk division or possibly rebellion within the Guards if they were to order them to use deadly force.    In summary, there is an internal dynamic in Iran that is very fluid and may produce mutations in different directions.

Secret Diplomacy
Given the uncertainty of the direction that events may take on the ground in Iran, the one most important fact for the United States is that it faces now an Iran that has a weaker government in place being challenged by a growing opposition.  The United States should seize this opportunity to engage in “secret” diplomacy.  Silence is gold in such circumstances.  Messages should be conveyed to both sides that the United States remains committed to engaging Iran on the basis of respect and mutual interests (refer to Security debrief on Iran dated May 29, 2009) and would like to do so as soon as possible.  This move by the United States would be welcomed by the reformers because it would limit the current government’s maneuverability against them.  It would also be welcomed by Ahmadinejad and Khameini (not all the conservatives) who would use it to contain the reformers’ final push at this time.

The United States has everything to gain and almost nothing to lose in engaging NOW in secret diplomacy with both sides.  Some may argue that, given these divisions within Iran, the United States would be better off having the situation in Iran deteriorate on the security level even to the point of civil war.  This would make it easier for the US military to take out the nuclear facilities with Iranians busy fighting among themselves.  At a first glance, this option may appear appealing as serving to fulfill the objective relating to Iran’s nuclear program.  It will, however, make Iran an unstable country with unpredictable and possibly devastating consequences to American national security interests in the Gulf region.  In other words, a stable Iran with better relations with Washington serves best the national security interest of the United States; an unstable Iran would most definitely be exploited by radical Islamists to spread chaos in the region and would present a clear and present danger to the United States.

Cultural intelligence matters!

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Iran: The U.S. Needs a New Strategy

Friday, May 29th, 2009

The Middle East through a New Prism – Part II

Almost everyone involved in national security affairs, within and outside the government, talks about the threat that Iran poses to U.S. interests in the Middle East as follows:

-    Iran was responsible for terrorist attacks against the United States in 1983 in Lebanon
-    Iran sponsors terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza-    Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability that threatens regional stability
-    Iran has been actively engaged in trying to defeat U.S. efforts in Iraq-    Iran threatens Israel’s security and existence through its vitriolic anti-Semitic rhetoric and support of Hamas

Given this view of the Iranian threat and Iranian’s unabated belligerent behavior, national security policymakers and opinion makers in the United States almost unanimously agree that the past policies of sanction regimes and containment employed by successive U.S. Administrations since 1979 have failed to produce the change in Iranian policies and attitudes towards the United States and the region.  Furthermore, almost all agree that the perceived Iranian threat has increased in scope and magnitude and therefore requires an American approach that is drastically different.  We find the national security community in Washington generally divided into two groups: those advocating a much tougher stance on Iran that includes the use of preemptive military force to destroy Iranian nuclear and military strategic capabilities; and those advocating an engagement approach to discuss ways to neutralize Iran’s nuclear threat while building an Arab regional axis to counter Iranian influence in the region.

-    Iran has been actively engaged in trying to defeat U.S. efforts in Iraq

Unfortunately, both approaches are derived from the same old prism and may have catastrophic consequences for the region’s stability, oil security, and U.S. long term interests.   Let me explain.

Approach I: Military Operation
A U.S. military operation against Iran may be very successful in destroying most if not all of Iran’s nuclear program’s facilities and capabilities.  The real question, however, does not center on America’s military capability to defeat Iran, but rather on what happens in the aftermath of a military victory.  Based on “cultural intelligence understanding” of the region, here are possible outcomes resulting from a U.S. military campaign against Iran:
-    Unstable Iran:  the destruction of Iran’s organized military infrastructure may bring about non-centralized armed militias that could operate with impunity and pose a very serious danger to neighboring countries.  There is one very important lesson to draw from the 2003 Iraq war — in the absence of an organized national army, armed militias and terrorist cells will most certainly emerge posing a more serious threat due to the asymmetrical world in which they operate.
-    Unstable Gulf: an unstable Iran will most definitely affect stability in neighboring Gulf countries which have large Shiite deprived populations and lack the capability to fight asymmetrical wars against extremist militias and/or organizations.  We also need to take into account the possibility of Iranian retaliation against oil and other strategic facilities in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf during and following a U.S. military campaign.
-    Unstable Iraq: all gains made in recent months in Iraq could be greatly reversed endangering the safety of the more than 120,000 U.S. troops still deployed in that country.  In a best case scenario, the Shiite community will split on whether to side with Iran, and in a worst case scenario, Shiites will unite against the United States.  Sunni extremists and Al-Qaeda will seize the opportunity to regroup and may even join forces with extremist Shiites in the fight against the United States posing a greater danger to the safety of U.S. troops who are currently operating under a withdrawal scenario and are not gearing up for major operations.
-    Israel’s Security: the Middle East of 2009 is drastically different from what it was in 1967 and poses a much greater threat to Israel’s security.  In 1967, Israel defeated the armies of several Arab countries combined, waged war on Arab territory, and had friendly regimes in power in Iran and Turkey.  Today, Israel faces a transformed Middle East.

Lebanon:  in the summer of 2006, Hezbollah dealt Israel a military defeat, admittedly limited and relative.  Furthermore, there is a strong probability that the opposition, which is led by Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement (headed by Christian General Michel Aoun), may score a victory in the parliamentary elections of June 6, 2009.  In a best case scenario for the United States and Israel, the opposition as a block will not get a majority, but Hezbollah will most certainly be part of the government and a force to be reckoned with; and in a worst case scenario for the United States and Israel, the opposition may win a majority in Parliament further enhancing Hezbollah’s power position within the Lebanese government.
Gaza:  Hamas controls the Gaza strip and is launching rockets targeting Israeli towns.  If open and democratic elections were to take place in the West Bank today, Hamas along with other more radical Islamist groups would probably win.
Arab Countries:  Arab Sunni Islamists have made the liberation of Palestine a sacred struggle and Arab undemocratic regimes are besieged by Sunni extremist Islamism advocating total war on Israel using the Hezbollah and Hamas models.  Israel’s wars in Lebanon in 2006 and Gaza in 2008 have emboldened Sunni Islamists throughout the region.
Iran:  the current Iranian regime poses a serious threat to Israel’s security and existence and is supporting militant groups like Hezbollah and Hamas.
Iraq: the country is governed today by a Shiite majority that is closer to Iran.
Turkey:  the current democratically elected government of Turkey is more Islamist (though not extremist) and has drawn closer to Iran and Syria than in the past.
Israel:  Israeli Arabs have become much more outspoken about the conflict with the Palestinians and had a “mini uprising” against the Israeli government during the Gaza war in 2008.
Given this state of affairs in the Middle East today, if the United States (or Israel) were to launch a military campaign against Iran, it could create a much more explosive situation with unpredictable consequences for Israel.

The Iranian Threat Viewed through the Old Prism
Almost everyone involved in national security affairs, within and outside the government, talks about the threat that Iran poses to U.S. interests in the Middle East as follows:
-    Iran was responsible for terrorist attacks against the United States in 1983 in Lebanon
-    Iran sponsors terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza
-    Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability that threatens regional stability

Approach II: Diplomatic Engagement
Those in Washington who see the potential danger in and the explosive chaos resulting from a military operation against Iran, advocate a strong diplomatic engagement aimed at neutralizing its nuclear threat.  To further enhance the U.S. negotiating stance, they also advocate the creation of a de facto coalition of moderate Arab regimes led by Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia whose aim would be to curtail Iranian influence in the region.  If the United States were to pursue this approach it would most probably fail in stopping Iran’s nuclear program and further embolden and empower Iran.  Why?  Because this approach is also based on viewing Iran and the Middle East through the old prism and fails to recognize the following:
a)    Iran’s quest for a nuclear weapon is a matter of Iranian security; and
b)    In the absence of a final resolution to the Palestinian problem, an anti-Iranian coalition made up of Arab undemocratic and unpopular regimes cannot go far.  Iran will continue to be perceived by Arab populations as the true defender of the Palestinian cause.

Let me explain.

Iranian Security
The Iranian political, religious and national security establishments share (almost unanimously) the view that the United States Government is quite deceitful in its dealings with Iran and, therefore, cannot be trusted.  This is a summary of how Iran perceives itself vis-à-vis U.S. policy:
-    Over the past almost 60 years, the U.S. has always blocked the emergence of democratic governments in the Middle East and continued to prop up absolutist monarchies and dictatorships with the sole aim of exercising greater influence over oil security policies.
-    In the aftermath of the Khomeini-led Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran, the United States has constantly exhibited hostility towards Iran and diligently worked to undermine and/or overthrow the Iranian regime.
-    The Islamic Republic of Iran never invaded or threatened with invasion any of its neighboring countries.  It was aggressed by Iraq in 1980 and suffered a bloody 10-year war in which chemical and other weapons of mass destruction were used against it by Iraq with the tacit, and later more open, support of the U.S. Government.
-    Iran was the first Moslem country in the region to forcefully condemn the terrorist attacks of September 11th.  Furthermore, on September 18, 2001, Iranians held spontaneous candlelight vigils for the victims of the attacks of September 11th.  No Arab country had that.
-    Iran’s constructive cooperation with the United States during Operation Enduring Freedom (launched by the U.S. in 2001 to liberate Afghanistan from the Taliban) was repaid by the Bush Administration with tougher anti-Iranian rhetoric.
-    Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States, Iran’s “extended hand” of cooperation expressed by Iranian President Mohammad Khatami (confirmed by Defense Secretary Gates) and Iran’s goodwill gesture by halting its nuclear program (confirmed by a National Intelligence Estimate at the time) were met with total rejection and regime change rhetoric and policies by the Bush Administration.

Given this view of the United States Government, the Iranian establishment concluded by 2005 that no matter what Iran does (save total submission to destructive U.S. conditions) its security will always be endangered unless it develops its own nuclear capability as a deterrent.  In addition, Iran finds itself in a wider region where Israel, Pakistan, India and China all have nuclear weapons.  In summary, Iran’s quest for a nuclear program has much more to do with security than achieving long term energy independence.   With this background in mind, and in order to counter what they perceived as destructive U.S. policies in the region, the Ayatollahs ‘orchestrated’ presidential elections in 2005 enabling the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran’s President.  The nuclear program was resumed and a much more aggressive anti-American campaign was adopted by Iran throughout the region.

President Obama’s expressed intentions of wanting to dialogue with Iran has divided (to a certain extent) the Iranian establishment on whether to temporarily freeze their nuclear program in one final attempt at extending a goodwill gesture towards a U.S. President who seems to be more genuine in his intentions and appear to be more understanding but must be tested. This explains to a certain degree the context within which the elections’ debate over the nuclear program is taking place.

Anti-Iranian Coalition
As soon as Iran’s government perceived the Bush Administration to be seriously trying to undermine Iran’s role and position in the region through an anti-Iranian Arab coalition, it adopted a two-tier counter strategy:
-    Defender of the Palestinian Cause:  the victory of Hamas in parliamentary elections in January 2006 generated serious concern among U.S. and Israeli officials because Hamas was committed to an armed struggle against Israel and its charter effectively calls for the destruction of the State of Israel.   The Bush Administration and the Israeli Government embarked almost immediately on a coordinated political and military effort aimed at undermining the power of Hamas.  Facing political isolation in spite of having come to power in democratic and open elections and fearing disruptive actions by Fatah and its security services in the Gaza strip, Hamas took control of Gaza in a preemptive military coup in June 2007.  This is the context within which Iran viewed and interpreted the actions of Hamas in 2007.  The Bush Administration immediately responded by advocating total isolation of Hamas and Gaza and pressured Arab governments such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt to follow suit.

Arab and Moslem populations witnessed, live on satellite television networks such as Al Jazeera, the desperate conditions to which Palestinians in Gaza were subjected to by Israeli and U.S. policies.  They expressed their anger at their own governments for what they perceived as abandonment of the Palestinians in Gaza and the Iranian government saw this as a golden opportunity.   Iran provided support to Hamas, championed the plight of the Palestinian people, criticized the passivity of Arab regimes like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and conducted an aggressive public relations campaign of anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic rhetoric.   In so doing, Iran positioned itself as the true defender of the Palestinian cause among Arabs and Moslems alike.  The Arab and Moslem perception of Iran as a reliable defender of the Palestinian people was further strengthened during the 2008 war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.  Arabs and Moslems alike repudiated the actions of Arab governments such as Egypt for closing the border with Gaza, trapping thousands of civilians trying to flee the conflict.  In contrast, Iran provided logistical, financial and moral support to Hamas and the Palestinians in Gaza.   By aggressively championing the Palestinian cause, and in the absence of a serious U.S./Israeli effort to resolve the Palestinian problem, Iran was successful in increasing its soft power in the region thus undermining the ability of the Bush Administration to create a viable and solid anti-Iranian Arab coalition.

-    Military Victory: The rhetoric coming out of Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia which raised the specter of an Iranian-led Shiite power threatening Arab and Sunni culture and position in the region, was interpreted by the Iranians as part of the U.S. effort to build an anti-Iranian Arab coalition.   To counter this effort and show Sunni Arab Moslems the invalidity of such an argument, Iran engaged in trying to build a Shiite-Sunni coalition in Iraq – united under the banner of nationalism – to fight U.S. occupation of that country.  This Iranian effort proved to have had a very limited effect if any at all.  Another Iranian effort centered on securing an Israeli military defeat.  Nothing rallies Arab and Moslem public opinion like military actions against Israel.  In preparation for such an eventuality, Iran provided Hezbollah in Lebanon with the needed logistics, equipment, financing and training.   The opportunity came knocking on July 12, 2006.  The conflict started when Hezbollah fired rockets on Israeli border towns while simultaneously attacking a couple of Israeli military vehicles.  The attack resulted in the killing of three Israeli soldiers and the kidnapping of two others by Hezbollah.  Israel responded with an aggressive bombing campaign that escalated into a 33-day war in Lebanon.  Early statements by Arab officials coming out of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia condemned Hezbollah’s actions as “reckless” and endangering the region’s stability.  In Iran’s thinking, Hezbollah had to resist as long as possible and win that war in order to: first, prove to the Arab and Moslem worlds that Israel can be defeated when and if the appropriate strategies are employed against it; and, secondly, to embarrass the governments of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia by portraying them as more eager to appease (if not be in league with) the Israeli enemy instead of standing firm by the side of the Lebanese people who are facing Israeli aggression.  Iran’s calculus worked.  Hezbollah’s effective resistance and later victory (though limited and relative) dealt a major set-back to U.S. efforts to build an anti-Iranian Arab coalition.   Demonstrations were held in several Arab cities and towns, including Cairo, Egypt, in support of Hezbollah and the Lebanese people.  The governments of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia had to ‘reverse course’ and strongly condemn Israeli actions and criticize the United States for not putting a quick end to the conflict.

For all these reasons, a U.S. diplomatic approach aimed at ending Iran’s nuclear program will most probably fail and may even project an image of the United States as being weak, indecisive, and effectively incapable of further isolating Iran.

The New Prism to View the Middle East and the Iranian Threat
Unfortunately, and to this day, no consensus has emerged within the U.S. national security establishment on how to deal effectively with the global threat of extremist Islamism.  The key culprit for this lack of consensus is the old prism through which policymakers continue to view the Middle East.  The United States needs to look at the region through a totally different prism that is derived from greater and deeper cultural intelligence of the region.

Defining the Threat
In reality, extremist Islamism can be divided into two main categories, Sunni-based and Shiite-based.  A common mistake that one often witnesses in Washington is the constant mixing and/or linking of Sunni and Shiite extremist Islamists; for example, putting Al Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah in the same basket!
Let us analyze the threat to the United States that emerges from each type of extremist Islamism.

Sunni Extremist Islamism
There are numerous groups around the world that fall under this umbrella and tend to be loosely connected if at all.  They have, however, common features that distinguish them drastically from Shiite extremist Islamism and are as follows:
-    Strict interpretation of the Koran: these various Sunni groups believe that the door of Ijtihad was closed in the 12th century and should remain so today.  In other words, it is impossible in their eyes to find common ground between their version of Sunni Islam and an international order that governs today’s modern world.
-    Suicide ideology: these Sunni groups justify the use of suicide bombings against civilians as a mean of martyrdom in fighting the infidel.
-    Record of terrorism: these Sunni groups have been responsible for almost every Islamist suicide terrorist bombing throughout the world since the Eighties.  The record includes bombings in Algeria, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Morocco, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, Turkey and most importantly, the United States on September 11th.
-    Worldwide ideology:  Sunni extremist Islamist groups are aggressively recruiting Sunni Moslems from around the world, especially the West, to create cells that could in the future destabilize those countries from within.  Furthermore, they are endeavoring to establish extremist Islamist governments and/or safe heavens within countries such as Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, or Somalia in order to sustain their struggle into the future.
-    Nuclear ambitions: Sunni extremist Islamist groups consider Pakistan’s nuclear bomb to be their own.  Their only goal is to one day put their hands on that power and use it against the infidels.

In summary, Sunni extremist Islamism is a global non-centralized revolutionary movement, is responsible for the terrorist attacks of September 11th and all other major Islamist terrorist attacks worldwide, is aggressively pursuing the radicalization of Sunni Moslems in Western countries so they can become a destabilizing force in the future, is fiercely fighting the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and is looking forward to the day it can put its hands on the nuclear arsenal of Pakistan and detonate dirty bombs in the United States and around the world (wherever it deems it necessary).

Shiite Extremist Islamism
This form of Islamist extremism is very different from the Sunni one and has the following key features:
-    Iran centered:  although Shiite groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon are relatively quite autonomous they are much more connected to the Iranian regime than Sunni extremist groups are to a single government.
-    Open interpretation of the Koran: Shiite Islamist groups believe that Ijtihad and Tafseer are permitted in Islam enabling them to adapt their beliefs to different situations as they see fit.  Such adaptations may vary dramatically from the narrowest views on social mores to the most open ones.  For example, in Hezbollah controlled areas in Lebanon, one can easily see totally covered women walking side by side with women dressed in western clothing without any head or face covering.
-    Suicide ideology:  Shiite extremist Islamist groups have justified suicide bombings as acts of martyrdom and have condoned them only when they are conducted against military and government installations of an occupying enemy on occupied land.  In other words, a suicide bombing against an Israeli target can be justified if it takes place in Lebanon but cannot be justified if carried out outside Lebanon.  Furthermore, suicide bombings targeting civilians in cafes, discotheques, shopping centers, etc. are, for the time being, totally forbidden.
-    Record of terrorism: the terrorism record of Shiite extremist Islamism is very small in comparison to the Sunni one.  The two major terrorist attacks attributed to Shiite extremist Islamism were both in Lebanon and took place 26 years ago (U.S. Embassy bombing in April 1983 and the U.S. Marines compound bombing in October of the same year.  The Marines compound was blown-up along with the French military compound).  Although Hamas receives support from Iran in its struggle against Israel, Hamas’ terrorist actions against Israeli civilians are carried out by Sunni extremist Islamists.
-    Self-preservation ideology: Shiite extremist Islamism is driven mainly by the need to preserve Shiite Islam and the struggle for Shiite emancipation in Sunni governed countries.  Unlike Sunni extremist Islamism which advocates a transnational ideology that aims at establishing a different world order that suits their Islamic views, Shiite Islamism is more nationalistic in nature.
-    Nuclear ambition: Iran is seeking the bomb for its own security and Shiite extremist Islamism may very well make use of it under certain circumstances.

In summary, Shiite extremist Islamism is driven by nationalism, is relatively centered on Iran, does not have worldwide ideological ambitions, has not carried out terrorist attacks in recent times, is more focused on the emancipation of Shiites within Islam rather than fighting the infidels, and is pursuing a nuclear weapon that it may use if necessary.

Defeating the Threat
The fight against extremist Islamism will be long and hard and will at times present dangers and challenges as great if not greater than those witnessed during the Cold War against the Soviet Union.  The United States cannot afford to walk away from this fight and the threat of extremist Islamism, whether Sunni or Shiite based, must be defeated.  The question is how?

Option I: Solve the Palestinian Problem
There is no doubt that solving the Palestinian problem would remove major complicating factors in the fight against extremist Islamism but will not bring the fight to an end.  Let me explain.

Sunni extremist Islamism has an ideology that goes beyond the Palestinian cause.  It has placed the plight of Palestinians under the same umbrella as the plight of Moslems in India, Chechnya, Bosnia, China, Europe, America and Arab countries who are being mistreated in a world dominated by the United States.  Resolving the Palestinian issue would weaken the case for Sunni extremist Islamism but not put an end to it.  Furthermore, the fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan against the Taliban would most certainly continue so would the fighting in Somalia and other parts of Africa and Asia.

On the other hand, Shiite extremist Islamism as I explained earlier is driven by nationalistic and discrimination factors.   The Palestinian problem has been successfully used by Iran to counter U.S. efforts aimed at isolating it in the region.  Solving the Palestinian problem would most definitely weaken Iran’s efforts in countering an anti-Iranian Arab coalition but would not stop it from pursuing its nuclear program, which is driven as I stated earlier by national security concerns.

Furthermore, given the priorities of the current Israeli government and the general feelings of Israelis today, it is almost impossible at this point to move effectively forward on the Palestinian-Israeli peace track.  Irrespective of who bears greater responsibility for the breakdown in Palestinian-Israeli peace talks and who is to be blamed and for what, Israeli public perceptions at this moment are skeptical of any concessions to Palestinians to the point of cynicism.  In their view, whether right or wrong, every Israeli territorial concession has been met with more Arab violence; the latest concession being the withdrawal of Gaza which was met with rockets fired by Hamas on Israeli towns.  Having said that, I believe it is imperative that the United States jumpstart the peace process as quickly as possible.  This, however, requires a new strategy that is based on viewing the region through a new prism (which will be Part III of this series).  In summary, this option, though effectively dead at this stage, can ease the pressure on the U.S. in the fight against extremist Islamism but does not solve the problem.

Option II: Confront both Threats Simultaneously
Given the realities outlined above, if the United States were to fight Sunni and Shiite extremist Islamism simultaneously, the results could be devastating to the region, oil security and long term interests of the West.  Both streams of Islamism might unite in their efforts and create horrific chaos in the Middle East and South and Central Asia.  A renewed but much more aggressive wave of terrorism would shake European cities and sooner rather than later reach U.S. shores.  While no one could predict the final outcome of such a confrontation, the cost of such confrontation would be horrendous.

Option III: Drive a Wedge between Sunni and Shiite extremist Islamism
In the absence of a solution to the Palestinian problem, such a strategy would have very little impact on the overall threat and does not drastically change the environment on the ground.  Furthermore, if conflict were to erupt between these two streams of extremist Islamism, it would probably spread to the entire Gulf region threatening oil security and long term U.S. interests.

Option IV: A “Kissinger/Nixon” Approach
The fourth option is based on the approach used by the United States in its fight against Communism.  Kissinger and Nixon determined that it would be in the U.S. best interest to drive Communist China away from Communist Russia by seeking to formulate a long term partnership with the one that represented the least ideological long term threat to the United States, namely China.  In facing extremist Islamism, the United States could seriously consider developing a rapprochement with the one stream of Islamism that presents the least long term threat to U.S. interests – Shiite extremist Islamism, and therefore, Iran.  There is one more important point.  Iran is a country with a long and rich civilization that has endured 30 years of Shiite extremist Islamism.  This form of Islamism has already evolved during the past three decades.  It is now a matter of time before Iran reaches a point of equilibrium between its Shiite identity and its rich and diverse civilization.  It is interesting to note for example that in Lebanon, Hezbollah has already rejected the idea of an Islamic Republic and agreed in February 2006 to a consensual democracy in Lebanon.  By contrast, Sunni extremist Islamism in Lebanon is still advocating the establishment of an Islamic Republic of Lebanon.

A New Strategy towards Iran
If the United States were to adopt the fourth option outlined above, it would have to be willing and ready to engage Iran with the aim of developing a strategic partnership that would eventually bring about effective Iranian support for U.S. initiatives in the region and provide U.S. assurances to alleviate Iranian security concerns.  It is in this spirit and within this context that the nuclear issue can be successfully addressed by the United States.  In addition, Iran can be of great support to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon.  What about Israel?  Hasn’t Iran threatened the annihilation of the State of Israel, denied the Holocaust and provided military and logistical support to Hamas and Hezbollah?

The threat to Israel from Iran is very real and cannot be minimized or dismissed.  If seen, however, through the new prism and within a different context, this threat could be dealt with much more effectively.  Let me explain.

While the Iranian Islamic revolution has always used vitriolic language against Israel and Zionism, the degree of aggressiveness has diminished remarkably since the terrorist attacks of September 11th until the summer of 2005.  During the Presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) attempts were made to explore possible détente between Israel and Iran.  The Bush Administration’s rebuffing of Iran’s extended hand and its rewarding of Iran’s cooperation in Afghanistan with an aggressive policy centered on regime change drove the Ayatollahs of Iran mad.  Their response to the United States was the election of Ahmadinejad to the Presidency in August 2005.  This explains why since, Iranian aggressive rhetoric against Israel, its denial of the Holocaust, the hosting of a conference entitled “A World without Zionism”, its threats of annihilating Israel, and its active support of Hamas have come about with such intensity.  If seen through this context and with this new prism, the Iranian nuclear and conventional threat, which are quite real, may be effectively dealt with through this new American strategy towards Iran.

Viewed through this new prism, one can also better understand why in the upcoming elections of June 12th, the Ayatollahs have allowed candidates to run for the Presidency who are critical of President Ahmadinejad’s stance on the nuclear issue and are advocating the normalization of relations with the United States.  The Ayatollahs are not quite sure what to make of President Obama’s intended overture towards Iran.  By allowing these candidates to run and be vocal on these national security issues, the Ayatollahs are sending the signal to Washington that they have heard President Obama.  If, however, Ahmadinejad as expected by many wins the elections, it means that the Ayatollahs want to test President Obama’s intentions first.

In closing, if the United States were to adopt a strategy aimed at forging a partnership with Iran, it would need to tread very carefully, be patient and show resolve because there is a lot of animosity and distrust on both sides, especially on the Iranian side.

Cultural intelligence matters!

Posted in Featured Feed, Ideology & Public Diplomacy, Intelligence, International, Management & Administration, Radicalization, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

Beardsworth Discusses White House efforts to launch holistic national security infrastructure

Thursday, May 28th, 2009

Randy Beardsworth, a Security Debrief contributor and former DHS Assistant Secretary for Strategic Planning, has spent the last several months advising the White House on its efforts to re-organize its homeland security and counterterrorism apparatus. Beardsworth took time off from his role at Catalyst Partners to offer his expertise in the effort to merge the Homeland Security Council with the National Security Council.

During an event yesterday at the George Washington University’s Homeland Security Policy Institute, Beardsworth joined John Brennan, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counteterrorism, and Dr. Michele Malvesti, his co-chair for drafting Presidential Study Directive-1 (”Organizing for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism”) to discuss and explain the new counterterrorism infrastructure.

You can watch a streaming video of the conference (Presidential Study Directive-1: Organizing for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism: An HSPI Policy & Research Forum) here.

Additionally, read the statement by President Obama on this effort:

Statement by the President on the White House Organization for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism

As President, my highest priority is the safety and security of the American people. That is why, in February, I issued a Presidential Study Directive to look at how the White House should be organized to deal with the critical issues of homeland security and counterterrorism. I have carefully reviewed the findings and recommendations of that study, and am announcing a new approach which will strengthen our security and the safety of our citizens. These decisions reflect the fundamental truth that the challenges of the 21st Century are increasingly unconventional and transnational, and therefore demand a response that effectively integrates all aspects of American power.

Key decisions that I have made include:

* The full integration of White House staff supporting national security and homeland security. The new “National Security Staff” will support all White House policymaking activities related to international, transnational, and homeland security matters. The establishment of the new National Security Staff, under the direction of the National Security Advisor, will end the artificial divide between White House staff who have been dealing with national security and homeland security issues.
* Maintaining the Homeland Security Council as the principle venue for interagency deliberations on issues that affect the security of the homeland such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, natural disasters, and pandemic influenza. The Homeland Security Council, like its National Security Council counterpart, will be supported by the National Security Staff.
* The establishment of new directorates and positions within the National Security Staff to deal with new and emerging 21st Century challenges associated with cybersecurity, WMD terrorism, transborder security, information sharing, and resilience policy, including preparedness and response.
* Retaining the position of Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (AP/HSCT) as my principal White House advisor on these issues, with direct and immediate access to me. The security of our homeland is of paramount importance to me, and I will not allow organizational impediments to stand in the way of timely action that ensures the safety of our citizens.
* Creating a new Global Engagement Directorate to drive comprehensive engagement policies that leverage diplomacy, communications, international development and assistance, and domestic engagement and outreach in pursuit of a host of national security objectives, including those related to homeland security.

The United States faces a wide array of challenges to its security, and the White House must be organized to effectively and efficiently leverage the tremendous talent and expertise of the dedicated Americans who work within it. The creation of the National Security Staff and the other recommendations from the study that I have approved will help to keep our country safe and our Homeland secure.

Posted in Congress, Politics & PR, Management & Administration, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

Pakistan: A Failed State?

Wednesday, April 29th, 2009

Time Is Running Out

In several Security Debrief posts published on this site in 2007 and 2008, I discussed the great urgency required by the United States to adopt a different strategy towards Pakistan and I also articulated the options and steps necessary to stop Pakistan’s fast slide towards instability.  Unfortunately, the United States has already missed the boat and time has run out for any “catching up” in policy and tactics.  Today, the world faces the stark and real possibility of Pakistan becoming a failed state and a haven for terrorism with potential nightmarish consequences.  Can this be stopped and what should the U.S. do about it?

What Went Wrong?

US policies towards Pakistan have failed and security has deteriorated dramatically in Afghanistan and Pakistan because the United States did not keeping its eye on the ball!  The source of terrorism and the threat to the world’s security has been, still is, and will remain for the foreseeable future, Wahhabi Sunni fundamentalism which has produced the Taliban, Al Qaeda and their likes, and has established bases of operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  It is not Iran.

Instead of focusing on developing strategies to curb and marginalize over time the influence of Wahhabi Sunni fundamentalism (the root cause of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the source of religious extremism that had inspired suicide bombings in Iraq, Israel, India, and Spain for example), the Bush Administration’s main efforts in its second term in office were aimed at isolating and destabilizing Iran while fighting Al Qaeda-in-Iraq.    The shift in focus produced confusing policies towards Pakistan and Afghanistan and provided the breathing space for Wahhabi Sunni extremists, the Taliban and Al Qaeda to reorganize their forces and restructure their tactics and engineer a major comeback in both countries.

Mission Focus: Defeat Wahhabi Extremism

Security conditions on the ground in both Pakistan and Afghanistan have reached a critical stage and time is running out.  Unless the United States switches gears immediately and adopts an aggressive policy aimed like a laser beam at defeating Wahhabi extremism in both countries, the world better brace itself at having to face two failed states – Pakistan and Afghanistan -  in the very near future.  The “key” to success will depend on having one integrated regionally-based comprehensive strategy towards both countries, otherwise failure is most certain.

Pakistan

The development of a new integrated strategy requires greater cultural intelligence. In this case, religion plays a paramount role in identifying the solution to the problem.  Let me explain.

The overwhelming majority of the people of Pakistan are Moslem or follow Moslem traditions.  It is important to note that Islamic values and practices color virtually all aspects of Pakistani life and society with most Pakistanis being Sunni Moslem (there is a Shiite minority comprising approximately 14% of the population).  The majority of Sunni Moslems in Pakistan adhere to the Hanafi School of Sunni Islam.  There are four major schools of Sunni jurisprudence in Islam namely Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali.  The Hanafi School of Islam is “relatively” the most liberal of the four.  In addition, many Moslems in Pakistan are influenced by Sufism, a more mystical form of Islam.  Although Islam plays a central role in the life of most Pakistanis it was not subverted by violent extremists because of its Hanafi and Sufi influences.

The real problem lies with the spread of the Wahhabi Sunni movement (founded in Arabia) more particularly, among the Pashtun tribes located along the border with Afghanistan.  Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Saudi Arabia provided relief and humanitarian assistance to Pakistan in order to care for the large number of Afghani refugees who crossed the border into Pakistan in search of safety and shelter.  In addition, Saudi Arabia funded the construction of thousands of “madrassas” (religious schools) in those areas which indoctrinated the local population in Wahhabi Sunni Islam.  Over time, these schools became the breeding grounds for fanatical ideologies espoused by extremist groups (notably Al Qaeda and the Taliban) in the region of Baluchistan, the North-West Frontier Province, and other parts of the country.

Any strategy aimed at eliminating the threat of Wahhabi Sunni fundamentalism must have a religious component at its core in order to be effective.  The United States should do the following:

•    United Pakistan Against Wahhabism: the United States should encourage the formation of a national unity government in Pakistan that represents all non-Wahhabi Moslem components of society including the Pakistan Muslim League (N) led by Nawaz Sharif and declare war on a sect that has infected Pakistani society and is threatening the noble soul of Islam.  Under the banner of Pakistani Islam, the country may be better enabled to unite itself and mobilize its population and resources in defense of Pakistan and the Pakistani way of life.
•    US Lower Profile: the United States should lower its military profile and refrain from making statements that are interpreted by Pakistanis as undue interference in their internal affairs.  The struggle against Sunni Wahhabism must be based on Pakistani nationalism and driven by Pakistani society and forces.  Furthermore, while the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is of real concern to the United States and the world, it is recommended that the Obama Administration address these concerns very quietly with the Pakistani military in order to avoid embarrassing Pakistan on an issue that is of great pride to the Pakistani people.
•    India’s Support:  the Obama Administration should discretely secure an understanding with India that provides full support to a national unity government of Pakistan in its push against Sunni Wahhabism.  After all, a ‘failed state’ in Pakistan is of greatest concern to India, given the protracted conflict over Kashmir and the infiltration of Wahhabi Sunni fundamentalism in Indian Moslem society.  This arrangement would free the hands of the Pakistani government enabling it to employ all of its resources against the Taliban and their allies in the North-West Province and Baluchistan regions of the country.

Afghanistan

The second major part of a new integrated and comprehensive strategy to defeat the real enemy – Sunni Wahhabi fundamentalism – centers on Afghanistan.

Virtually all the people of Afghanistan are Moslem with a 75% majority adhering to the Hanafi School of Sunni Islam and approximately 24% of the population are Shiite Moslems, particularly the Hazara and Kizilbash.  Sufism is also widely practiced among Sunnis and Shiites alike in Afghanistan.  While at first glance one may be tempted to think that since the majority religion is Hanafi Sunni, maybe a strategy similar to the one being proposed for Pakistan could also be adapted to Afghanistan.  The answer is no because conditions in Afghanistan are much more complex than in Pakistan.  Although religion holds an important position in the daily life of most Afghanis, divisions along cultural and ethnic lines are quite dominant.  Let me explain.

The Pashtun ethnic group heavily centered in the southern province of Kandahar comprises less than two-fifths of the population and does not constitute a majority.  Tajiks account for approximately 25 percent of Afghanis, the Hazara comprise nearly 20 percent, and Uzbeks and Chahar Aimaks each account for slightly more than 5 percent of the population.  Furthermore, the official languages of Pakistan are Pashto and Persian (Dari).  Approximately two-fifths of the population speaks Pashto (the language of the Pashtuns) but more than half of the population speaks some dialect of Persian (Dari).

The complex religious, ethnic and linguistic mosaic of Afghanistan makes the development of a more coherent strategy against Sunni Wahhabism more difficult but not impossible.  We need to first understand the status of the Taliban in this complex picture.

The Taliban, whose ranks came originally from the Saudi funded Sunni Wahhabi madrassas in northern Pakistan, became a real force in Afghanistan in 1990’s following the withdrawal of Soviet troops.  Their main power base within Afghanistan is in the southern province of Kandahar among the Pashtun ethnic group.  Having taken over the government of Afghanistan in the nineties, the Taliban provided a safe haven for Sunni Wahhabi militants from around the world, including Al Qaeda headed by exiled Saudi Arabian Osama Bin Laden.  Resistance to Taliban power in Afghanistan came primarily from non-Pashtun ethnic groups such as the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, whose power bases are in the north, west, and central parts of the country.  The Northern Alliance, led by Ahmad Shah Massoud (assassinated by Al Qaeda on September 9, 2001, two days before 9/11), grouped local leaders from those regions and ethnic groups of the country in opposition to the Taliban.  The alliance was supported: by India because of their rivalry with Pakistan; by Iran because of their opposition to a strong Sunni Taliban government; and, by Russia and Tajikistan because of the growing Islamic movements in Chechnya and Central Asia.

Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Operation Enduring Freedom was launched by the Unites States and NATO aimed at removing the Taliban from power and going after Al Qaeda.  Having succeeded in toppling the Taliban government and establishing a new government in Kabul, the Bush Administration ‘lost’ focus in its second term.  Instead of pursuing an aggressive policy aimed at neutralizing the long term impact of the Taliban and their Sunni Wahhabi extremist allies, the United States shifted its attention to neutralize Iran’s rising regional influence.  This change in policy focus caused a major setback to U.S. interests in Afghanistan and led to the gradual re-emergence of the Taliban as a power and a major threat to stability in that country.

As in the case of Pakistan, the Obama Administration needs to adopt a strategy that has the single aim of defeating Sunni Wahhabi fundamentalism in Afghanistan.  Given all the background information provided above, the recommended strategy is as follows:

•    New “Northern Alliance” Against Wahhabism:  the United States should encourage the formation of a new ‘Northern Alliance’ made up of all non-Pashtun ethnic groups who are vehemently opposed to the Taliban.  A new national government would be formed that brings on board non-Wahhabi Pashtuns and that has at its core this new Northern Alliance.  The defeat of the Taliban and Sunni Wahhabism must take precedence and should not be sacrificed for the sake of seeking greater accommodation with the Pashtuns.
•    India and Tajikistan:  India and Tajikistan have provided military and logistical support in the past to the old Northern Alliance in its resistance to the Taliban.  The Obama Administration should reach out to these two countries and develop a coordinated effort to support the new Afghani government’s policy to defeat the Taliban.  It is in both countries’ national interest, and even most especially India, to have Sunni Wahhabism defeated in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
•    Iran: Iran was the one country most actively engaged in supporting the old Northern Alliance in its resistance to the Taliban during the nineties.  Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom with the aim of removing the Taliban from power and destroying Al Qaeda.  Iran was quite supportive of the American effort:
o    Military and Rescue Support: Iran continued providing weapons to the opposition Northern Alliance, closed its border with Afghanistan, and in response to a request from the Bush Administration, agreed to rescue any American military personnel in distress in its territory.
o    Formation of new Afghanistan Government: after the toppling of the Taliban government, U.S. and Iranian diplomats met together in Bonn to discuss the formation of a new government and constitution for Afghanistan.  “None was more [helpful] than the Iranians,” said James Dobbins, the U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan at the time, writing in the Washington Post. “The original version of the Bonn agreement … neglected to mention either democracy or the war on terrorism. It was the Iranian representative who spotted these omissions and successfully urged that the newly emerging Afghan government be required to commit to both.”

The United States should build on this constructive past experience and engage in a serious dialogue with Iran because the defeat of the Taliban and Sunni Wahhabism are in the interest of both countries, especially Iran.

The Iraq Challenge

An intensified and well-focused effort on defeating Sunni Wahhabism in Pakistan and Afghanistan requires, as stated earlier, the active involvement of regional powers such as India and Iran but also requires a U.S. shift in military, logistical and economic resources away from Iraq towards the Pakistani-Afghani theatre of operations.  An orderly and effective drawdown of U.S. military assets in Iraq necessitates a region-based security arrangement with Iraq’s key neighbors namely Iran, Turkey and Syria.  Of the three, Iran is most important in order to secure stability in Iraq, post U.S. withdrawal, and to insure the non-resurgence of Sunni Wahhabi fundamentalism and Al Qaeda.

Iran and the Netanyahu Opportunity

In this long term war against Sunni Wahhabism Iran could potentially be one of the most reliable regional partners for the United States.  But how can the U.S. engage Iran given past hostilities, the nuclear agenda, Iran’s support to Hamas and Hezbollah, and Iranian leadership threatening to “wipe Israel off the map”?

Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has effectively facilitated the opening for the United States to engage Iran. Let me explain.

On March 29, 2009, two days before he was sworn in as the new Prime Minister of Israel, Binyamin Netanyahu in an interview with the Atlantic was quoted as saying “The Obama Presidency has two great missions: fixing the economy, and preventing Iran from gaining nuclear weapons.”  Netanyahu also said in the same interview that he would support President Obama’s decision to engage Iran, so long as negotiations brought about a quick end to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. “How you achieve this goal is less important than achieving it,” he said.

The Washington Post published an article on April 22, 2009, in which it stated that Israel would not move ahead on the core issues of Palestinian peace talks until it sees progress in U.S. efforts to stop Iran’s suspected pursuit of nuclear arms and to limit Tehran’s rising influence in the region.  “It’s a crucial condition if we want to move forward,” Deputy Foreign Minister Daniel Ayalon, a former ambassador to the United States, told The Washington Post. “If we want to have a real political process with the Palestinians, then you can’t have the Iranians undermining and sabotaging.”

When asked about those Israeli comments at a testimony hearing in front of the House Appropriations Committee on April 23, 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton stated “For Israel to get the kind of strong support it’s looking for vis-à-vis Iran it can’t stay on the sideline with respect to the Palestinians and the peace efforts, that they go hand-in-hand.”

Some analysts have interpreted Secretary Clinton’s remarks as implicitly rejecting the emerging position of Netanyahu’s government and others have predicted that American and Israeli priorities were no longer in sync.  In reality, however, by putting Iran ahead of Palestinian peace talks on Israel’s list of top priorities, Prime Minister Netanyahu has opened the door for the Obama Administration to move as quickly as possible towards engaging Iran in a serious dialogue that may bring peace of mind and security to Israel.

While it is true that Iran is providing support to Hamas, it is important to keep in mind that this support is based on convenience much more than anything else.  Hamas was cut off by Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt after it seized power in Gaza through a military coup and sought support from anywhere, including Iran.  This support, can easily end if and when circumstances, vis-à-vis Hamas, were to change.  The real long term problem for Israel, however, is the ideology of suicide bombing aimed at killing innocent civilians, which is espoused by core elements of Hamas and other extremist Islamist Palestinian factions.

In other words, while Israel considers Iran’s nuclear agenda its top immediate security priority, Israel also knows that the long term threat to its security comes from the ideology of Sunni Wahhabi fundamentalism that rejects any accommodation with Israel and indoctrinates the hatred of the Jews in its teachings.  It is this ideology, and not Iran, that has produced suicide bombings in Israel, Iraq, India, Spain and the United Kingdom.

In summary, the opening presented by Prime Minster Netanyahu must be seized by the Administration with the goal of reaching an arrangement with Iran on multiple fronts that are all inter-related, namely Israel’s security, Iraq’s stability, Pakistan’s recovery and Afghanistan’s liberation.

Eye on the Ball

Stopping Pakistan’s slide into chaos depends on adopting this new integrated comprehensive strategy, and the success of this new strategy depends on keeping two factors constant: preserve mission focus (the defeat of the real enemy – Sunni Wahhabi fundamentalism), and secure regional engagement.

Cultural Intelligence matters!

Posted in Ideology & Public Diplomacy, Intelligence, International, Terror Finance, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

Attacking the Piracy Problem

Thursday, April 16th, 2009

The recent pirate attack on the MAERSK ALABAMA generated a great deal of reporting and discussion on how to respond to the future pirate threat.  Many of the reports came to the conclusion that the area to protect is so great (over 1 million square miles of ocean) and the pirate threat so pervasive, all of the ships in the U.S. Navy couldn’t protect shipping in the area.

The officials responsible for the security of the U.S. often find themselves in this dilemma; too many threats and not enough resources to counter all of them.  In these challenging cases, one of the fundamental rules of security is this: If you try to protect against all threats you will spread your capacity so thin that you will not effectively protect against any of them.  Security planners must identify the most valuable things to protect, assess threats and evaluate enemy capability using robust risk management tools.  The results of this risk assessment are then used to determine how to optimally deploy limited capacity with goal of safeguarding the most important potential targets.

A risk assessment and U.S. counter-piracy plan might look like this:

1)    Protect U.S. shipping first.  U.S. flagged vessels are sovereign territory of the U.S. regardless of where they are in the world.  It is incumbent on the U.S. government to protect this territory as aggressively as we do our homeland.  Ship owners that register their vessels in the U.S. expect this protection.  As a matter of scope, there are only 422 U.S. registered merchant ships over 1000 gross tons (CIA Factbook 2008) operating around the globe and only a small percentage sail in the vicinity of Somalia.  Military escorts, armed boarding teams, and, if necessary, convoys could be used to protect this small number of U.S. flagged ships.
2)    Protect ships carrying U.S. and U.N. sponsored relief supplies.  If capacity is available, protect non-U.S. flagged ships carrying relief supplies to the Horn of Africa.  Prioritize highest value cargoes and begin by protecting these ships first.
3)    Partner with other nations to build capacity.  The French, Dutch and others have credible naval presence in the region.  Agreements could allow for sharing intelligence, protection and boarding of the partner’s flagged vessels, and coordinating patrol areas.
4)    Partner with regional naval forces.  Work with coastal states to gain intelligence from coastal radar and AIS sites in order to improve maritime domain awareness.  The more U.S commanders know about maritime activity in the region, the better they can detect threats and position forces.
5)    Build regional capacity.  The long term goal would be to build effective governance and law enforcement capacity in Somalia.  That is not on the horizon so we should help build credible regional naval forces that can assist in countering the pirate threat.  For example, the U.S. has helped build a fledgling Yemeni Coast Guard that has improved maritime domain awareness and coastal security in the area.  More can be done for both Yemen and other Horn of Africa nations.

The pundits and reporters who work under the assumption that all shipping in the region should be protected by the U.S. and then wring their hands because there are not enough resources to protect everything are missing the point.  The U.S. is not responsible for solving the Somali piracy problem, but we are responsible for protecting U.S. citizens, territory and interests in the region.  If we start with that goal in mind, the problem becomes manageable.

Posted in Emergency Preparedness & Response, Ideology & Public Diplomacy, Intelligence, International, Maritime & Seaport Security, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

DHS Threat Assessments: More Psychology, less Idealism Needed

Wednesday, April 15th, 2009

There has been a lot of news about the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence & Analysis’ (I&A) April 7, 2009 assessment on “Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment.”  Some of these news – rather commentary – reports have expressed concern with the assessment’s characterization of “rightwing.” Having endured three years of partial reporting, misreporting and downright yellow journalism by the media while working at DHS I learned, in addition to proper stress relief techniques, to disregard erroneous reporting. But having read I&A’s report, I have to admit, some of the media outlets have a point.

I&A periodically puts out these assessments with FBI coordination as a way to inform state and local officials. They’ve done these assessments on a variety of issues. The analysts that write them are simply taking information they’ve collected (mostly open source information) and compiling it in a way to shed light on an issue. So I don’t buy into the conspiracy theories that this was timed with the “tea party” demonstrations or that this is a political move to paint conservatives or Republicans as out of the main stream or dangerous.

However, the assessment’s footnote definition, in part, of ‘rightwing extremist’ includes groups that “reject[ing] federal authority in favor of state or local authority, or rejecting government authority entirely. It may include groups and individuals that are dedicated to a single issue, such as opposition to abortion or immigration.” Now I&A may be going too broad with that definition.

There are plenty of issues where I don’t think the federal government has the authority to act and that the state and local authority possesses that authority. My basis for that thinking comes from the US Constitution and from specific cases where the US Supreme Court upheld the basic tenents of federalism.  The vagueness of the assessment and the broad terms used to define ”rightwing extremism” deserve criticism and I&A should specifically catagorize “extremists”, especially in reports that begin with the words: “The DHS/Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has no specific information that domestic rightwing* terrorists are currently planning acts of violence .  . .” You almost wonder why then law enforcement needs the assessment.

DHS I&A may also want to consider the true reasons behind extremists’ violent acts – and possibly the mental make-up of those individuals as part of their assessment. The assessment reasons that the economic downturn, the inability to get credit and the first African American president may cause rightwing extremists to become violent. I&A uses past experiences to support this assessment. But the assessment is mostly supposition. New investigations of noteworthy violent acts should cause I&A to factor in the physiological mindset of individuals who tend to become violent.
Next week is the tenth anniversary of the Columbine High School shooting. One of the most violent school massacres in our nation’s history, and it was committed by teenagers. Yesterday, USA Today ran the piece “10 years later, the real story behind Columbine”.  The story tackles a number of myths about why Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold murdered 13 people and wounded 24 more. The article points out that the attack was planned as a bombing, however the bombs failed to detonate. The two teens planned to shoot people fleeing from the explosion inside the school and they even rigged their vehicles to explode when first responders began to arrive. (In any other context this would be called an act of terrorism.) Most notably the article debunks the myth that these two were outsiders, bullied by classmates and full of teen angst. Psychologists looking at these types of school shootings conclude first and foremost that these were teens with serious psychological problems, including depression and suicidal thoughts. However, immediately after the shootings the fingers were pointed at parents, school officials, bullying, gun laws and a variety of other symptoms. What was apparently missing from the initial diagnosis of “why” they did this was the teens’ severe mental state.

In the future, DHS I&A may want to include in its assessments what seems to be a key link between groups that are upset about the economy or proposed gun laws or anything else for that matter and the indicators that signal that a person will act violently. The Secret Service did this for school shootings in a 2002 report. Increased internet chatter, increased membership in “rightwing” groups and greater access to bomb-making internet sites aren’t the most reliable factors indicating violence. The assessment even points out that the “lone wolf” presents the most imminent threat to homeland security. So before we raise the risk level on these groups and increase the surveillance on people genuinely upset with the current economic and political situation, we may want to analyze the true indicators of violence and help state and local law enforcement to identify those in individuals.

Jeffrey Sural, who currently serves as counsel in the Legislative & Public Policy Group at Alston & Bird, LLP, is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Office of Legislative Affairs at the Department of Homeland Security.

Posted in Civil liberties & Privacy, Congress, Politics & PR, Emergency Preparedness & Response, Homeland Security & the Internet; Gov't 2.0, Homeland Security Industry & Private Sector, Ideology & Public Diplomacy, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

David Heyman: New Kid On the DHS Block

Wednesday, April 15th, 2009

According to the Washington Post “yesterday, Obama announced his intent to nominate former Energy Department official David F. Heyman to be assistant secretary of policy for DHS. Heyman is a senior fellow and director of the homeland security program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.”

Around Washington, Heyman is well known as one of the nation’s most respected homeland security analysts. Heyman was the co-director of two important and influential studies — DHS 2.0, which was instrumental in guiding the major reorganization of the Department of Homeland Security, correcting many of the shortfalls in the legislation that established DHS in 2002; and Homeland Security 3.0, which offered a blueprint for the new administration how to develop a national homeland security enterprise.

As the chief policy officer in DHS, Heyman will be responsible for helping craft the department’s role as the steward of the national homeland security enterprise. In particular, he will have to play an important part in building trust and confidence and the basis for joint action with other federal agencies; the private sector; state, local, and tribal governments; and our international partners. Perhaps most challenging of all he will have to explain and defend the department’s policies and programs to the myriad of Congressional committees that oversee DHS affairs.

Those of us who know him well, know that he is well-qualified for the challenges ahead.

Posted in Congress, Politics & PR, Management & Administration, Terror Strategic Analysis | Comments

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