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Archive for the ‘Smuggling’ Category

“The US border has never been more secure”

Wednesday, June 23rd, 2010

Before a packed audience at CSIS, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano delivered what can only be described as a pointed and aggressive defense of the Obama Administration’s border security efforts. Declaring that “the US border has never been more secure…but there is more work to be done” and that “no one is satisfied with the status quo,” her “tough talk” about border security comes at a very interesting time.

With the Obama Administration poised to challenge in court the recently enacted tough Arizona immigration law, the ongoing southwest border violence and recent charges by Sen. John Kyl (R-AZ) regarding a recent Oval Office meeting with the President about when immigration reform might be tackled, the Obama Administration rolled out their most experienced border expert to take on its critics and declare what had been done.

While I’ve never seen her campaign for elective office, I got the sense from her delivery that she was very happy to put on her boxing gloves and take on all comers. It was in essence a campaign speech to declare what had been done on the Administration’s watch and to make sure they knew the President and his team deserved credit for it.

Pointedly saying, “the numbers tell a story and don’t lie,” the Secretary detailed increases in border patrol hiring and deployments, increases in enforcement and deportations, and in technology deployments. The numbers were impressive and they do tell a positive story, but sitting in the audience, I and a number of other attendees noted that many of the investments and numbers she heralded were initiated by her predecessor, Michael Chertoff and the previous Administration. I haven’t had time to do it, but it would be an interesting side-by-side comparison to put the end-of-term Chertoff accomplishments against the numbers professed at CSIS. I’m sure the numbers have improved, but they were already trending in the right direction. Fortunately the Obama Administration has kept them going that way.

I’m sure that sounds like political pettiness (especially from a former DHS political appointee, as I was), but for as quick as this Administration is to blame the Bush Administration for all that is wrong in the world, there are a number of things for which they also deserve credit. Doubling the size of the border patrol and other investments are part of that legacy. I realize it is not in Sec. Napolitano’s job description to burnish the legacy of her predecessor or the previous Administration but a significant portion of what she crowed about at CSIS she inherited, and it has made a difference. If that sounds defensive, it was supposed too. The “facts also tell a story.”

In sending out the Administration’s strongest and most experienced voice on the southwest border, the White House through DHS is essentially taking head-on the criticisms of the 24-7 punditry (e.g. Fox News, etc.); Congress; and states like Arizona that are looking to follow with their own tough illegal immigration measures. Declaring several times that border security “is the responsibility of the federal government” and “we can’t have 50 different policies” for immigration, “smart actions” were the only thing that could solve the on-going border security problems that plague our nation.

To reinforce that point, Chief Rob Davis of the San Jose Police Department emphasized the challenge and confusion that he and other police departments face. “Do you want us [police officers] out looking for murderers, rapists and other bad guys or arresting illegal immigrants?” Explaining that his police department was facing a potential force reduction of 8 percent because of ongoing budget problems in California, he stated that communities across America were going to have to make a choice of what they wanted policed when resources such as his were becoming increasingly limited. And having 50 different immigration enforcement policies was not a suitable answer.

His point couldn’t have been driven home any better, and his call for the nation to produce a comprehensive immigration bill was just what the Secretary wanted to hear. Applauding his public service as well as his statement, Secretary Napolitano offered that until that was done by Congress, our border problems would continue.

Border Patrol Foundation Inaugural Event

Tuesday, November 10th, 2009

Last Friday, I had the opportunity to attend an intimate event that marked the launch of a long-overdue organization supporting federal law enforcement. The Border Patrol Foundation held its first annual recognition dinner in downtown D.C. to tout the creation of an organization whose mission is to “provide timely financial grants to the families of fallen” Border Patrol agents. The guest of honor was Rosalie Rosas, the wife of Border Patrol agent Robert Rosas who was killed in the line of duty on July 23.

Ms. Rosas spoke about the value of the Border Patrol as a family and the sense of mission her husband found while working alongside his fellow agents to protect our nation from criminals and terrorists in what must be one of the most challenging law enforcement jobs in America. Border Patrol agents often operate alone, in remote areas of our nation, many minutes and miles from backup or support. They regularly encounter unidentified bands of individuals in the desert who they pursue without knowing how large the group is or whether their targets are harmless illegal immigrants, well-armed drug smugglers or potentially murderous terrorists.

Since 1919, 108 Border Patrol agents have died in the line of duty. While these deaths often occur in remote places like Roseau, NM, Campo, CA, or Los Indios, TX, we should be thankful for the sacrifices of these dedicated agents and their families. Ms. Rosa’s remarks, as well as those of Chief of the Border Patrol David Aguilar and Deputy Chief Ronald Colburn, helped personalize these sacrifices, as well as others suffered by Border Patrol families during their loved one’s tours of duty.

I look forward to watching the work of the Border Patrol Foundation in supporting the men and women in uniform to whom many of us are grateful. Although the Border Patrol Foundation was launched just this year by committed friends and advocates of the U.S. Border Patrol, it appears to be off to a solid start, particularly given the impressive support shown by the Washington community at its inaugural event on Friday night.

U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy in Afghanistan

Thursday, October 22nd, 2009

Michael Braun, former Chief of Operations for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, testified before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control regarding the Taliban’s involvement in drug production and trafficking.

Mr. Braun is now a Managing Partner with Spectre Group International, LLC.  The company has offices in Alexandria, VA and Kabul, Afghanistan.

Statement for the Record

Chairman Feinstein, Co-Chairman Grassley, and Distinguished Members of the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the threat posed by drug trafficking and related security issues in Afghanistan.  The security challenges facing Afghanistan today, above and beyond drug trafficking and abuse are enormous.  I believe you will agree with me that the Taliban is at the root of most of those security threats, and I believe it will be abundantly clear by the end of this hearing that most of the security threats emanating from the Afghan drug trade now fall squarely in the lap of the same malevolent thugs—the Taliban. What is even more ominous are the broader strategic threats, the by-product if you will, this activity has, and will continue to produce.

Madam Chairman let me say up front that each of you on this Caucus, and your colleagues throughout Congress, should be praised for all that you have done to support the multi-faceted counternarcotics efforts of our nation, and many other countries around the globe.  I appreciate the fact that it is in that spirit you called us here today.

Before entering the private sector on November 1 of last year, I served for almost four years as the Assistant Administrator and Chief of Operations with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, and for one year as the Agency’s Acting Chief of Intelligence.  I also served in a number of DEA offices throughout the United States, including service on both our Southern and Northern borders, on both our East and West Coasts, in the Midwest, as well as approximately three years in various countries in Latin America and Iraq.

It is through my 34 years in law enforcement that I sit before you today, deeply concerned about drug trafficking and related security threats playing out in Afghanistan.  You will receive a career, Federal narcotic agent’s perspective on the Afghan drug trade, and how the trade will continue to destabilize the country if we do not become more aggressively involved in countering this major threat.  If left unchecked, funding from the Afghan drug trade will continue to fill the Taliban’s war chest in volumes unmatched by all other forms of illicit finance combined.  I will also provide you with my views on the continued evolution of the Taliban—from an insurgent group, to a designated terrorist organization, to a ‘hybrid terrorist organization.’

The Continued Evolution of the Taliban, And 21st Century Global Organized Crime

The Taliban is following in the footsteps of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and at least 20 other terrorist groups designated by our nation, into a ‘hybrid terrorist organization.’  The Taliban was merely an insurgent group just a few short years ago, but they are now clearly one part designated terrorist organization—and one part global drug trafficking cartel.

Just like the FARC, the Taliban got its start in the global drug trade by simply taxing poor farmers, which is one of the world’s oldest forms of organized criminal extortion.  They then began taxing the movement of drugs and precursor chemicals within Afghanistan, and across its borders.  Like the FARC, the Taliban formed ever-closer relations with traditional traffickers as they grew more accustomed and comfortable with each other, and the Taliban eventually started providing security at the traditional traffickers’ clandestine laboratories and cache sites.  In the private sector, it is called ‘outsourcing.’

About three years ago, the National Security Council asked the DEA to conduct a comparative analysis of the FARC and Taliban with respect to their evolution in the global drug trade.  What the Agency reported as I recall, was that the Taliban was on the exact same path as the FARC, but the Taliban was seven to ten years behind the FARC’s evolutionary development in the global drug trade.  What troubles me most about the study are not its findings; but the speed with which the Taliban is advancing their commitment and involvement in drug trafficking activity.  They are closing the seven to ten year ‘evolutionary gap’ with the FARC at a speed far faster than most care to admit or acknowledge.

The DEA reestablished its presence in Afghanistan in early 2003, after being forced from the country by the Soviet Union’s invasion in 1979.  By 2005, the DEA clearly identified the Taliban’s involvement in protecting clandestine laboratory and drug cache sites for traditional traffickers.  Flash forward just four short years.  The Agency has unmistakably determined that the Taliban is now managing and operating major clandestine laboratories, drug cache sites, and poppy bazaars.  They have morphed; they have become the manufactures and traffickers of heroin, opium, hashish and marijuana.

As an example, just two weeks ago the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan and Afghan Army Commandos, supported by the DEA and U.S. military Special Forces, raided a major laboratory in Southern Afghanistan and seized approximately 1.8 metric tons of opium and heroin—a major haul by anyone’s calculations.  It doesn’t stop there.  Sixteen Taliban were killed at the site, and the evidence clearly reveals the group was involved in the manufacture of heroin.

What is even more troubling is the fact that Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and IED bomb making materials were recovered at the scene, along with a host of other weapons and Taliban propaganda and training manuals.  Thanks to strong support from our military, raids like this are now taking place weekly.  IEDs and IED bomb making materials, suicide vests, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, other weapons, as well as Taliban propaganda and training manuals, are routinely located at these sites.  Nearly all of those labs, cache sites and opium bazaars are directly linked to the DEA’s High Value Targets (HVTs) in Afghanistan, and they provide a treasure trove of evidence that support future prosecutions.

The DEA is usually focused on building prosecutable cases against 15 to 20 HVTs in Afghanistan.  These are the ‘most wanted’ drug traffickers in the country and most, if not all, are members of the Taliban.  Those who aren’t Taliban are closely linked to the Taliban.  I am proud of the men and women of the DEA for their work with Afghan counterparts in bringing several of the most notorious Afghan traffickers to justice in the United States.  Traffickers like Haji Bashir Noorzai, who was the world’s single largest heroin trafficker before being arrested by the DEA in an elaborately complex undercover sting operation.  He was also one of the five original founding members of the Taliban Ruling Shura in Kabul, and was on Central Command’s ‘Top 10’ HVT list when we invaded Afghanistan and initially ousted the Taliban in 2002.  Noorzai got a taste of American justice in the Southern District of New York, and is now serving a life sentence with no hope of parole.  The DEA could not have successfully brought Noorzai or any of the other Afghan HVTs to justice without the powerful extraterritorial jurisdictions that you bestowed on the Agency when you passed legislation enacting the Title 21, 959 and 960(a) statutes.  From a retired federal narcotics agent—thank you.

The money generated by the Afghan opium and heroin trade is staggering, and most experts usually fail to consider how much money the Taliban derives from the hashish trade.  In June 2008, the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan and Afghan Army Commandos, supported by the DEA and U.S. military Special Forces, raided a Taliban hashish processing facility near Spin Boldak in Southern Afghanistan where they seized 235 metric tons of the drug—by far the largest drug seizure in world history.  The estimated Western European value of the drugs was over $600 million dollars.  If the Taliban’s profit was just 5 percent, which is being overly conservative, they stood to gain $30 million dollars from the stash.  Around the same time, the DEA and Afghan counterparts raided a HVT’s compound in Eastern Afghanistan and seized his drug ledgers, which clearly showed that $169 million dollars had moved through the traffickers hands for the sale of 81 metric tons of heroin over just a 10-month period.  He is unequivocally affiliated with the Taliban, and is facing American justice.

One important aspect of the Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade that I believe we are failing to exploit is their leadership’s growing level of greed.  The Taliban’s ‘corporate office’ has acquired an insatiable appetite for easy money over the past few years.  Just like the FARC, the Taliban leadership uses ideology as an effective means by which to recruit and indoctrinate the young warriors they rely on to do their dirty work, as well as the nasty fighting.  However, the Taliban leadership’s core beliefs are going right out the window as greed replaces ideology as their principle motivator.

As we witness the continued evolution of the Taliban, we must also recognize we are witnessing the evolution of 21st Century global organized crime.  It is becoming more and more difficult to distinguish the terrorist from the cartel member, because they are operationally and organizationally interbreeding and morphing into one and the same.  The indisputable convergence of terrorism and international drug trafficking is playing out before our very eyes in Afghanistan, and in many other places around the globe.

U.S. Military Support to Law Enforcement An Important Aspect of the Afghan Counter Insurgency

Our military has conclusively realized over the past couple years that we will not win in Afghanistan until we get the country’s drug trade in check, and law enforcement cannot effectively conduct counter-narcotics operations without the support of our military.  What was unsympathetically absent a few short years ago is now generously available—robust military support to counter-narcotics interdiction operations.  The types of interdiction operations I mentioned earlier are now supported in myriad ways by our military and all are jointly planned, coordinated, de-conflicted and executed by military and law enforcement personnel.

In support of drug enforcement operations, our military routinely provides airborne medical evacuation capability, and they dedicate heavily armed close air support and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) aerial platforms to provide airborne force protection.  They have purchased specialized field equipment for DEA and Afghan officers, such as night vision goggles, and they have purchased MI-17 heavy lift helicopters for dedicated vertical lift of agents and their equipment.  Our military has purchased and issued to DEA portable Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for dedicated use on drug enforcement operations.  They provide critically important encrypted communications equipment, and have purchased very costly telecommunications intercept equipment that Afghan police and DEA agents use to judicially tap traffickers communication devices.  They have invested in ISR technology for DEA aircraft, and have built training academies and other facilities to support Afghan and DEA personnel.  Moreover, our military has paid for virtually all aspects of the Interagency Operations Coordination Center, and the Afghan Threat Finance Cell, which is helping to identify and track the funds derived from the Afghanistan drug trade.  Most important—almost all operations are now executed with U.S. Military Special Forces operators working shoulder-to-shoulder with law enforcement agents.

When you fuse the unparalleled tradecraft that seasoned DEA agents bring to the fight with the exclusive war fighting techniques of highly experienced Special Forces operators, you create a counter-insurgency capability that is second-to-none.  More of this blend would definitely be better, and would be a wise investment of taxpayer dollars.

The Bottom Line

We are not going to win the fight in Afghanistan until we get the country’s drug production and trafficking activity in check, because it provides a limitless stream of funding directly into the Taliban’s war chest.

Professor James Fearon of Stanford University completed a study in 2002 entitled, “Why Some Wars Last Longer than Others.”  The professor identified and studied 128 civil wars and insurgencies from 1945 to 2000, and found that on average they lasted about eight years.  However, he identified and isolated 17 of the 128 that lasted on average about five times longer than the other 111—40 years or longer.  The common thread between the 17 was that the anti-government forces involved in the conflicts generated their own contraband revenue, most of which was through their involvement in one or more aspects of the global drug trade.

Finally, the Taliban and traditional drug traffickers both thrive in what our military calls ‘ungoverned space.’ In Afghanistan, they share a truly symbiotic relationship.  When traditional drug traffickers successfully destabilize government by corrupting officials—the Taliban benefits.  When the Taliban successfully destabilizes government through attacks on government forces or by intimidating the populace—the drug traffickers benefit.  They are both constantly working to destabilize government and create permissive environments in which to operate, because they flourish in areas of weak governance.  Consequently, if you fight one with any less passion and vigor than you fight the other, you are most likely doomed to fail.

Changes Afoot on the Border

Wednesday, October 14th, 2009

This week has been a telling one for those of us who follow border security closely. Congress and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have made a series of bold moves that arguably make our borders less secure. At the same time, the changes will be hailed by some as overdue upgrades to a flawed border management policy that built fences between neighbors and sought to imprison illegal aliens for ‘just’ entering the country.

America’s Sheriff Demoted

The first of these changes was the revelation that DHS has taken steps to revoke Maricopa, AZ, Sheriff Joe Arpaio’s ability to arrest and detain under federal law illegal immigrants encountered in the course of his normal law enforcement activities. This authority, known as the 287(g) program, was aggressively promoted by the Bush Administration and state and local law enforcement advocates (including former Governor Napolitano) as a relatively low cost way to increase manpower intended to address illegal immigration.

While critics have always stated concerns that 287(g) could be used by some law enforcement officials to harass anyone they think could be an illegal alien, the program was considered highly successful and resulted in few tangible complaints. The popularity of the program, in the eyes of federal officials, appears to have eroded under a steady stream of pressure from illegal immigrant advocates who want all enforcement efforts stopped. It looks like America’s Toughest Sheriff, as he likes to be called, has become one of the first casualties in rolling back the previously successful enforcement activities. Ironically, Sheriff Joe will be able to continue detaining illegal immigrants under an Arizona state law advocated and signed by Governor Napolitano that makes being in the country illegally a state crime. The only difference appears to be that he will have to, in his own words, “drive them back to the border [him]self” instead of handing them over to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for prosecution and removal.

Motel Napolitano

Also this week DHS announced that they would begin housing so-called low-risk illegal immigrants in refurbished hotels instead of prisons. This change arises from a myriad of complaints over the now shuttered T. Don Hutto Detention Center in Texas which was created to house families and small children who illegally enter the United States. Prior to the establishment of the Hutto facility, DHS was forced to release illegal immigrants traveling with children due to a lack of adequate detention space. Therefore, the ever crafty and ruthless smugglers decided to place the lives of children in danger by using them as decoys in border crossings to evade detention if apprehended. While the intention behind the Hutto facility was noble, it was universally panned by immigration and child advocates alike.

Hopefully the change announced by DHS is intended to create an alternative holding facility to protect children. However, the additional cost incurred by such a ‘posh’ program could result in significantly fewer detention beds available to ICE. The loss of one detention bed is exacerbated because most detainees only spend a fraction of a year in detention – as little as 20 days. This means the loss of one bed could mean 18 additional illegal immigrants being released each year without removal.

No Mas Fence

It is hardly a surprise that Congress recently voted to knock down an amendment by South Carolina Senator Jim DeMint that would have required the construction of an additional 300 miles of border fence in Texas. Given the ongoing interest in stimulus projects, I am a little shocked that the idea of essentially digging a ditch and building a fence in it did not appeal to the same people in Congress who gave billions to the auto industry and millions to shady community organizers.

I do believe that tactical infrastructure (what we like to call border fence and vehicle barriers) is a useful deterrent in certain border situations. However, it is just that – tactical. It is intended to be used only where it gains an advantage: generally in urban areas where the ability of an illegal immigrant to abscond once detected crossing the border is measured in seconds. These urban areas are where most of the fencing built in the last three years has been placed – on the borders near El Paso, Yuma, San Diego, and Nogales. Much of the fence in the DeMint amendment would have gone to areas where the gained tactical advantage would be minimal given the Rio Grande River and barren inhospitable terrain.

Cash In Clunkers – smuggling guns, drugs and money across the border

Wednesday, October 7th, 2009

We are standing on the pavement watching inspections at the land border port of El Paso. Columns of pick-up trucks and 1970s vintage American-made cars inch toward the inspection points from Ciudad Juarez, drivers stopping briefly to converse with Customs and Border Protection officers who man the booths in blue uniforms looking for nervous eyes or lumped seat cushions. Somebody in our group asks our guide, a close-cropped CBP inspector, how they pick which vehicles to pull aside for secondary inspection.

“I can’t really get into all of that,” he says, suspiciously eyeballing one of the individuals in our group with the enviable capability of looking as if he has just come off a three-day binger no matter whether he’s dressed in jeans and a t-shirt or a suit and tie. “Mostly, though, we can tell by looking at them,” he says. “Our officers are trained to spot unusual behavior.”

He entertains the group with the weird ways in which smugglers try to move drugs and contraband across the border. There are the usual cocaine-filled balloons, swallowed like pigs-in-a-blanket and later emptied by what must be a painful process of defecation and sweating and praying. If any of the balloons were to break while still making their way through the intestines, it could be deadly. There are the panels removed from car-door interiors, filled with blocks of meth or pot or cash. The hollowed-out shoes. The ones dumb enough to simply throw the drugs in the trunk and cover them with an old jacket.

Things are getting weirder, though, with the increase in human smuggling. Rather than drugs, more and more people are being folded up and stuffed into tiny compartments, sometimes two, three, four at a time like midgets tumbling out of circus clown cars. “You get used to spotting the lumps in the seats and knowing you’ve got drugs there. You pop out a knife and jab it into seat and the evidence spills out,” our CBP guide says. “Now you’ve got to be careful. One of the times we were poking around with a knife in the backseat and we got a yelp and a por favor! por favor! Cut some poor guy in the hand.”

As more drugs and illegal aliens are being smuggled northbound, there has been a similar spike in guns and cash heading south. The same false dashboard compartments and hollowed suitcases that carry contraband into the United States are used to move the cash back into Mexico. That has always been the case – the drugs moving north and the drug money moving south. The guns, though, are a newer development, at least at this volume. Just as the Mexican cartels are only too happy to provide Americans with the meth they can inject into their veins, so are we only too happy to provide them with automatic machine guns they need to kill one another.

It’s illegal to bring guns into Mexico, isn’t it? somebody asks. The officer smiles, and though he doesn’t roll his eyes you know he wants to. It’s as if somebody had asked whether it’s illegal to smoke pot in college. “Yeah, it’s illegal,” he says, and jabs his thumb toward the line of American brand eighteen-wheelers waiting for passage south of the border. “They usually come in big shipments in those trucks.”

According to the Government Accountability Office, more than 90 percent of guns seized in Mexico with traceable origins are smuggled in from the United States.

With the flood of drugs heading north, and the flood of guns traveling south – and the illicit revenues flowing in both directions – it is disconcerting to realize that, nearly a year into the Obama Administration, there is still no nominee to lead the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. No nominee to take charge of the ATF – the law enforcement bureau responsible for enforcing gun and explosives laws. That the man nominated to head Customs and Border Protection still waits idly to be confirmed. The city of Juarez, literally a stone’s throw across the border from El Paso, plays host to the world’s most vicious drug cartels. The city just tallied its highest murder rate ever – a stunning feat considering that some 1,600 people were murdered in that city alone last year. Human smuggling and gun running is reaching unprecedented levels in contemporary law enforcement. Indeed, the president of Mexico all but accused the United States of arming the violent drug lords of Mexico by failing to staunch the flow of weapons. Kidnappings and carjackings are routine along the border. The State Department warns Americans that they travel in the vicinity of Juarez, the entire Mexican state of Chihuahua really, at their own peril. Yet, with the exception of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, practically the entire law enforcement and security infrastructure for the southern border of America is lacking in permanent leadership. The talk of meeting the “epidemic” of violence along the border seems almost bizarre under such circumstances.

We tour through the visa processing center inside the El Paso port’s main facility. Rows of simple aluminum-framed chairs fill the center of the room, like a convention for Bridge players, Mexican families and individual workers grasping tabs of paper with numbers, waiting for their turn to approach one of the many pexiglas windows, seeking work and redemption, or maybe just a better deal on some shoes, across the border. Behind the windows, CBP officers with glocks strapped to their belts review documents and interview applicants seeking to legally enter the United States. They pound plastic stamps with official seals on tedious reams of paper. Handcuffs hang from various chairbacks. It’s like the local DMV, only friendlier. The citizens of Juarez, and those who have traveled northbound from places south in Mexico, wait patiently in a way that most Americans could not bear. They are used to the waits.

Standing in the agricultural inspection area, we gaze upon a riot of fruits and vegetables and pigs feet and roosters. The walls are adorned with rows of jars filled with formaldehyde and small animal parts and agricultural byproducts, a mad scientist’s dusty laboratory. Everywhere there is evidence of the vehicles of foot-and-mouth disease and crop pestilence, all seized by Customs officers from Mexican citizens trying to cross the border. Perhaps we can stop the spread of Swine Flu if only we empty enough pockets and rummage through enough back seats. The desire to touch everything is overwhelming. An indigenous kind of Mr. Potato Head, pantyhose stuffed with some quick-growing Mexican plant, sits bodyless on the table, painted eyes leering. I poke at a severed pig’s foot, huge and faded and unreal looking. I expect Styrofoam or maybe even more stuffed pantyhose; it is solid, dull, meaty.

And, then, like the river breachers and desert scramblers caught every day sneaking into the United States along the southern border, we are delivered into the custody of the Border Patrol. We are going to tour the long wall being built across the southern border of the United States. The epicenter of the movement of drugs, laundered cash, hard weaponry and smuggled human beings. Ground zero in the nation’s heated debate over immigration reform.

The Small Boat Threat In the U.S. Is Real

Tuesday, October 6th, 2009

The Department of Homeland Security’s Office of the Inspector General recently released a report on DHS’ strategy to address small boat threats in U.S. waters.  The report, “DHS’ Strategy and Plans to Counter Small Vessel Threats Need Improvement” (OIG-09-100), criticizes Customs & Border Protection (CBP), the Coast Guard and DHS policy for failing to write a complete strategy that includes measures of effectiveness and resource requirements.  The criticism may be technically deserved, but there may be a good reason for its shortcomings.

The threat of a small boat attack in the U.S is real.  Terrorist enemies are known to use means of attack that are tested and have proven effective in the past.  The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) guerrillas developed and perfected small boat attack methods that were emulated by terrorists around the globe.  The USS Cole attack is an example.  U.S. efforts to destroy al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups have prevented major attacks on the U.S. since 9/11 but the recent breakup of a domestic terrorist threat planning to use high explosives highlights the continuing danger.  Past performance and the desire to use high explosives suggests that a small boat might be a preferred method of delivery for a terrorist attack in the U.S.  The small boat could come from within the U.S., sail from a neighboring country or be launched from a mothership offshore.  Current migrant and contraband smuggling activities to the U.S. using small boats prove that this avenue of attack is viable.

DHS leadership knows that understanding and control of small boat activity in and around the U.S. is key to addressing the small boat terrorism threat.  But DHS leadership also understands that the small boating public is known for its vocal protection of privacy and independence, and the participation of the small boating public is absolutely critical to addressing the terrorist threat in our waterways.  A top down grand strategy with draconian requirements would be strongly resisted by the small boating public and doomed to failure.  Wisely, DHS leadership issued this first strategy as the first salvo in a long campaign to win the buy-in and participation of a group of loyal, but independent citizens desperately needed to be part of the solution.  That is why the DHS Inspector General did not find many of the elements you might expect to find in a top-down strategy.  The current DHS small boat threat strategy is the start of a bottom up solution.  In the long run, this approach will have more success than a traditional top-down strategy.  While this bottom up strategy begins to take shape, DHS must continue its aggressive implementation of Maritime Domain Awareness regimes and improve DHS operating agency coordination both internally and with State and local law enforcement to address the small boat attack threat.

A New CBP Commissioner: What Took So Long?

Thursday, September 24th, 2009

On Tuesday, President Obama nominated Department of Homeland Security (DHS) “Border Czar” Alan Bersin as the next Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the 57,000 person strong frontline agency. This ends what was a seemingly lengthy gap in political leadership at one of the nation’s flagship law enforcement agencies, but opens the door to a series of questions about Mr. Bersin’s role in the promised Obama Administration efforts to address immigration reform.

To say that Mr. Bersin has enormous professional shoes to fill would be an understatement. Since 9/11, CBP has been led by Robert C. Bonner, Ralph W. Basham and Jayson P. Ahern. Bonner was a five-time Senate confirmed law enforcement advocate who shined in merging separate agencies into CBP after 9/11. Ralph Basham’s career as a U.S. Secret Service agent for 30 years and the head of three separate DHS agencies is, if anything, even more impressive than Commissioner Bonner’s. Jay Ahern, the current Acting Commissioner and one of the premier Senior Executives in the federal government, worked his way up through the ranks during a 30 year career at CBP, has receive the rank of Distinguished Executive from President Bush in 2005 and was awarded the DHS Secretary’s Gold Medal for service in 2008. These are no security and law enforcement novices.

I don’t dwell on the resumes of the prior leadership to disparage Mr. Bersin’s somewhat less conventional resume for a top law enforcement position; I do so only to stress how serious and challenging this job is for any nominee. While Mr. Bersin clearly has knowledge of the current situation at our nation’s borders – some would say his last six months as the “Border Czar” were a tutorial period – his operational experience is more limited. However, his current reputation at DHS is positive and given his outgoing nature, he could be a solid selection to lead what is often known as “the face of homeland security” given CBP’s daily interaction with many stakeholders.

This leads us to two pressing questions about this nomination. The first is: Why was this political position so difficult to fill and left empty for so long? CBP is an enormous agency with an $11 billion dollar budget and a noble mission. More importantly, the Commissioner has an expansive office at the Ronald Reagan Building and the largest law enforcement air force in the world at his disposal.

Why was the eventual nominee in an office at DHS policy for six months with the “Border Czar” title?

I imagine the Obama Administration had trouble filling the post for two reasons. First, the presence of the “Border Czar” at DHS headquarters diminished the real power of the eventual Commissioner. Who wants to be the Senate-confirmed head of one of the nation’s premiere federal law enforcement agencies with operational authority effectively reporting to a policy guy at HQ?

Second, the Obama Administration’s commitment to the agency’s immigration-enforcement mission could be suspect as it has already rolled back enforcement efforts at CBP’s sister (or is it brother?) agency, Immigration and Custom’s Enforcement (ICE), to appease core administration political supporters. No one wants to volunteer for failure.

This initial question is doubly important when considering my second inquiry: What role will the head of CBP play in the promised immigration reform proposals we expect from the Obama administration in the next year?

After the failure of immigration reform in 2007, the Bush administration attempted to earn credibility with the American people by increasing Border Patrol staffing, building a 600 mile-long fence and strictly enforcing the nation’s immigration laws. Has the Obama administration selected an official who – working with Secretary Napolitano – will continue to push for strict enforcement in an effort to win over the public to some form of immigration reform?

I don’t know, but I expect the new Commissioner to focus on border security as it relates to drugs and weapons smuggling – which is a greater concern for current and former border state officials like Bersin and Napolitano – than dealing with immigration enforcement. This would be unfortunate for the 10,000 Border Patrol agents who joined CBP under the last administration and were promised the resources and support to secure our borders; they are too close to success to have new leadership change course.

I wish the Commissioner nominee the best of luck in what I hope is a speedy confirmation process. (I worked with Commissioner Basham – a man nominated by President Bush and endorsed by the late Senator Ted Kennedy – on his confirmation, and if Americans only knew how screwed up Congressional oversight of DHS is that the confirmation of the head of the U.S. Secret Service to be the Commissioner took more than four months, they would not sleep more soundly at night.)

America wants strong leadership on our borders, not only to keep us safe from terrorists, drugs and criminals, but to also earn credibility with our citizens so we can eventually have the immigration reform we so desperately need. Whether Bersin can give deliver that credibility and pave the road to reform will be his legacy within in the agency. Here’s hoping he can.

Very Disturbing News: Are Mexico’s Drug Cartels Getting to U.S. Law Enforcement?

Tuesday, September 22nd, 2009

The arrest of Richard Cramer earlier this month is very disturbing news for many reasons.  Personally disturbing to me, not only because I am a former ICE Special Agent and Supervisor, but also because of the damage incidents like this have on inter-agency cooperation, and in this case, international cooperation.  It should remind all agents, officers, prosecutors, analysts, and staff of the importance and necessity to “compartmentalize” any and all information relating to sensitive investigations and law enforcement activities.  It reinforces the necessity of operational security and the policy of controlling access to “on a need to know basis”.

Cramer was arrested by DEA on September 4th for his participation in a conspiracy to provide members of a Mexican drug cartel with information and background on U.S. narcotics enforcement activities.  According to the criminal complaint filed by DEA, “Cramer was responsible for advising the drug traffickers how U.S. law enforcement works with warrants and record checks as well as how DEA conducts investigations to include “flipping” subjects or recruiting informants”.  Cramer allegedly pulled files to help identify confidential sources, charging as much as $2000. for one document sent to a suspect in Miami.

Cramer was a ranking federal law enforcement official with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) until he retired in January 2007. During his career he was employed in many very sensitive positions including a supervisory position in Nogales, Arizona, and as the ICE Attache in Guadalajara, Mexico.  Cramer’s duties in Mexico included serving as liaison with the Mexican police, assisting investigations and collecting intelligence.

Cramer’s behavior is what we have come to associate with Mexico where the drug cartels have compromised Mexican politicians, police chiefs, judges and military components.  We have not come to associate it with high-ranking members of U.S. anti-drug law enforcement agencies.

I do not personally know Richard Cramer but I am sure he is unable to justify this betrayal.  It is a significant affront to all involved in the war on drugs on a daily basis.  The damage done may never be measured, but if it reminds the personnel waging this “drug war” of the absolute necessity for operational security, it will a small positive in this very disturbing news.

Corruption – Why Cartels and Terrorists Succeed

Tuesday, September 22nd, 2009

The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) conducted a survey of its top performing confidential sources a couple years ago, and asked them to list in order of importance the factors that allow global drug trafficking cartels [and terrorist organizations] to succeed.  At the very top of the list for every respondent was the single word— ‘CORRUPTION.’

Powerful Mexican and Colombian drug trafficking cartels, both of which now span the globe, invest billions of dollars a year to corrupt virtually every level of government in their respective countries.  And if United States policy and lawmakers think for a moment that the cartels are focused solely on their side of the border, they had better think again.  Richard Padilla Cramer, who not long ago retired as a Supervisory Special Agent with the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), was recently accused by the U.S. Government of comporting with Mexican drug cartels and selling out his former U.S. law enforcement colleagues.  It is important to remember that Cramer is innocent until proven guilty, but this recent drug corruption arrest should sound some alarm bells here in our country.

It’s also essential to understand that corruption within the ranks of law enforcement in our country is nothing new, especially along our Southwest Border.  There have been a number of employees of every three-letter agency in the U.S. Government’s law enforcement alphabet soup, the FBI, DEA, ATF, ICE, CBP and USMs (Marshals), who have succumbed to corruption at the hands of formidable drug cartels.  Local and state law enforcement agencies have fared worse, with some officers even arrested while transporting large loads of drugs in their squad cars for Mexican cartels.

The most significant difference between U.S. and Mexican law enforcement is our internal ‘policing’ capacity.  Federal and state law enforcement agencies in our country, as well as most local departments, have aggressive internal affairs divisions that work hard to identify, investigate and bring to justice those from within their ranks who have gone wrong.  And although American law enforcement has an accomplished track record of policing its ranks, the pressure being exerted on the cartels in Mexico by President Calderon will most certainly cause them to resort to ever more assertive attempts to permeate every nook and cranny of the entire judicial systems of both our countries.

Corruption within the ranks of law enforcement and judicial systems, as well as military and intelligence institutions, is like a cancer.  It is absolutely crucial, now more than ever, that these critically important institutions remain healthy.  In order to do so they must constantly undergo self-imposed preventive check-ups for the disease, and when a cancer is discovered it has to be aggressively cut out, and the margins continually checked.

Consequently, now is the time for policy and lawmakers, as well as Inspectors General, to vigorously examine and assess the strengths of anti-corruption and internal policing programs within our government’s law enforcement, intelligence and military departments, commands and agencies.  More importantly, now is the time to proactively identify and shore-up the weaknesses—before it’s too late.

Mexico’s Risky Drug Decriminalization Sends the Wrong Message

Tuesday, September 15th, 2009

Mexico recently took a dramatic step in the war on drugs, decriminalizing possession of small amounts of marijuana, cocaine and heroin. In the midst of battling the drug cartels that grow fat on the profits of drug abuse and addiction, not to mention all of the violent crime that accompanies drug trafficking, the Mexican Government has sent a clear message. Unfortunately, it’s the wrong message. It is the message of surrender.

Mexican officials say the move will allow their law enforcement agencies to focus on fighting the big cartels, rather than small abusers. Predictably, drug legalization advocates cheered the move.

But other nations’ experiences with legalization have shown that these schemes rarely deliver on what they promise, while bringing with them significant new problems. Indeed it seems counter-productive in the extreme to be launching the nation’s most aggressive fight against the narcotraffickers while at the same time giving a wink and nod to drug use at home. It as if Mexico were trying to develop a stronger market for drug use at home.

The Mexican Government says that the new law is meant to allow law enforcement to focus on the major trafficking of drugs and not waste resources on small-time users. As the United States Government does with U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Mexico can focus its national resources on major traffickers without making a public proclamation that using drugs is okay.

When I headed the DEA in the early part of this decade, I toured a pilot legalization project in south London, where a local police commander launched an experimental program to de-emphasize small-time drug arrests. In the Lambeth borough, where the project was attempted, I saw drug dealers openly pushing hard drugs like heroin and crack. Residents of the working class neighborhood reported open drug use—indeed, I witnessed a young couple injecting heroin in an abandoned building—and significant increases in crime.

Legalization has even been tried in the United States, although most Americans may not realize it. In 1975, the Supreme Court of Alaska ruled that it was constitutional for adults to possess small amounts of marijuana for home consumption. The results were predictable enough: Drug use skyrocketed. A 1988 University of Alaska survey showed that the state’s teenagers used marijuana at a rate more than twice the national average for their age group. The report also showed a frequency of marijuana use that suggested it wasn’t experimental but was a well-incorporated practice for teens. Fed up with this dangerous experiment, Alaska’s residents voted in 1990 to recriminalize the possession of marijuana. A ballot proposal to legalize marijuana possession in Alaska in 2004 was also soundly defeated.

It’s also important to point out that legalizing (or “decriminalizing”) drug use won’t change the violent fight the Mexican Government is facing in going after criminal organizations trafficking drugs. It is still illegal to move distribute large quantities of drugs in Mexico, just as it is in the United States. But this is where the money is. The cartels will continue to bribe, kill and steal as necessary to traffick major shipments of drugs.

Some have suggested that we should therefore abandon the entire war on drugs. I disagree. It’s one of the great myths of our era that U.S. anti-drug efforts have not made a difference. Overall drug use in the United States is down from the levels of the 1970s, thanks to tough enforcement coupleed with effective drug education programs and drug treatment programs. In fact, while the use of illicit drugs has fluctuated over the years, the overall trend over the last three decades has been toward decreased usage. (To take the most recent good news, the 2008 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, released just last week, shows that youth drug use has shown a significant drop since 2002.)

It’s important to note that this progress did not come from decriminalization or legalization. It stems from a program that integrates enforcement with innovative approaches like drug courts, drug testing in the workplace, community coalitions to fight drugs and enhanced investment in education and prevention. That’s the formula for reducing drug abuse and addiction. That’s the formula for saving lives.

The precedents are clear: Where legalization has been attempted, regrets soon followed as the costs became clear. I fear our neighbors to the south will soon relearn this tragic lesson.

Terror on the Border: Ciudad Juarez Has an Image Problem

Sunday, September 6th, 2009

Editor’s Note: The following post is the second in a series of posts — “The Other Side of El Paso: Drugs, Violence and Social Media in Juarez City” — reporting on a State Department-sponsored trip to Mexico. The delegation visited Juarez City and Mexico City as part an effort to give ideas to citizens, grassroots groups and the government on how to raise their voices and organize their opposition to the drug cartels and the spiraling violence along the border.

The first post in the series can be read here.

Ciudad Juarez Has an Image Problem

I remember now why a narco didn’t meet me at the airport in Juarez. Likely because I flew in to El Paso, which sits across the Rio Grande, the big river which is little more than a dried out creekbeed near El Paso, separating the American city from its Mexican counterpart, a sister city, a mirror image of Juarez in the sprawl of rooftops creeping into the browned-out hillsides of the Franklin Mountains but an utterly different environment, streets buzzing with open-air retail and curbside commerce, free of roaming military trucks bristling with automatic weapons. Free of the stench of carjacking and kidnapping and murder that settles in the air of Juarez, just a stone’s throw across the footbridge.

Ciudad Juarez has an image problem. It is jarring to recognize that a mere matter of yards separates you from potential lawlessness. On the American side of the river, I was not nervous during a stop a local brewery, where we ordered chicken wings and the local beer before heading out for a tour of the U.S.-Mexico border. It was like any other American city bar-and-grill, where the most likely occurrence of violence is an argument breaking out over a football game airing on the television. I couldn’t say the same while I was in Juarez. I expected violence. I watched for it. I didn’t go out by myself. Maybe my imagination is overactive. Maybe I too easily accepted as fact the grisly stories reported every day in the local newspapers. Maybe it was the armored SUVs in which we traveled, with their heavy doors and their back windows sealed with the thick metal of a bank vault.

But why was I nervous? During my stay in Juarez, I never saw so much as a rude comment. And still, I kept expecting something. During a stop at the Juarez equivalent of the American bar and grill, we sat on a patio and I noticed a guy wearing a black teeshirt and jeans, leaning in the doorway, boots crossed, with a black eye. It’s something you see every day in the United States, but in Juarez I watched him out of the corner of my eye, especially when a group of about four other youngish looking men walked up to where he was standing. I doubt they knew him, but in my mind I sensed conspiracy, a kidnapping plot in the making, a chance to make some quick ransom money off a group of clueless gringos. Probably the guy with the shiner was just a bartender getting some air. The four guys were just that … four guys getting together to watch a soccer game on television. The waiters were fantastic, the beer cold. The conversation lively. So why was I spooked? Would I have been just as jumpy literally less than a mile north in El Paso?

Yeah, Ciudad Juarez has an image problem all right. And like all good citizens around the world, the people of Juarez blame their problems on the media. People have the wrong idea about Juarez, I’m told during several quiet conversations, because the local newspapers are only interested in the negative, the small-arms combat taking place in the streets, the narcotraffickers and the federales unloading on one another, AK-47 casings littering the parking lot of Starbucks. They have a saying for that in the United States, too: If it bleeds, it leads. Meaning, journalists aren’t interested in the sunny and productive, the non-chaotic and smoothly performing. Where’s the news in that? I chat with residents of Juarez about this and they nod their heads. The media cover the beheadings and carjackings and the arbitrary kidnappings but what about the local economy, they ask? When was the last time they paid attention to the opening of a small business or a manufacturing facility – not that there have been that many, they will admit, since the recession. Too many of the American facilities have shuttered their doors and gone elsewhere. The jobs have dried up, and too many people have nothing to do and no money to do it with.

They have a point. Maquiladoras, the local manufacturing arms of behemoth American corporations, dot the streetscapes. They surprise you. You are riding along the avenue, Mexican versions of fastfood joints scattered about, and then up rises a big gated facility, clean and new and out of place. Most are manufacturing facilities, once home to internationally recognizable names like Lear, Siemens, and Boeing. Only a few years ago, people came from all around Mexico to Juarez to partake in the NAFTA-fueled boom. These factories import the raw materials from abroad, put together the finished products, and then ship them back to the originating cities. Unfortunately, the dollars go with them. So these factories do little to pump up the economy, except that they do provide jobs – the most valuable commodity in this part of the country outside of cocaine. The city had been on its way to becoming known as the jobs capital of Mexico, not the murder capital. Combined with El Paso, the area accounted for one of the largest manufacturing regions in all of North America. Now, though, many of those same maquiladoras are quiet.

“What happens to all of these large facilities if they’re not operational anymore?” somebody asks.

“They are housing for all of the new soldiers coming into the area to fight the cartels.”

The gasping economy is not unique to Juarez, but it is inseparable from the level of criminal operation, which is unique. At least to Mexico. Last year, there were 1,600 murders in this town of 1.5 million. This year, as of September, there are more than 1,400, with no end in sight and a new bloody record just within reach. A news article proclaimed this August to be the deadliest month ever.

The week I returned from Juarez, the following story about the September 3rd slaughter of 18 Juarez residents ran in the Los Angeles Times:

The deed was stomach-turning. Hooded gunmen burst into a Ciudad Juarez drug treatment center, gathered together those inside and lined them p before opening fire with automatic weapons. When the shooting was over, 18 people were dead.

Attention focused immediately on the site of Wednesday night’s killings: a rehab center, where addicts go to get clean, suggesting a new level of depravity in Mexico’s drug violence.

Odds are that the slayings, like hundreds of others in the border city, will never be solved. The crime is a further sign of the chaos enveloping Ciudad Juarez and a reminder of another tragic development that has accompanied the flow of cocaine and other drugs through Mexico: a big and growing problem with local drug addiction.

What was remarkable about the rehab center killings was how unremarkable that sort of violence has become in the city, which has seen about 3,000 violent deaths since the start of last year.

In the previous week, at least 75 people were killed in the city, including a man who was beheaded, another suspended by handcuffs from a chain-link fence and four whose bodies were piled on a sidewalk.

Those killings went largely unnoticed outside Ciudad Juarez.

- Los Angeles Times

Yet another negative story. Seems nobody likes the media in Juarez. The residents think they are too focused on drug crime and violence; so, too, evidently, do the drug cartels. The drug lords do not take kindly to having nosy journalists poking about in their business and reporting their operations for all the world to see. Which makes journalists frequent targets of said crime. Executions, kidnappings, beatings. Juarez has been called the most dangerous city in the world for journalists.

El Diario de Juarez journalist Armando Rodriguez Carreon was well-known for countless stories about gangland killings in his hometown of Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua. For years, the 40-year-old police beat reporter tirelessly published pieces about the latest executions in a violence-torn city.

Rodriguez’s stories, which relied a lot on police sources and often did not implicate any particular suspects, were characterized by an almost matter-of-fact quality that kept to the narrative even as violence kept escalating. On Thursday morning, November 13, Rodriguez became a victim himself when a gunman who reportedly fled shot him outside his home in a waiting car. No possible motive for the homicide was publicly disclosed, but it was reported that Rodriguez received a text threat on his cell-phone earlier this year.

His killing occurred one week to the day that a severed human head was discovered at a monument to journalists in Ciudad Juarez.

- Media Alliance

During a lunch with journalists in Juarez, the head of the Mexican newspaper association acknowledges that the people have begun to lose confidence in the media. “They think we focus too much on the negative,” he admits, with the kind of knowing, exasperated look of journalists everywhere. The look that says: How can we not cover it? They don’t have to be very enterprising to find it. It comes to them. He tells me about a colleague who was executed for reporting on one of these negative stories. Assassinated by one of the local drug gangs, a message to rest of them. Of course, nobody can prove this. Crime usually goes unsolved in Juarez. Prosecutions are a rarity. The police themselves are often on the take. “Do you know what it’s like to be pulled over by the police and they walk up to your car with machine guns and you have no idea what they might do?” asks one college student. An American business man in Mexico City tells me that he and all of his colleagues are given security training before working in Mexico. “If you are pulled over by the police, you don’t stop,” he says, “until you find a well-lighted area. You just keep going, blue lights flashing for as long as it takes. You don’t stop with armed police in Mexico in isolated areas.”

I think the media might be the only friend the people of Juarez have. Who will keep shining the light into these ratholes where the drug gangs operate, if not the media? Who will hold them accountable? Evidently not the police. We are down to talk with residents about how to organize themselves, how to make their voices heard above the din of street slayings. How to tell the world that the cartels do not represent Mexico. But you cannot do this without an active media. Without a free and independent media, there is no voice for the people. Not even the blogosphere can change that.

I am told, almost as if by way of explanation, that the people doing the shooting in Juarez are very good at what they do. They kill well. They don’t often miss. This is not collateral damage. The executed can usually be tied to the drug trade. Gang-related, as they say in the United States. Small-time dealers who owe money. The double-crossed. The nasty business of achieving dominance over rivals.

Still, that doesn’t account for the judges executed. The law enforcement agents and soldiers murdered. The reporters who cover the killings and who end up resented, tortured and dead for the effort. It doesn’t account, exactly, for the 18 murdered in cold blood at the rehab center on September 3rd. Were they convenient cover for a more purposeful execution? The newspapers report that some of the dead may have been members of rival gangs. Others among the dead, though, were just trying to get clean. Like the teenager who had graduated the program and was ready to come home but was still trying to get himself right.

Nor does the gang-on-gang violence theory fully account for the spiraling violence of the youths who can’t find a job and want to break into the ranks of the cartels and are willing to show they have what it takes. The random carjackings. Kidnappings for ransom.

Yes, Juarez City has an image problem. And, yes, maybe the media has something to do with it. But something is awry with this theory, too. I like blaming the media as much as the next guy. Still, I think perhaps the problem in Juarez City rises above mere media bias. I come to this conclusion, definitively, during my first hours in Juarez, when Silvio, one of our able State Department hosts, notes that he nearly tripped over a corpse coming out of his house in one of the gated communities where Americans are supposed to being living in a safer environment. “Safer” is a relative term.

My conclusion is reinforced with that first morning’s headline of four beheaded residents dumped in the street. And the next day’s report of a father and son assassinated by one of the cartels. Was the father involved in the drug trade? Did the boy have to die? A few days later, I read of the murder of an assistant to a federal law enforcement officer working in Juarez. These stories just keeping, as certain as rain in the tropics.

I am convinced that this is not just a media problem, even as I devour the endless media stories narrating the violence that has descended on Ciudad Juarez. Eighteen rehab patients massacred. Lined up on a patio and gunned down like the St. Valentine’s Day Massacre that has become part of American mob mythology. Only seven people were lined up by Al Capone’s gang that day. Also gang-on-gang violence. The floor of the patio of the Juarez rehab clinic was littered with more than 80 spent casings, scattered across the concrete and coated in the blood. This won’t go down in Mexican mob history. It won’t reach mythic status. It’s routine.

Maybe we have something more than only an image problem in Juarez City. Maybe admitting this is the first step to finding a voice.

The Other Side of El Paso: Drugs, violence and social media in Juarez City (Part I)

Saturday, August 29th, 2009

There were many things that surprised me during a State Department-sponsored trip to Mexico this week, where we took a tour of U.S. border security operations before heading into Ciudad Juarez and Mexico City to meet with groups organizing against the spiraling violence in that country. I was surprised, for instance, that a representative from one of the Juarez drug cartels did not meet me at the airport, a block-typed sign with my name on it in one hand and a diamond-handled .45 in the other. I was surprised by the Border Patrol video with shrieking death metal background music. I was surprised by the mixture of courage and nonchalance of the college students living in Juarez who have grown sick of the murders and extortions and kidnappings in their city and who want desperately for the world to know that these cartels do not define them. I was surprised that traffic lights in Mexico City are optional. I was surprised by mad-eyed chickens, stuffed and sitting amid a stash of pungent fruit seized by Customs, arrayed across a table like some dionysian offering to the gods of smuggling. I was surprised by the number of grassroots groups throughout Mexico who want to fight back against the violence but who struggle in isolated and fragmented groups and seem utterly unaware of one another. I was surprised by the unending sea of lights beneath me as my plane descended into Mexico City near midnight, the city infinite and beautiful and ever-changing from neighborhood to neighborhood. Most of all, though, I was surprised that the cruel and savage murder of 14-year-old Fernando Marti has not led to a national uprising in Mexico, an outraged rebellion against the strutting drug tyrants and petty street thugs who seem to rule the country through levers of chaos and terror and brutality.

We were in Mexico as part of a delegation brought in to meet with citizens, students, grassroots groups (NGOs, short for non-governmental organizations, to use the common bureacrateze) and Mexican government officials to talk about ways these folks could organize and make their voices heard, particularly how they might use social media tactics in their emerging public relations battle with the criminal class. The cartels have long been given voice through gunfire and averted gazes, punctuated messages of terror reported daily in the newspapers, and with rural folk ballads, the narcocorridos, that romanticize meth labs and smuggling as mere working-class struggle. The people of Mexico, however, have had no voice, no one to champion their cause. They do not trust the police, who are so often caught in bed with the cartels. And, as more than one pointed out to us, they don’t even trust each other. That is changing now. The cartels have overplayed their hand and the sheer savagery that they have brought down upon the countryside is prompting the people of Mexico to organize themselves. And they have found an alley in President Felipe Calderon, who has virtually declared war on the cartels. And now entire swaths of the country have erupted into open battlefields.

The cartels come equipped with the highest-powered weapons and the most sophisticated of technology. In a country where families are so poor they are living generations to a room, the narcos are swimming in cash – most of it pumped in from the United States, from Americans with voracious appetites for Mexican-flavored dope. Pot, cocaine, meth, heroin … if you can smoke it, snort it or shoot it, Americans want it. It’s like we all want to live the life of Hollywood movie stars and since most of us can’t act, inhaling drugs or signing up for reality tv is the next best thing. Most Americans have a little more pride than Tom DeLay or Vanilla Ice, eliminating reality tv as an option. What’s left is the world’s largest market for drugs of every color, and the cartels of Mexico possess just the kind of psychotic entrepreneurial spirit – a nose for business development combined with a willingness to execute the competition – to meet this insatiable demand.

Perhaps embarrassed by the truckloads (literally) of cash that American college professors and Wall Street brokers are shoveling over to these sadistic fiends, the U.S. government recently decided it would only be fair to give money to the Mexican Government as a kind of counterbalance. The $1.4 billion of the Merida Initiative is largely going to training law enforcement and the military, to guns, bullets, choppers, bulletproof vests, high-tech surveillance and reinforced vehicles. And while $1.4 billion might seem like governmental pennies in an era in which Uncle Sam is purchasing U.S. multinational corporations and piling up a national debt in the trillions, this kind of cash represents an unprecedented effort of the American Government to join forces with the Mexicans against an enemy that is threatening both of our streets.

While the preponderance of the money is being used to pay for those Kevlar-chested cops you see riding around in the backs of jeeps, fingers vibrating just off the triggers of their machine guns, an important sliver is also going to what the folks in the State Department like to refer to as “soft side policies” – legal reform, public diplomacy, and cultural engagement. In short, helping to give voice to the Mexican people who look about at the wreckage and say, “Enough.”

Which is where we came in. For a day or two, anyway. Looking to give a megaphone to these citizens, the State Department flew in a group of us with a background in political organizing and public relations and social media development.

We had representatives from the likes of Facebook and Microsoft and other corporate faces of America’s new economy, along with innovative owners of web and social media companies. One of our crew started his first IT business at the age of 14, and another noted that he was a frustrated Rhodes Scholar, twice turned down as a finalist because he was deemed “too entrepreneurial” – something only an academic committee could despise. How I ended up in this group of technological wunderkinds is not entirely clear. I was just some poor slob who’d been involved in a few political campaigns, a former government bureaucrat myself, who now took the brilliant tech work of these other guys and applied it to public relations campaigns. Maybe I was there as an interpreter – not English to Spanish but Technologicaleze to English, which could then be translated into Spanish by somebody else. If so, it wasn’t necessary. These guys got politics, too, some of them part of the Obama campaign diaspora, the crew that has transformed the nature of grassroots politics in America with the power of digital organizing and who are now running things in Washington and distant satellites in Boston, Chicago and Silcon Valley.

We were all led by Suzanne Hall, a young public diplomacy advisor from the State Department who referred to everybody as “Dude.” Even in the plural, we were “dudes.” In fact, when she showed up for the first round of official meetings dressed in formal attire and tossing about sparkling diplomatic tones, I momentarily freaked, certain I had wandered into the wrong State Department travelling delegation. She brought the kind of energy and cheer and insight that probably does more – day-in, day-out – for cross-national relationships than any given dozen of the plastic-grimaced formal photo-op sessions that dot the schedules of Washington assistant secretaries and far-flung embassy managers throughout the course of a year.

There we were, this group of gringos as one Mexican traveler observed of us deplaning in Mexico City (prompting me to wonder if I had just been campily referred to as the equivalent of a honkey or something), not exactly fitting in to the landscape, blackberries and Ipods constantly in hand, laptop wiring strung across makeshift tables, come to discuss leveraging social media in a nation with less than 30 percent Internet penetration. To be used in the fight against drug lords, no less. Could Twitter stop bullets, pay ransoms? It seemed like a tall order, to say the least. That first morning in the hotel in Juarez City, reading about a series of drug executions, four beheaded corpses dumped into the city streets the night before, I wondered what we were doing.

Over the course of the day, though, in meeting after meeting of frustrated citizens, I regained my balance. It was clear what we were doing. We weren’t doing much at all. We were there to listen and offer whatever advice we might to a growing population beginning the slow but unstoppable awakening, stirring itself to outrage. Marches were being organized, networks developed. I remembered then that that’s where it all has to start. With the people. Twitter can’t stop bullets, but then neither can the local police at this point. President Calderon had just sacked several hundred in the area because of corruption. Most crimes go unsolved. As long as the citizenry stood for this kind of chaos, then little could be done. They had to organize first. What’s the cliché about the pen being mightier than the sword? How does that translate into the Digital Age? If we could help the organizers organize, maybe we could make a small difference. So this is what we were there to do.

The bloody drug violence on our border will get worse before it gets better

Tuesday, July 21st, 2009

William Booth’s article in the Washington Post, “12 Federal Agents Are Slain in Mexico,” highlights yet another act of desperation on the part of the Mexican drug cartels in response to Mexico President Felipe Calderon’s strategy to break the backs of the cartels-once and for all.  The cartels are lashing out like never before, because they are slowly and systematically being backed into a corner from which there is no escape.  President Calderon’s attack has been relentless and unyielding.  The cartels have never before experienced the likes of President Calderon, and to say they are feeling the heat is an understatement.  Taking on powerful drug cartels with a global reach is dirty business, and the work ahead for Mexico’s security institutions is most likely going to get even nastier before meaningful signs of improvement are witnessed.  However, there is hope.

There are vast differences between Mexico and Colombia, but there are many commonalities with respect to their wars waged against powerful drug cartels.  Fifteen years ago Colombia was experiencing levels of violence similar to that which Mexico is experiencing today.  Why?  Because the Colombian government’s security institutions, thus its people, were threatened by the power and influence of its home grown drug cartels and terrorist groups.  Colombian President Uribe, with financial support from the United States, developed an aggressive strategy to take back his country from the ruthless thugs that threatened its democratic existence.  Over the past three years Colombia’s kidnappings, murders, robberies, home invasions and other violent crimes have plummeted.  There is a police presence in every community of the country for the first time in that nation’s history.  Tourism is flourishing in many parts of the country that had not long ago been written off as all but lost to the cartels and terrorists.

Mexico must follow Colombia’s lead and not fold under the pressure of the wrath playing out on her streets today.  What is playing out in Mexico today is part of the never-ending struggle between right and wrong; the never-ending battle between good and evil.  Good must and will prevail, provided Mexico does not lose the will to fight on-and win.  The aid provided by the “Merida Initiative” for Mexico, just like Plan Colombia, is a step in the right direction, but the American people need to show resounding support for the war that is being waged just south of our border.  If Mexico loses the will to continue this fight, then life in Mexico and the United States will change as we know it.  There are a lot of brave Mexican cops and military personnel fighting and dying for our country as well as their own.  They deserve our support.

Finally, there is an important lesson to be learned from all of this.  Drug cartels, just like terrorist organizations, work very, very hard to destabilize governments around the globe.  They rely on corruption, intimidation and violence, the hallmarks of organized crime, to create permissive environments where they can grow and thrive; areas where they can literally get away with mass murder.  When government officials who have taken an oath to serve and protect, no matter what country they represent, succumb to corruption and deal with the devil-they should not be surprised when the devil relentlessly demands more – and more.  That’s what the devil does for a living, and in the end innocent blood will always spill.

Targeting Taliban’s Bankroll

Thursday, June 25th, 2009

Armen Keteyian of CBS News did a piece on the intersection of terror finance with international drug trade.  Only just recently, the DEA put more agents on the ground in war zones to crack down on the funneling of drug money to key terrorist operatives.

Targeting Taliban’s Bankroll

The U.S. military tried to cut the Taliban’s money supply by destroying Afghanistan’s poppy fields. Now the U.S is targeting heroin traffickers who bankroll the Taliban. Armen Keteyian reports.

Can We Return to Sanity? A Plea for Risk-Based Security

Tuesday, June 9th, 2009

In “Wanted: A Smarter Immigration Policy,” Ted Alden of the Council on Foreign Relations offers an excellent analysis of what’s wrong with our immigration process – or at least, one of the things that is wrong with our broken immigration process. In a nutshell, his is an argument – a desperate plea really – for a return to risk-based security procedures that use intelligence and information to prioritize threats rather than the hopelessly ineffective but increasingly popular notion on Capitol Hill that we can prevent 100 percent of all threats we may face.

Do we really need, for instance, to do in-person interviews of everyone who seeks a visa, even if they have already been interviewed for visas in the past, and we already have their fingerprints on U.S. government databases? That only wastes scarce consular resources on low-risk travelers. Is it necessary to pull all male travelers from Muslim countries into the long humiliation of secondary screening at the airport, even those who are frequent visitors well-known to U.S. officials? It is time to reassert some common sense … Of all the initiatives undertaken in the name of homeland security after 9/11, the visa screening requirements for foreign scientists and engineers have probably done the most lasting damage to America’s economy — particularly in the cutting-edge technology fields that are vital to our economic leadership and national security.

Alden’s right. His particular focus is immigration, but the same logic – that we must prioritize threats based upon risk – applies across the board in the homeland security environment. Risk-based and layered security measures are the universally accepted best practices among security experts – unless you isolate a particular vulnerability and task a particular security agency with ensuring that nothing gets through. When that happens, you get situations of the sort Alden refers to, with the State Department and the FBI preferring to create massive backlogs and waste in the immigration screening process, in an effort to scan 100 percent of any particular group, rather than judiciously putting risk-based procedures into place. While individual lives are ruined (visa holders who return to their native countries for a vacation and find that they can’t quickly get back into the United States, losing their homes or jobs or private property), the agencies have covered themselves so no congressional inquiry can put the blame on them should something go wrong in the future. (And as everybody knows, there will be another terrorist attack at some point, and, as is Congress’s tendency, somebody – besides Congress – will need to be blamed.)

You see the same kind of brain-dampened approach to security in the supply chain environment. Well-known security experts like Congressman Ed Markey of Massachusetts have led the effort to apply the 100 percent model to cargo security. (For the Markey fan(s?) out there lacking any sense of irony or experience in homeland security, the reference to his expertise in security is sarcasm; he’s a politician, not a security expert, though it seems many members of Congress seem to confuse the two.) So just as you have stunning backlogs in the immigration screening process, we will soon be facing similar backlogs in the international supply chain. In this case, the economic damage to which Alden refers above will not be indirect. It will not take prescient reporters or scholars to point out how shutting out key segments of our workforce will damage our economy. Once our global competitiveness is undermined, and international trade is routinely disrupted, the damage to our economy will be clear and immediate.

And for what? Scanning 100 percent of the cargo that enters our nation’s borders will not make us safer. Indeed, numerous credible third-party reports indicate that the 100 percent model could make us less safe. But, then, that doesn’t play as well on the campaign trail.

Hutchinson to AP: Border security push requires nominees at key agencies

Monday, June 8th, 2009

Asa Hutchinson, who served as head of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) as well as the first Border Czar (though the term Czar was less trendy then and he took the more staid title of “Undersecretary”), interviews with the Associated Press and notes that the oddity of the Administration announcing a new push to take on the drug cartels and the smuggling of narcotics and guns along the Southwest Border while there still hasn’t even been nominations for the heads of key border security agencies — DEA, ATF and CBP.

Hutchinson is joined by the former head of the ATF, as well as Mike Braun, another Security Debrief contributor and former Chief of Operations of the DEA, in urging the Administration to appoint permanent leadership into these critical agencies.

US plan to fight drug cartels lacks agency leaders – Associated Press

In any new administration, most government agencies go for a few weeks or months without a presidentially selected leader. But the continued vacancies, particularly as the drug cartel campaign begins, worries past agency chiefs.

Asa Hutchinson, who at different points led the DEA and border security efforts under the previous Republican administration, said the DEA must be the centerpiece of any push against the cartels.

“Just as you would not want to go without a high-level Defense Department official during a time of war, you would not want to go without the lead DEA official being confirmed for the fight we have with the cartels,” said Hutchinson.

Michael Braun, a former DEA official, said the lack of confirmed leaders weakens the agencies in dealing with foreign countries, as well as other parts of the U.S. government.

“When you have a presidentially appointed administrator in place, with that position comes the power,” he said.

Worksite Enforcement Questions

Tuesday, May 12th, 2009

Over the next two days, Secretary Napolitano will testify before four different congressional committees to discuss the Department of Homeland Security’s proposed budget for 2010.  Given the budget implications on worksite enforcement and the Department’s issuance of new worksite guidelines, the appropriations and authorizing committees should have no shortage of questions.

However, if any member is looking for questions, here are just a few that I would propose:

1.    Given the FY 2010 Budget for Worksite Enforcement, How Does DHS Expect ICE to Increase Enforcement of Employers?

While the Secretary has indicated that worksite enforcement is a top priority for ICE, the proposed fiscal year 2010 budget does not appear to provide for an increase in the program.  Furthermore, when DHS was asked about worksite enforcement at the press budget briefing, the response was simply “can we get back to you on that?”  For this reason, it would be helpful to hear the Secretary explain what resources the Department will dedicate to the worksite program, and as a result, how she expects to have it perform.

2.    Did the Department of Justice (DOJ) Commit to Prosecution of Egregious Employers, and If Not, How Will DHS Get Those Commitments?

The recently released worksite enforcement guidelines indicate that ICE agents should not go forward in a worksite enforcement operation, “absent exigent circumstances,” unless DOJ or a U.S. Attorney’s Office has made a commitment or otherwise agreed to prosecute an employer.

This is great news if Secretary Napolitano has agreement from the Department of Justice that worksite enforcement is a priority, and DOJ is prepared to give those commitments at the outset of a worksite enforcement operation.  One of the biggest difficulties we had during the time I was at ICE was convincing prosecutors at DOJ to bring worksite cases against employers.  In some instances, DOJ attorneys required more proof for worksite cases than for other types of crimes, such as narcotics or traditional white collar crimes.  On other occasions, we were promised action by the U.S. Attorney’s Office that never came.   In most cases, we were continually advocating for criminal cases against employers – at individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices and Main Justice.  This was often an uphill battle, and rarely did ICE get a commitment up front to the prosecution of the employer.

Part of this reluctance is understandable – the INA does not make employment of illegal aliens a strict liability crime.  The government has to prove knowledge.  As such, it is often hard to know whether the government will be able to prove knowledge at the outset of the case, and before the government interviews the key witnesses (in many cases, the aliens) and reviews all the documents.  But, part of this reluctance regrettably stemmed from the failure of DOJ to make worksite enforcement a DOJ priority.  At ICE, we were at the mercy of individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices and their particular priorities.  More often than not, that complicated and lessened the likelihood of successful prosecutions in worksite enforcement cases.

Given the new significant role DOJ has in “green-lighting” particular cases, Congress should ask Secretary Napolitano about what commitments, if any, DOJ has made with respect to worksite enforcement cases.   If DOJ has not made any commitments, the committees should further inquire what steps DHS will take to secure these to ensure ICE’s success.

3.    Is DHS Using Metrics That Just Don’t Add Up?

The new leadership has repeatedly implied that their focus on employers will result in the arrest of more employers than employees.  This metric simply misses the mark.  Such an emphasis also ignores the numbers found in significant charges that have been brought against employers over the past several years.  Take the example of the federal prosecution of IFCO, a large pallet company, for instance.  In IFCO, ICE arrested 1187 workers and twelve managers, and pursued charges against one corporate entity. Some parts of the case are still pending, but nine of the managers have pleaded guilty and IFCO has already agreed to pay more than $20 million to resolve the matter.  That’s a significant case.  Yet, under the new analysis, the IFCO case would be deemed unsuccessful because the agency arrested more workers than managers.  Ridiculous.

There will always be more workers than managers in any company (at least, almost any viable company).  If the new guidelines seek to have ICE arrest more managers than workers, Congress should ask the question:  is Secretary Napolitano serious about this metric, and if so, how exactly does she intend for the agents to do this?  Is DHS shifting the emphasis to smaller businesses (with fewer workers compared to managers), hoping to ignore the workers altogether, or employing some other strategy to accomplish that goal?

4.    What does DHS Intend to Do With Two Proposed Compliance Tools: E-Verify Requirements For Federal Contractors and the No-Match Rule?

The new worksite enforcement guidelines imply that ICE agents should use all available tools to help prosecute egregious employers and create a culture of compliance.  For this reason, it is troubling that DHS has not announced what it will do with two tools that would greatly enhance enforcement and compliance:  the E-Verify Requirement for Federal Contractors and the No-Match Rule.  The committees should ask Secretary Napolitano whether these are tools she is preparing to utilize in her efforts to ensure more targeted enforcement efforts, and if not, why not.

Like the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration recognizes that worksite enforcement is key to stopping the magnet of illegal immigration.  Secretary Napolitano deserves credit for issuing new guidelines that encourage ICE agents to bring cases against egregious employers.  Yet, despite the new guidance, many questions remain unanswered about precisely how ICE’s new implementation of the worksite enforcement guidelines will meet the Department’s stated goals.  Over the next two days, Congressional leaders have a great opportunity – one that shouldn’t be squandered- to get clarity from Secretary Napolitano on this important issue.

Questions for Napolitano – #10

Tuesday, May 5th, 2009

DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano is tentatively scheduled to testify before the United States Senate Judiciary Committee on DHS immigration enforcement policies.  Heritage has its own set of questions that should be asked of Napolitano about the Administration’s views on immigration enforcement.  We will be adding new questions for Secretary Napolitano daily until the May 6, 2009 hearing—along with Heritage’s suggested response.

10.     Does the Obama Administration support the implementation of the Real ID Act?

Congress has passed two bills that set Real ID standards for driver’s licenses in all U.S. jurisdictions. The Real ID legislation does not create a federal identification card, but it does set minimum security standards for driver’s licenses. All states have either agreed to comply with these standards or have applied for an extension of the deadline. Secure identification cards will make fraudulent documents more difficult to obtain and will also simplify employers’ efforts to check documents when verifying employer eligibility. Real ID is a sensible protection against identify fraud.

Congress is set to introduce legislation next week that could largely repeal the Real ID.  The Administration should put pressure on Congress to ensure that this legislation does not effectively eliminate the Real ID standards.

For more Heritage research on Real ID, check out: The Heritage Foundation’s Research on Real ID.

Counternarcotics Offers Chance to Cooperate with Tehran

Wednesday, April 29th, 2009

On March 31, Washington took its first step toward engagement with Tehran through a diplomatic encounter with the Iranian government at the Afghanistan conference in the Hague. Even though the initial contact was awkward, it was clearly a step forward for the Obama administration, and both countries agreed that the opium/heroin trade was a destructive force in both the region and the world. As such, the United States should consider using collaboration on counternarcotics as an effective means to jump-start diplomacy with Iran. Although such an approach would be difficult, it could succeed if both sides focused solely on law enforcement, without the intrusion of politicians, intelligence operatives, and diplomats.

Background

Afghanistan produces roughly 90 percent of the world’s opiates — principally opium and heroin — and the resulting drug trade fuels the Taliban’s war effort. The Taliban is becoming increasingly reliant on this illicit multibillion-dollar industry to fund its operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and there is evidence of growing al-Qaeda involvement.

The UN’s 2008 World Drug Report states that more than half of the world’s opiate users — over 9.3 million people — reside in Asia and are found mostly along the major drug trafficking routes from Afghanistan. More than 2.3 million of the users live in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, many in Afghanistan and Iran.

Estimates for the number of Iranian users vary widely. Iranian government sources report that between 1.2 million and 2 million Iranians are addicted to opiates, while other estimates are generally higher, especially when frequent users are added to the figures. In other words, at least 2.5 percent of the adult population is addicted, and since 90 percent of Iranian users are male, 5 to 8 percent of adult men in Iran are using opiates regularly.

Opiates are the traditional intoxicant of choice in Iran, with opium use well established in tradition, in contrast to the negative social image of alcohol consumption. Opium was a significant problem in Iran before World War II, when it was the drug’s leading international producer. In the decades before the revolution, much progress was made in addressing drug addiction, but the problem roared back after 1979.

Part of the problem was government attitude, since not all clerics disapproved of opium. The problem is compounded by geography, since Iran has served for many years as a major transshipment route for opium and heroin to Turkey, Europe, and other international destinations. As in many other countries, outside traffickers, in this case Afghans, work with Iranian organized crime to create the infrastructure necessary within Iran to support the transshipment of Afghan opiates to Western markets. The Afghan traffickers pay their Iranian partners with product rather than cash, thus contributing to the development of markets and increased demand inside Iran.

Not only is the Iranian addiction rate extremely high, a number of Iranian military personnel have been killed in the line of duty as a result of drug-related violence. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), whose al-Quds Force is the country’s primary support organization for regional terrorists, is at the same time a main actor in the fight against drug trafficking. A number of IRGC units appear to be involved in both tasks, which poses a significant problem for U.S.-Iranian counternarcotics cooperation.

Another potential obstacle for a collaborative effort is the perception that Washington supports at least one of the major organizations smuggling opiates into Iran, Jundallah, an ethnically Baluch “political” group also known as Iranian People’s Resistance Movement. This organization has engaged in acts of terrorism against the Iranian government, and its leader has spoken on Voice of America.

The Way Forward

The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) should be allowed to establish direct communication and cooperation with its Iranian law enforcement counterparts. Iranian officials have sought this kind of arrangement in the past, and some senior U.S. State Department leaders have even lobbied for it; however, previous administrations have prohibited the DEA from moving forward.

This year the DEA is cohosting — with its Mexican counterparts — its twenty-seventh annual International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC) in Cancun, Mexico. The IDEC has grown from a five-country, Western-hemisphere-centric endeavor, to a global effort involving approximately one hundred nations. Ninety-one countries participated in the 2008 event in Istanbul, Turkey. The IDEC venue could provide an ideal opportunity to open relations between the DEA and Iranian law enforcement, as well as other law enforcement agencies from around the globe, ultimately paving the way for a new era of cooperation between the United States and Iran.

After initial exchanges, the next step is to share intelligence and evidence, ideally though the establishment of a DEA office in Tehran. The DEA has the largest U.S. law enforcement presence abroad (eighty-six offices in sixty-seven countries), made possible only by the acceptance of DEA agents as federal narcotics officers, not spies. Gaining that acceptance in Iran will be a great challenge, and it certainly would not happen overnight. But it is important to set long-term goals. Although no foreign government has succeeded in working with Iran in this manner — and the recent conviction of a foreign journalist as a spy is alarming — the DEA has been extraordinarily effective in sharing related leads and sensitive drug intelligence with their counterparts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries throughout the region and the world.

The Challenge

Policing is a science, and complex counternarcotics policing is even more challenging. Senior politicians from both countries becoming involved in police business could be disastrous. Since the problem will be compounded by the role of the IRGC, a reflexively anti-American force, the challenge will be to find a way for cooperation among senior law enforcement leaders, working at a “cop-to-cop” level.

From there, law enforcement officials could conduct collaborative work on efforts to address drug demand reduction and treatment, with professionals from those disciplines taking the lead. In this context, it is discouraging that Iran arrested two brothers, Arash and Kamiar Alaei, as they were heading to the 2008 international AIDS conference where they were due to be awarded a prize for their work with mostly drug-addicted AIDS victims. The brothers were convicted as spies on the charge that their foreign collaboration was promoting the “soft overthrow” of the Islamic Republic — a preoccupation of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who sees cooperation with foreigners as potentially dangerous to his regime.

To succeed, any U.S. effort to cooperate with Iran on counternarcotics efforts must draw upon the DEA’s successful and decades-long experience with law enforcement partners from around the globe. Although Iran does not subscribe to U.S. terrorist designations of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, it is nonetheless in Iran’s interest to work aggressively with the United States to target the drug-trafficking activities of these groups, which destabilize Iran and the region.

Michael Braun retired recently from the Drug Enforcement Administration, after a twenty-three-year career with the agency. From 2005 until his retirement, he served as the DEA’s assistant administrator and chief of operations, overseeing the agency’s 227 domestic and 86 foreign offices.

This piece was originally posted Policy Watch/Peace Watch at The Washington Istitute for Near East Policy.

Security Debrief Debate: How Should DHS Safeguard the Border With Mexico – Updated

Friday, April 24th, 2009

Security Debrief is hosting its first online debate after an announcement by the Department of Homeland Security on their plan to secure the border with Mexico. The Fact Sheet, Southwest Border: The Way Ahead, outlines the new activities and spending for specific departments and locations.

Debating the topic will be Contributor, Chad Wolf, along with Guest Contributor Douglas Doan (read his most recent post here).  The debate will be in a point-counterpoint style, with Douglas Doan taking the lead and Chad Wolf offering the rebuttal.

Check back often for updates on the debate. And let the debate begin!

Argument by Douglas Doan:

When President Obama pressed for a huge $ 787 billion stimulus, he declared that the government would especially focus on building and infrastructure projects that would help spur economic growth.  High on that list was a promise of $720 million in new spending for Ports of Entry (POE) along our nation’s borders.  For good reason too, POEs are the nation’s cash registers where nearly $2 billion in trade passes EACH DAY.

Unfortunately, because of  years of underinvestment in the new roads, bridges, and primary inspection booths manned by CBP officers, those cash registers have been clogged and long lines, excessive wait times, and lost productivity have become endemic.  Not too surprisingly, the trade community, border regions, exporters, and Chambers of Commerce, were wildly supportive of the President’s decision to dedicate nearly $1 billion to building more infrastructure at the nation’s POEs.
But those early joys are fading fast.  It has becoming increasingly clear that DHS intends to divert most of the federal funds intended to help alleviate the congestion and long wait times at POEs to other internal priorities.

Acting Commissioner Jayson Ahern
fanned the flames of discontent by indicating that little of the stimulus funding will flow to the busiest POEs with the longest lines and most frustrated travelers.  Instead, Ahern implied that much of the funding will be directed towards new inspection technologies, communications systems, and other border technology.
Put bluntly, for those that hope to see new roads, bridges, and more primary inspection lanes, to handle the nearly tenfold increase in traffic across the border during the last 10 years, there was nothing new.
In his announcement, Ahern did highlight improvements at Nogales, Arizona, and Otay Mesa California, but failed to mention that plans and most of the funding for improvements at those particular POEs was approved by Congress long ago.

What keen observers where hoping to see was an indication that new huge new stimulus funding would result in the construction of new lanes bridges and inspection booths, not just a reminder that projects established long ago will continue.   Adding salt to the wound, Ahern implied that that CBP will concentrate on the smallest POEs, on the Northern border, where traffic is minimal and the impact on trade and commerce is zilch.

The growing realization that little if any of the $720 million dollars reserved for improving border infrastructure is going to add new capacity at our POEs and reduce the long wait times for legitimate trade and travel is a particular blow to the busiest border crossings like those near Detroit or Buffalo.  These crossings are among the most important trade arteries in the world linking our largest trade partner, Canada, and feature  a huge volume of daily trade.

Not long ago, long wait times and traffic snarls of 20 or more miles prompted one frustrated Canadian operator of the Blue Water Bridge called it simply “the Summer from Hell”.  But apparently, no new stimulus funding will be spent in Detroit to help move beleaguered trade, much of it associated with the automobile industry, more quickly.

Instead, almost as a cruel joke, CBP has indicated that improvements to the POE at Los Ebanos are to be anticipated. Los Ebanos, located in Texas, is a wonderful piece of history, a hand operated ferry.  But there is almost no trade that crosses, and the place is essential a quaint tourist destination, where travelers can get a kick out of riding on the last hand operated ferry across the Rio Grande.

And yet, as our auto industry teeters on insolvency, there was no urgent desire within CBP to help improve Detroit productivity be reducing the long wait times and border frustrations which are especially damaging to the automobile industry.  With auto parts and components crossing the border sometimes 20-30 times before final installation, even small improvements at the border would have been economically meaningful.  Instead, CBP indicated that improvements, perhaps new rope and pontoons for the ferry at Los Ebanos were more of a priority.  Go figure.

My colleague, Chad Wolf, argued in a previous conversation, that stimulus spending on new border technology and inspection equipment is not all bad, and once this equipment is installed, technology will speed the transit times. I understand the argument. But more importantly, I understand the history.
For the past 20 years, senior CBP officials, including Jayson Ahern, have testified to Congress that new funding and technology at the borders would do exactly that, facilitate the flow of legitimate trade and travel. Congress has almost always approved every spending program requested and we have seen a virtual alphabet soup of DHS programs (ACE, SBI, C-TPAT, USVISIT, et. al).
And yet, wait times at the border continue to plague honest trade and travelers. Long lines not only endure, but have grown.  This growth occurs despite the fact these DHS technology programs have consumed billions in taxpayer funds.

While, it would be nice to believe that this time might be different, the past is prologue.  The sad truth is that not a single one of CBP’s most touted programs has achieved the desired results.  All have overrun their budgets by several billion in taxpayer dollars and none of the programs were delivered on time.

But what is most perplexing about the DHS indifference to towards speeding the flow of legitimate trade and commerce across the border is that Secretary Napolitano, who when she served as Governor of Arizona, was one of the strongest advocates for building more lanes, bridges and inspection booths.

Indeed, several years ago, while serving in the Office of the Private Sector at DHS, I launched a project to build additional lanes across the border at the port of Nogales in Arizona.  What made this project unusual is that we intended to do it without any federal funds at all, and would instead leverage the resources of the private sector and attempt to build the lanes at a 10th of the normal cost and do it all in less than 2 years.

Then-Governor Napolitano jumped on the idea like a dog on a bone, energized her staff, and helped push the bureaucracy.  The new lanes in Nogales were built in less than two years, and relieved congestion that had plagued legitimate trade for years.

What then-Governor Napolitano must have learned from this experience in Nogales is that if the government is wise, it can leverage huge resources and additional capital to build more capacity at our borders and do it quickly.   Indeed, private investors are even now ready to build a new POE some 10 miles from Otay Mesa which would more than double the capacity and provide an economic stimulus to the State of California that Governor Schwarzenegger has estimated to be in the $ billions/ per year.  In Detroit, private investors are ready to build new and expanded plazas with more than 25 new inspection lanes to facilitate the traffic demands.  The same is true in Buffalo New York, one of the busiest POEs in the nation.

And yet, DHS stumbles around in a curious way, determined to avoid making the very changes that would yield the largest possible economic impacts.  Partners at the state and local levels of government along with private investors, who understand the economic benefits that could be gained by getting legitimate trade and travelers moving more quickly across the border, are left scratching their head and wondering why the government decided to invest most of this money to make changes that are not needed and in places that don’t matter.

Let’s hope there is still time for Secretary Napolitano to get a grip on the DHS policy and make some badly needed changes. Otherwise, honest trade and travelers expecting to cross the border need to be prepared for many more summers from hell.

Argument by Chad Wolf:

Before we begin an all out assault on CBP for how the agency is spending its stimulus funds, we need to take a deep breath and fully understand Congressional direction in the American Recovery & Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009.

Some have criticized CBP for ignoring land Ports of Entry (POE) modernization needs and requirements in favor of new border security technologies.  I don’t necessarily disagree that our major POEs desperately need updating and enhancements to handle increased traffic they are now experiencing.  There’s no doubt that should be a priority.  But I don’t think that it’s a zero sum game.

It’s been suggested that CBP is using much of the $720 million it received in ARRA to procure new inspection technologies, communications systems and other border technology at the expense of POE modernization.  That’s simply not the case (at this time).

Under ARRA CBP received, in addition to the $720 million, approximately $260 million for non-intrusive technology, tactical communications equipment and radios and border technology (SBInet) on the southwest border.  This money, and not the $720 million, was exactly what Acting CBP Commissioner Ahern alluded to during recent remarks touting the benefits of new technology along the border.

Let us not forget that we are in the midst of a serious fight along the southern border with the Mexican drug cartels.  Increased security is what is needed and the Congress provided a down payment toward that end in ARRA.  Border security technology not only increases the security of the region but, if deployed successfully, can help reduce congestion and wait times at POEs and free up CBP resources for other critical purposes. The technology CBP is procuring has tried and true performance capabilities and is currently deployed on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan where it has saved countless lives by detecting IEDs.  We can be assured that it will find contraband (such as guns) going south as well as contraband (such as drugs, money and illegal aliens) coming north.

When I take a look at what CBP is doing with its $720 million for POEs I also disagree with some that the agency is ignoring the busiest POEs.  Again, let’s take a look at how Congress allocated the $720 million.  $420 million is allocated to CBP-owned land ports of entry.  These are some of the smallest and most remote POEs that exist to be sure.  Perhaps they don’t offer the most bang-for-the buck, but CBP doesn’t have flexibility to reallocate this money.  It must spend it on CBP-owned POEs.

The remaining $300 million was appropriated for GSA-owned POEs.  These are the large POEs that many of us are aware of and perhaps have traveled through.  While $300 million sounds like a significant amount of money, it really just represents an initial down payment for these high-traffic POEs.  Just recently Secretary Napolitano announced that $200 million of ARRA funding would go toward “a major overhaul of the Nogales [Ariz.] port of entry.”  In addition, the Secretary indicated that CBP would be installing improvements at Otay Mesa [California] and redesigning Columbus [New Mexico].  All three of these POEs are GSA-owned and represent some of the largest crossings.

To this author it appears that CBP is implementing ARRA funding in a responsible manner.  But perhaps most importantly, the agency is implementing the funding in manner in which the Congress directed it to do so.  If there’s an argument to be made about the allocation of these funds and the re-setting of priorities, that’s a discussion to have with Congress and not CBP.

Argument by Sam Rosenfeld:

The recent decision to reallocate Point of Entry improvement funds to security spending is prioritizing security above livelihoods, and appears to demonstrate a disconnect between big picture and tactical thinking within the Administration.  This comment examines the decision from a government decision-making and prioritization perspective.

The Obama Administration promised Congress that they would allocate $1 billion to infrastructure improvement at Points of Entry (POEs); that money is now being reallocated to improving security technology and communications. The reallocation of funds around the POEs demonstrates department-level bureaucratic imperatives are being prioritized over the fundamental, macro-economic needs of the United States, and possibly leading to the ceding of control of important functions of government.

Mazlov’s personal hierarchy of needs is informative here; a human must have water, food and shelter before they can go on to do other things.  Note that this list does not include security as a fundamental priority for survival.  This list is equally applicable to the nation-state: countries have hierarchies of needs too, and the very first must be to meet those Mazlovian needs of their people – the bite of the economy is surely demonstrating that without national and personal economic survival and prosperity, all else is window dressing.  There are risks we must take, and risks we need not take; in the current climate, assessing these risks must be conducted by those who sit above individual departments, not by the departments themselves; that is what our leaders are for.  Once those decisions are taken, they must be communicated clearly to the individual departments.  This reprioritization of the use of the funds demonstrates the prioritizing of security over the economy – blood over lifeblood.

One argument being fielded is that the money must be used to make the borders more secure, and that in doing so the technology will increase the flow rate of traffic across the border.  That may be so, but increasing the rate of drips from a tap doesn’t substantially increase the speed with which the bucket gets filled; not when the tap can be repaired and turned on full.  If we examine the alternatives from a economic perspective, the spending on increased technology and communications will direct funds to technology companies.  There will be spending on the manufacture of electronics of various natures.  Much of the cost of electronic devices is spent to recompense these companies for research and development costs; generally, of the monies spent by the government some of the funds will go to employees involved in manufacture, some will go to the operating margin of the company, some to future R&D, and some to the shareholders.  The result of the spending will be greater efficiency at the checkpoints and a ‘higher’ (unspecified) level of security.  Alternatively, by investing in infrastructure improvements money will be spent on construction, distributing a greater percentage of funds directly to workers; there is more discretion for spending with small businesses and other disadvantaged companies on a local basis, ensuring that funds are disbursed locally.  The improvements to the POEs will ensure much higher flow-rate of goods and services across the border.  I am not suggesting which alternative is better, rather I am outlining the two options.  Only the members of the DHS will be able to tell us what the facts and figures are when one compares the two alternatives; what the economic impacts are, what the value of the security spending is in terms of efficiency as well as security, etc.  My concern is whether such an assessment was done at all, and that the comparative assessment makes clear distinctions between economics and security, and clearly explains the value of the increase in technology.

What is really interesting is that DHS is effectively forcing private enterprise to improve the POEs because ‘it is in their own interest to do so’.  Not only are taxes going to increase, but the government is simultaneously encouraging private enterprise to pick up the bill for improvements not in the budget.  This is effectively an aggrandized ‘pay to play’ scheme, shifting responsibility for government infrastructure onto private enterprise.  While arguably this is not a bad thing – it can be argued that those who want the improvements will pay for them, while no-one is going to pay for increased security and so the government must address that issue – the wholesale ceding of responsibility for the POEs raises concerns about where the Obama Administration draws the line between private and public enterprise; my particular concern is whether there has been a line identified, or whether the discreet parts of the Administration is simply making up policy on the fly, without thought for the wider implications of their decisions.

Now is the time for Congress to prove that it is closely monitoring the new government, by seeking the proof that DHS took into account ALL factors, and not just security factors, when making this decision, and that the decision was influenced by what is best for the nation as a whole, not just what is the best security decision.  If this was not done, then the White House staff must take a long look at their performance thus far in ensuring an integrated approach to government, because they have failed this test.

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