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For Victory over al Qaeda, Build the Mosque at Ground Zero

Monday, August 16th, 2010

By Justin Hienz

Radicalization and violent jihad are phenomena intimately linked to the United States’ homeland security efforts. Those who buy into transnational terrorism’s violent ideology are threats to America, but just as important to U.S. security is how the American public understands and responds to Islam.

On Friday, President Obama weighed in on the continuing debate over whether to allow construction of an Islamic Center near Ground Zero in New York City. Celebrating the Islamic holy month of Ramadan with invited guests during a Friday dinner, the president said:

“I believe that Muslims have the same right to practice their religion as everyone else in this country. That includes the right to build a place of worship and a community center on private property in lower Manhattan.”

A strong statement. A bold statement. A statement of leadership on our country’s values. In commenting on the proposed mosque (albeit indirectly), Obama sent a message to the country – the mosque should be built because our national principles demand it. Well said, Mr. President.

But then, on Saturday, Obama amended his statements for reporters. Quoted in the Wall Street Journal, he said:

“‘I was not commenting and I will not comment on the wisdom of making the decision to put a mosque” near Ground Zero. ‘I was commenting very specifically on the right people have that dates back to our founding.’”

Did I miss something? His position on Friday seemed fairly clear, particularly because the mosque-in-NYC issue had been made so salient by constant media coverage. What else could he have been talking about? Yet on Saturday, the President’s stance was far less sure.

For those unfamiliar with this matter, the debate revolves around whether an Islamic Center can be housed in a building planned for a location two blocks – 45 Park Place – from where the Twin Towers once stood. The building would be open to all faiths, and the proposed name, Cordoba House, refers to a Spanish city where Muslims, Christians and Jews once lived together in peace.

Nevertheless, headlines have focused on the key words “mosque” at “Ground Zero” because it grabs attention and sells. This has served to inflame a national debate, with known opponents of the mosque sticking dead on message, peppering remarks with dramatic key words. There have also been other instances throughout the country where communities have argued against the construction of a mosque in their neighborhood.

A CNN/Opinion Research report shows that 68 percent of those surveyed oppose the mosque. While the question’s wording is somewhat leading, 68 percent is still a significant number, even with a wide margin of error. The ongoing debate reveals a great deal about how some Americans view Islam.

To be sure, those objecting to the Islamic Center are opposed not simply to the new place of Muslim worship but to the idea that anything related to Islam can safely exist so close to the site of al Qaeda’s greatest victory, without dishonoring the dead. This viewpoint is flawed, because it is based on a misunderstanding of religion generally, Islam specifically.

Islam, like all other religions, is dynamic, not static and monolithic. It is diverse across regions and has changed throughout history. More importantly, the concept of “Islam” (much like the concept of “Christianity,” et al.) is not standard across the world. An individual’s religious beliefs are unique to themselves because how a person interprets their faith is guided, in part, by forces in their environment, such as economy, lawlessness, poverty, etc. No person’s belief is identical to another’s, and so, to understand Islam as a singular idea and motivator is incorrect.

There is no legal, ethical or American justification for refusing the right to build an Islamic Center at 45 Park Place. It is ridiculous to oppose a house of prayer on the grounds that it is Islamic, citing the terrorists who brought down the Twin Towers as evidence of Islam’s inherent problems.

Denying the Islamic Center is tantamount to denying the construction of a Christian church (of any denomination) near the site of the destroyed Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Timothy McVeigh (the man responsible for blowing up the federal building) was Christian, but do you expect we would hear the same outcry if the site of a proposed church was adjacent to where that building once stood?

What we are encountering here is an emotional response, fanned by the media, revealing that, even a decade after the attacks on September 11, some Americans still just don’t get it. They don’t understand that al Qaeda and other terrorists are the Timothy McVeighs of Islam. Radicalized believers draw no more support from Muslim communities than militant Christians do from the global Christian population.

Debate is healthy. It’s one of the best attributes of the American social tradition. But if this debate leads to either 1. An action that prevents the construction of the mosque or 2. Further anti-Islamic attitudes preventing an American Muslim’s basic rights, then we have dishonored the memory of those who died on 9/11.

It means we have allowed Osama bin Laden, his followers and other enemies of America to construct a false opposition between Islam and America. “The Narrative,” a monstrous ideology advocating an inherent conflict between Western society and the Muslim faith, is what al Qaeda and other enemies of America believe. We must not perpetuate this lie by suspecting and fearing Islam. We must see clearly that the tragedies on September 11 were the product of terribly misguided people. The bastardized interpretation of Islam that they used to justify their actions does not reflect what most of the world’s one billion Muslims believe. Period.

If this mosque is not built (or if it is protested after it is built), then Osama’s greatest victory was getting Americans to believe what he believes – that there is a war between America and Islam. But if the mosque is built, we honor those killed, because it shows that we are continuing to triumph over bin Laden’s lies. Neither he nor his ideology has a home in America.

Had the President not made those weak-willed statements on Saturday, his initial endorsement of the mosque would have been a step in the right direction for the American people’s perception of Islam. Now more than ever we need authoritative voices to take a consistent stand and guide the public towards a more nuanced and accurate understanding of the Muslim faith.

Justin Hienz is Managing Editor for Security Debrief and a Senior Account Executive at Adfero Group.

Posted in Ideology & Public Diplomacy, International, Management & Administration, Radicalization, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

Word to the Wise On Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Africa

Wednesday, July 14th, 2010

Terrorism in Africa, like all questions of strategy and of strategic consideration, is context specific – to time, space, actors and events. Generalizations of terrorism in Africa, past and present, are most unwise and unhelpful. Countering terrorist threats in Africa requires a deep understanding of Africa – from subregion to subregion, country to country, and small folk community to small folk community. Thus, as I teach my students, understanding terrorism and counterterrorism in Africa requires knowledge of Africa, first and foremost. Policymakers would be wise to follow suit.

For the past two years, I have taught a senior seminar to upper division undergraduate and graduate students called “Terrorism in Africa.” Three years prior, before the announcement of the formation of U.S. Africa Command, I was hired to be the Africa desk officer for an intelligence and terrorism analysis team working for the U.S. Government. To say that I have an interest in what transpired this past weekend in the Ethiopian Village restaurant and the Kyadondo Rugby Club in Kampala, Uganda, would be an understatement, to say the least.

The near-simultaneous attacks (approximately ten minutes apart in two different Kampala neighborhoods, Kabalagala and Lugogo) against civilians watching the World Cup finals match between Spain and the Netherlands herald a qualitative advance in the capabilities of the Somalia-based terrorist organization al Shabaab, which has claimed allegiance to Osama bin Laden and credit for these attacks. But before we begin worrying about future terrorist attacks in Africa and shifting our resources (diplomatic, intelligence, military and economic) to the next so-called battleground against al Qaeda, it is prudent to consider what terrorism is in Africa and what is needed to counter it.

Historical and geographic factors impinge directly on the meanings of terrorism in Africa. Do Africans consider immediately what occurred in Kampala on July 11 acts of terrorism? The question is more difficult to answer for Africans than for non-Africans. Uganda, the source of the Nile River, has been intimately linked to events in neighboring Kenya and, therefore, Somalia.

During the reign of its three leaders since independence, it has faced interstate and intrastate war, civil strife, and insurgency. To pundits who are speaking and writing today about the recent attacks in Kampala, the rationale for the attacks is the participation of the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces in the African Union Mission in Somalia. In short, this is pay-back from al Shabaab for meddling in the affairs of Somalis, and Burundi may be next.

Stepping back from such insightful analysis, however, we must recognize that terrorism and political violence motivated by Islam has and has not been called terrorism by Africans. In fact, this bears out in the history of Uganda itself: in late June 1976, Palestinian terrorists hijacked an Air France plane with Israeli passengers and received safe haven at Entebbe Airport by then dictator of Uganda, Idi Amin. Does this mean that Ugandans have sympathy for terrorists motivated by an extremist interpretation of Islam? Most likely, not. But to answer the question properly, we must develop a thorough understanding of the geography and politics of Uganda. Furthermore, the future terrorist threat of al Shabaab speaks to the heart of the failed Somali nation-state, policy solutions to which require understanding the geography and politics of Somalia. Word to the wise: to counter terrorism in Africa, understand Africa.

Posted in Intelligence, International, Radicalization, counterterrorism | Comments

Terrorist Short List is Getting Longer

Thursday, April 22nd, 2010

On March 29, two nearly simultaneous suicide bombings targeting Moscow’s subway system killed dozens and injured many others. Officials believe that 17-year-old Dzhennet Abdurakhmanova, who carried out one of the attacks, was seeking revenge for her husband’s death. An Islamist separatist, Umalat Magomedov died fighting the Russians.

The black widows’ bombs reverberated here in the United States. New York immediately beefed up its subway security. Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-CN) warned all Americans to be extra-vigilant on buses and trains. “These are targets, and we know that,” he declared.

However, the American response to the Moscow bombings misses the real terrorist threat to the United States. Yes, separatist movements in Russia espouse Islamist dogma, but the United States and Russia have little common cause in the long war on terror.

U.S. intelligence should prioritize and focus on America’s most dangerous enemies. Here is a list of the groups posing the most immediate threat to the United States:

1. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: This Yemen-based group is responsible for the attempted Christmas Day bombing. Some intelligence operatives suspect al Qaeda would like to build up a stronger presence in Yemen, both for operational attacks on Western targets and as an alternative base if Pakistan has to be abandoned.

2. Al-Shabaab: Government intelligence officials have found unambiguous links between al Qaeda and this Somali group, which has been actively recruiting among the Somali Diaspora in the U.S. Last year, one of those recruits took part in the suicide bombing of an African Union peacekeeping base in Mogadishu.

3. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT): This Pakistani organization carried out the horrific shootings in Mumbai, India, in 2008. It has evolved from being a terrorist group active primarily in Kashmir’s separatist movement into a transnational force with a pan-Islamist agenda. While LeT originally targeted Indian security forces, it now targets civilians and boasts a wide international network, including connections to al Qaeda and a global criminal syndicate run by Dawood Ibrahim, known as the D-Company.

4. Hamas and Hezbollah: Both Iranian-backed groups have global reach, including networks throughout Latin America that offer a backdoor into the United States. As the world’s No. 1 state sponsor of terrorism, Iran routinely uses terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy. Reports that Iran has aided al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan show that it could order Hamas and Hezbollah to take on the U.S.

While all of these threats can be beaten, they will all become more dangerous if we ignore them or allow our security assets to become distracted and diffused by vaporous threats to the homeland, such as the black widows.

Posted in Intelligence, International, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, Radicalization, counterterrorism | Comments

15 Years Later: We Must Not Forget the Oklahoma City Terrorist Bombing

Monday, April 19th, 2010

Well, it is April again. Normally, people are thinking about spring time and taxes, at least until the 15th of the month. However, today we also need to remember one of the major acts of terrorism that happened here at home – the bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building.

The truly scary part is that these terrorists were Americans and they killed Americans – homegrown domestic terrorists who were mad at the government and took the lives of 168 American men, women and children.

To show their anger and strike at the government, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols took a rental truck (much like the kind we see everyday on the highway), mixed readily available materials and parked a homemade bomb in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Then they hit the fuse and walked away. The truck exploded, killing some of our fellow Americans as they started their day at work. Eight federal law enforcement agents and officers were killed, along with 19 children in the day care center.

April 19, 2010 marks the 15th anniversary of this horrific event in our Nation’s history. I hope that others join me in remembering those who died that day. Let us not ever forget that day, as it marks the first awakening and a change in our way of life.

Posted in Congress, Politics & PR, Emergency Preparedness & Response, Homeland State & Local, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, Radicalization, counterterrorism | Comments

Napolitano was Right: The System Worked (Almost)

Monday, January 11th, 2010

By Edward Alden, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations

The failed Christmas bombing plot has been called, by everyone up to President Obama, a massive failure of the intelligence and targeting systems that are supposed to identify would-be terrorists before they come so close to succeeding. But the more we have learned about what the government knew before the attacks, the more it looks like this was instead a very near miss by agencies that were doing most of the right things.

Consider the alternative. What if Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab had been wholly unknown to the U.S. government? We would be faced with a dangerous new type of threat – an individual from a country that was not seen as a likely source of terrorist threats who had managed to escape notice by U.S. or allied intelligence. That would have been a truly damning condemnation of the intelligence community and other agencies with a counterterrorism mission, and it would have left the Obama administration floundering for a response.

But look at what the intelligence community knew about Abdulmutallab. Here was an individual from a country that had been far down the list of U.S. terrorism concerns and who had spent much of his life in London, first at a boarding school and later as an engineering student at the prestigious University College London. He had been vetted for a U.S. tourist visa in 2008, and nothing of concern had been noted.

Yet last year, U.S. intelligence began to pick up several hints that pointed in his direction. The National Security Agency intercepted communications that Al Qaeda in Yemen was plotting an attack on the United States and that it planned to use a Nigerian to carry out a strike. According to Newsweek, the NSA also intercepted a phone conversation between Abdulmutallab and Anwar al-Awlaki, the radical cleric in Yemen linked to the Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan. And then came the warning that Abdulmutallab’s father gave to the U.S. embassy in Nigeria, which resulted in a so-called Visas Viper cable back to Washington suggesting that the son warranted further scrutiny for terrorist links.

Finally, U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials were set to pull Abdulmutallab aside when his plane landed in Detroit. His name was on the list of passengers that all airlines since 9/11 must now provide to CBP on all flights headed for the U.S., and CBP had run its checks and discovered the State Department cable that linked him to Yemeni extremists. Had Adbulmutallab landed in Detroit, he would almost certainly have been sent back to Nigeria, and the case would have marked one more success for CBP’s targeting system, like that of Raed-al-Banna, the Jordanian who was turned back at Chicago’s O’Hare in 2003 and later died in a suicide car bomb attack in Iraq.

Clearly there were many failures in this case. His name should, as the President said, have been moved quickly to the “no fly” list, or at least to the “selectee” list, given the conjunction of different information that suggested his role in a plot. Even before that, his visa should have been revoked based on the information known to the U.S. government. There is no excusing those mistakes.

But it is critical to understand that this was a near-miss rather than an abject failure. Had the government known nothing at all of Abdulmutallab, there would be little choice but to continue to do heavy-handed pre-flight screening on everyone flying to the United States, giving foreign tourists, students, business executives and others one more reason not to come to this country.

Instead, the right response is to improve information-sharing and targeting systems to make sure that warnings are analyzed more quickly, the pieces are pulled together, and the names of those who might be a threat are put promptly into the hands of front-line transportation and border security officials. The real lesson of the Christmas bombing is this: the U.S. government has actually learned a lot since 9/11 about how to keep terrorists out of the United States. It wasn’t quite enough in this case, but it was awfully close.

Edward Alden is the author of The Closing of the American Border: Terrorism, Immigration and Security Since 9/11, which tells the story of the development and impact of U.S. visa and border security measures since the 9/11 attacks.

Posted in Aviation and airport security, Border Security, Immigration & Visa Policy, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, Radicalization, counterterrorism | Comments

Asa Hutchinson on Aviation Security After Failed Christmas Day Bombing

Tuesday, January 5th, 2010

Security Debrief contributor Asa Hutchinson was quoted on an NBC story about aviation security in the aftermath of Umar Abdulmutallab’s failed attempt to detonate a bomb aboard the Detroit-bound Northwest Flight 253 on December 25. Here are some excerpts from the story recapped by First Coast News.

Airport Officials Tightening Security Without Seeming to Punish Public Flyers

Umar Abdulmutallab hid three ounces of a powerful explosive in his undergarment. It, along with a syringe, were charred when the material caught fire.

Today, airport lines are still long amid heightened security.

But the government has begun to ease some in-flight restrictions, allowing pilots to decide if passengers can hold blankets, read magazines or use the restroom in the last hour of flight.

“What we have to guard against is to punish two million travelers and the whole aviation industry whenever we should be focusing on proper intelligence,” says former Homeland Security Undersecretary Asa Hutchinson.

Posted in Aviation and airport security, Intelligence, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, Radicalization, counterterrorism | Comments

New York’s Terror Trials – Lessons from Nuremberg

Monday, January 4th, 2010

I was watching a History channel documentary on the Nuremberg trials recently … because that’s the kind of weird stuff I do on weekends, which my wife and children do not appreciate. As fascinating as it was to me, my five-year-old felt that it did not live up to the standards of Spongebob Squarepants. Fair enough. However, I do believe it offered some insights and “teachable moments,” as our President likes to say, when it comes to the trial of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the rest of the bloody terrorists held at Guantanamo. In particular, the example of Hermann Goering as the leader, apologist and chief propagandist of his own gang of war criminals.

Let’s put aside the matter of whether holding the trial of some of al Qaeda’s most ruthless associates on American soil is a good idea or not. Whether it creates an irresistible temptation for their brethren to make a statement on the streets of New York City, the very den of the Great Satan. Whether it gives foreign war criminals undue access to America’s justice system, in which technicalities can be twisted and deformed by clever attorneys to clear the way for acquittals of clearly guilty criminals. Whether it presents the grandest stage of all for some of the world’s most effective propagandists.

The decision to hold the trials in New York has been made. So instead, let’s focus on what can be done to minimize al Qaeda turning the trial into a publicity bonanza for its radical and violent agenda. Imagine Khalid Sheikh Mohammed cross-dressing as Hermann Goering, and we might imagine and prevent some of the ways in which the al Qaeda operative plans on turning this venue to his advantage.

From the outset, Goering staked out a claim to be the leader of the defendants at Nuremberg. He would use this position to inspire and intimidate his fellow defendants into following his defiant lead and presenting a unified front. Perhaps because he was indeed one of Hitler’s right-hand men, the prosecution played into the hands of Goering’s claim to be the spokesman for all and seated him at the head of the dock, thus ensuring his prominence. In doing so, perhaps the prosecution thought it was setting Goering up for a more dramatic fall when he was found guilty. (There was about as much expectation in 1945 that Goering would be found guilty as there is today for Mohammed). The result, however, was to highlight Goering’s twisted charm, provide him with a bully pulpit for his propaganda, and cement his authority over the other prisoners.

Mohammed should not be given the same kind of elevated status, despite his role as the self-proclaimed mastermind of September 11. The very fact that he already brags about his role as the leader of this atrocity suggests he plans to embrace his prominence with as much swagger as possible. If we play into his hands, he too will be given an undue opportunity to dominate the trial and intimidate the other prisoners. He should be thrown into the middle of the gaggle of thugs, no more prominent than any of the other criminals, just another small-minded murderer and crackpot who believes that God has ordained his violence. The world is filled with men who believe God wants them to murder for some holy cause, and Guantanamo has a disproportionately high number of them. Why give Mohammed a unique status as some kind of super-terrorist and interpreter of the sins of the West in the name of God?

Another mistake from the prosecution during the Nuremberg trial was to bring in too many lawyers with too many documents to prove their case. Such documents are important, clearly. However, when it comes time for a trial, to engage the public debate, the prosecution must find the right balance between overwhelming the public – and make no mistake, regardless of the venue, this is about making a case to the international public – with a mind-numbing swath of legalese and paper, and highlighting the key evidence that will capture the public imagination. Reviewing the Nuremberg case: At the very same time that Goering was at his manipulative and rhetorical best, the prosecution was swimming in a sea of documents. The documentary film maker pans his camera across the courtroom during these periods, and even many of those folks in the room, in the midst of this historic proceeding, were stifling yawns.

Be selective about what evidence is necessary to be put on display. And every prosecution team should include a public relations professional who can provide input on the strategic messaging that emerges from the evidence trail. Certainly, the lawyers should have the final say, but they should be given guidance from those who aren’t too close to the laborious period of research and discovery. In the case of some attorneys and law enforcement officials, one is reminded of PhD students defending their doctoral dissertations, unable to leave out the slightest fact or even trivia that may bolster their case – no matter that the overall message gets lost as such details are hauled forth in layer after layer.

It was not until the prosecution moved on from paperwork, no matter how important, and displayed visual evidence – photos and film of the horror of the concentration camps – that it was able to recapture the public imagination – and condemnation of the prisoners. Documents and rhetoric, no matter how damning and brilliant, can never match the power of images. As difficult as it may be for the American public to live through 9/11 again, the United States should come prepared with a diverse library of visual evidence. The courtroom – the literal one in New York, as well as the larger one of public opinion – must be left outraged and aghast at the horror inflicted by Muhammed and his fellow terrorists.

Finally, and most importantly, the officers of the court must not allow Mohammed to turn the courtroom into his grand stage. If a criminal proceeding is the decided venue for bringing Mohammed to justice, then he must be afforded the same opportunity to defend himself as other defendants. Otherwise, the entire proceeding can too easily be dismissed as a kangaroo court. However, he should be given no more latitude than absolutely necessary.

One of the most interesting insights into the Nuremberg trial was that the judge, Francis Biddle, perhaps in an effort to prove the superiority of the American system of justice over the tyrannical and corrupt Nazi system of justice, bent over backwards to give the Nazis every opportunity to strut and propagandize. Under normal court proceedings, the prosecutor is given leeway to interrupt, inject and generally box in the defendant. Biddle repeatedly gave Goering free reign to marshal all of the charm and intellect at his disposal and to often turn the prosecution on its head.

Equally, important: The United States better come prepared with prosecutors who are as charismatic and egotistical and willing to engage in theatrics as we can expect the master propagandists of al Qaeda to do.

“If you all handle yourselves half as well as I did,” Goering boasted to the other prisoners, “you will do all right.” The prosecution was forced to bring in a trial attorney who was as crafty and quick on his feet as Goering before the trial was able to get back on track and the prosecution was able to regain the upper hand.

The BBC provides an excellent insight into just how well Goering took over the proceedings at Nuremberg and manipulated the prosecution, even the chief prosecutor, Robert Jackson:

When it came to his cross-examination [Goering] prepared carefully and in the opening exchanges with the American chief prosecutor Robert Jackson he emerged an easy winner.

So frustrated did Jackson become with Goering’s clever, mocking but evasive responses that at the end of the session he threw down the headphones he had been wearing to hear the translated answers and refused to continue.

I am not convinced that giving Khalid Sheikh Mohammed a criminal trial, with all the trappings enjoyed by American citizens, is the proper course of action. Al Qaeda launched an attack on America more bloody and atrocious than anything we have seen since Pearl Harbor. Nobody suggested putting the Japanese in court. It has been suggested that trying al Qaeda via a military tribunal will elevate the organization to a level of legitimate war fighters. Well, al Qaeda is a band of war fighters. They have no qualms about targeting innocent civilians; they make no exception for children; they have no conscience and do not respect the Geneva Convention nor the concept of crimes against humanity. Nonetheless, just because they do not use conventional tactics does not make them any less a militant band of terrorists who have declared war on the United States and have repeatedly shown a willingness and competence to execute that war. What is the old axiom about not re-fighting the previous war?

Nonetheless, a criminal courtroom has been chosen as the venue. That being the case, the United States should come prepared to expect a show trial, to expect preening and theatrics, to expect al Qaeda to turn this venue into the greatest propaganda venue ever handed them. And we better come prepared to beat them at their own game.

Posted in Homeland State & Local, Ideology & Public Diplomacy, Management & Administration, Radicalization, counterterrorism | Comments

The System Worked? Government Blinders on Homeland Security

Sunday, December 27th, 2009

I was dismayed by the Obama Administration’s claim that our security apparatus worked in terms of foiling the intended attack by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab on Detroit-bound Northwest Flight 253. To quote Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, “One thing I’d like to point out is that the system worked.”

The system most assuredly did not work.

I am disappointed to have to take this stance. As I have watched gotcha media stories over the years about how the Department of Homeland Security “failed” because a reporter or GAO analyst snuck through one layer of security, I have become increasingly frustrated by the media’s lack of awareness that the nation’s homeland security strategy is based upon multiple layers of security. Getting through one layer doesn’t mean you’ll get through the next. Getting through even two layers still doesn’t mean you’ll be so lucky to get through a third. There is no such thing as 100 percent protection, which is why we need multiple layers of security.

However, in this case the system failed repeatedly. It shattered the confidence that the public should have that a layered system of security is at play. And for the Administration to come out and say that the “system worked” is to deepen – not strengthen – our sense of insecurity because of the outright foolishness of such a claim.

Let us count the ways in which the system failed:

The father of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab reported to the U.S. Embassy in Nigeria that his son was becoming increasingly radicalized and might pose a threat to the United States, the information was entered into the system at the National Counterterrorism Center and then largely dismissed with no follow up.

Next the terrorist was given a visa by the State Department, despite his name now being on a terrorist watch list. How that is even possible is beyond me. We interrogate and delay students simply looking to come to the United States to study in graduate school, but we hand out visas to individuals actually on a terrorist watch list?

Next the terrorist breezed through airport security with incendiary materials stitched into his underwear. One wonders where all the privacy groups are now. Probably hanging thinly to the Administration’s claim that everything worked great and there is nothing to see here. Napolitano actually went so far as to say, “There is no suggestion that he [Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab] was improperly screened.”

Huh? There is every suggestion that he was improperly screened.

Finally, the Administration falls back upon its now-trite argument that this was somehow the Bush Administration’s fault. The Washington Post reports on White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs comment that “White House officials struggled to explain the complicated system of centralized terrorist data and watch lists, stressing that they were put in place years ago by the Bush administration.” Good grief. At some point, the Administration is going to have to take responsibility for its own government.

Perhaps Napolitano meant that the “system worked” because this idiot managed to set himself on fire and several passengers leaped on him. Is this what we have come to? The government will no longer protect us from terrorists but we will have to protect it? There’s a confidence builder.

What we have here is a monumental failure of “the system.” This Administration’s claim to the contrary assumes that the American public is remarkably ignorant or that it simply isn’t worried about another terrorist attack and will accept such lame explanations.

Either of these suppositions is a dangerous place for the Administration. Dangerous for our country, from a counterterrorism perspective, at a time when international terrorists still view the United States as their greatest enemy. And, frankly, dangerous for the Obama team, from a political perspective, to assume that citizens and voters are intellectual slobs, which may create a lack of confidence by the public in this Administration’s grip on the terrorist threat to America.

After all, as this particular failed terrorist boasted: “There are many more like me.”

Update: On December 28th, Secretary Napolitano took back her claim that the system. See NPR’s report: “Our System Did Not Work,” Napolitano Concedes.

Posted in Aviation and airport security, Civil liberties & Privacy, Congress, Politics & PR, Featured Feed, Immigration & Visa Policy, Intelligence, Radicalization, Transportation Security, counterterrorism | Comments

Who’s Walking Your Hallways – Protecting Private Sector Infrastructure

Thursday, December 10th, 2009

Recent comments by Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano highlight the growing threat of homegrown radicalization. The recent arrests in connection with thwarted terror plots, “remove any remaining comfort that some might have had from the notion that if we fight the terrorists abroad, we won’t have to fight them here,” Secretary Napolitano said. The lack of terrorist attacks in the United States since the devastating 9/11 attacks, coupled with our aggressive efforts to undermine al Qaeda overseas has created a false sense of security. Sure, we should have increased confidence in the state of our domestic security, but complacency is not an option. The threat of al Qaeda or some other homegrown terrorist motivated by jihad or another ideology (e.g., Unabomber, Tim McVeigh) striking again is a real problem that should not be taken lightly.

Just this week, federal officials charged Chicago resident David Hadley in a 12-count criminal information. The charges relate to his alleged role in conspiring with Lashkar-e-Taiba in the November 2008 Mumbai terror attacks and developing a plan to attack a Danish newspaper that published cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed.

This comes on the heels of the attack at Fort Hood. On the afternoon of November 5, U.S. Army Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan opened fire at Fort Hood, killing 13 and wounding 30 others. While his motivations are still under investigation, Mr. Hasan had been the target of suspicion for his radical extremism and connection to Anwar al-Awlaki. Born in America, Mr. al-Awlaki was the imam of the Dar al-Hijrah mosque where Mr. Hasan and two of the 9/11 hijackers attended in 2001. Mr. Hasan and al-Awlaki had at least 18 e-mail exchanges prior to the Fort Hood attack, according to published reports.

And earlier this fall, authorities uncovered what they call an al Qaeda-sponsored domestic terrorist attack plot involving a Denver airport shuttle driver, Najibullah Zazi. Mr. Zazi allegedly trained with al Qaeda in Pakistan in 2008 before he tested homemade bombs and drove cross country to New York with nine pages of hand-written notes on the manufacturing and handling of explosives. He faces charges of conspiring to use weapons of mass destruction.

Secretary Napolitano recently reminded real estate, professional sports, media and financial leaders in New York that “[t]he majority of America’s critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector.”

What then, can corporate America do to protect itself, the country at large and prevent attacks from taking place?

Companies must be aware of who they are letting into their offices, plants and warehouses. Access to private sector infrastructure and technology can have devastating effects in the hands of al Qaeda operatives or sympathizers.

Background checks for employees and visitors are a vital first step toward ensuring workplace safety. It is important for companies to run background checks not only on their employees but on visitors as well.

“Insider” threats have the potential to have the most destructive results, as “insiders” are familiar with vulnerabilities and have access to areas that the general public typically would not.

Like David Hadley, who during five trips to India conducted surveillance and took photos and videos of various targets, including those attacked in Mumbai, visitors can gather information about a company’s facilities and use that information to plot an attack.

It is important for corporations to know that traditional criminal background checks typically only reveal arrests. As is clear from recent events, companies should drill down further in search of ticking time bombs like Mr. Zazi. An arrest is not the only indication of potential risk for terrorist connections.

The private sector must take Secretary Napolitano up on her commitment to build “meaningful partnerships with businesses across the country to secure the infrastructure vital to the safety of our citizens,” and work on implementing systems that would allow the public sector to disclose limited information on suspected terrorist connections of employees and visitors.

Additionally, companies can more vigorously institute security clearance levels that allow only certain employees access to specific locations, files and information. Implementing a “need to know” system for information access, similar to that used by government agencies, would limit access to the least number of people necessary. This would require corporations to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the way they store information to better determine who should have access to sensitive materials. While these measures might seem extreme, the security of the private sector is not only an issue of corporate security but of national security.

No additional security measures will be successful, however, without increased information sharing between the public and private sectors. The private sector must put in the work to ensure that its facilities and information are not being accessed by those seeking to harm the nation. But, the private sector can only do this if the public sector is willing to allow some form of access to information on which more informed security decisions can be made. There has been much post-9/11 talk about information sharing; however, one should question whether enough progress has been made.

In a recent interview, former Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff discussed homegrown radicalization and stated that, “a larger trend has emerged that is not surprising, but is disturbing . . . . You are beginning to see the fruits of the pipeline that al-Qaida built to train Westerners and send them back to their homelands.” The private sector must develop, deploy and use technologies and processes that promote the sharing of reliable information – the first step in eliminating “insider” threats is to know who is in your hallways.

As FBI Director Robert Mueller has oft repeated, it is not a question of if another terrorist attack will occur. It’s a question of when.

Posted in Critical Infrastructure, Homeland Security Industry & Private Sector, Law Enforcement, Radicalization, counterterrorism | Comments

Allies Matter in War on Terrorism

Tuesday, December 1st, 2009

By Jena Baker McNeill
Homeland Security Policy Analyst at The Heritage Foundation

America’s allies matter when it comes to keeping our homeland safe. But working with our allies on the security front is more than just a matter of safety for U.S. soil. It is about the security of these countries as well. Their security ensures that the bad guys don’t get the upper hand in terms of global terrorism, while forming bonds between the U.S. and other countries that sustains information sharing, military cooperation, and overall goodwill. It also helps keep the global marketplace up and running—making everyone better off.

The Heritage Foundation is hosting an event this Thursday, December 3, 2009, at 2 p.m. that will examine the counterterrorism practices of Britain, one of the most long-standing of these allies. Joining Heritage will be U.K. Shadow Home Secretary Chris Grayling, as we discuss the joint threats facing the U.S. and the U.K. and how the two nations can work together and separately to tackle the threat of terrorism.

Heritage Foundation expert Ted Bromund has written extensively on the terrorist threat facing the United Kingdom. In a recent paper, he emphasizes that “in January 2009, the head of MI-5, Britain’s domestic security service, stated that 2,000 individuals in Britain were directly connected to Islamist terrorist plots and that many more supported terrorism through fundraising or propaganda. This is a growing problem and one that could jeopardize Britain’s future. And this isn’t the first sign of this growing problem either. In fact, sixty-seven British citizens, and at least a dozen or more with close U.K. ties, perished on September 11, 2001. Just four years later, at least 700 British citizens were injured, and over 50 killed, in the London train bombings.

It’s important for both countries to continue to examine how to prevent these attacks from happening again.

Posted in International, Management & Administration, Radicalization, counterterrorism | Comments

Defining Terrorism

Monday, November 9th, 2009

With the probable execution of John Allen Muhammad in Virginia this week and the tragic rampage at Fort Hood by U.S. Army Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, still fresh in the American public’s memory, the term “terrorism” is being used quite a bit by the news media.

While there are those who would seek to link the two very different incidents to one another, given that they were murderous rampages committed by two military-trained Muslim men, political, military, religious, law enforcement and other leaders have gone to great lengths to explain that these acts are indeed distinct and are not some larger plot by Muslims against those with other religious beliefs. Those are facts, but is it proper to use the word “terrorism” to accurately describe what these men did?

If you’re Sen. Joseph Lieberman (I/D-CT), the Chairman of the U.S. Senate’s Governmental Affairs and Homeland Security Committee, you’ve already made up your mind on the Ft. Hood shootings. In an appearance on Fox News Sunday, the independent and security-minded Senator stated that, “We don’t know enough to say now, but there are very, very strong warning signs here that Dr. Hasan had become an Islamist extremist and, therefore, that this was a terrorist act.”

The Senator further stated that if news reports were true, that Mr. Hasan had turned to Islamic extremism, “the murder of these 13 people was a terrorist act and, in fact, it was the most-destructive terrorist act to be committed on American soil since 9/11.”

In the case of John Allen Muhammad, the leader of the D.C. Sniper team that murdered 10 and wounded several others in the National Capital Region in October 2002, he was one of the first people convicted under the Commonwealth of Virginia’s anti-terrorism laws enacted shortly after 9/11. As a result of those convictions and baring clemency by VA Governor Tim Kaine or some last-minute action by the U.S. Supreme Court, Muhammad will pay the ultimate price with a lethal injection at the Greensville Correctional Center in Jarret, VA on the evening of November 10th.

As repugnant and horrific as the murderous actions of Hasan and Muhammad were, do they constitute “terrorism?”

If you were to stop someone on the street and ask them what is terrorism, chances are they would describe the 9/11 attacks or some sort of suicide attack. Furthermore, if you were to explain what an act of terrorism is, you might describe improvised explosive device (IED) explosions or a suicide car bombing like those that have killed thousands over the past two decades. If you’ve studied terrorism, you might even reference some of the more notable events and groups like the Achille Lauro cruise-ship hijacking by Abu Nidal or some of the other infamous attacks undertaken by the Irish Republican Army, Hezbollah and others.

Lone wolf actions and singular shooting sprees by deranged snipers and enraged misfits always seemed to be classified as something other than a formal act of terror – but that seems to have changed.

Nowadays, the term “terrorism” is used so often to describe horrific actions that the term’s meaning has expanded from what it was just a few short years ago. If history is any precursor, we’re about to see some further expansion of that definition beyond what it is today.

While “terror” is a more than appropriate word for describing what Muhammad and Hasan did to their victims, I can’t help but wonder in looking at these two different men and two different events why the term “terrorism” is used to describe their actions and it is not used to describe another recent tragic event.

When a mentally-deranged student, Seung-Hi Cho, killed 32 people at Virginia Tech in April 2007, the day’s carnage was as unprecedented as it was horrific, but I don’t recall it being described as “terrorism.”

Why?

Was it because Cho was mentally ill?

Was it because he didn’t spout off some hateful ideology?

Was it because he successfully took his own life and could not be prosecuted for his actions?

Was it because he wasn’t Muslim?

I don’t know the answer to these questions, but I do know that if investigators had gone into his dorm room and discovered a poster of Osama Bin Laden on the wall, militant Islamist Web sites all over his computer and had found he had shouted “Allahu Akbar” as he was shooting his victims, we would be looking at the tragedy at Virginia Tech much differently than we do today.

That brings us to our use of the word “terrorism.” There are strict legal definitions of what does and does not constitute terrorism. Those definitions have come into play in the completed and forthcoming prosecutions of Muhammad and Hasan, but in terms of the word’s public use, we run a risk of de-sensitizing the real meaning of the word when we use it so easily to label unspeakable acts.

By offering that thought, I am not saying that what Muhammad, Hasan, Tim McVeigh and others have done is not terrorism. Legally, as well as in the eyes of society, they have all committed murder via acts of terrorism. But this word has a sense of power that should reserve it for the worst of actions and means. The legal system and society have judged Muhammad and McVeigh as terrorists, and it may eventually add Hasan to those ranks, but for whatever reason, Cho has avoided the label.

I don’t know the reason why, but I know that the debate on the word’s meaning is going to be a long discussion, and I hope to learn a lot more along the way.

Posted in Law Enforcement, Military & Homeland Defense, Radicalization, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

The Other Threat to the Energy Industry: Environmental Protester Preparations for Copenhagen 2009

Friday, October 30th, 2009

While there has been a sustained effort to protect the energy industry, particularly nuclear facilities, from terrorist attack, in the run-up to the Global Environmental Conference in Copenhagen later this year, another threat is emerging – environmental protesters.

Greenpeace alone has a solid record lately of anti-whaling and related activities, but their environmental activities against power stations globally have been less prevalent in the last decade. This is rapidly changing. During the G8 Summit in Italy in June, Greenpeace occupied four coal-fired power stations and a coal ship in Italy and draped a banner over Mt Rushmore. At the G20, they conducted a banner drop from a bridge in Pittsburgh. They’ve conducted effective protests at Tar Sands Oil Extraction facilities in Alberta, Canada and banner drops at Niagara Falls. Most recently, they managed to infiltrate the UK Houses of Parliament, gain access to the roofs and welcome Members of Parliament back to work with banners draped around the building.

Greenpeace is joined by other groups, including Camp for Climate Justice, which organized the attempts to over-run and shut down the Ratcliffe-On-Soar power station and the occupation of Didcot this week (both in the UK).

Recent targeting has been broad; trains and ships delivering fuel to coal-fired power stations have been targeted, as have the offices of energy firms, their suppliers and associated businesses. During the Climate Camp in August, the offices of a PR firm that works for E.On was occupied.

The threat to energy is primarily financial and operational, and like all protesters, environmentalists are asymmetric in their approach. They find either targets of high emotional impact or photogenic targets likely to be regarded as low-threat for terrorist activity, and therefore, security that is more easily penetrated. While some facilities may have lower security standards, the financial ramification of being out of commission for a few days is nevertheless significant.

It doesn’t take much to disrupt an energy facility. Tactics such as hanging personnel from structures, creating obstruction and other activities pose risks to energy facilities. Although there has been an increase of non-confrontational tactics in some instances (e.g., at the Tar Sands, the protest was conducted, positive media achieved and everyone gone by the time the police arrived), in other locations, they have been prepared to stay in place for days.

At this time, energy firms should be reviewing their procedures and tactics for dealing with protesters and the tactics they will likely use.

Sam Rosenfeld is the Chairman of the Densus Group; the Densus Threat Centre produces the Demonstration Report and Threat Analysis, a bi-weekly report of recent activities that identifies trends and makes recommendations about planned activities and likely threats. Details can be obtained at www.densusgroup.com, or by e-mailing demonstratorthreat@densusgroup.com.

Posted in Critical Infrastructure, Ideology & Public Diplomacy, International, Law Enforcement, Radicalization, counterterrorism | Comments

U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy in Afghanistan

Thursday, October 22nd, 2009

Michael Braun, former Chief of Operations for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, testified before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control regarding the Taliban’s involvement in drug production and trafficking.

Mr. Braun is now a Managing Partner with Spectre Group International, LLC. The company has offices in Alexandria, VA and Kabul, Afghanistan.

Statement for the Record

Chairman Feinstein, Co-Chairman Grassley, and Distinguished Members of the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the threat posed by drug trafficking and related security issues in Afghanistan. The security challenges facing Afghanistan today, above and beyond drug trafficking and abuse are enormous. I believe you will agree with me that the Taliban is at the root of most of those security threats, and I believe it will be abundantly clear by the end of this hearing that most of the security threats emanating from the Afghan drug trade now fall squarely in the lap of the same malevolent thugs—the Taliban. What is even more ominous are the broader strategic threats, the by-product if you will, this activity has, and will continue to produce.

Madam Chairman let me say up front that each of you on this Caucus, and your colleagues throughout Congress, should be praised for all that you have done to support the multi-faceted counternarcotics efforts of our nation, and many other countries around the globe. I appreciate the fact that it is in that spirit you called us here today.

Before entering the private sector on November 1 of last year, I served for almost four years as the Assistant Administrator and Chief of Operations with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, and for one year as the Agency’s Acting Chief of Intelligence. I also served in a number of DEA offices throughout the United States, including service on both our Southern and Northern borders, on both our East and West Coasts, in the Midwest, as well as approximately three years in various countries in Latin America and Iraq.

It is through my 34 years in law enforcement that I sit before you today, deeply concerned about drug trafficking and related security threats playing out in Afghanistan. You will receive a career, Federal narcotic agent’s perspective on the Afghan drug trade, and how the trade will continue to destabilize the country if we do not become more aggressively involved in countering this major threat. If left unchecked, funding from the Afghan drug trade will continue to fill the Taliban’s war chest in volumes unmatched by all other forms of illicit finance combined. I will also provide you with my views on the continued evolution of the Taliban—from an insurgent group, to a designated terrorist organization, to a ‘hybrid terrorist organization.’

The Continued Evolution of the Taliban, And 21st Century Global Organized Crime

The Taliban is following in the footsteps of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and at least 20 other terrorist groups designated by our nation, into a ‘hybrid terrorist organization.’ The Taliban was merely an insurgent group just a few short years ago, but they are now clearly one part designated terrorist organization—and one part global drug trafficking cartel.

Just like the FARC, the Taliban got its start in the global drug trade by simply taxing poor farmers, which is one of the world’s oldest forms of organized criminal extortion. They then began taxing the movement of drugs and precursor chemicals within Afghanistan, and across its borders. Like the FARC, the Taliban formed ever-closer relations with traditional traffickers as they grew more accustomed and comfortable with each other, and the Taliban eventually started providing security at the traditional traffickers’ clandestine laboratories and cache sites. In the private sector, it is called ‘outsourcing.’

About three years ago, the National Security Council asked the DEA to conduct a comparative analysis of the FARC and Taliban with respect to their evolution in the global drug trade. What the Agency reported as I recall, was that the Taliban was on the exact same path as the FARC, but the Taliban was seven to ten years behind the FARC’s evolutionary development in the global drug trade. What troubles me most about the study are not its findings; but the speed with which the Taliban is advancing their commitment and involvement in drug trafficking activity. They are closing the seven to ten year ‘evolutionary gap’ with the FARC at a speed far faster than most care to admit or acknowledge.

The DEA reestablished its presence in Afghanistan in early 2003, after being forced from the country by the Soviet Union’s invasion in 1979. By 2005, the DEA clearly identified the Taliban’s involvement in protecting clandestine laboratory and drug cache sites for traditional traffickers. Flash forward just four short years. The Agency has unmistakably determined that the Taliban is now managing and operating major clandestine laboratories, drug cache sites, and poppy bazaars. They have morphed; they have become the manufactures and traffickers of heroin, opium, hashish and marijuana.

As an example, just two weeks ago the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan and Afghan Army Commandos, supported by the DEA and U.S. military Special Forces, raided a major laboratory in Southern Afghanistan and seized approximately 1.8 metric tons of opium and heroin—a major haul by anyone’s calculations. It doesn’t stop there. Sixteen Taliban were killed at the site, and the evidence clearly reveals the group was involved in the manufacture of heroin.

What is even more troubling is the fact that Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and IED bomb making materials were recovered at the scene, along with a host of other weapons and Taliban propaganda and training manuals. Thanks to strong support from our military, raids like this are now taking place weekly. IEDs and IED bomb making materials, suicide vests, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, other weapons, as well as Taliban propaganda and training manuals, are routinely located at these sites. Nearly all of those labs, cache sites and opium bazaars are directly linked to the DEA’s High Value Targets (HVTs) in Afghanistan, and they provide a treasure trove of evidence that support future prosecutions.

The DEA is usually focused on building prosecutable cases against 15 to 20 HVTs in Afghanistan. These are the ‘most wanted’ drug traffickers in the country and most, if not all, are members of the Taliban. Those who aren’t Taliban are closely linked to the Taliban. I am proud of the men and women of the DEA for their work with Afghan counterparts in bringing several of the most notorious Afghan traffickers to justice in the United States. Traffickers like Haji Bashir Noorzai, who was the world’s single largest heroin trafficker before being arrested by the DEA in an elaborately complex undercover sting operation. He was also one of the five original founding members of the Taliban Ruling Shura in Kabul, and was on Central Command’s ‘Top 10’ HVT list when we invaded Afghanistan and initially ousted the Taliban in 2002. Noorzai got a taste of American justice in the Southern District of New York, and is now serving a life sentence with no hope of parole. The DEA could not have successfully brought Noorzai or any of the other Afghan HVTs to justice without the powerful extraterritorial jurisdictions that you bestowed on the Agency when you passed legislation enacting the Title 21, 959 and 960(a) statutes. From a retired federal narcotics agent—thank you.

The money generated by the Afghan opium and heroin trade is staggering, and most experts usually fail to consider how much money the Taliban derives from the hashish trade. In June 2008, the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan and Afghan Army Commandos, supported by the DEA and U.S. military Special Forces, raided a Taliban hashish processing facility near Spin Boldak in Southern Afghanistan where they seized 235 metric tons of the drug—by far the largest drug seizure in world history. The estimated Western European value of the drugs was over $600 million dollars. If the Taliban’s profit was just 5 percent, which is being overly conservative, they stood to gain $30 million dollars from the stash. Around the same time, the DEA and Afghan counterparts raided a HVT’s compound in Eastern Afghanistan and seized his drug ledgers, which clearly showed that $169 million dollars had moved through the traffickers hands for the sale of 81 metric tons of heroin over just a 10-month period. He is unequivocally affiliated with the Taliban, and is facing American justice.

One important aspect of the Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade that I believe we are failing to exploit is their leadership’s growing level of greed. The Taliban’s ‘corporate office’ has acquired an insatiable appetite for easy money over the past few years. Just like the FARC, the Taliban leadership uses ideology as an effective means by which to recruit and indoctrinate the young warriors they rely on to do their dirty work, as well as the nasty fighting. However, the Taliban leadership’s core beliefs are going right out the window as greed replaces ideology as their principle motivator.

As we witness the continued evolution of the Taliban, we must also recognize we are witnessing the evolution of 21st Century global organized crime. It is becoming more and more difficult to distinguish the terrorist from the cartel member, because they are operationally and organizationally interbreeding and morphing into one and the same. The indisputable convergence of terrorism and international drug trafficking is playing out before our very eyes in Afghanistan, and in many other places around the globe.

U.S. Military Support to Law Enforcement An Important Aspect of the Afghan Counter Insurgency

Our military has conclusively realized over the past couple years that we will not win in Afghanistan until we get the country’s drug trade in check, and law enforcement cannot effectively conduct counter-narcotics operations without the support of our military. What was unsympathetically absent a few short years ago is now generously available—robust military support to counter-narcotics interdiction operations. The types of interdiction operations I mentioned earlier are now supported in myriad ways by our military and all are jointly planned, coordinated, de-conflicted and executed by military and law enforcement personnel.

In support of drug enforcement operations, our military routinely provides airborne medical evacuation capability, and they dedicate heavily armed close air support and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) aerial platforms to provide airborne force protection. They have purchased specialized field equipment for DEA and Afghan officers, such as night vision goggles, and they have purchased MI-17 heavy lift helicopters for dedicated vertical lift of agents and their equipment. Our military has purchased and issued to DEA portable Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for dedicated use on drug enforcement operations. They provide critically important encrypted communications equipment, and have purchased very costly telecommunications intercept equipment that Afghan police and DEA agents use to judicially tap traffickers communication devices. They have invested in ISR technology for DEA aircraft, and have built training academies and other facilities to support Afghan and DEA personnel. Moreover, our military has paid for virtually all aspects of the Interagency Operations Coordination Center, and the Afghan Threat Finance Cell, which is helping to identify and track the funds derived from the Afghanistan drug trade. Most important—almost all operations are now executed with U.S. Military Special Forces operators working shoulder-to-shoulder with law enforcement agents.

When you fuse the unparalleled tradecraft that seasoned DEA agents bring to the fight with the exclusive war fighting techniques of highly experienced Special Forces operators, you create a counter-insurgency capability that is second-to-none. More of this blend would definitely be better, and would be a wise investment of taxpayer dollars.

The Bottom Line

We are not going to win the fight in Afghanistan until we get the country’s drug production and trafficking activity in check, because it provides a limitless stream of funding directly into the Taliban’s war chest.

Professor James Fearon of Stanford University completed a study in 2002 entitled, “Why Some Wars Last Longer than Others.” The professor identified and studied 128 civil wars and insurgencies from 1945 to 2000, and found that on average they lasted about eight years. However, he identified and isolated 17 of the 128 that lasted on average about five times longer than the other 111—40 years or longer. The common thread between the 17 was that the anti-government forces involved in the conflicts generated their own contraband revenue, most of which was through their involvement in one or more aspects of the global drug trade.

Finally, the Taliban and traditional drug traffickers both thrive in what our military calls ‘ungoverned space.’ In Afghanistan, they share a truly symbiotic relationship. When traditional drug traffickers successfully destabilize government by corrupting officials—the Taliban benefits. When the Taliban successfully destabilizes government through attacks on government forces or by intimidating the populace—the drug traffickers benefit. They are both constantly working to destabilize government and create permissive environments in which to operate, because they flourish in areas of weak governance. Consequently, if you fight one with any less passion and vigor than you fight the other, you are most likely doomed to fail.

Posted in Critical Infrastructure, Homeland Security Industry & Private Sector, Intelligence, International, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, Narcotics, Radicalization, Smuggling, Terror Finance, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

G-20 Warnings to Pittsburghers

Thursday, September 24th, 2009

Last night I got an email from Pittsburgh related to the protests that Western Pennsylvania residents can expect to see over the next few days with the G-20 Summit in town. I’ve redacted from the email personal information that protects this person’s identity but needless to say the person who shared it with me has some of the same anxiety that others from my hometown have shared over this event.

While the area’s residents are all proud to share Pittsburgh with the world, they will all be glad when businesses and schools can reopen; they can freely move about the area without jersey walls and reinforced security perimeters; and the protestors “get the hell out of town,” “take a bath” and “learn to use a razor” as one person told me yesterday.

Here’s the email:

“Hey everyone,

I am on the Board of Directors of the XXXXXXX XXXX Community Council and I just returned from a meeting where we had two police officers from Zone 5 warn us about security issues surrounding the G-20 Summit.

The protesters are already here – a bunch of them were thrown out of their illegal “campsite” today in the Allegheny Cemetery.

There are 81 targets in and around Pittsburgh. They include:

Mostly corporate owned companies -
•   Starbucks (all over Pittsburgh)
•   Giant Eagle (all over Pittsburgh)
•   Trader Joe’s (in East Liberty)
•   Gap (Shadyside, Ross Park Mall, etc.)
•   Victoria’s Secret (same as above)
•   Basically all of Walnut Street which is already starting to board up storefronts

NOT Whole Foods because the owner supports some of the protesters’ issues

They will throw bricks through windows, explode stink bombs or tear gas in grocery stores and block streets – mostly at intersections all over Pittsburgh, not just downtown.

Also,
•   BNY Mellon – even the temporary space in Monroeville where some employees will be working
•   Bayer Corp
•   PNC
•   CMU

And,
•   Bridges
•   Tunnels (they will stop a car in the middle of a tunnel, flatten the tires and set it on fire)

The police told us to STAY AWAY FROM THE PARKWAY WEST on Thursday and Friday. It could be closed up to 12 hours with all the officials coming to town. They will be landing their jets at Pittsburgh International and the County Airport.

Pittsburgh is already crawling with Police, Federal Agents, Undercover Agents….you name it. But please be careful for the next week.”

Here’s hoping that everything goes peacefully but I have to ask myself, “Is this event worth the costs to the area?”

Posted in Congress, Politics & PR, Homeland Security & the Internet; Gov't 2.0, Homeland Security Industry & Private Sector, Ideology & Public Diplomacy, Intelligence, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, Radicalization, counterterrorism | Comments

Let them hang – G-20 Protests have Begun

Wednesday, September 23rd, 2009

While the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh does not begin until tomorrow, protestors are already making their presence know in the city. Earlier today protestors (identified as members of Greenpeace) affixed a large banner off the West End Bridge stating, “Climate Destruction Ahead” and “Reduce CO2 Emissions Now.”

While their message may be important and relevant to humanity, their tactics are reckless, dangerous and now first responders have to put their lives on the line to get these morons down.

Here’s an idea, let them hang. That’s it… Let them hang there.

These self-proclaimed messengers to the world aren’t blocking traffic.

They aren’t particularly in the way (unless you’re a pigeon in their immediate flight path) and very frankly these people put themselves there. They took it upon themselves to execute this stunt. Here’s hoping they enjoy the view for a good, long time.

The Pittsburgh regions first responders have enough on their plates the next forty-eight hours safeguarding the President, the other world leaders and the overall community from those that would like to cause harm and destruction to this event.

These aerial acrobats thought so highly of the West End Bridge to make it their podium, I think they should get to enjoy it even more.

Who knows, maybe we can hand them a brush and bucket of yellow paint and they can paint the undercarriage of the bridge? I’m sure it needs it.

The Summit ends the evening of the 25th. Maybe we can get them down then. Or maybe some time over the weekend when the traffic dies down.

Until then, let them hang.

Posted in Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, Radicalization | Comments

Very Disturbing News: Are Mexico’s Drug Cartels Getting to U.S. Law Enforcement?

Tuesday, September 22nd, 2009

The arrest of Richard Cramer earlier this month is very disturbing news for many reasons. Personally disturbing to me, not only because I am a former ICE Special Agent and Supervisor, but also because of the damage incidents like this have on inter-agency cooperation, and in this case, international cooperation. It should remind all agents, officers, prosecutors, analysts, and staff of the importance and necessity to “compartmentalize” any and all information relating to sensitive investigations and law enforcement activities. It reinforces the necessity of operational security and the policy of controlling access to “on a need to know basis”.

Cramer was arrested by DEA on September 4th for his participation in a conspiracy to provide members of a Mexican drug cartel with information and background on U.S. narcotics enforcement activities. According to the criminal complaint filed by DEA, “Cramer was responsible for advising the drug traffickers how U.S. law enforcement works with warrants and record checks as well as how DEA conducts investigations to include “flipping” subjects or recruiting informants”. Cramer allegedly pulled files to help identify confidential sources, charging as much as $2000. for one document sent to a suspect in Miami.

Cramer was a ranking federal law enforcement official with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) until he retired in January 2007. During his career he was employed in many very sensitive positions including a supervisory position in Nogales, Arizona, and as the ICE Attache in Guadalajara, Mexico. Cramer’s duties in Mexico included serving as liaison with the Mexican police, assisting investigations and collecting intelligence.

Cramer’s behavior is what we have come to associate with Mexico where the drug cartels have compromised Mexican politicians, police chiefs, judges and military components. We have not come to associate it with high-ranking members of U.S. anti-drug law enforcement agencies.

I do not personally know Richard Cramer but I am sure he is unable to justify this betrayal. It is a significant affront to all involved in the war on drugs on a daily basis. The damage done may never be measured, but if it reminds the personnel waging this “drug war” of the absolute necessity for operational security, it will a small positive in this very disturbing news.

Posted in Border Security, Congress, Politics & PR, Emergency Preparedness & Response, Homeland State & Local, Immigration & Visa Policy, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, Narcotics, Radicalization, Smuggling, counterterrorism | Comments

PITTSBURGH G20; PREPAREDNESS THROUGH THINKING REALISTICALLY

Monday, August 10th, 2009

The G20 poses challenges for local businesses; it will test their readiness for a range of credible scenarios, whether those exact scenarios were predicted or not. Information will be scarce until very close to the event for security reasons, meaning that businesses must plan for the worst and hope for the best, so that they can react to the final plans with confidence, flexibility and the assuredness that their businesses will continue to operate during a potentially disruptive period in Pittsburgh’s Central Business District.

Unfortunately, at Densus our research shows that managers with G-20 exposure are too keen to ask questions about how businesses may be inconvenienced, and not about the actual risks and how to manage them effectively. As professional risk managers, we, the risk management community, seek to clarify and present solutions based on analysis and experience. We believe that risk management is about understanding the most credible scenarios, and managing the likely outcomes if, unfortunately, things going awry.

Businesses should embrace this event as an opportunity to test their business continuity planning. BC plans should be flexible enough to address effects as much as to try to combat causes. The effects of the central bus station being closed should already be a part of management and business continuity plans because snow often has the same effect. The effect of the city’s public schools being cancelled, affecting business leaders and staff members who are also parents should already be included in planning, as school closings are a normal activity.

Whether businesses see the G20 as welcome or not, it does present an opportunity to revise and test business continuity plans. When information does become available, the business is ready for the worst case scenario and down-grade its planned response, rather than being forced to plan for difficult circumstances on the fly.

The language surrounding the G20 in Pittsburgh focuses on “disruptions” and ”inconveniences.” Disruption, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. The inability to get vehicles inside a security cordon may be one person’s disruption but a business owner’s critical effect on the business. I am not stating as fact that there will be critical interruption to any business, but as a professional risk manager with an absence of definitive information in Pittsburgh at the moment, I would certainly be planning for the eventuality, considering likelihood to be mostly proportional to proximity to the Convention Centre and the Omni William Penn Hotel, where the President and British Prime Minster will be staying.

Two groups will affect business in Pittsburgh during the period September 19-25: the authorities and the protestors. Note that while the G-20 is September 24-25, ”camps” in the area begin to be formally occupied by September 19th, protest action is set to begin on September 20th, and security measures around the meeting locations are likely to begin in earnest by September 23rd.

The authorities will seek to maintain security, and protestors will seek to get their message across, some peacefully, some using direct action, some using violence. These groups can be easily described separately in abstract, but are not likely to be so easily distinguished on the streets, raising challenges for building and office security, particularly for bank branches and other potential targets.

Four major local businesses have been singled out as ”sponsors” by anarchists – they must work on the principle that they are the headline targets for direct action. A list will be issued, probably in the form of a map for “out of towners,” identifying 100 businesses; these businesses must assume that they are the secondary targets for anarchist attention.

“The protestors in London were Europeans, they won’t travel to Pittsburgh, and it won’t be an issue” is a sentiment often repeated in Pittsburgh-based blogs, forums and conversations. Whether the G20 attracts the numbers that London did or not is irrelevant; for protestor actions of a direct action or violent nature it only needs to attract a critical mass. The largest protest in London contained 35,000 people; this protest was self-policed by the TUC and passed off peacefully. There were only 3,000 people at the protest in London that turned violent, and the St. Paul police “lost control of the city centre” (their exact words) to only 200 anarchists. So the question isn’t whether 35,000 people will be in Pittsburgh, but whether there will be 200 or more anarchists dedicated to violence. In my mind there is no question – risk managers must be planning for the event, because it could happen, and as a risk management issue it must be addressed.

Threats to businesses that risk managers must be considering and planning for are listed below. This list is by no means exhaustive, nor is it a definitive list of threats that I consider high probability. However, each is possible, and so risk managers must be planning for these events and their effects on the business:

Office Occupation or Raids. Recently executed in DC by the National Peoples Action on March 23rd, 2009, an office occupation may simply entail the occupation of public spaces in the foyer or include an attempt to bypass security and penetrate into the working spaces of the target company. If the latter is successful, the target organisation will be severely affected as will the well-being of employees, visitors and contractors on-site. Such an event will traumatise staff, disrupt business operations and is likely to cause physical damage, thereby affecting the ability of the organisation to do its business. Based on information available to Densus this could include up to 100 Pittsburgh based businesses or business locations.

Denial of Access to Places of Business. Denial of access may have a disruptive effect on business operations. The denial of access may be into the physical offices, or simply getting into downtown. This may be the result of:

•   Protests that prevent access into the offices,
•   The authorities placing areas containing offices and businesses out of bounds,
•   Deliberate blocking and disruption of key routes and bridges; the Pittsburgh Organizing Group demonstrated real talent for this when they conducted two of the most successful road blocks at the RNC in St Paul.
•   Bus routes and other transport not being able to deliver staff to the office area.

Staff Impairment/Injury. One of the most serious concerns about protest action is the likelihood of injury to staff or customers. This can be the result of:

• Staff getting caught up in protestor action and injured or swept up in mass arrests (if the authorities choose to use this tactic).
• Staff protesting and getting arrested as part of mass arrests (for those companies with policies covering conduct, particularly security clearances, this must be a concern).

Targeting of Management. Although the targeting of executives has traditionally been a more European tactic protests at the houses of AIG executives disproves the assertion that ”it could never happen here.” It is not outside the bounds of possibility that individuals may be being targeted for direct action in Pittsburgh. Protests or direct action at homes, clubs and other venues are threats that should be considered and planned for.

Physical Damage to Infrastructure. Physical damage to infrastructure focuses on physical damage caused by protestors; the breaking of glass, setting fires, graffiti. However, more serious threats infrastructure threats do exist; in particular a terrorist act that is successful in detonating a bomb downtown could have serious effects on building structures. This is not likely, but the possibility exists; if it did not, there would be no access restrictions around key buildings and there would be no flight restrictions over Pittsburgh during the Summit.

Disruption to Power Supplies. At the G8 Summit in L’Aquila last month Greenpeace led the occupation of three coal fired power stations near the G-8 Summit and one hundreds of miles away ‘in sympathy’. There are three coal fired power stations near Pittsburgh. Management of the national power grid is not my specialty, but for businesses where even a five second discontinuation of power may affect business processes, discontinuation of power must be a planning consideration.

Risk management is about understanding the potential effects and managing for them through pre-emptive planning and measures, and measures in place if threats do realise.

At this point businesses should be planning for:

•   Not being able to freely access their place of business for the period September 20-25.
•   They have logistical systems downtown that cannot be used, such as transport, suppliers and food and beverage shops.
•   Key staff cannot get to their primary place of work.
•   Information is lost at the main location because of office invasion or disruption.

Given the range of potential threats, businesses should be considering alternatives to utilising their place of business where that is possible. These include:

•   Working from home.
•   Working from alternate locations.
•   Leave and holidays.
•   Reallocation of working days.

I write this blog not to be alarmist, but to remind that while hope and optimism rightly have their place, it is anticipation and analysis that are the hallmark of the professional risk manager; risks must be fully understood before they can be effectively assessed for effects and likelihoods, and for pre-emptive and post-event plans to manage those risks written and put in place.

Risk management and business continuity in the context of a G-20 has idiosyncratic risks and management methodologies. With less than 45 days to go until there is a critical mass of those willing to use extreme methods, it is beholden on risk managers to understand that in addition to the scenarios being briefed by local authorities there are other, realistic, scenarios that should be addressed. These scenarios must be understood, prepared for and, if they materialise, managed in an effective manner that minimises their impact.

For more details, the Densus Group’s Demonstration Report and Threat Analysis is published on a bi-weekly basis; a special G-20 Annex is also being produced. The DRTA, and other documents briefing on the risks to businesses and to Pittsburgh during the G-20 are available to select recipients. Membership of the distribution list can be arranged by contacting DemonstratorThreat@densusgroup.com.

Posted in Congress, Politics & PR, Critical Infrastructure, Emergency Preparedness & Response, Homeland Security Industry & Private Sector, Ideology & Public Diplomacy, Intelligence, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, Private and Physical Security, Radicalization, counterterrorism | Comments

Lawlessness At Sea

Friday, July 24th, 2009

Americans have been lulled into a false sense of security since being so far removed from the attacks of September 11, 2001. Though many suggestions of the 9/11 Commission have been enacted, there are still many significant holes in our country’s maritime and port security. Many Americans are shocked, and horrified, to learn that approximately 225 hostages are being held off the Somali coast at this very moment. This security threat is far from solved, and in my opinion, the U.S. gave up a long time ago its preeminence in the maritime sector.

Piracy will continue to be a problem as long as Somalia remains a failed state. Africa writ large is a broader security concern, but you cannot address the symptom of piracy without taking on the disease ashore. The policy options all are lacking and reflect a broader strategic threat Africom was created to address. The bottom line: lawlessness on shore leads to lawlessness at sea.

The United States Navy is struggling with responding to the threat due to being spread too thin from imperial overstretch and an unwillingness to tackle this issue for other strategic and cultural reasons. Inviting an international flotilla to assist, as we’re helping coordinate, makes a lot of sense for many reasons but also raises some uncomfortable realities – such as Chinese combatants in the Indian Ocean.

The surprise of the Maersk Alabama was not that it was captured by pirates, but that a U.S. flag ship still exists on international routes. International shipping is essentially stateless — with commercial tankers now built, owned, insured, crewed and flagged in many different places. Each actor is loathe to assume liability, and many of these sailors are still hostage because no one wants to pay to cut them loose.

The UAE’s Dubai Ports World (DPW) fiasco a few years back was also emblematic of this broader crisis; Americans do not control, much less understand, international shipping and why it is vitally important to national interests.

There is the possibility of an alarming criminal nexus between the Middle East, London and the Puntland region in Somalia. The stooges doing the hijacking are just pawns of bigger, shadowy forces. What happens to the millions of ransom payments? These suitcases of cash being dropped from helicopters are not being invested in Mogadishu hedge funds.

Posted in Maritime & Seaport Security, Private and Physical Security, Radicalization | Comments

The homegrown face of regime change: Social media’s influence in public diplomacy

Friday, July 10th, 2009

Social networking’s influence in the realm of public diplomacy and cross-cultural communications is becoming ever clearer. An article published in IslamOnline (“Iran’s Crisis in the Western Media” ) inadvertently highlights the power of sites such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube to give voice to the once-voiceless in the seminal events of contemporary history.

“It seems that the battle lines and areas of the current confrontation with Iran are being drawn up by the media. In the virtual world of media hype and opinion, it is obvious that the recent Iranian elections are deliberately being manipulated and distorted by the Western media,” writes the author. “This exploitation has also extended to the online world, taking advantage of sites like Facebook and Twitter for propaganda purposes.”

One has come to expect the standard assertions from apologists for Middle Eastern autocrats (both those who are hostile to and those who are friendly with the U.S. government) that American media are controlled by the U.S. government. And certainly CNN and the New York Times take their hits in this article. What is fascinating, however, is how quickly new media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook have achieved the same level of fear and loathing from these apologists in such a short amount of time.

The article blasts the U.S. media for “continuing its concerted propaganda campaign against Iran over charges that the government stole the June 12 presidential election.” In prose that nearly reaches self-parody, the author says of the brutal oppression of Iranian protestors: “Iran, like every other democratic country, has its own internal political strife and it would be naïve to expect the democratic process in this country to be unblemished and without controversy. This is the nature of democracy and politics.” He follows with the obligatory, “America is certainly the last country in the word to cast stones as it too has been mired in allegations of questionable electoral process in the past.”

It is one thing, however, to accuse the media in the United States (or, more typically, all Western media) of being the puppets of a heavy-lidded government propaganda machine. After all, in countries where the state does indeed control the media, such as Iran (and Saudi Arabia … and Egypt … and so repressively on …), where this kind of heavy-handed propaganda is the norm, it is easier to plant the seeds of doubt among the general population that the American media and indeed all Western media must also operate in a similar manner. Since the general public gets their “news” only from state-controlled organs, what else do they have to go on? It’s not like the average Iranian citizen has had the chance to grab a cup of coffee with Christiane Amanpour or George Will and learn how the news process actually works in America.

The same can’t be said of their own friends, neighbors and fellow citizens, however. And this is where statist governments and their apologists will run aground when they try to lump New Media in the same mold as traditional media – that is, government manipulated operatives helping Western imperialists seek hegemony over (insert repressive country or region of choice here).

“A site with visual impact like YouTube certainly has been successful in promoting a very biased and negative view of the elections,” observes IslamOnline. The observation is made with a knowing nod, the implication being that this is just another example of Western bias and government manipulation of the media.

Here’s the problem with that logic: The videos of beatings and shootings broadcast to the world weren’t posted by Americans. They weren’t posted by Westerners. Or affiliates of the Western media. They were posted by Iranian citizens.

The clerics who control the mechanisms of power in Iran, hidden behind the veil of a “democratically elected government,” cannot wave away the voices of their own people as being the voices of puppets of the West. They can try, and are obviously doing so. But the grieving Iranian families, friends and neighbors of Neda Soltan – the young woman who was shot through the heart on the streets of Tehran, and whose painful and sad last moments were captured by a fellow Iranian as she lay dying and then uploaded to YouTube – know that her death was not a manufactured hoax by some CIA operative in the hopes of spurring chaos in Iran. They know who filmed this awful event: It was them. They know that the anguished cries of grief and rage heard in the background are their own. They know that it was fellow Iranians who broadcast this footage for all the world to see.

The dictators of the world, throughout the world, can no longer blame the convenient bogeymen of their choosing – whether it be the imperialist West, the Great Satan, Communists or Trotsky – for their own failings and the suffering of their people. Of course, they will try. But the haunting eyes of Neda Soltan will make it that much harder.

Posted in Civil liberties & Privacy, Congress, Politics & PR, Homeland Security & the Internet; Gov't 2.0, Ideology & Public Diplomacy, International, Radicalization, counterterrorism | Comments

Iran: The U.S. Needs a New Strategy

Friday, May 29th, 2009

The Middle East through a New Prism – Part II

Almost everyone involved in national security affairs, within and outside the government, talks about the threat that Iran poses to U.S. interests in the Middle East as follows:

-    Iran was responsible for terrorist attacks against the United States in 1983 in Lebanon
-    Iran sponsors terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza-    Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability that threatens regional stability
-    Iran has been actively engaged in trying to defeat U.S. efforts in Iraq-    Iran threatens Israel’s security and existence through its vitriolic anti-Semitic rhetoric and support of Hamas

Given this view of the Iranian threat and Iranian’s unabated belligerent behavior, national security policymakers and opinion makers in the United States almost unanimously agree that the past policies of sanction regimes and containment employed by successive U.S. Administrations since 1979 have failed to produce the change in Iranian policies and attitudes towards the United States and the region. Furthermore, almost all agree that the perceived Iranian threat has increased in scope and magnitude and therefore requires an American approach that is drastically different. We find the national security community in Washington generally divided into two groups: those advocating a much tougher stance on Iran that includes the use of preemptive military force to destroy Iranian nuclear and military strategic capabilities; and those advocating an engagement approach to discuss ways to neutralize Iran’s nuclear threat while building an Arab regional axis to counter Iranian influence in the region.

- Iran has been actively engaged in trying to defeat U.S. efforts in Iraq

Unfortunately, both approaches are derived from the same old prism and may have catastrophic consequences for the region’s stability, oil security, and U.S. long term interests.   Let me explain.

Approach I: Military Operation
A U.S. military operation against Iran may be very successful in destroying most if not all of Iran’s nuclear program’s facilities and capabilities. The real question, however, does not center on America’s military capability to defeat Iran, but rather on what happens in the aftermath of a military victory. Based on “cultural intelligence understanding” of the region, here are possible outcomes resulting from a U.S. military campaign against Iran:
-    Unstable Iran: the destruction of Iran’s organized military infrastructure may bring about non-centralized armed militias that could operate with impunity and pose a very serious danger to neighboring countries. There is one very important lesson to draw from the 2003 Iraq war — in the absence of an organized national army, armed militias and terrorist cells will most certainly emerge posing a more serious threat due to the asymmetrical world in which they operate.
-    Unstable Gulf: an unstable Iran will most definitely affect stability in neighboring Gulf countries which have large Shiite deprived populations and lack the capability to fight asymmetrical wars against extremist militias and/or organizations. We also need to take into account the possibility of Iranian retaliation against oil and other strategic facilities in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf during and following a U.S. military campaign.
-    Unstable Iraq: all gains made in recent months in Iraq could be greatly reversed endangering the safety of the more than 120,000 U.S. troops still deployed in that country. In a best case scenario, the Shiite community will split on whether to side with Iran, and in a worst case scenario, Shiites will unite against the United States. Sunni extremists and Al-Qaeda will seize the opportunity to regroup and may even join forces with extremist Shiites in the fight against the United States posing a greater danger to the safety of U.S. troops who are currently operating under a withdrawal scenario and are not gearing up for major operations.
-    Israel’s Security: the Middle East of 2009 is drastically different from what it was in 1967 and poses a much greater threat to Israel’s security. In 1967, Israel defeated the armies of several Arab countries combined, waged war on Arab territory, and had friendly regimes in power in Iran and Turkey. Today, Israel faces a transformed Middle East.

Lebanon: in the summer of 2006, Hezbollah dealt Israel a military defeat, admittedly limited and relative. Furthermore, there is a strong probability that the opposition, which is led by Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement (headed by Christian General Michel Aoun), may score a victory in the parliamentary elections of June 6, 2009. In a best case scenario for the United States and Israel, the opposition as a block will not get a majority, but Hezbollah will most certainly be part of the government and a force to be reckoned with; and in a worst case scenario for the United States and Israel, the opposition may win a majority in Parliament further enhancing Hezbollah’s power position within the Lebanese government.
Gaza: Hamas controls the Gaza strip and is launching rockets targeting Israeli towns. If open and democratic elections were to take place in the West Bank today, Hamas along with other more radical Islamist groups would probably win.
Arab Countries: Arab Sunni Islamists have made the liberation of Palestine a sacred struggle and Arab undemocratic regimes are besieged by Sunni extremist Islamism advocating total war on Israel using the Hezbollah and Hamas models. Israel’s wars in Lebanon in 2006 and Gaza in 2008 have emboldened Sunni Islamists throughout the region.
Iran: the current Iranian regime poses a serious threat to Israel’s security and existence and is supporting militant groups like Hezbollah and Hamas.
Iraq: the country is governed today by a Shiite majority that is closer to Iran.
Turkey: the current democratically elected government of Turkey is more Islamist (though not extremist) and has drawn closer to Iran and Syria than in the past.
Israel: Israeli Arabs have become much more outspoken about the conflict with the Palestinians and had a “mini uprising” against the Israeli government during the Gaza war in 2008.
Given this state of affairs in the Middle East today, if the United States (or Israel) were to launch a military campaign against Iran, it could create a much more explosive situation with unpredictable consequences for Israel.

The Iranian Threat Viewed through the Old Prism
Almost everyone involved in national security affairs, within and outside the government, talks about the threat that Iran poses to U.S. interests in the Middle East as follows:
-    Iran was responsible for terrorist attacks against the United States in 1983 in Lebanon
-    Iran sponsors terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza
-    Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability that threatens regional stability

Approach II: Diplomatic Engagement
Those in Washington who see the potential danger in and the explosive chaos resulting from a military operation against Iran, advocate a strong diplomatic engagement aimed at neutralizing its nuclear threat. To further enhance the U.S. negotiating stance, they also advocate the creation of a de facto coalition of moderate Arab regimes led by Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia whose aim would be to curtail Iranian influence in the region. If the United States were to pursue this approach it would most probably fail in stopping Iran’s nuclear program and further embolden and empower Iran. Why? Because this approach is also based on viewing Iran and the Middle East through the old prism and fails to recognize the following:
a) Iran’s quest for a nuclear weapon is a matter of Iranian security; and
b) In the absence of a final resolution to the Palestinian problem, an anti-Iranian coalition made up of Arab undemocratic and unpopular regimes cannot go far. Iran will continue to be perceived by Arab populations as the true defender of the Palestinian cause.

Let me explain.

Iranian Security
The Iranian political, religious and national security establishments share (almost unanimously) the view that the United States Government is quite deceitful in its dealings with Iran and, therefore, cannot be trusted. This is a summary of how Iran perceives itself vis-à-vis U.S. policy:
-    Over the past almost 60 years, the U.S. has always blocked the emergence of democratic governments in the Middle East and continued to prop up absolutist monarchies and dictatorships with the sole aim of exercising greater influence over oil security policies.
-    In the aftermath of the Khomeini-led Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran, the United States has constantly exhibited hostility towards Iran and diligently worked to undermine and/or overthrow the Iranian regime.
-    The Islamic Republic of Iran never invaded or threatened with invasion any of its neighboring countries. It was aggressed by Iraq in 1980 and suffered a bloody 10-year war in which chemical and other weapons of mass destruction were used against it by Iraq with the tacit, and later more open, support of the U.S. Government.
-    Iran was the first Moslem country in the region to forcefully condemn the terrorist attacks of September 11th. Furthermore, on September 18, 2001, Iranians held spontaneous candlelight vigils for the victims of the attacks of September 11th. No Arab country had that.
-    Iran’s constructive cooperation with the United States during Operation Enduring Freedom (launched by the U.S. in 2001 to liberate Afghanistan from the Taliban) was repaid by the Bush Administration with tougher anti-Iranian rhetoric.
-    Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States, Iran’s “extended hand” of cooperation expressed by Iranian President Mohammad Khatami (confirmed by Defense Secretary Gates) and Iran’s goodwill gesture by halting its nuclear program (confirmed by a National Intelligence Estimate at the time) were met with total rejection and regime change rhetoric and policies by the Bush Administration.

Given this view of the United States Government, the Iranian establishment concluded by 2005 that no matter what Iran does (save total submission to destructive U.S. conditions) its security will always be endangered unless it develops its own nuclear capability as a deterrent. In addition, Iran finds itself in a wider region where Israel, Pakistan, India and China all have nuclear weapons. In summary, Iran’s quest for a nuclear program has much more to do with security than achieving long term energy independence. With this background in mind, and in order to counter what they perceived as destructive U.S. policies in the region, the Ayatollahs ‘orchestrated’ presidential elections in 2005 enabling the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran’s President. The nuclear program was resumed and a much more aggressive anti-American campaign was adopted by Iran throughout the region.

President Obama’s expressed intentions of wanting to dialogue with Iran has divided (to a certain extent) the Iranian establishment on whether to temporarily freeze their nuclear program in one final attempt at extending a goodwill gesture towards a U.S. President who seems to be more genuine in his intentions and appear to be more understanding but must be tested. This explains to a certain degree the context within which the elections’ debate over the nuclear program is taking place.

Anti-Iranian Coalition
As soon as Iran’s government perceived the Bush Administration to be seriously trying to undermine Iran’s role and position in the region through an anti-Iranian Arab coalition, it adopted a two-tier counter strategy:
- Defender of the Palestinian Cause: the victory of Hamas in parliamentary elections in January 2006 generated serious concern among U.S. and Israeli officials because Hamas was committed to an armed struggle against Israel and its charter effectively calls for the destruction of the State of Israel. The Bush Administration and the Israeli Government embarked almost immediately on a coordinated political and military effort aimed at undermining the power of Hamas. Facing political isolation in spite of having come to power in democratic and open elections and fearing disruptive actions by Fatah and its security services in the Gaza strip, Hamas took control of Gaza in a preemptive military coup in June 2007. This is the context within which Iran viewed and interpreted the actions of Hamas in 2007. The Bush Administration immediately responded by advocating total isolation of Hamas and Gaza and pressured Arab governments such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt to follow suit.

Arab and Moslem populations witnessed, live on satellite television networks such as Al Jazeera, the desperate conditions to which Palestinians in Gaza were subjected to by Israeli and U.S. policies. They expressed their anger at their own governments for what they perceived as abandonment of the Palestinians in Gaza and the Iranian government saw this as a golden opportunity. Iran provided support to Hamas, championed the plight of the Palestinian people, criticized the passivity of Arab regimes like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and conducted an aggressive public relations campaign of anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic rhetoric. In so doing, Iran positioned itself as the true defender of the Palestinian cause among Arabs and Moslems alike. The Arab and Moslem perception of Iran as a reliable defender of the Palestinian people was further strengthened during the 2008 war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. Arabs and Moslems alike repudiated the actions of Arab governments such as Egypt for closing the border with Gaza, trapping thousands of civilians trying to flee the conflict. In contrast, Iran provided logistical, financial and moral support to Hamas and the Palestinians in Gaza. By aggressively championing the Palestinian cause, and in the absence of a serious U.S./Israeli effort to resolve the Palestinian problem, Iran was successful in increasing its soft power in the region thus undermining the ability of the Bush Administration to create a viable and solid anti-Iranian Arab coalition.

- Military Victory: The rhetoric coming out of Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia which raised the specter of an Iranian-led Shiite power threatening Arab and Sunni culture and position in the region, was interpreted by the Iranians as part of the U.S. effort to build an anti-Iranian Arab coalition. To counter this effort and show Sunni Arab Moslems the invalidity of such an argument, Iran engaged in trying to build a Shiite-Sunni coalition in Iraq – united under the banner of nationalism – to fight U.S. occupation of that country. This Iranian effort proved to have had a very limited effect if any at all. Another Iranian effort centered on securing an Israeli military defeat. Nothing rallies Arab and Moslem public opinion like military actions against Israel. In preparation for such an eventuality, Iran provided Hezbollah in Lebanon with the needed logistics, equipment, financing and training. The opportunity came knocking on July 12, 2006. The conflict started when Hezbollah fired rockets on Israeli border towns while simultaneously attacking a couple of Israeli military vehicles. The attack resulted in the killing of three Israeli soldiers and the kidnapping of two others by Hezbollah. Israel responded with an aggressive bombing campaign that escalated into a 33-day war in Lebanon. Early statements by Arab officials coming out of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia condemned Hezbollah’s actions as “reckless” and endangering the region’s stability. In Iran’s thinking, Hezbollah had to resist as long as possible and win that war in order to: first, prove to the Arab and Moslem worlds that Israel can be defeated when and if the appropriate strategies are employed against it; and, secondly, to embarrass the governments of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia by portraying them as more eager to appease (if not be in league with) the Israeli enemy instead of standing firm by the side of the Lebanese people who are facing Israeli aggression. Iran’s calculus worked. Hezbollah’s effective resistance and later victory (though limited and relative) dealt a major set-back to U.S. efforts to build an anti-Iranian Arab coalition. Demonstrations were held in several Arab cities and towns, including Cairo, Egypt, in support of Hezbollah and the Lebanese people. The governments of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia had to ‘reverse course’ and strongly condemn Israeli actions and criticize the United States for not putting a quick end to the conflict.

For all these reasons, a U.S. diplomatic approach aimed at ending Iran’s nuclear program will most probably fail and may even project an image of the United States as being weak, indecisive, and effectively incapable of further isolating Iran.

The New Prism to View the Middle East and the Iranian Threat
Unfortunately, and to this day, no consensus has emerged within the U.S. national security establishment on how to deal effectively with the global threat of extremist Islamism. The key culprit for this lack of consensus is the old prism through which policymakers continue to view the Middle East. The United States needs to look at the region through a totally different prism that is derived from greater and deeper cultural intelligence of the region.

Defining the Threat
In reality, extremist Islamism can be divided into two main categories, Sunni-based and Shiite-based. A common mistake that one often witnesses in Washington is the constant mixing and/or linking of Sunni and Shiite extremist Islamists; for example, putting Al Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah in the same basket!
Let us analyze the threat to the United States that emerges from each type of extremist Islamism.

Sunni Extremist Islamism
There are numerous groups around the world that fall under this umbrella and tend to be loosely connected if at all. They have, however, common features that distinguish them drastically from Shiite extremist Islamism and are as follows:
-    Strict interpretation of the Koran: these various Sunni groups believe that the door of Ijtihad was closed in the 12th century and should remain so today. In other words, it is impossible in their eyes to find common ground between their version of Sunni Islam and an international order that governs today’s modern world.
-    Suicide ideology: these Sunni groups justify the use of suicide bombings against civilians as a mean of martyrdom in fighting the infidel.
-    Record of terrorism: these Sunni groups have been responsible for almost every Islamist suicide terrorist bombing throughout the world since the Eighties. The record includes bombings in Algeria, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Morocco, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, Turkey and most importantly, the United States on September 11th.
-    Worldwide ideology: Sunni extremist Islamist groups are aggressively recruiting Sunni Moslems from around the world, especially the West, to create cells that could in the future destabilize those countries from within. Furthermore, they are endeavoring to establish extremist Islamist governments and/or safe heavens within countries such as Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, or Somalia in order to sustain their struggle into the future.
-    Nuclear ambitions: Sunni extremist Islamist groups consider Pakistan’s nuclear bomb to be their own. Their only goal is to one day put their hands on that power and use it against the infidels.

In summary, Sunni extremist Islamism is a global non-centralized revolutionary movement, is responsible for the terrorist attacks of September 11th and all other major Islamist terrorist attacks worldwide, is aggressively pursuing the radicalization of Sunni Moslems in Western countries so they can become a destabilizing force in the future, is fiercely fighting the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and is looking forward to the day it can put its hands on the nuclear arsenal of Pakistan and detonate dirty bombs in the United States and around the world (wherever it deems it necessary).

Shiite Extremist Islamism
This form of Islamist extremism is very different from the Sunni one and has the following key features:
-    Iran centered: although Shiite groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon are relatively quite autonomous they are much more connected to the Iranian regime than Sunni extremist groups are to a single government.
-    Open interpretation of the Koran: Shiite Islamist groups believe that Ijtihad and Tafseer are permitted in Islam enabling them to adapt their beliefs to different situations as they see fit. Such adaptations may vary dramatically from the narrowest views on social mores to the most open ones. For example, in Hezbollah controlled areas in Lebanon, one can easily see totally covered women walking side by side with women dressed in western clothing without any head or face covering.
-    Suicide ideology: Shiite extremist Islamist groups have justified suicide bombings as acts of martyrdom and have condoned them only when they are conducted against military and government installations of an occupying enemy on occupied land. In other words, a suicide bombing against an Israeli target can be justified if it takes place in Lebanon but cannot be justified if carried out outside Lebanon. Furthermore, suicide bombings targeting civilians in cafes, discotheques, shopping centers, etc. are, for the time being, totally forbidden.
-    Record of terrorism: the terrorism record of Shiite extremist Islamism is very small in comparison to the Sunni one. The two major terrorist attacks attributed to Shiite extremist Islamism were both in Lebanon and took place 26 years ago (U.S. Embassy bombing in April 1983 and the U.S. Marines compound bombing in October of the same year. The Marines compound was blown-up along with the French military compound). Although Hamas receives support from Iran in its struggle against Israel, Hamas’ terrorist actions against Israeli civilians are carried out by Sunni extremist Islamists.
-    Self-preservation ideology: Shiite extremist Islamism is driven mainly by the need to preserve Shiite Islam and the struggle for Shiite emancipation in Sunni governed countries. Unlike Sunni extremist Islamism which advocates a transnational ideology that aims at establishing a different world order that suits their Islamic views, Shiite Islamism is more nationalistic in nature.
-    Nuclear ambition: Iran is seeking the bomb for its own security and Shiite extremist Islamism may very well make use of it under certain circumstances.

In summary, Shiite extremist Islamism is driven by nationalism, is relatively centered on Iran, does not have worldwide ideological ambitions, has not carried out terrorist attacks in recent times, is more focused on the emancipation of Shiites within Islam rather than fighting the infidels, and is pursuing a nuclear weapon that it may use if necessary.

Defeating the Threat
The fight against extremist Islamism will be long and hard and will at times present dangers and challenges as great if not greater than those witnessed during the Cold War against the Soviet Union. The United States cannot afford to walk away from this fight and the threat of extremist Islamism, whether Sunni or Shiite based, must be defeated. The question is how?

Option I: Solve the Palestinian Problem
There is no doubt that solving the Palestinian problem would remove major complicating factors in the fight against extremist Islamism but will not bring the fight to an end. Let me explain.

Sunni extremist Islamism has an ideology that goes beyond the Palestinian cause. It has placed the plight of Palestinians under the same umbrella as the plight of Moslems in India, Chechnya, Bosnia, China, Europe, America and Arab countries who are being mistreated in a world dominated by the United States. Resolving the Palestinian issue would weaken the case for Sunni extremist Islamism but not put an end to it. Furthermore, the fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan against the Taliban would most certainly continue so would the fighting in Somalia and other parts of Africa and Asia.

On the other hand, Shiite extremist Islamism as I explained earlier is driven by nationalistic and discrimination factors. The Palestinian problem has been successfully used by Iran to counter U.S. efforts aimed at isolating it in the region. Solving the Palestinian problem would most definitely weaken Iran’s efforts in countering an anti-Iranian Arab coalition but would not stop it from pursuing its nuclear program, which is driven as I stated earlier by national security concerns.

Furthermore, given the priorities of the current Israeli government and the general feelings of Israelis today, it is almost impossible at this point to move effectively forward on the Palestinian-Israeli peace track. Irrespective of who bears greater responsibility for the breakdown in Palestinian-Israeli peace talks and who is to be blamed and for what, Israeli public perceptions at this moment are skeptical of any concessions to Palestinians to the point of cynicism. In their view, whether right or wrong, every Israeli territorial concession has been met with more Arab violence; the latest concession being the withdrawal of Gaza which was met with rockets fired by Hamas on Israeli towns. Having said that, I believe it is imperative that the United States jumpstart the peace process as quickly as possible. This, however, requires a new strategy that is based on viewing the region through a new prism (which will be Part III of this series). In summary, this option, though effectively dead at this stage, can ease the pressure on the U.S. in the fight against extremist Islamism but does not solve the problem.

Option II: Confront both Threats Simultaneously
Given the realities outlined above, if the United States were to fight Sunni and Shiite extremist Islamism simultaneously, the results could be devastating to the region, oil security and long term interests of the West. Both streams of Islamism might unite in their efforts and create horrific chaos in the Middle East and South and Central Asia. A renewed but much more aggressive wave of terrorism would shake European cities and sooner rather than later reach U.S. shores. While no one could predict the final outcome of such a confrontation, the cost of such confrontation would be horrendous.

Option III: Drive a Wedge between Sunni and Shiite extremist Islamism
In the absence of a solution to the Palestinian problem, such a strategy would have very little impact on the overall threat and does not drastically change the environment on the ground. Furthermore, if conflict were to erupt between these two streams of extremist Islamism, it would probably spread to the entire Gulf region threatening oil security and long term U.S. interests.

Option IV: A “Kissinger/Nixon” Approach
The fourth option is based on the approach used by the United States in its fight against Communism. Kissinger and Nixon determined that it would be in the U.S. best interest to drive Communist China away from Communist Russia by seeking to formulate a long term partnership with the one that represented the least ideological long term threat to the United States, namely China. In facing extremist Islamism, the United States could seriously consider developing a rapprochement with the one stream of Islamism that presents the least long term threat to U.S. interests – Shiite extremist Islamism, and therefore, Iran. There is one more important point. Iran is a country with a long and rich civilization that has endured 30 years of Shiite extremist Islamism. This form of Islamism has already evolved during the past three decades. It is now a matter of time before Iran reaches a point of equilibrium between its Shiite identity and its rich and diverse civilization. It is interesting to note for example that in Lebanon, Hezbollah has already rejected the idea of an Islamic Republic and agreed in February 2006 to a consensual democracy in Lebanon. By contrast, Sunni extremist Islamism in Lebanon is still advocating the establishment of an Islamic Republic of Lebanon.

A New Strategy towards Iran
If the United States were to adopt the fourth option outlined above, it would have to be willing and ready to engage Iran with the aim of developing a strategic partnership that would eventually bring about effective Iranian support for U.S. initiatives in the region and provide U.S. assurances to alleviate Iranian security concerns. It is in this spirit and within this context that the nuclear issue can be successfully addressed by the United States. In addition, Iran can be of great support to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon. What about Israel? Hasn’t Iran threatened the annihilation of the State of Israel, denied the Holocaust and provided military and logistical support to Hamas and Hezbollah?

The threat to Israel from Iran is very real and cannot be minimized or dismissed. If seen, however, through the new prism and within a different context, this threat could be dealt with much more effectively. Let me explain.

While the Iranian Islamic revolution has always used vitriolic language against Israel and Zionism, the degree of aggressiveness has diminished remarkably since the terrorist attacks of September 11th until the summer of 2005. During the Presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) attempts were made to explore possible détente between Israel and Iran. The Bush Administration’s rebuffing of Iran’s extended hand and its rewarding of Iran’s cooperation in Afghanistan with an aggressive policy centered on regime change drove the Ayatollahs of Iran mad. Their response to the United States was the election of Ahmadinejad to the Presidency in August 2005. This explains why since, Iranian aggressive rhetoric against Israel, its denial of the Holocaust, the hosting of a conference entitled “A World without Zionism”, its threats of annihilating Israel, and its active support of Hamas have come about with such intensity. If seen through this context and with this new prism, the Iranian nuclear and conventional threat, which are quite real, may be effectively dealt with through this new American strategy towards Iran.

Viewed through this new prism, one can also better understand why in the upcoming elections of June 12th, the Ayatollahs have allowed candidates to run for the Presidency who are critical of President Ahmadinejad’s stance on the nuclear issue and are advocating the normalization of relations with the United States. The Ayatollahs are not quite sure what to make of President Obama’s intended overture towards Iran. By allowing these candidates to run and be vocal on these national security issues, the Ayatollahs are sending the signal to Washington that they have heard President Obama. If, however, Ahmadinejad as expected by many wins the elections, it means that the Ayatollahs want to test President Obama’s intentions first.

In closing, if the United States were to adopt a strategy aimed at forging a partnership with Iran, it would need to tread very carefully, be patient and show resolve because there is a lot of animosity and distrust on both sides, especially on the Iranian side.

Cultural intelligence matters!

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