Subscribe to our RSS feed
The State Department’s renewal of its contract with Blackwater shows the gap between operational necessity and public perception. All the evidence available from reports of those in Iraq using their services is that Blackwater has worked offensively to project a much more efficient, user-friendly image. They are also now being far more closely supervised and are working even more closely with the military. Yet the public reaction to the continuation of the Blackwater contract is clearly negative.
Last week, al-Qaeda’s Deputy in Command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, resumed answering questions previously submitted to Al-Sahab via the internet. His answers and how they have been analyzed and reported by some journalists sheds new light on the growing criticism of the terrorist organization in the “Muslim world”.
Recently declassified documents disclose the bureaucratic side of al Qaeda and the terrorist organization’s continuing struggle with funding. The documents were captured in Afghanistan and Iraq and date from the early 90s to the present. They reflect an organization obsessed with paperwork, and the control and flow of money - something that has become more difficult in the post 9/11 world.
At first glance, the positions of the three major Presidential candidates regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions do not seem much different. All three express concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and all three seem committed to stopping Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Taking a second look at the candidates’ positions, however, one finds differences mainly centering on the question of how and when to negotiate with Iran.
It was with a mix of astonishment and amusement that I noted Blackwater’s contract with the State Department was extended this week. It’s as though Sept. 17, the hearing in front of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee, the angst between the Departments of State and Defense, and the angst between the Department of State and the Iraqi Government, never happened. Or at least, were inconsequential.
All eyes are on Capitol Hill this week as General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker testify before Congress on Iraq War Policy for the first time since last September. The hot topic of the week is progress—military, political and economic. As expected, General Petraeus asked Congress on Tuesday to temporarily halt troop withdrawals. Current plans mandate that U.S. forces in Iraq will gradually decline to pre-surge levels by the end of July, and Petraeus thinks that a hold on troop reduction would help maintain the recent success and promote further progress in the region.
Justice Department Declassifies Memo on Military Interrogations - Homeland Security Digital Library Weblog
Yesterday, the Justice Department declassified and publicly released a 2003 legal memorandum prepared in response to a request from the Pentagon to “examine the legal standards governing military interrogations of alien unlawful combatants held outside the United States,” including both international and [...]
Congressman Waxman has extended his investigative activities into Blackwater to include the company’s treatment of employees as independent contractors; this is not news, as the allegations arose last year. It is interesting that the issue’s reprise has received media exposure and attention. I am not a Beltway expert by any means, but it is informative that the Committee has gone to pains to let the public know that it continues to pursue Blackwater through any means, relevant or not.
Pakistan is facing a most defining moment in its history with serious implications to US security interests in the region. As stated in earlier analyses, the United States should have long ago adopted alternative approaches to Pakistan. It did not, and consequently, the situation in Pakistan today is much more dangerous. It is not, however, too late for the United States to re-engage more effectively.
The psychological effect in each of these cases is for the psychiatrists, medical experts and ultimately the legal apparatus to decide. My concern is that the crimes demonstrate that the federal safety net in place to catch and treat sufferers is not effective, and that merely educating the soldiers themselves is not working. PTSD is a legitimate threat to anyone who has served in combat or experienced conditions of high stress. Knowing that, and mixing alcohol, loaded weapons and an aggravating situation is a recipe for disaster.
It was disappointing to read of the deaths of eight Afghan police and one civilian during a U.S. military raid in Afghanistan. The lack of co-ordination is interesting, as it signals either a lack of faith in the Afghan police or a level of arrogance that is unacceptable in a Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operation. This kind of incident, which discredits the U.S. military in the eyes of the locals, is significantly detrimental to the overall effort.
Recent debriefings of captured al-Qaeda leaders in Iraq have provided new insight into the importance of insurgent financial networks. Abu Nawall, a captured 28-year-old al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, was responsible for managing the $6 million plus annual budget of the Mosul branch of the Islamic State of Iraq, an insurgent group formed by al-Qaeda. Abu Nawall arranged payments to the 500 plus al-Qaeda fighters in Mosul, insurgents increasingly motivated more by money than ideology. Abu Nawall readily admitted during his interrogation to have joined al-Qaeda because he was out of work and needed the money. Abu Nawall stated “How else could I support my family?”
It appears Blackwater used CS gas at the gates to the Green Zone in Baghdad during an incident in 2005. Although the incident is being portrayed as a travesty, this does have all the signs of a regrettable, and stupid, accident. I am no apologist for BW - far from it - but sometimes an accident is just that: an accident. Regardless, as the incident raises some important questions about the use of CS gas, the planning and authority for its use and ultimately, the stomach for its use.
On January 11, 2008, a Boston federal court convicted Emadeddin Muntasser, Samir Almonla, and Muhammad Mubayid of conspiring to defraud and conceal information from the U.S. government. Prosecutors proved the defendants fraudulently used the charity they ran — Care International — “to solicit and obtain tax deductible donations for the purpose of supporting and promoting the mujahedin (Muslim holy warriors) and jihad (violent armed conflict).” The defendants concealed from U.S. authorities the fact that Care was an outgrowth of and successor to the al-Kifah Refugee Center, and engaged in non-charitable activities such as the solicitation and expenditure of funds to support violent jihad. Coming on the heals of partial convictions and hung juries in other recent “material support” cases, this recent case highlights the strategic utility of charging terrorists and their supporters for ordinary criminal activities that the government can easily prosecute. Such legal strategy, however, should not cloud the fact that this was a terrorism case at heart.
Often referred to as Osama bin-Laden’s Top Lieutenant and al-Qaeda’s “Number 2″, Ayman al-Zawahiri continues to emerge as al-Qaeda’s most prominent and influential leader. The recent announcement by al-Sahab inviting journalists to send questions to al-Zawahiri (the first time media sources have been invited by al-Qaeda to interview one of its leaders since 9/11), reflects not only an attempt by the terrorist organization to reach a broader audience, but also an attempt by al-Zawahiri to portray himself as a sophisticated leader rather than just a mass murderer.
The new reality of the Middle East presents new challenges to US foreign policy makers as they shape future US engagements and/or disengagements in part or parts of that region. On the other hand, this new reality gives the United States a larger degree of maneuverability unthinkable of few years ago. As intelligence is key to national security strategy-making, so is cultural intelligence essential to the development of foreign policy strategies.
The assassination of Benazir Bhutto will unfortunately speed up the destabilization of Pakistan. Bhutto had the potential of winning the upcoming elections and steering the country away from extremism and towards democracy. Her elimination has created a theatre in which the three key players are a discredited Musharraf, an Islamist Sharif, and a Taliban/Al Qaeda coalition. This spells trouble to the U.S. mission in Afghanistan and the war on terror.No matter whether elections are held or whether Musharraf re-imposes emergency rule, the prospects for long term stability in Pakistan are very dim. The United States needs to do several things in the immediate future to help preserve stability.
Everything done to date on the matter of misuse of force by private military companies has the whiff of politics – of too-little too-late and knee-jerk response. If the government and the Congress are to face up to this problem properly, they need to put in place a regime that creates hurdles for entry, based on a clear set of professional standards, and then enforce those standards through licensing and audits.