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Breaking: US investigates potential terrorist test run

Tuesday, August 31st, 2010

The news of two men arrested in Amsterdam on suspicion of terrorism is making its way across the news wire. Here’s the latest from AP.

US investigates potential terrorist test run – Associated Press

Two men arrested in Amsterdam may have been conducting a dry run for a potential terrorist attack, U.S. officials said Tuesday after a cell phone taped to a Pepto-Bismol bottle and a knife and box cutters were found in one of the men’s luggage.

U.S. investigators are pursuing leads in Detroit, Birmingham, Ala.; and Memphis, Tenn., according to officials speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss the ongoing investigation.

The arrests come at a time of heightened alert just days before the ninth anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks.

On Sunday, authorities found the suspicious items — a cell phone taped to a Pepto-Bismol bottle, multiple cell phones and watches taped together, and a knife and box cutter — in one of the men’s checked luggage in Virginia. The man and his luggage were headed to separate international destinations, which also raised concerns.

Posted in Aviation and airport security, Border Security, Intelligence, International, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, Transportation Security, counterterrorism | Comments

Cyberspy Hunting al Qaeda Speaks to Security Debrief

Thursday, August 26th, 2010

Over the last decade, America and her allies have done a solid job of beating al Qaeda to a bloody pulp. We’ve hit them with everything we’ve got: troops on the ground; Predator drones in the sky; missiles from the sea; and we’re taking them apart piece by piece on the Web.

But it’s not just the government that’s running down al Qaeda. Even U.S. citizens are using some good-ol’-fashioned American initiative; citizens like Shannen Rossmiller, a citizen cyber spy.

A what?

Rossmiller’s no government agent. She’s just your average citizen with an extraordinary conviction to bring al Qaeda to its knees. Online she sounds like a terrorist, looks like a terrorist and walks like a terrorist, but in reality, she is anything but. Since 9/11, Rossmiller has been on the cutting edge of cyber counterterrorism, hunting and tracking terrorists online and sharing her findings with federal authorities.

Given that we are hunting al Qaeda relentlessly, one might think terrorists would take extra steps to hide their identity on the Internet. Rossmiller said no.

“People still believe they have anonymity online,” she said. “They don’t realize you can trace them and figure out who they are, using IP addresses and other means.”

And because of that belief, they’re willing to talk openly, she said. That’s how she gets them.

So what is cyber counterterrorism? It isn’t yet a defined practice area, though Rossmiller is making strides in that direction. She told us all about it when she spoke to a small gathering of industry specialists, a discussion hosted by Security Debrief and homeland security consulting firm Catalyst Partners.

Take the case of Ryan Anderson, an American National Guardsman who on the verge of deployment to Iraq was also online, using a different name and talking about jihad. Rossmiller identified him as a threat, and posing as an Algerian sympathizer, lured Anderson, over the course of numerous e-mails, into revealing details of his plans.

Rossmiller provided this evidence to the FBI, and with Rossmiller serving as a key witness for the prosecution, Anderson was convicted of attempting to aid and provide information to al Qaeda. He is spending the rest of his life in prison.

Rossmiller is many people in cyberspace, all of them supposedly eager to wage violent jihad. But they’re constructs, built through research and trial and error. She engages radicalized and potentially violent individuals in online forums and websites, slowly but surely writing in Arabic (not her native tongue). The lingo she uses smacks of al Qaeda-speak (whatever that sounds like), and clearly her efforts are effective as she’s pulling would-be terrorists into the open, teeing them up for our federal forces to finish the job.

Ready to sign up? Vigilantes beware. Rossmiller is particularly effective because she understands the law. As the youngest female judge in U.S. history, she has a keen awareness of what constitutes entrapment and what is needed for a conviction. Other well-intentioned but less legal-minded individuals may not be as effective in finding evidence that leads to convictions.

The discussion was moderated by Dr. David McWhorter, principal at Catalyst Partners and a former analyst with the Institute for Defense Analyses. Also helping lead the discussion was Security Debrief’s Steve Bucci, Cyber Security Lead, Global Leadership Initiative at IBM Global Services.

Posted in Cyber Security, Homeland Security Industry & Private Sector, Intelligence, International, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, Science & Technology, counterterrorism | Comments

What is a Law Enforcement Fusion Center?

Monday, August 23rd, 2010

Fusion Centers are a fairly new concept in law enforcement, and many people don’t know the purpose they serve or how their local law enforcement agency should be engaging these centers. If you ask 20 people for a definition of “fusion center,” you’ll get 20 different answers. Some might even think these centers are making frozen coffee concoctions or protein drinks.

Fusion centers are an attempt to deal with the fact that clues related to criminal activity often remain undiscovered in disconnected law enforcement databases. These centers address that challenge by bringing the data into one place or making it accessible from one place, typically on one software platform where analysts can connect the dots.

Much of the rationale for developing these centers comes from the post-9/11 realization that we knew a lot about the terrorists, but the data points were scattered and didn’t raise any red flags in isolation. Many agencies had a piece of the jigsaw puzzle but not enough to form a picture of a credible threat.

So in recent years, as a national grassroots initiative developed, in part, from a joint project with the federal intelligence community, including DHS and DOJ, about 50 of these fusion centers have been created across the United States. Each is staffed with personnel from multiple agencies that help facilitate local, state, county and federal data sharing.

While almost every fusion center has a slightly different mission, most people agree the goal is to bring a lot of data together to form a complete picture of criminal activity.

Based on what I’ve seen working in over a dozen of these centers, some are simply amassing numerous data stores in one location for quick and efficient query used to support tactical investigative activity. This approach allows instant access to various data sources, but minimal analysis occurs. In contrast, some fusion centers focus on strategic analysis, with officers and analysts collecting and analyzing the data, and then making assessments of the threats posed and the potential for criminal activity.

Contrary to popular “blogosphere” opinion, these fusion centers are not “big brother.” The rules for private and protected personal data have really not changed. State and local police still need court authorization to access an individual’s telecommunications records, credit card transactions, Internet activity and similar confidential information.

Fusion centers that are doing strategic analysis are best positioned to prevent criminal acts. Trained intelligence analysts in these centers look at a local tip or Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) and then use advanced search tools across many databases simultaneously for indications that the tip could be part of a much bigger “iceberg” hiding below the surface. These analysts are trained to develop a hypothesis and test it through search, data analysis and proper vetting.

Often, an analyst determines there is no cause for concern, but occasionally, the outcome is a finding that there is a clear and present threat, in which case the analyst publishes a “product,” which is a finished intelligence report for review by law enforcement command. While analysis of this kind has been done for years, new technologies for unstructured data search, automated workflows, and better data sharing drive more efficiency and deeper results.

If you are working in law enforcement, it’s wise to know who to contact at your regional fusion center and designate a contact point within your agency. Also, by linking your local databases to these centers, it’s possible that a traffic stop in your area could possibly help crack a bigger case.

Posted in Homeland Security & the Internet; Gov't 2.0, Homeland State & Local, Intelligence, Law Enforcement, Science & Technology, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

Let’s Not Talk Nonsense About Cyber

Friday, August 20th, 2010

A recent blog post on Wire.com by Kevin Poulsen, “Cyberwar Against Wikileaks? Good Luck With That” was brought to my attention by a good friend. She nominally just wanted my thoughts on the provocative article, but in effect, challenged me to blog on the subject. So here goes.

The genesis of the “controversy” was not the release of the mountain of leaked documents by the WikiLeaks folks, but rather, some of the response it had provoked, and that created a connection to cyber. A pundit had opined in the Washington Post that the U.S. Government had the cyber capability to “prevent WikiLeaks from disseminating those materials.” He was referring to the slightly smaller mountain of documents that have been so far held back (on the advice of newspaper leadership types). These specific articles are apparently potentially more injurious to innocent folks than those already released.

OK, so the pundit was suggesting that President Obama authorize government entities to turn WikiLeaks computers into silicon bricks? Come on folks, educated people should not talk nonsense. Could we “attack” the website’s servers, computers, and other digital infrastructure? Yes, we probably could. That defined a target is well within the capabilities of several different parts of the government, but why in the name of all that is anchored in reality would any President ever do it?!?

Even if you skip right over that pesky free speech and freedom of the press stuff, just from a policy standpoint, it would be entirely self defeating. Using cyber capabilities to silence those with whom we disagree is exactly what privacy and civil liberties advocates fear most about the development of our cyber defenses. If anyone in the administration convinced the President to do this, it would forever torpedo the efforts to husband these capabilities for use in protecting the nation from our external enemies.

Was the release of the Afghanistan documents harmful? Yes, but not hugely so. The documents are for the most part low-level tactical reports at the SECRET level – not exactly the Pentagon Papers of this generation.

What the young soldier who released the documents did was illegal. He had a security clearance and had signed numerous non-disclosure agreements that go with official access to classified material. He knowingly broke federal law and the Uniformed Code of Military Justice. He should and will be prosecuted. But the military failed in its screening of this individual and in its supervision of him. As a result, he took actions that he may regret in the future.

WikiLeaks, however, made no such non-disclosure agreements. I am not defending what they did, and I wish they had not done it. Their actions have hurt the reputation of this country, our efforts to free the Afghan People from an oppressive ideology (however imperfect those efforts may be), and may in the long run get innocent people killed. If the online outlet’s ambitions to publish the documents in full had not been tempered by more mature and experienced news people, it would have been worse.

Basically, the U.S. Military must suck this one up and do a better job of securing its classified documents (they are far easier to steal and transfer than ever before). Clearly, if we have legal recourse to keep other documents from being leaked, we should take them, but nothing more. We must also work even harder at screening our personnel and then monitoring them for signs (public Web postings for example) that they might be considering illegal actions. If anyone is considering taking extra-legal actions involving our cyber capabilities, PLEASE put that option aside. Nothing good would come of it, and lots of damage would be done.

Posted in Civil liberties & Privacy, Cyber Security, Homeland Security & the Internet; Gov't 2.0, Ideology & Public Diplomacy, Intelligence, Law Enforcement, Science & Technology, counterterrorism | Comments

UAE Blocks BlackBerry for the Sake of Security, at the Cost of Liberty

Tuesday, August 3rd, 2010

By Justin Hienz

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is home to bizarre sights. Man-made islands shaped like palm trees; the tallest building in the world literally reaching the clouds in Dubai; vending machines offering gold bars; 16 year olds driving the newest Mercedes, BMW or Jaguar. It is a strange place, and the veneer of extreme luxury certainly impresses (or fools) most tourists.

But when you pull back the curtain (and it doesn’t take much), the UAE is revealed as a developing country with many challenges, such as a rigid class system, pollution and of course, security. Don’t forget that the UAE is a stone’s throw from Iran, has hundreds of miles of unsecured coastline and is one of the few GCC States to have escaped an al Qaeda attack thus far. That is no easy security situation, and one that merits as much preparation, vigilance and strategy as the country can muster.

Yet, the Emirates’ approach to securing the country is not bound by the same rights as those granted to U.S. citizens – the UAE is a not a democracy, and what the ruling sheikhs say, goes.

On Sunday, UAE officials announced that it would block BlackBerry mobile services. The rationale: to improve security. Apparently, the experts at Research in Motion (RIM), the producers of the BlackBerry, have done an excellent job encrypting information sent to and from the smart phone. The encryption is so effective in fact that UAE security services can’t hack it, meaning they can’t monitor it in search of potential threats – hence the block on BB mobile services. Clearly, the UAE is striving for security in every way, but at what cost?

When I worked in the UAE, I became familiar with threats in the region and the steps needed to secure the country. A mighty task but one the Emirates take seriously. But this move to block BB services comes at a high cost to those seeking information in the UAE. Here is an example.

Currently, if you access the Internet in the Emirates and you are looking for information about human rights abuses that occur there, a quick Google search reveals that the Human Rights Watch website has a page dedicated to the UAE. Click the link, but whoops:

“We apologize the site you are attempting to visit has been blocked due to its content being inconsistent with the religious, cultural, political and moral values of the United Arab Emirates.”

I did this exact search while living in Abu Dhabi, and when I received that message, I went straight for my BlackBerry. The state-owned communications giant Etisalat can monitor and control Internet servers, but my BB helped me find the information the UAE government didn’t want me to.

It’s a fact of life in most Middle Eastern countries (and others around the world) that communications are monitored by the state. Looking at this from the Land of the Free, one might feel a sense of relief that we enjoy liberty and the right to read, write and say anything we like (within the law, that is) without fear of government intervention. But we must remember that maintaining our individual freedoms is a never-ending struggle.

A Washington Post article this week quotes the U.S. State Department, which is criticizing the UAE’s decision. Yet, as the reporter notes, in another Post article from last week we find that the Administration is attempting to provide the FBI with more authority to demand “electronic communication transactional records” without a court order.

Though our governing styles are starkly different, are our approaches to security really that dissimilar?

We’ve had our challenges reconciling security needs with individual freedom and right to privacy. I need not review the public reactions to the Patriot Act or other instances in our history where elements of the government have sought information to the perceived detriment of the American people.

Should al Qaeda land another blow, whispers of a right to privacy would likely die out quickly amidst voices shouting that we must do more to defeat our enemies. In this way, the ban on BB mobile services in the UAE is not as far from U.S. practice as it might seem.

Both countries are pursuing security for the sake of its citizens. But at what point does this good intention cross the line into excessive intrusion? And if undemocratic countries are levying security tactics that violate a right to freedom and privacy, and similar efforts are pursued here in America, what does that say about the legitimacy of our freedom?

Justin Hienz is Managing Editor for Security Debrief and a Senior Account Executive at Adfero Group.

Posted in Civil liberties & Privacy, Cyber Security, Homeland Security & the Internet; Gov't 2.0, Intelligence, International, Private and Physical Security, Science & Technology, counterterrorism | Comments

Can Police Agencies Perform Meaningful Predictive Analysis?

Monday, August 2nd, 2010

It amazes me how “good theoretical concepts” in law enforcement and the “programs derived from them” consistently get diluted as they are put in place at the operational level. They usually look nothing like what was on the drawing board.

Why is this? One continually hears police executives talk about strategy and then spend their days and most of their time focusing on tactical activity and decisions. Usually the “strategy” goes out the window.

Police executives agree that strategic work like data mining and using advanced tools to predict crime are great things. But very few agencies are actually doing this operationally. I know improvement is possible. Law enforcement agencies can create more actionable intelligence from the stores of information they currently hold by applying advanced analytical techniques to that information.

Understanding that information transforms into intelligence is the key. The vetting process that takes place during this transformation usually means that action can and should be taken.

Understanding what action should be taken is also important. Is it opening a full-blown investigation, conducting surveillance, or interviewing a witness or suspect? Something can and should be done, but what is it, and who is going to do it?

There are a lot of moving parts here. A typical intelligence cycle model shows a lot of information coming from myriad sources. Some part of a given agency does something to that information, and hopefully an intelligence product goes out.

But out to where? Ideally, processes are in place to send intelligence to command for strategic decision-making – and out to operations for tactical decision-making. And to case support as well for enhanced situational awareness in the operational environment.

Getting intelligence to command is relatively easy with few moving parts. Whether command does anything with it, however, is another story. Getting intelligence to operations is tricky with a lot of moving parts. How does it get to operations in a meaningful time-frame and in a usable format?

As you strive to get timely, meaningful intelligence to your operators, the question to ask is, “Do I have the appropriate technology and processes I need, in the hands of the right people in the organization to get the job done?”

Posted in Homeland State & Local, Intelligence, Law Enforcement, Science & Technology, counterterrorism | Comments

Should We Seek Cyber Attribution?

Monday, July 26th, 2010

Several news items of late have addressed the thorny issue of cyber attribution; that is, the ability to identify the sources of Web and network attacks. For cyber companies and some government agencies, attribution is the Holy Grail. Without attribution, there can be no real retribution for cyber attacks. If you don’t know (with certainty) who did it, you cannot respond. If you cannot respond, even if you have the means to do so, you become an impotent giant and therefore have no deterrence.

The counter augment, made last week by several experts before Congress, is that if we develop a means of attribution (technology that attributes cyber attacks to the criminals who conducted them), soon bad governments will get it too. They will surely use it against dissident elements inside their own countries to suppress free speech and abridge other civil rights of all sorts. Some folks in the United States worry that our own government will use technology of this sort for similarly nefarious purposes.

So, should we consciously forgo the possibility of deterring bad guys from cyber crime, cyber terror and cyber war because the technology could be used badly? I think the answer is clearly “no.”

Even if the United States and our democratic allies chose not to pursue the sort of technology needed to attribute cyber attacks, repressive countries will still eventually develop their own and use it against their people. We should be as vigorous as possible in discouraging the repression of civil rights, but we cannot give up the possibility of adding to our own protection.

This is one of those situations where national interests trump our idealist desires. If we could keep the attribution technology away forever, you might have an argument, but that is a pipe dream. We should develop it as soon as possible, keep it as closely held as we can for as long as we can, and then use diplomacy to mitigate its improper use. In some cases, that is the best we can do.

Posted in Cyber Security, Homeland Security & the Internet; Gov't 2.0, Intelligence, International, Management & Administration, Science & Technology, counterterrorism | Comments

Data Mining Tools for Law Enforcement?

Thursday, July 22nd, 2010

Recently, there’s been a trend toward some agencies purchasing new data mining tools for their needs at fusion centers. It is great to see this investment in technology, but watch out – many of these solutions don’t have any inherent method for capturing Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) and Request for Service (RFS) data, which fusion centers use to track case management activities.

Also, these new data mining tools typically don’t communicate bi-directionally with Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS), nor can they communicate with National Data Exchange system (NDEX), the FBI’s information-sharing platform.

In fact, many of these software vendors don’t understand these systems need to comply with 28CFR23, the federal guideline that governs intelligence sharing.

Let’s review the four types of data that law enforcement officers encounter in their work:

1. Open-Source Data – Anything from the Internet, newspapers, other public sources [No prohibitions to sharing]

2. SARs – Information reported by citizens or police; no identifiable crime being committed but something’s suspicious [Can be shared between agencies under National SAR Initiative]

3. Investigative related – Evidence or information collected from a crime that has been committed with a goal to prosecute or prevent crimes [data sharing polices vary widely]

4. Intelligence – Important data in assessing threats to the community; proactive, strategic analysis conducted and patterns of activities are identified; resources focus on problem at hand, be it street gangs or organized crime [28CFR23 governs this type of data – If information rises to level of reasonable suspicion, then it can be entered into an intelligence system and shared with other agencies.]

All four types of data streams have separate and distinct laws governing what law enforcement can and cannot do with them.

Agencies want to ensure that they are holding data consistent with all the rules and regulations. But if the data mining technology companies have not considered any of the aforementioned issues, their tools are putting fusion centers at risk of violating statutes, laws and regulations.

One fusion center I use as an example vetted vendors with this criteria, and instead of settling for a one-size fits all intelligence analysis system, it selected one vendor for information/intelligence management and another for analyzing the information managed by the other system.

This is what should be happening more often – using the right tool for the right job.

Bottom line: Look for technology companies that know the compliance landscape.

Posted in Homeland Security & the Internet; Gov't 2.0, Homeland State & Local, Intelligence, Law Enforcement, counterterrorism | Comments

The Disturbing Value of the Washington Post’s Work

Wednesday, July 21st, 2010

There is always something in the media that captures the conversation of people in Washington, whether it is some unfortunate gaffe that a political figure makes, some new gossip about a government official’s missteps, or the latest poll numbers identifying the rising and falling fortunes of one political power over another. This week seems to be different though.

In a series of front-page exposes entitled, “Top Secret America,” the Washington Post has essentially blown the cover off a number of classified programs and their geographic locations around the country. Using public sources and their own talents as investigative journalists, Post reporters Dana Priest and William Arkin have put together a very impressive piece of work that raises a number of important questions about the explosive growth of the intelligence community since 9/11.

These questions (most notably, “What are we spending billions of tax dollars on?” and “What difference are these investments making?”) echo questions that have been raised by both sides of the political aisles over the past few years. The ability to spend money without thinking or an overarching strategy is a skill that Washington has long perfected to the detriment of American taxpayers. Priest and Arkin’s work highlights some of the waste of tax dollars, particularly those instances where multiple intelligence players are conducting the same intelligence analysis work as their peers.

Shining a light on those actions and raising the questions of why we are doing the same thing multiple times over is certainly of value. But Priest and Arkin and their employer, the Washington Post, have also done something of disturbing value that benefits no one but those persons foreign or domestic that wish to do us harm.

By identifying the geographic locations of some of our country’s top secret facilities (government and private sector) and surmising who does what and where at those spots, the Post reporters created an operative target list that is literally synthesized and ready for use by people whose allegiances are not in American’s best interest. While they used publicly available sources and had the cooperation of the public affairs offices of many of the federal intelligence pieces highlighted in the article, the authors seem to have taken the extra mile to share things that frankly need not be shared.

In the Editor’s note about the series, the Post does share that the newspaper removed from their map graphic the geographic locations of several sensitive facilities. As commendable as that may be, that which the Post details has potentially grave consequences for the men and women who work at those facilities. The fact is that every one of those facilities had a bull’s eye on their front door last week. After this series and its wide online dissemination, that bull’s eye just got a whole lot bigger.

There are very good reasons you are not allowed to photograph inside security screening areas (e.g. airport screening areas).

There are very good reasons that the President and other dignitaries’ motorcade routes are not published in the newspaper.

There are very good reasons that when you go to Google Earth or other digital map services some areas are not available for downloading and printing (e.g. Camp David, MD; Area 51; etc.).

There are also some very good reasons that organizations like the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial Information Agency, and others in the public and private sector do not actively place neon marquee signs outside their locations and say “WE DO INTELLIGENCE WORK HERE!”

Is there signage outside many of these facilities to denote who they are?

For many of these structures there is, but that does not mean any of them want to be featured on a local Chamber of Commerce tourism map. Each of those facilities is spread out around the country for reasons of politics, duplicity, expertise and assignments. None of them has made it a policy of publicly waving a flag to say, “Hey look at me” to draw attention to themselves or the people who work there.

Maybe the Post forgot about the 1993 shootings outside of the CIA’s Langley Headquarters, when Mir Amal Khasi got out of his car with an assault rifle and fired away at CIA employees killing two and injuring three more.

Maybe they’ve forgotten about the numerous shootings that have occurred at the Pentagon over the years by those individuals, whatever their grievance, who decided to open fire or display some type of weapon.

While CIA HQ and the Pentagon are much more publicly known (and accessible structures) than many of those identified by the Post series, the fact remains that the people who work at these lesser known facilities are much more vulnerable for potential harm than they were before. Lesser-known targets are easier to strike than the higher value and publicly recognizable ones. Those structures often have their own security forces to safeguard the perimeter. Some of these others facilities may not. As this series continues to be shared by friend and foe alike, the security posture at those locations is certain to change as terrorists, lunatics and the disenfranchised have been given a hefty menu of targets of opportunity.

According to the Editor’s note, as well as the reporters’ public comments, the Post is not interested in causing any personal harm. Unfortunately, their actions speak louder than their words.

Posted in Critical Infrastructure, Homeland Security Industry & Private Sector, Intelligence, International, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, Military & Homeland Defense, Private and Physical Security, counterterrorism | Comments

E-passports Key to Border and Travel Security

Monday, July 19th, 2010

A top-rated lacrosse team representing the Iroquois Confederacy apparently won’t be competing in the world championship of the sport their ancestors helped invent. The United Kingdom—which is hosting the tournament—has indicated it will deny entry to the team because its members are not traveling on U.S. passports. The players are understandably upset that despite years of training and commitment, they won’t be able to compete for a championship. In addition, the team members and their supporters have made this an issue of Iroquois identity. However, the British authorities are correct that the decision is a matter of border and travel security rather than Iroquois sovereignty. Iroquois passports, which contain hand-written elements, simply aren’t as secure as the latest generation of U.S. passports.

To terrorists and other criminals, travel documents are as valuable as weapons. Altered passports and visas, or genuine documents obtained fraudulently, allow bad actors to cross borders in the course of planning or carrying out operations. Recognizing this, many countries in recent years have implemented higher security standards for these travel documents so they are considerably more difficult to counterfeit or for an impostor to use should it be lost or stolen. These upgrades significantly enhance the security of international travel. This is one reason, for example, that all citizens from newly designated Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries are required to travel on electronic passports.

Electronic passports, or e-passports, contain a biometric identifier, either a digitized photo of the bearer or fingerprints or both. Digitized photographs and other biometrics are important because they are harder to substitute or alter than glued or laminated photos, for example.

In addition, e-passports contain a microchip that holds the digitized photograph, fingerprints (if used) and other information visible on the passport data page. The data written to the chip is protected from alteration by the use of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) digital signature. When an e-passport is scanned upon entry, the face of the traveler, the data on the data page, and the data on the chip will all match if the traveler is the person to whom the passport was issued. As a result, border officials are better able to intercept suspect travelers and speed entry of legitimate ones.

E-passports also incorporate several other, more technical security measures (such as watermarks and the like) to guard against fraud or other tampering. Just as important as the security of the document itself is compliance with international standards for reporting lost and stolen passports. The INTERPOL Stolen and Lost Travel Document (SLTD) database – which is the preferred repository for these reports – is used at primary passport inspection by countries around the world to detect those who travel on fraudulent documents.

The United States should continue its efforts to encourage countries to not only produce and issue secure travel documents, such as e-passports, but also, to establish a daily, automatic means of reporting lost and stolen passports to INTERPOL. Both of these measures are requirements of the U.S. VWP because they close gaps exploited by terrorists and other mala fide travelers. Indeed, the Iroquois themselves recognize the benefits of more secure documents, having nearly completed a transition to a new generation of passports.

Posted in Aviation and airport security, Border Security, Immigration & Visa Policy, Intelligence, International, Law Enforcement, Science & Technology, counterterrorism | Comments

Word to the Wise On Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Africa

Wednesday, July 14th, 2010

Terrorism in Africa, like all questions of strategy and of strategic consideration, is context specific – to time, space, actors and events. Generalizations of terrorism in Africa, past and present, are most unwise and unhelpful. Countering terrorist threats in Africa requires a deep understanding of Africa – from subregion to subregion, country to country, and small folk community to small folk community. Thus, as I teach my students, understanding terrorism and counterterrorism in Africa requires knowledge of Africa, first and foremost. Policymakers would be wise to follow suit.

For the past two years, I have taught a senior seminar to upper division undergraduate and graduate students called “Terrorism in Africa.” Three years prior, before the announcement of the formation of U.S. Africa Command, I was hired to be the Africa desk officer for an intelligence and terrorism analysis team working for the U.S. Government. To say that I have an interest in what transpired this past weekend in the Ethiopian Village restaurant and the Kyadondo Rugby Club in Kampala, Uganda, would be an understatement, to say the least.

The near-simultaneous attacks (approximately ten minutes apart in two different Kampala neighborhoods, Kabalagala and Lugogo) against civilians watching the World Cup finals match between Spain and the Netherlands herald a qualitative advance in the capabilities of the Somalia-based terrorist organization al Shabaab, which has claimed allegiance to Osama bin Laden and credit for these attacks. But before we begin worrying about future terrorist attacks in Africa and shifting our resources (diplomatic, intelligence, military and economic) to the next so-called battleground against al Qaeda, it is prudent to consider what terrorism is in Africa and what is needed to counter it.

Historical and geographic factors impinge directly on the meanings of terrorism in Africa. Do Africans consider immediately what occurred in Kampala on July 11 acts of terrorism? The question is more difficult to answer for Africans than for non-Africans. Uganda, the source of the Nile River, has been intimately linked to events in neighboring Kenya and, therefore, Somalia.

During the reign of its three leaders since independence, it has faced interstate and intrastate war, civil strife, and insurgency. To pundits who are speaking and writing today about the recent attacks in Kampala, the rationale for the attacks is the participation of the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces in the African Union Mission in Somalia. In short, this is pay-back from al Shabaab for meddling in the affairs of Somalis, and Burundi may be next.

Stepping back from such insightful analysis, however, we must recognize that terrorism and political violence motivated by Islam has and has not been called terrorism by Africans. In fact, this bears out in the history of Uganda itself: in late June 1976, Palestinian terrorists hijacked an Air France plane with Israeli passengers and received safe haven at Entebbe Airport by then dictator of Uganda, Idi Amin. Does this mean that Ugandans have sympathy for terrorists motivated by an extremist interpretation of Islam? Most likely, not. But to answer the question properly, we must develop a thorough understanding of the geography and politics of Uganda. Furthermore, the future terrorist threat of al Shabaab speaks to the heart of the failed Somali nation-state, policy solutions to which require understanding the geography and politics of Somalia. Word to the wise: to counter terrorism in Africa, understand Africa.

Posted in Intelligence, International, Radicalization, counterterrorism | Comments

The Value of Aspen

Friday, July 9th, 2010

As we continue to swelter in the ongoing summer heat wave, it is easy for me to reminisce about my recent visit to Aspen, Colo. Tucked amongst the Rockies with its clean air, fervent green and majestic views, a town known primarily for its skiing with the rich and famous was home to what was, simply put, the best conference program I have ever attended.

The first annual Aspen Security Forum put forward a program that I can only describe as pleasant, informational waterboarding. By the time each of the presenters and panelists were done, my hand was dead from writing so much and my head hurt from being given the firehouse treatment of a candor and content overload.

With a venerable “who’s who” of notable names in the national security arena attending the two and a half day program, attendees had the opportunity to hear first-hand from the men and women who have served or continue to serve in some of the most demanding positions in the world. It was literally very hard to turn around and not see a face that you did not recognize from some recent event or news program, sharing insights on our country’s national and homeland security challenges.

While the presented content was outstanding, the best part about the entire program was that the overwhelming majority of notable speakers and presenters made themselves available to engage with the attendees. All too often, speakers rush in, deliver their canned pitch, say thanks to the crowd and are whisked away by their aides to get back to the office, leaving actual human contact an afterthought. To have the many distinguished speakers stick around and engage in that lost art-form of “CONVERSATION” was an absolute pleasure.

Hosted by Clark Ervin and the Aspen Institute, this was the first time they had put on a program with this particular focus. You can call it beginner’s luck if you want, but they put together a top notch effort that literally became a “must attend” for anyone who is interested in national and homeland security issues. Fortunately, for those who weren’t able to attend the program, it was taped for later broadcast by C-Span, hopefully sometime this summer. I have to tell you, there is a significant portion of C-Span’s programming that can cure insomnia, but when they broadcast the presenters and panels from the Aspen Security Forum, it will be as NBC used to call it, “Must See TV!”

To understand why I write that, here’s a rundown of some sessions (with video hyperlinks):

Adm. Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

When your opening speaker travels all the way from Kabul to Tel Aviv to Aspen to take part in the program, it’s a pretty good indicator that the organizers are up to something big. That was especially true with Adm. Mullen. Coming off a week where Gen. McChrystal was taken out by a large Rolling Stone and replaced by Gen. Petraeus, and then traveling to Afghanistan and Israel to assuage any fears and concerns they may have about the big changes, Mullen made news by essentially not making news. While his comments about the state of the nation’s counter insurgency policy dovetailed those of the White House’s, the plainspoken manner in which they were delivered conveyed the gravity of the situation our military forces are faced with in Afghanistan. His comments about Iran’s nuclear ambitions – “They’ve given us no reason to trust them” – also spoke volumes about what few measures the Administration has left at its disposal in dealing with them.

Aviation Security Panel

There is probably no other facet of the post-9/11 world that Americans gripe about more than dealing with aviation security, but as the CEO of the Air Transport Association (ATA), Jim May, said, “What’s your alternative?” Joined by Erroll Southers of USC’s CREATE Program (and the first Obama Administration nominee to lead TSA) and Christopher Bidwell of the Airport Council International, this panel laid on the table the very real threats and frustrations that accompany this portion of the security environment. One of the most interesting things discussed was the use of full-body imaging devices by airports to screen passengers. While recognizing the civil rights and privacy concerns that people have about them, Jim May of ATA shared that he thought they should be mandatory. When it came to addressing the Government Accountability Office’s recently issued criticisms of TSA’s Behavioral Detection efforts, May and the other panelists pointed out that this program was part of many layers of security, and there was no one-size-fits-all solution or silver bullet that would reduce the aviation risks faced today.

Fran Townsend, former Homeland Security Advisor to President Bush

There are many things that have been written and said about Fran Townsend, the former Homeland Security Advisor to President Bush (43), but the word “shy” is not one that would be used to describe her. The only thing that could possibly surpass the candor of her public comments when she was working as a government employee was her candor in being a former government employee. With no holds barred, Townsend explained that, “We have a reason to expect we can connect the dots this time” given all of the post 9/11 work that has been done.

In a more than hour-long conversation with Walter Isaccson, the CEO of the Aspen Institute, and the Security Forum audience, Townsend pounded on the fact that much still needs to be done to improve information sharing amongst intelligence and law enforcement agencies across the board. Her declaration that there still needed to be a senior level official or “Cabinet Agency,” but “not a czar,” to “pound these government agencies into submission to do information sharing.” Her proposal that an NGO, public-private partnership, rather than a solely government-led approach to address the growing cyber security risks, was also interesting.

Bill Bratton, former Chief, Los Angeles Police Department

Dubbed by many media outlets as “America’s Top Cop” for having led the police departments of Boston, New York City and Los Angeles, I think Bill Bratton surprised everyone at the program when he explained how the terror attacks in Mumbai, India caused him to change the entire structure of the LAPD. His interview with CNN’s Jeanne Meserve detailed how 60 days after those attacks, he was able to transform his police department with new training, exercises and more. The relatively simply trained Mumbai terrorists were not interested in holding hostages; in fact, they were using so-called negotiations to buy time to kill more people. This showed Bratton that he had to change how his department was positioned to respond to a similar event, should it occur in Los Angeles.

Michael Leiter, Director of the National Counter Terrorism Center

For a man that much of Washington thought would have his head handed to him following the failed information sharing efforts surrounding the failed Christmas Day attack, Michael Leiter, the Director of the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), displayed all of the skill and confidence that make him one of a few Bush Administration appointees to successfully transition into the Obama Administration. His description of his job, his work with the President to report on the range of threats to the country and how he thinks information sharing needs to work made this particular presentation one of the most revealing and compelling of the entire program. Interviewed by Michael Isikoff, a former Newsweek reporter and now Chief Investigative Correspondent for NBC News, ended up producing some great back and forth between the two men that was as revealing as it was humorous. This session again explained more about Leiter’s job and the mission of the NCTC than any government report or Congressional hearing to date.

Border Security Panel

Despite the countless GAO and IG reports and the many hearings before the U.S. House and Senate, there was no better overview of America’s border security than a panel made up of:

Bob Mocny, Director of DHS’ US VISIT Program;
Mark Borkowski, Director of CBP’s Secure Border Initiative (SBI); and
Steve Oswald, Vice President of Boeing.

These three gentlemen described what worked, what didn’t, what could be better and what the future may look like on programs that have regularly been making news for years. In presenting the details of these newsworthy programs, they did so with none of the drama or hysterics that are so often associated with the Congressional hearings that have exhaustively covered the respective programs. What each of them said frankly offered more substantive insight than any of the previous Congressional hearings have produced to date. That was an observation made not just by the conference attendees but also by the first-tier media, congressional staff and others who have observed each of these respective programs closely. Truth be told, if you want to know what is really happening with US VISIT and the Secure Border Initiative (minus the belligerent questions and political posturing), spending 90 minutes watching this panel when it is aired on C-Span will be time well spent.

Attending News Media

As I mentioned, the conference was a literal “who’s who” of notable current and former national and homeland security leaders, and the same could be said for the attending members of the media. With CNN’s Jeanne Meserve, Fox News’ Catherine Herridge, the Washington Post’s Spencer Hsu, Newsweek’s/NBC News’ Michael Isikoff, and more, it seemed as if there was a representative from every major news outlet, print and broadcast media in attendance. While many of them were there to serve as session/panel moderators for the various parts of the program, the entire forum was a reservoir of information for them on today’s security concerns and a background on the actions of the past. It was also a treasure trove for journalists in developing future sources for national and homeland security news stories.

Michael Chertoff, former Secretary of Homeland Security

After consecutive 12-hour days of literally (albeit pleasantly) waterboarding attendees with tons of substantive content, it’s hard to figure out how to end a program such as that in Aspen, but they picked a great closer in former DHS Secretary Chertoff. Whether it was the fact that he’s been out of office for almost a year and half and doesn’t have to worry about a 2 AM phone call from National Operations Center about someone doing something vile to the homeland, Chertoff’s candor and demeanor crystallized for everyone the seriousness of the threats we face while also assuring we should continue to go about our regular lives. As one of the very few “senior statesmen” on homeland issues that we have in this country, his conversation with Fox News’ Catherine Herridge conveyed the balance that we need to have when planning for and operating against the range of risks we face.

A wondering disappointment

I can say without doubt that I loved every moment at the Aspen Institute, but I can’t sign off without discussing the one disappointment that I and many others had in the presentation by DHS Deputy Secretary, Jane Holl Lute. Whether it was her discomfort at the conversational interview format led by CNN’s Jeanne Meserve, her fear in the week after the McChrystal debacle, not wanting to say anything to cause problems for herself or the Administration, or the fact that maybe she was having a bad day, her presentation left the overwhelming majority of attendees scratching their heads in wonder as to the real story at the Department.

All of the questions that were asked by Meserve were fair and nothing was out of the ordinary, but Lute’s responses were defensive, sometimes evasive and could have been dramatically better. Time and time again in her hour long session there were questions to which she could have responded with hard and fast examples of the Department’s accomplishments. Instead, she offered simplistic, almost apple-pie like anecdotal responses that left the audience wondering why she wouldn’t answer the most basic of questions.

When she stated, “the [U.S.] border has never been more secure,” and offered no facts to prove that statement, portions of the audience looked around at one another in shock while others openly chortled at the declaration.

When it came time for Q&A with the audience, the tenor of her responses seemed to be even more defensive. When Michael Isikoff asked her about her statement on the border’s security and her metrics to prove that it had never been more secure, Lute seemed to bristle at the question. She firmly retorted, “The Secretary has been very clear on what those metrics are,” and effectively cut him off.

Lute’s response referred to the speech Secretary Napolitano delivered at CSIS the week before, when she declared, “the U.S. border has never been more secure…but there is more work to be done” and that “no one is satisfied with the status quo.”

In that speech, Secretary Napolitano detailed a series of metrics to back up her statement, but none of those were shared by Lute with Isikoff or the observing audience. In speaking with Isikoff and some of the other attendees after her remarks, none of them were aware of the CSIS speech and the metrics behind the powerful declaration. To the credit of the Department, Bob Mocny and Mark Borkowski did an exceptional job during their joint appearance on the Border Security panel explaining why DHS leadership is stating things have improved on the border.

It is certainly a debatable point to make a declaration like the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary have made in recent forums about border security. When you back it up with information and facts, it provides some measure of credibility and fosters informed debate. When you state it and don’t want to defend it with facts, it leaves people wondering why you would state something like that and not be able to prove it. After her appearance in Aspen, a lot of people were left wondering about the Deputy Secretary, and after viewing her session either on-line or on C-Span, I expect there will be a lot more.

Final thoughts

All of our time is valuable, and God knows we don’t have enough of it, but if you can set your DVRs to record the Aspen Security Forum or go to the Aspen Institute webpage and download panels for your Ipod/MP3 player – DO IT. Think of each of the respective sessions as graduate level courses shared by esteemed faculty who have the real life scar tissue and experiences to tell you what happened and what we can all do better. If you do, I’m confident you will walk away from each session with a lot more knowledge and a bit of a mild headache too. That’s what pleasant informational waterboarding will do to you, but I have to say, it is much more enjoyable amongst the mountains and beautiful vistas of Aspen.

Posted in Aviation and airport security, Border Security, Congress, Politics & PR, Critical Infrastructure, Cyber Security, Homeland Security & the Internet; Gov't 2.0, Homeland Security Industry & Private Sector, Ideology & Public Diplomacy, Immigration & Visa Policy, Intelligence, International, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, Military & Homeland Defense, Private and Physical Security, Science & Technology, Supply Chain Security, Terror Finance, Terror Strategic Analysis, Transportation Security, WMD, Chemical & Biological, counterterrorism | Comments

International Criminal Information Sharing

Wednesday, July 7th, 2010

A brief June 25 Washington Post article reports that Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano and Salvadoran Foreign Minister Martinez have agreed to share criminal information about deportees. The article goes on to note that the United States has a similar agreement in place with Mexico. DHS should be congratulated for this and other innovative agreements to share information to combat serious crime, especially serious transnational crime such as trafficking and smuggling.

In fact, over the past years more than a dozen agreements to share information about criminals have been signed with our Visa Waiver Program (VWP) partners. Known as Preventing and Combating Serious Crime (PCSC), these agreements stem from the more robust VWP information sharing requirements mandated by the 9/11 Act.

A PCSC agreement provides for the reciprocal exchange of biometric and biographic data and any relevant underlying information for law enforcement purposes. It works like this: The parties provide each other automated access to their fingerprint (and potentially DNA databases) on a hit/no hit basis. Each party can query the other’s database and, if a match is found, can request identity and other information about the individual through established, informal police-to-police channels. The parties may also “spontaneously” share terrorism or criminal information with each other, even without a query being made. This spontaneous or voluntary sharing may occur on a case-by-case basis or in bulk and may be used for criminal investigations, for preventing a serious threat to public security, and for other related uses. The PCSC contains extensive provisions designed to ensure that the data is protected from any unlawful release and that data will be swiftly corrected or deleted at the request of the party that originated and owns the data.

DHS and the Department of Justice lead PCSC negotiations for the U.S. government. Most recently, PCSCs have been signed with Finland, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece. Additional signatories include Germany, the Czech Republic and South Korea.

Although more agreements are on the way, significant work remains to be done to complete bilateral agreements with each VWP country in accordance with the 9/11 Act. A few countries have resisted the VWP’s core information-sharing requirements due to domestic political concerns or by citing restrictive privacy laws. DHS has continued its efforts to find common ground, and while no country has yet arrived at the point of outright non-compliance, several appear to be heading in that direction. It is therefore imperative for DHS—supported by the Departments of State and Justice—to continue to communicate a firm message on the necessity of timely compliance and clearly signal the costs of backward movement to VWP participants.

It is equally important that DHS be clear and consistent regarding the potential consequences of a failure to comply with the requirements, up to and including termination from the program. This method proved to be a successful approach for previous security enhancements to the VWP, such as mandating the adoption of electronic passports for VWP travel.

If a VWP participant continues to prove unwilling to comply with statutory standards, DHS would be forced to consider suspension or termination of that country from the program until the legal requirements are met. While necessity of suspending or terminating VWP countries from the program in the event of noncompliance is clear, the diplomatic, political and economic consequences of such a decision could be far-reaching. Even so, the Department’s relationship with Congress, which has demonstrated a strong interest in the VWP, as well as the broader goals of securing our borders and enforcing our immigration laws, depend on holding VWP members to these high standards in a timely manner.

Posted in Featured Feed, Immigration & Visa Policy, Intelligence, International, Law Enforcement, counterterrorism | Comments

Spying at the Biggest Arms Show in the World

Wednesday, July 7th, 2010

At the recent Eurosatory Arms Show outside Paris, everyone seemed to be in dark suits and sunglasses. The show attracted all the major and most minor arms manufacturers in the world. It also brings in over 50,000 attendees. If you want a weapon or defense system, the latest hardware, or the means to stop it, this is your place.

Spying at such events has always happened. For the most part, it consists of taking pictures, some openly, asking “innocent” questions, or looking over the shoulder of a competitor as he makes a pitch. The risks at the arms show also range from petty theft to covert photography and electronic eavesdropping. Behind those suits and dark glasses there is an atmosphere of mutual distrust.

“Everyone is told to keep their eyes and ears open, watch that equipment doesn’t disappear. If people take photographs, we need to know who they are,” said a French Defense executive.

Today, however, the threat has expanded. Cyber spying is alive and well at this very lucrative target environment.

“It is very easy to go crawling over everybody’s systems here. Some people come and their approach is to grab everything they can,” said a senior Western Defense company official.

Given that many of the exhibitors now do much of their advertising digitally, they are vulnerable to either losing the content or having it corrupted by competitors. Events like this can be gold mines for cyber access that otherwise might require more sophisticated hacking skills. Throw in wireless networks, and there is a huge “harvest” all around.

Interestingly, defense companies are investing heavily in systems to fight the growing threat of cyber attacks on corporations, utilities, financial services companies and government computers. It should be a cautionary tale that many of those marketing their skills, methodologies and products for cyber security are often hit very hard at events like the Paris show. It is always a wise thing for a potential client to investigate how a company peddling security protects itself and its crown jewels.

Again, spying at arms shows is not really news, but much like espionage in general, cyber techniques have proven to be a boon to the hunters and a headache to those playing defense. It takes wisdom, good practices and constant vigilance to protect IP and other valuable data.

Posted in Cyber Security, Homeland Security Industry & Private Sector, Intelligence, Management & Administration, Science & Technology, counterterrorism | Comments

A Need to Prioritize Intelligence Analysis at Fusion Centers

Monday, June 14th, 2010

By Steve Serrao

Having visited and worked in many fusion centers across the nation, I often wonder how much attention is given to a basic question: Are we conducting analysis or not?

Fusion centers, which started as a project between the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, share information and intelligence with the federal government and within their local jurisdictions. The answer to the question of whether the centers conduct analysis varies widely, and it is partly dependent on whether the fusion center’s goal is to provide strategic-intelligence analysis or serve as a tactical operational data-sharing operation.

Several managers at the centers I visited told me they feel as if they are “flying by the seat” of their pants when it comes to analysis. For example, as Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) come in, the center’s limited personnel focus on a tactical response, and often times strategic analysis never occurs.

When the tactical mission overtakes the strategic mission, it becomes impossible for the fusion center to paint the “big picture” of major plots or threats.

Your center can be a data fusion center by simply amassing numerous data stores in one location so you can quickly and efficiently query for results tied to an investigation. This approach allows instant access to various data sources – but minimal analysis occurs.

In contrast, some fusion centers focus on strategic analysis, and those are generally the ones I define as intelligence centers. These centers collect information independent of the tactical case load from many sources, including investigations, informants, debriefings, physical and electronic surveillance, and by searching open sources. They have officers and analysts collecting and analyzing the data, making assessments of what threats are posed and what potential for criminal activity exists.

Fusion centers that have decided to perform both data fusion and analysis need the appropriate staff and resources assigned. Strategic analysts develop over years of training and work experiences; they aren’t hired right out of college. There must be a division of analytical labor. For example, it doesn’t make sense to have highly trained analysts working on tactical daily activity like “turning and burning” routine SARs.

If there is strategic analysis being done, fusion centers need to determine what content should be in their published bulletins and ensure that it gets to the appropriate audiences. Progress on these issues will continue to place fusion centers at the center of adding value to “all crimes, all hazards” law enforcement efforts.

Captain Stephen G. Serrao is a former New Jersey State Police Counterterrorism Bureau Chief and is currently Director of Product Management, Americas Region for Memex, Inc., a provider of intelligence management, data integration, search and analysis solutions.

Posted in Critical Infrastructure, Homeland Security Industry & Private Sector, Homeland State & Local, Intelligence, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

Paris Joins Other Global Transit Hubs in Immigration Advisory Program

Monday, June 14th, 2010

On June 3, DHS announced that it had completed an agreement with France to implement the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) at the Charles De Gaulle International Airport in Paris. When Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers are deployed later this summer, Paris will join Amsterdam, Frankfurt, London, Madrid, Tokyo and Seoul (among other locations) as places where the IAP operates.

The IAP enables the identification of high-risk travelers at foreign airports before they board aircraft bound for the United States. In effect, CBP officers stationed in the airport pre-screen travelers and make boarding recommendations to the host authorities. Some of these travelers may not be on watchlists but present other risk factors indicating the need for additional scrutiny.

One of IAP’s key objectives, for example, is to reduce the number of improperly documented passengers traveling from or through a country to the United States. To that end, IAP officers can interview the traveler at check-in to determine if he or she is the lawful bearer of the document or if there is fraud involved. In this way, IAP not only enhances security; it saves millions of dollars. The government avoids the costs associated with removal proceedings, and the airline avoids penalties and the costs of transporting the traveler back to the originating airport.

Not surprisingly, the airports at which IAP has a presence are global transit hubs. DHS should continue to work with these partners to export best security practices and standards more widely. For example, selected hubs (and host governments) could be offered the opportunity to participate in Registered Traveler programs, deploy interoperable screening technologies and collaborate on flights of mutual interest. Such cooperation would ultimately enable the United States and its partners to build a distributed border screening network that minimizes the ability of terrorists, criminals and illegal aliens to take advantage of stove-piped national border screening programs.

Posted in Aviation and airport security, Border Security, Immigration & Visa Policy, Intelligence, International, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, counterterrorism | Comments

Is Cyber War an International Inevitability?

Friday, June 11th, 2010

There is great debate on the possibility, existence, inevitability and reality of Cyber War. Some say we are in the midst of one everyday. Others say that this is just technologically enabled espionage, nowhere near a “war.”

The stand up of U.S. Cyber Command and the confirmation of its new commander, Gen. Keith Alexander, is read by many people in many ways. It is either the panacea through which America’s networks will be protected (Just military networks? All government networks? Everything?) or a harbinger of the cyber conflagration its very existence will provoke. Frankly, many countries see the United States as the biggest cyber threat because we do OPENLY have a cyber command.

Those that think this is all a tempest in a teapot were dealt a blow recently when it was revealed that a special NATO Commission led by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright is warning that the next aggression against a NATO member country will probably come via the cyber realm. Further, the commission believes that in such a scenario, NATO can invoke Article 5 (collective defense), without any modifications to existing treaties.

This is a victory for one of NATO’s newest members, Estonia. That small country was hit by a cyber attack in 2007 and called for help under Article 5. NATO could not come to agreement at that time. Since then, NATO opened a Cyber Defense Center in Estonia, and the Estonians have led the calls for NATO to define a policy on cyber. The Albright Commission is the result of their efforts, along with the growing concern that cyber will be used in war because of the economy of it and the anonymity/deniability of such a method.

The NATO position will also put pressure on the Obama Administration to more definitively lay out the U.S. position on cyber offense, defense and the large, grey area between them.

Posted in Critical Infrastructure, Cyber Security, Intelligence, International, Management & Administration, Science & Technology, counterterrorism | Comments

Visa Waiver Program for Latin America

Thursday, June 10th, 2010

Among the issues awaiting Secretary of State Clinton on her trip to Latin America is U.S. immigration policy and combating narco-trafficking.
The Secretary could advance both issues while simultaneously stressing the Obama administration’s commitment to the Western Hemisphere by offering the prospect of Visa Waiver Program (VWP) membership to qualified Latin American countries. Currently, no country from the region is on the VWP list. (Argentina and Uruguay had been part of the VWP but were removed from the program in 2002 and 2003, respectively). This absence of our neighbors to the south is something that can and should be remedied.
Most countries in the region cannot be part of the VWP in the short term because they lack the infrastructure (and sometimes the will) to meet the requisite security and law enforcement standards. Specifically, to achieve and maintain VWP eligibility, countries must continually demonstrate strong document security standards, effective border security procedures and immigration controls, and excellent counterterrorism and law enforcement cooperation with the United States.
Several Latin American nations could be viable VWP candidates according to the above criteria and should be offered the prospect of program membership as an incentive to continue to upgrade their security and law enforcement capabilities and collaboration with the United States. In addition to the security and law enforcement benefits, doing so would pay public diplomacy dividends, enhance economic investment and build relationships with key international partners.

Posted in Border Security, Immigration & Visa Policy, Intelligence, International, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration | Comments

The Mavi Marmara and the Exodus 1947: A Historical Parallel?

Monday, June 7th, 2010

On July 11, 1947, a ship carrying more than 4,000 Jews sailed from the south of France and headed to Palestine. The Zionist movement endeavoring to create the State of Israel as a home for the Jews sought to “break the embargo imposed by Great Britain on immigration to Palestine.”

On July 18, British naval forces intercepted the ship and boarded it in international waters off the coast of Palestine. A clash ensued with the immigrants on board resulting in three deaths with more than 30 wounded. Britain faced worldwide condemnation for having used excessive force in dealing with the ship’s passengers.

The ship’s name was Exodus 1947, and it became the symbol of Jewish Aliya Bet. The international outrage forced the British to change their policy and in September 1947, the United Nations voted to partition Palestine into two states, one Arab and one Jewish. With the departure of the last contingent of British forces from Palestine on May 14, 1948, David Ben-Gurion declared the establishment of the State of Israel.

On May 30, 2010, more than 500 Palestinian activists and sympathizers sailed from Turkey aboard the Mavi Marmara ship as part of the “Free Gaza Flotilla” in an effort to “break the siege imposed by Israel on Gaza.”

On May 31, the Israeli Navy intercepted the ship, which was then boarded by Israeli commandoes. The clash that ensued resulted in the death of more than a dozen activists and approximately thirty wounded. Israel is facing worldwide condemnation for having used excessive force, and Palestinians and their supporters are vowing to continue the flotilla effort until the Gaza siege is lifted.

Will the Mavi Marmara end up having the same historical significance to Palestinians as did the Exodus 1947 for Jews? Only time will tell.

Cultural intelligence matters.

The Mavi Marmara and the Exodus 1947: A Historical Parallel?

Will the Mavi Marmara end up having the same historical significance to Palestinians as did the Exodus 1947 for Jews? Only time will tell.

Cultural intelligence matters.

Posted in Border Security, Intelligence, International, Management & Administration, Maritime & Seaport Security, counterterrorism | Comments

Cooper on Federal News Countdown

Monday, May 24th, 2010

Last week, I had an opportunity to speak with Federal News Radio’s Francis Rose about a variety of topics. We covered John Pistole’s nomination for TSA administrator, the Taliban’s plans for attacking our nation’s capital and of course, the ongoing discussion on immigration. You can listen to the broadcast by visiting the Federal News Countdown for May 21.

Posted in Aviation and airport security, Border Security, Immigration & Visa Policy, Intelligence, International, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, counterterrorism | Comments