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The Value of Aspen

Friday, July 9th, 2010

As we continue to swelter in the ongoing summer heat wave, it is easy for me to reminisce about my recent visit to Aspen, Colo. Tucked amongst the Rockies with its clean air, fervent green and majestic views, a town known primarily for its skiing with the rich and famous was home to what was, simply put, the best conference program I have ever attended.

The first annual Aspen Security Forum put forward a program that I can only describe as pleasant, informational waterboarding. By the time each of the presenters and panelists were done, my hand was dead from writing so much and my head hurt from being given the firehouse treatment of a candor and content overload.

With a venerable “who’s who” of notable names in the national security arena attending the two and a half day program, attendees had the opportunity to hear first-hand from the men and women who have served or continue to serve in some of the most demanding positions in the world. It was literally very hard to turn around and not see a face that you did not recognize from some recent event or news program, sharing insights on our country’s national and homeland security challenges.

While the presented content was outstanding, the best part about the entire program was that the overwhelming majority of notable speakers and presenters made themselves available to engage with the attendees. All too often, speakers rush in, deliver their canned pitch, say thanks to the crowd and are whisked away by their aides to get back to the office, leaving actual human contact an afterthought. To have the many distinguished speakers stick around and engage in that lost art-form of “CONVERSATION” was an absolute pleasure.

Hosted by Clark Ervin and the Aspen Institute, this was the first time they had put on a program with this particular focus. You can call it beginner’s luck if you want, but they put together a top notch effort that literally became a “must attend” for anyone who is interested in national and homeland security issues. Fortunately, for those who weren’t able to attend the program, it was taped for later broadcast by C-Span, hopefully sometime this summer. I have to tell you, there is a significant portion of C-Span’s programming that can cure insomnia, but when they broadcast the presenters and panels from the Aspen Security Forum, it will be as NBC used to call it, “Must See TV!”

To understand why I write that, here’s a rundown of some sessions (with video hyperlinks):

Adm. Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

When your opening speaker travels all the way from Kabul to Tel Aviv to Aspen to take part in the program, it’s a pretty good indicator that the organizers are up to something big. That was especially true with Adm. Mullen. Coming off a week where Gen. McChrystal was taken out by a large Rolling Stone and replaced by Gen. Petraeus, and then traveling to Afghanistan and Israel to assuage any fears and concerns they may have about the big changes, Mullen made news by essentially not making news. While his comments about the state of the nation’s counter insurgency policy dovetailed those of the White House’s, the plainspoken manner in which they were delivered conveyed the gravity of the situation our military forces are faced with in Afghanistan. His comments about Iran’s nuclear ambitions – “They’ve given us no reason to trust them” – also spoke volumes about what few measures the Administration has left at its disposal in dealing with them.

Aviation Security Panel

There is probably no other facet of the post-9/11 world that Americans gripe about more than dealing with aviation security, but as the CEO of the Air Transport Association (ATA), Jim May, said, “What’s your alternative?” Joined by Erroll Southers of USC’s CREATE Program (and the first Obama Administration nominee to lead TSA) and Christopher Bidwell of the Airport Council International, this panel laid on the table the very real threats and frustrations that accompany this portion of the security environment. One of the most interesting things discussed was the use of full-body imaging devices by airports to screen passengers. While recognizing the civil rights and privacy concerns that people have about them, Jim May of ATA shared that he thought they should be mandatory. When it came to addressing the Government Accountability Office’s recently issued criticisms of TSA’s Behavioral Detection efforts, May and the other panelists pointed out that this program was part of many layers of security, and there was no one-size-fits-all solution or silver bullet that would reduce the aviation risks faced today.

Fran Townsend, former Homeland Security Advisor to President Bush

There are many things that have been written and said about Fran Townsend, the former Homeland Security Advisor to President Bush (43), but the word “shy” is not one that would be used to describe her. The only thing that could possibly surpass the candor of her public comments when she was working as a government employee was her candor in being a former government employee. With no holds barred, Townsend explained that, “We have a reason to expect we can connect the dots this time” given all of the post 9/11 work that has been done.

In a more than hour-long conversation with Walter Isaccson, the CEO of the Aspen Institute, and the Security Forum audience, Townsend pounded on the fact that much still needs to be done to improve information sharing amongst intelligence and law enforcement agencies across the board. Her declaration that there still needed to be a senior level official or “Cabinet Agency,” but “not a czar,” to “pound these government agencies into submission to do information sharing.” Her proposal that an NGO, public-private partnership, rather than a solely government-led approach to address the growing cyber security risks, was also interesting.

Bill Bratton, former Chief, Los Angeles Police Department

Dubbed by many media outlets as “America’s Top Cop” for having led the police departments of Boston, New York City and Los Angeles, I think Bill Bratton surprised everyone at the program when he explained how the terror attacks in Mumbai, India caused him to change the entire structure of the LAPD. His interview with CNN’s Jeanne Meserve detailed how 60 days after those attacks, he was able to transform his police department with new training, exercises and more. The relatively simply trained Mumbai terrorists were not interested in holding hostages; in fact, they were using so-called negotiations to buy time to kill more people. This showed Bratton that he had to change how his department was positioned to respond to a similar event, should it occur in Los Angeles.

Michael Leiter, Director of the National Counter Terrorism Center

For a man that much of Washington thought would have his head handed to him following the failed information sharing efforts surrounding the failed Christmas Day attack, Michael Leiter, the Director of the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), displayed all of the skill and confidence that make him one of a few Bush Administration appointees to successfully transition into the Obama Administration. His description of his job, his work with the President to report on the range of threats to the country and how he thinks information sharing needs to work made this particular presentation one of the most revealing and compelling of the entire program. Interviewed by Michael Isikoff, a former Newsweek reporter and now Chief Investigative Correspondent for NBC News, ended up producing some great back and forth between the two men that was as revealing as it was humorous. This session again explained more about Leiter’s job and the mission of the NCTC than any government report or Congressional hearing to date.

Border Security Panel

Despite the countless GAO and IG reports and the many hearings before the U.S. House and Senate, there was no better overview of America’s border security than a panel made up of:

Bob Mocny, Director of DHS’ US VISIT Program;
Mark Borkowski, Director of CBP’s Secure Border Initiative (SBI); and
Steve Oswald, Vice President of Boeing.

These three gentlemen described what worked, what didn’t, what could be better and what the future may look like on programs that have regularly been making news for years. In presenting the details of these newsworthy programs, they did so with none of the drama or hysterics that are so often associated with the Congressional hearings that have exhaustively covered the respective programs. What each of them said frankly offered more substantive insight than any of the previous Congressional hearings have produced to date. That was an observation made not just by the conference attendees but also by the first-tier media, congressional staff and others who have observed each of these respective programs closely. Truth be told, if you want to know what is really happening with US VISIT and the Secure Border Initiative (minus the belligerent questions and political posturing), spending 90 minutes watching this panel when it is aired on C-Span will be time well spent.

Attending News Media

As I mentioned, the conference was a literal “who’s who” of notable current and former national and homeland security leaders, and the same could be said for the attending members of the media. With CNN’s Jeanne Meserve, Fox News’ Catherine Herridge, the Washington Post’s Spencer Hsu, Newsweek’s/NBC News’ Michael Isikoff, and more, it seemed as if there was a representative from every major news outlet, print and broadcast media in attendance. While many of them were there to serve as session/panel moderators for the various parts of the program, the entire forum was a reservoir of information for them on today’s security concerns and a background on the actions of the past. It was also a treasure trove for journalists in developing future sources for national and homeland security news stories.

Michael Chertoff, former Secretary of Homeland Security

After consecutive 12-hour days of literally (albeit pleasantly) waterboarding attendees with tons of substantive content, it’s hard to figure out how to end a program such as that in Aspen, but they picked a great closer in former DHS Secretary Chertoff. Whether it was the fact that he’s been out of office for almost a year and half and doesn’t have to worry about a 2 AM phone call from National Operations Center about someone doing something vile to the homeland, Chertoff’s candor and demeanor crystallized for everyone the seriousness of the threats we face while also assuring we should continue to go about our regular lives. As one of the very few “senior statesmen” on homeland issues that we have in this country, his conversation with Fox News’ Catherine Herridge conveyed the balance that we need to have when planning for and operating against the range of risks we face.

A wondering disappointment

I can say without doubt that I loved every moment at the Aspen Institute, but I can’t sign off without discussing the one disappointment that I and many others had in the presentation by DHS Deputy Secretary, Jane Holl Lute. Whether it was her discomfort at the conversational interview format led by CNN’s Jeanne Meserve, her fear in the week after the McChrystal debacle, not wanting to say anything to cause problems for herself or the Administration, or the fact that maybe she was having a bad day, her presentation left the overwhelming majority of attendees scratching their heads in wonder as to the real story at the Department.

All of the questions that were asked by Meserve were fair and nothing was out of the ordinary, but Lute’s responses were defensive, sometimes evasive and could have been dramatically better. Time and time again in her hour long session there were questions to which she could have responded with hard and fast examples of the Department’s accomplishments. Instead, she offered simplistic, almost apple-pie like anecdotal responses that left the audience wondering why she wouldn’t answer the most basic of questions.

When she stated, “the [U.S.] border has never been more secure,” and offered no facts to prove that statement, portions of the audience looked around at one another in shock while others openly chortled at the declaration.

When it came time for Q&A with the audience, the tenor of her responses seemed to be even more defensive. When Michael Isikoff asked her about her statement on the border’s security and her metrics to prove that it had never been more secure, Lute seemed to bristle at the question. She firmly retorted, “The Secretary has been very clear on what those metrics are,” and effectively cut him off.

Lute’s response referred to the speech Secretary Napolitano delivered at CSIS the week before, when she declared, “the U.S. border has never been more secure…but there is more work to be done” and that “no one is satisfied with the status quo.”

In that speech, Secretary Napolitano detailed a series of metrics to back up her statement, but none of those were shared by Lute with Isikoff or the observing audience. In speaking with Isikoff and some of the other attendees after her remarks, none of them were aware of the CSIS speech and the metrics behind the powerful declaration. To the credit of the Department, Bob Mocny and Mark Borkowski did an exceptional job during their joint appearance on the Border Security panel explaining why DHS leadership is stating things have improved on the border.

It is certainly a debatable point to make a declaration like the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary have made in recent forums about border security. When you back it up with information and facts, it provides some measure of credibility and fosters informed debate. When you state it and don’t want to defend it with facts, it leaves people wondering why you would state something like that and not be able to prove it. After her appearance in Aspen, a lot of people were left wondering about the Deputy Secretary, and after viewing her session either on-line or on C-Span, I expect there will be a lot more.

Final thoughts

All of our time is valuable, and God knows we don’t have enough of it, but if you can set your DVRs to record the Aspen Security Forum or go to the Aspen Institute webpage and download panels for your Ipod/MP3 player – DO IT. Think of each of the respective sessions as graduate level courses shared by esteemed faculty who have the real life scar tissue and experiences to tell you what happened and what we can all do better. If you do, I’m confident you will walk away from each session with a lot more knowledge and a bit of a mild headache too. That’s what pleasant informational waterboarding will do to you, but I have to say, it is much more enjoyable amongst the mountains and beautiful vistas of Aspen.

Posted in Aviation and airport security, Border Security, Congress, Politics & PR, Critical Infrastructure, Cyber Security, Homeland Security & the Internet; Gov't 2.0, Homeland Security Industry & Private Sector, Ideology & Public Diplomacy, Immigration & Visa Policy, Intelligence, International, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, Military & Homeland Defense, Private and Physical Security, Science & Technology, Supply Chain Security, Terror Finance, Terror Strategic Analysis, Transportation Security, WMD, Chemical & Biological, counterterrorism | Comments

A Victory in the War on Terrorism

Thursday, June 24th, 2010

The Supreme Court decision this week defining and clarifying “material support” as it relates to aid to designated terrorist organizations is a huge victory in this continuing war. In a 6 to 3 decision, the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge from humanitarian aid groups claiming the support is intended to move the terrorist groups toward peaceful and legal activities. The Court ruled that such support was illegal even if its intention was to support “non-violent” elements within such terrorist organizations.

The humanitarian aid groups were challenging provisions that “talking to terrorist organizations about non-violent activities” was material support as defined by the State Department. State Department designation as a “terrorist organization” bars material support from money to technical know-how to legal advice.

The decision strengthens an important weapon against terrorism that in lower courts has been challenged as vague and unconstitutional. It has been used by the Federal government on about 150 occasions since 9/11 resulting in convictions in half of the cases.

It reminds all of us as to what these terrorist organizations represent and does not lend legitimacy to their activities. It makes no distinction between the “moderate” and “radical” elements of these organizations but treats them as to who they are – terrorists.

Posted in International, Management & Administration, Terror Finance, counterterrorism | Comments

Erroll Southers: Who’s Learning Faster, Al Qaeda or Us?

Thursday, June 17th, 2010

Who’s Learning Faster, Al Qaeda or Us? – Homeland Security Today

There are a growing number of Americans who, despite enjoying the benefits of freedom and rule of law, choose to become terrorists, bent on killing their countrymen, destroying property, and if necessary, dying in the process. They pose a unique danger because impressionable and misguided Americans can plan and execute attacks in anonymity more effectively than their non-American terrorist brethren. They represent the “nightmare” threat scenario.

Posted in Homeland State & Local, Intelligence, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, Private and Physical Security, Radicalization, Terror Finance, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

Terrorists Use the Internet But Not How You Might Think

Tuesday, March 16th, 2010

I have to admit that in the past I have been guilty of a sin of omission that has plagued many commentators in the cyber arena. I have spoken and written many times about the terrorist threats I see as strong and dangerous possibilities. That danger is the combination of terrorist group intent and ideology with cyber criminal capabilities to execute a real attack scenario. To me, this means using cyber to literally destroy something, irreparably damage some part of our infrastructure or some large critical mass of data, or at least, to use cyber means to augment a kinetic terrorist attack.

I have always mentioned the present terrorist use of the internet as an aside, and so much a lesser issue as to be unworthy of too much worry. I will stand up and admit that I have been WRONG. Yes, the terrorists have not used the cyber world for an attack as we might envision, but the threat presented by what they do now is real and chilling.

A superbly prepared and obviously brilliant young man named Evan Kohlmann disabused me of my previously held belief. On March 9 at the JW Marriott in Washington, DC, Mr. Kohlmann gave a detailed and exhaustive elaboration on how terrorists are using the internet to make up for lost time in radicalizing Americans. He gave numerous examples of the successes Al Qaeda and its affiliates have found in reaching out to Americans, turning them to radical ideas and leading them into joining the violent fight against the United States and the West.

Kohlmann has been an expert witness in trials of jihadists around the world. He dissects their e-mail communications both linguistically and operationally. He had his audience marveling at how much of the communications are totally in the “clear,” aside from language. More of it is in English, as they reach out to disaffected Americans.

He did not discuss Jihad Jane, the American woman who has joined the fight against the West, but the release of the news about her at essentially the same time was a wonderful confirmation. For those interested, a great deal of commentary on Kohlmann’s work can be found at the Web site.

The bottom line is this: Yes, it is true that the terrorists have not YET used the internet for an attack. That does not mean their use of the Internet is benign. What is going on everyday is poisonous and dangerous. They revel in the freedom our laws afford them to preach the ideology that demands our freedoms be destroyed.

The fact that they ONLY use the Internet for communication, fund raising and radicalization is not an indicator that they are not dangerous and that we can put off addressing this use until a later date. We can debate the very valid arguments about who should respond – law enforcement, intelligence or military – but someone needs to respond to this ongoing threat today.

Posted in Critical Infrastructure, Cyber Security, Homeland Security & the Internet; Gov't 2.0, International, Law Enforcement, Terror Finance, counterterrorism | Comments

DEA Agents Killed in Afghanistan: Another Tragic Reminder

Friday, October 30th, 2009

The recent death of three DEA Special Agents in Afghanistan is a tragic reminder that the war on narcotics and terrorism cannot be separated in that part of the world. I doubt many heroin dealers and addicts in the U.S. make the connection between the two. I suspect they really do not care. But it must never be forgotten that they are threatening our national security when they participate in this activity.

It has been established beyond a doubt that the Taliban and Al Qaeda have financed their terrorist activities with proceeds from the heroin trade. Without this source of funding, their agenda would be greatly curtailed.

As we mourn the loss of these lives, let us not forget that we are fighting, as a nation, for our national security, both on the streets of America and Afghanistan. Separating the two does no justice to this loss.

Posted in Intelligence, International, Law Enforcement, Military & Homeland Defense, Narcotics, Terror Finance, counterterrorism | Comments

U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy in Afghanistan

Thursday, October 22nd, 2009

Michael Braun, former Chief of Operations for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, testified before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control regarding the Taliban’s involvement in drug production and trafficking.

Mr. Braun is now a Managing Partner with Spectre Group International, LLC. The company has offices in Alexandria, VA and Kabul, Afghanistan.

Statement for the Record

Chairman Feinstein, Co-Chairman Grassley, and Distinguished Members of the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the threat posed by drug trafficking and related security issues in Afghanistan. The security challenges facing Afghanistan today, above and beyond drug trafficking and abuse are enormous. I believe you will agree with me that the Taliban is at the root of most of those security threats, and I believe it will be abundantly clear by the end of this hearing that most of the security threats emanating from the Afghan drug trade now fall squarely in the lap of the same malevolent thugs—the Taliban. What is even more ominous are the broader strategic threats, the by-product if you will, this activity has, and will continue to produce.

Madam Chairman let me say up front that each of you on this Caucus, and your colleagues throughout Congress, should be praised for all that you have done to support the multi-faceted counternarcotics efforts of our nation, and many other countries around the globe. I appreciate the fact that it is in that spirit you called us here today.

Before entering the private sector on November 1 of last year, I served for almost four years as the Assistant Administrator and Chief of Operations with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, and for one year as the Agency’s Acting Chief of Intelligence. I also served in a number of DEA offices throughout the United States, including service on both our Southern and Northern borders, on both our East and West Coasts, in the Midwest, as well as approximately three years in various countries in Latin America and Iraq.

It is through my 34 years in law enforcement that I sit before you today, deeply concerned about drug trafficking and related security threats playing out in Afghanistan. You will receive a career, Federal narcotic agent’s perspective on the Afghan drug trade, and how the trade will continue to destabilize the country if we do not become more aggressively involved in countering this major threat. If left unchecked, funding from the Afghan drug trade will continue to fill the Taliban’s war chest in volumes unmatched by all other forms of illicit finance combined. I will also provide you with my views on the continued evolution of the Taliban—from an insurgent group, to a designated terrorist organization, to a ‘hybrid terrorist organization.’

The Continued Evolution of the Taliban, And 21st Century Global Organized Crime

The Taliban is following in the footsteps of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and at least 20 other terrorist groups designated by our nation, into a ‘hybrid terrorist organization.’ The Taliban was merely an insurgent group just a few short years ago, but they are now clearly one part designated terrorist organization—and one part global drug trafficking cartel.

Just like the FARC, the Taliban got its start in the global drug trade by simply taxing poor farmers, which is one of the world’s oldest forms of organized criminal extortion. They then began taxing the movement of drugs and precursor chemicals within Afghanistan, and across its borders. Like the FARC, the Taliban formed ever-closer relations with traditional traffickers as they grew more accustomed and comfortable with each other, and the Taliban eventually started providing security at the traditional traffickers’ clandestine laboratories and cache sites. In the private sector, it is called ‘outsourcing.’

About three years ago, the National Security Council asked the DEA to conduct a comparative analysis of the FARC and Taliban with respect to their evolution in the global drug trade. What the Agency reported as I recall, was that the Taliban was on the exact same path as the FARC, but the Taliban was seven to ten years behind the FARC’s evolutionary development in the global drug trade. What troubles me most about the study are not its findings; but the speed with which the Taliban is advancing their commitment and involvement in drug trafficking activity. They are closing the seven to ten year ‘evolutionary gap’ with the FARC at a speed far faster than most care to admit or acknowledge.

The DEA reestablished its presence in Afghanistan in early 2003, after being forced from the country by the Soviet Union’s invasion in 1979. By 2005, the DEA clearly identified the Taliban’s involvement in protecting clandestine laboratory and drug cache sites for traditional traffickers. Flash forward just four short years. The Agency has unmistakably determined that the Taliban is now managing and operating major clandestine laboratories, drug cache sites, and poppy bazaars. They have morphed; they have become the manufactures and traffickers of heroin, opium, hashish and marijuana.

As an example, just two weeks ago the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan and Afghan Army Commandos, supported by the DEA and U.S. military Special Forces, raided a major laboratory in Southern Afghanistan and seized approximately 1.8 metric tons of opium and heroin—a major haul by anyone’s calculations. It doesn’t stop there. Sixteen Taliban were killed at the site, and the evidence clearly reveals the group was involved in the manufacture of heroin.

What is even more troubling is the fact that Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and IED bomb making materials were recovered at the scene, along with a host of other weapons and Taliban propaganda and training manuals. Thanks to strong support from our military, raids like this are now taking place weekly. IEDs and IED bomb making materials, suicide vests, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, other weapons, as well as Taliban propaganda and training manuals, are routinely located at these sites. Nearly all of those labs, cache sites and opium bazaars are directly linked to the DEA’s High Value Targets (HVTs) in Afghanistan, and they provide a treasure trove of evidence that support future prosecutions.

The DEA is usually focused on building prosecutable cases against 15 to 20 HVTs in Afghanistan. These are the ‘most wanted’ drug traffickers in the country and most, if not all, are members of the Taliban. Those who aren’t Taliban are closely linked to the Taliban. I am proud of the men and women of the DEA for their work with Afghan counterparts in bringing several of the most notorious Afghan traffickers to justice in the United States. Traffickers like Haji Bashir Noorzai, who was the world’s single largest heroin trafficker before being arrested by the DEA in an elaborately complex undercover sting operation. He was also one of the five original founding members of the Taliban Ruling Shura in Kabul, and was on Central Command’s ‘Top 10’ HVT list when we invaded Afghanistan and initially ousted the Taliban in 2002. Noorzai got a taste of American justice in the Southern District of New York, and is now serving a life sentence with no hope of parole. The DEA could not have successfully brought Noorzai or any of the other Afghan HVTs to justice without the powerful extraterritorial jurisdictions that you bestowed on the Agency when you passed legislation enacting the Title 21, 959 and 960(a) statutes. From a retired federal narcotics agent—thank you.

The money generated by the Afghan opium and heroin trade is staggering, and most experts usually fail to consider how much money the Taliban derives from the hashish trade. In June 2008, the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan and Afghan Army Commandos, supported by the DEA and U.S. military Special Forces, raided a Taliban hashish processing facility near Spin Boldak in Southern Afghanistan where they seized 235 metric tons of the drug—by far the largest drug seizure in world history. The estimated Western European value of the drugs was over $600 million dollars. If the Taliban’s profit was just 5 percent, which is being overly conservative, they stood to gain $30 million dollars from the stash. Around the same time, the DEA and Afghan counterparts raided a HVT’s compound in Eastern Afghanistan and seized his drug ledgers, which clearly showed that $169 million dollars had moved through the traffickers hands for the sale of 81 metric tons of heroin over just a 10-month period. He is unequivocally affiliated with the Taliban, and is facing American justice.

One important aspect of the Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade that I believe we are failing to exploit is their leadership’s growing level of greed. The Taliban’s ‘corporate office’ has acquired an insatiable appetite for easy money over the past few years. Just like the FARC, the Taliban leadership uses ideology as an effective means by which to recruit and indoctrinate the young warriors they rely on to do their dirty work, as well as the nasty fighting. However, the Taliban leadership’s core beliefs are going right out the window as greed replaces ideology as their principle motivator.

As we witness the continued evolution of the Taliban, we must also recognize we are witnessing the evolution of 21st Century global organized crime. It is becoming more and more difficult to distinguish the terrorist from the cartel member, because they are operationally and organizationally interbreeding and morphing into one and the same. The indisputable convergence of terrorism and international drug trafficking is playing out before our very eyes in Afghanistan, and in many other places around the globe.

U.S. Military Support to Law Enforcement An Important Aspect of the Afghan Counter Insurgency

Our military has conclusively realized over the past couple years that we will not win in Afghanistan until we get the country’s drug trade in check, and law enforcement cannot effectively conduct counter-narcotics operations without the support of our military. What was unsympathetically absent a few short years ago is now generously available—robust military support to counter-narcotics interdiction operations. The types of interdiction operations I mentioned earlier are now supported in myriad ways by our military and all are jointly planned, coordinated, de-conflicted and executed by military and law enforcement personnel.

In support of drug enforcement operations, our military routinely provides airborne medical evacuation capability, and they dedicate heavily armed close air support and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) aerial platforms to provide airborne force protection. They have purchased specialized field equipment for DEA and Afghan officers, such as night vision goggles, and they have purchased MI-17 heavy lift helicopters for dedicated vertical lift of agents and their equipment. Our military has purchased and issued to DEA portable Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for dedicated use on drug enforcement operations. They provide critically important encrypted communications equipment, and have purchased very costly telecommunications intercept equipment that Afghan police and DEA agents use to judicially tap traffickers communication devices. They have invested in ISR technology for DEA aircraft, and have built training academies and other facilities to support Afghan and DEA personnel. Moreover, our military has paid for virtually all aspects of the Interagency Operations Coordination Center, and the Afghan Threat Finance Cell, which is helping to identify and track the funds derived from the Afghanistan drug trade. Most important—almost all operations are now executed with U.S. Military Special Forces operators working shoulder-to-shoulder with law enforcement agents.

When you fuse the unparalleled tradecraft that seasoned DEA agents bring to the fight with the exclusive war fighting techniques of highly experienced Special Forces operators, you create a counter-insurgency capability that is second-to-none. More of this blend would definitely be better, and would be a wise investment of taxpayer dollars.

The Bottom Line

We are not going to win the fight in Afghanistan until we get the country’s drug production and trafficking activity in check, because it provides a limitless stream of funding directly into the Taliban’s war chest.

Professor James Fearon of Stanford University completed a study in 2002 entitled, “Why Some Wars Last Longer than Others.” The professor identified and studied 128 civil wars and insurgencies from 1945 to 2000, and found that on average they lasted about eight years. However, he identified and isolated 17 of the 128 that lasted on average about five times longer than the other 111—40 years or longer. The common thread between the 17 was that the anti-government forces involved in the conflicts generated their own contraband revenue, most of which was through their involvement in one or more aspects of the global drug trade.

Finally, the Taliban and traditional drug traffickers both thrive in what our military calls ‘ungoverned space.’ In Afghanistan, they share a truly symbiotic relationship. When traditional drug traffickers successfully destabilize government by corrupting officials—the Taliban benefits. When the Taliban successfully destabilizes government through attacks on government forces or by intimidating the populace—the drug traffickers benefit. They are both constantly working to destabilize government and create permissive environments in which to operate, because they flourish in areas of weak governance. Consequently, if you fight one with any less passion and vigor than you fight the other, you are most likely doomed to fail.

Posted in Critical Infrastructure, Homeland Security Industry & Private Sector, Intelligence, International, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, Narcotics, Radicalization, Smuggling, Terror Finance, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

Administration Quietly Campaigning for Patriot Act Renewal

Wednesday, October 14th, 2009

Administration Quietly Campaigning for Anti-Terrorism Provisions: CQ Homeland Security

The Obama administration is pressuring lawmakers, both publicly and privately, to renew expiring provisions of the anti- terrorism law known as the Patriot Act with as few changes as possible.

The Justice Department has nodded to civil libertarians’ concerns about the law’s broad reach with vague statements of flexibility on the scope of the reauthorization. But it is concentrating its energies on a not-so-subtle campaign to get Congress to extend the expiring provisions in the law (PL 109-177) without major revisions.

Posted in Civil liberties & Privacy, Congress, Politics & PR, Intelligence, Law Enforcement, Terror Finance, counterterrorism | Comments

Corruption – Why Cartels and Terrorists Succeed

Tuesday, September 22nd, 2009

The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) conducted a survey of its top performing confidential sources a couple years ago, and asked them to list in order of importance the factors that allow global drug trafficking cartels [and terrorist organizations] to succeed. At the very top of the list for every respondent was the single word— ‘CORRUPTION.’

Powerful Mexican and Colombian drug trafficking cartels, both of which now span the globe, invest billions of dollars a year to corrupt virtually every level of government in their respective countries. And if United States policy and lawmakers think for a moment that the cartels are focused solely on their side of the border, they had better think again. Richard Padilla Cramer, who not long ago retired as a Supervisory Special Agent with the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), was recently accused by the U.S. Government of comporting with Mexican drug cartels and selling out his former U.S. law enforcement colleagues. It is important to remember that Cramer is innocent until proven guilty, but this recent drug corruption arrest should sound some alarm bells here in our country.

It’s also essential to understand that corruption within the ranks of law enforcement in our country is nothing new, especially along our Southwest Border. There have been a number of employees of every three-letter agency in the U.S. Government’s law enforcement alphabet soup, the FBI, DEA, ATF, ICE, CBP and USMs (Marshals), who have succumbed to corruption at the hands of formidable drug cartels. Local and state law enforcement agencies have fared worse, with some officers even arrested while transporting large loads of drugs in their squad cars for Mexican cartels.

The most significant difference between U.S. and Mexican law enforcement is our internal ‘policing’ capacity. Federal and state law enforcement agencies in our country, as well as most local departments, have aggressive internal affairs divisions that work hard to identify, investigate and bring to justice those from within their ranks who have gone wrong. And although American law enforcement has an accomplished track record of policing its ranks, the pressure being exerted on the cartels in Mexico by President Calderon will most certainly cause them to resort to ever more assertive attempts to permeate every nook and cranny of the entire judicial systems of both our countries.

Corruption within the ranks of law enforcement and judicial systems, as well as military and intelligence institutions, is like a cancer. It is absolutely crucial, now more than ever, that these critically important institutions remain healthy. In order to do so they must constantly undergo self-imposed preventive check-ups for the disease, and when a cancer is discovered it has to be aggressively cut out, and the margins continually checked.

Consequently, now is the time for policy and lawmakers, as well as Inspectors General, to vigorously examine and assess the strengths of anti-corruption and internal policing programs within our government’s law enforcement, intelligence and military departments, commands and agencies. More importantly, now is the time to proactively identify and shore-up the weaknesses—before it’s too late.

Posted in Border Security, Congress, Politics & PR, Homeland Security Industry & Private Sector, Homeland State & Local, Ideology & Public Diplomacy, Immigration & Visa Policy, International, Law Enforcement, Management & Administration, Smuggling, Terror Finance, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

U.S. anti-drug and border violence aid to Mexico reaches $214 million

Wednesday, September 2nd, 2009

U.S. anti-drug aid to Mexico reaches $214 million | Reuters

The United States has written checks for $214 million of the $1.4 billion promised to Mexico in 2007 to help fight the country’s powerful drug cartels, Washington’s top anti-drug diplomat said on Tuesday.

The amount is a fraction of $1.12 billion authorized by the U.S. Congress since 2008, of which $700 million was part of funds promised under the 2007 Merida Initiative.The money is intended to pay for equipment and training for Mexican security forces battling the violent drug gangs that send some $40 billion worth of illegal drugs into the United States every year.

The United States is also helping Mexican police set up internal affairs units to root out corrupt officers and improve recruiting procedures.

Mexican President Felipe Calderon has staked his legacy on confronting and crushing the drug cartels that are at the heart of a drug war that has killed more than 13,000 people in the last three years.

Posted in Border Security, Immigration & Visa Policy, International, Law Enforcement, Military & Homeland Defense, Narcotics, Smuggling, Terror Finance, counterterrorism | Comments

Mexican drug cartels now smuggling oil to US

Tuesday, August 11th, 2009

The Associated Press: AP NewsBreak: Mexican cartels smuggle oil to US

U.S. Justice Department officials say U.S. refineries are buying stolen oil siphoned from Mexican government pipelines and smuggled across the border — in some cases by drug cartels.

Posted in Border Security, Homeland Security Industry & Private Sector, International, Law Enforcement, Narcotics, Smuggling, Terror Finance, Transportation Security | Comments

The bloody drug violence on our border will get worse before it gets better

Tuesday, July 21st, 2009

William Booth’s article in the Washington Post, “12 Federal Agents Are Slain in Mexico,” highlights yet another act of desperation on the part of the Mexican drug cartels in response to Mexico President Felipe Calderon’s strategy to break the backs of the cartels-once and for all. The cartels are lashing out like never before, because they are slowly and systematically being backed into a corner from which there is no escape. President Calderon’s attack has been relentless and unyielding. The cartels have never before experienced the likes of President Calderon, and to say they are feeling the heat is an understatement. Taking on powerful drug cartels with a global reach is dirty business, and the work ahead for Mexico’s security institutions is most likely going to get even nastier before meaningful signs of improvement are witnessed. However, there is hope.

There are vast differences between Mexico and Colombia, but there are many commonalities with respect to their wars waged against powerful drug cartels. Fifteen years ago Colombia was experiencing levels of violence similar to that which Mexico is experiencing today. Why? Because the Colombian government’s security institutions, thus its people, were threatened by the power and influence of its home grown drug cartels and terrorist groups. Colombian President Uribe, with financial support from the United States, developed an aggressive strategy to take back his country from the ruthless thugs that threatened its democratic existence. Over the past three years Colombia’s kidnappings, murders, robberies, home invasions and other violent crimes have plummeted. There is a police presence in every community of the country for the first time in that nation’s history. Tourism is flourishing in many parts of the country that had not long ago been written off as all but lost to the cartels and terrorists.

Mexico must follow Colombia’s lead and not fold under the pressure of the wrath playing out on her streets today. What is playing out in Mexico today is part of the never-ending struggle between right and wrong; the never-ending battle between good and evil. Good must and will prevail, provided Mexico does not lose the will to fight on-and win. The aid provided by the “Merida Initiative” for Mexico, just like Plan Colombia, is a step in the right direction, but the American people need to show resounding support for the war that is being waged just south of our border. If Mexico loses the will to continue this fight, then life in Mexico and the United States will change as we know it. There are a lot of brave Mexican cops and military personnel fighting and dying for our country as well as their own. They deserve our support.

Finally, there is an important lesson to be learned from all of this. Drug cartels, just like terrorist organizations, work very, very hard to destabilize governments around the globe. They rely on corruption, intimidation and violence, the hallmarks of organized crime, to create permissive environments where they can grow and thrive; areas where they can literally get away with mass murder. When government officials who have taken an oath to serve and protect, no matter what country they represent, succumb to corruption and deal with the devil-they should not be surprised when the devil relentlessly demands more – and more. That’s what the devil does for a living, and in the end innocent blood will always spill.

Posted in Border Security, International, Law Enforcement, Narcotics, Smuggling, Terror Finance, counterterrorism | Comments

Iran Now: The United States’ Next Move?

Tuesday, July 21st, 2009

The presidential elections of June have brought to the surface, like never before, the deep rifts that exist within Iranian society and its power structure. What is really happening there? And more importantly, what should the United States do about it? The delicate and serious nature of the current situation in Iran requires a very wise approach by the Obama Administration. The stakes are very high and the opportunity is unique. Let me explain.

Lack of Consensus from the Start
The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran gave birth to a form of government called velayat e faqih, a theocracy run by a council of Islamic jurists and a supreme leader. The leader at the time was Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini who ruled from the spiritual base of the revolution, the holy city of Qom. From day one, the Ayatollahs and Islamic leaders of the revolution were divided over the direction of the revolutionary government and the nature of the velayat e faqih theocracy. The most influential Ayatollahs at the time of the revolution were: Ruhollah Khomeini, Mortaza Motahhari, Mohammad Beheshti, Sayyid Ali Hoseyni Khamenei (Ali Khameini), Abdul-Karim Mousavi Ardebili (Mousavi Ardebili), Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, Mahmoud Taleghani, and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.

•    Khomeini became the supreme leader until his death in 1989. He advocated for a velayat e faqih with near absolute powers given to the supreme leader.
•    Motahhari’s influence, which was significant in the years preparing for the revolution, came to an abrupt end with his assassination on May 1, 1979, before he could influence the debate over the direction of the Islamic government.
•    Beheshti (assassinated in 1981) was close to Rafsanjani and influenced the thinking of Mohammad Khatami. He had his doubts about the powers entrusted to the supreme leader.
•    Khameini was closest to Khomeini and succeeded the latter as supreme leader in 1989. He is opposed to reforming the current system but lacks his predecessor’s charisma and stature.
•    Mousavi Ardebili, who did some of his studies in Najaf, Iraq under the guidance of Ayatollahs Khoi (Khu’ee), Hakim and Shirazi, is currently the senior theologian of the Islamic republic. He was the head of the judiciary until 1989 and founded Mofid University. He has mixed views regarding the powers of the supreme leader. (It is important to note that the Hawza of Najaf has historically consistently opposed the velayat e faqih system of government.)
•    Mahdavi Kani became an influential member of the Guardians Council and showed his more liberal political views when he declared the foreign trade nationalization bills and land reform bills in the 80’s to be against the teachings of Islam. He too has mixed feelings about the powers of the supreme leader.
•    Taleghani was probably the most influential leader of the Islamic revolution. He paved the way for Khomeini and was the chairman of the Revolutionary Council plotting for the revolution. Upon the return of Khomeini to Iran, he became the most vocal opponent to the absolutist powers of the supreme leader and often ‘clashed’ with Khomeini on this issue leading to a major rift between them in April 1979. His sudden death in September 1979 robbed the reformers of a powerful figure.
•    Rafsanjani along with Khameini were the closest Ayatollahs to Khomeni and held the most power. He was instrumental in the founding of the most important institutions of power of the newly established theocracy, became Speaker of the Parliament and was elected twice to the Presidency. Under his leadership, fundamental economic reforms were undertaken liberalizing Iran’s economy and major moves towards normalizing relations with the West were also initiated. He opposes the absolutist powers of the supreme leader.

Of the seven original most influential Ayatollahs around Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, five (Beheshti, Mousavi Ardebili, Mahdavi Kani, Talleghani and Rafsanjani) while being strong supporters of the establishment of an Islamic Republic were opposed in varying degrees to the powers of the Supreme Leader (which include the power to remove an elected President from office) as advanced by Khomeini.

Iranian intellectuals and much of the middle class had a different vision and outlook in mind for the post-Shah Iran. Most were contemplating the establishment of a secular constitutional republic and some had envisioned a more Marxist type of government. In the end, however, Khomeini was so popular that the country overwhelmingly supported his call for establishing the Islamic Republic of Iran with an Islamic Constitution in an open referendum held in April 1979.

Given the divisions among the clerics vis-à-vis the powers of the supreme leader, it was a matter of time before these differences would come to the surface. The major ‘crack’ in the system appeared following the election on January 25, 1980, of Abolhassan Banisadr as the first President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Banisadr, who was not a cleric, clashed with the clergy over his powers as President. This had the potential of creating a rift within the country, a rift that could have been used by the reformers; but something else happened.

First Setback for Reformers
The one most important event that stopped the reform movement from gaining ground and more openly challenging the velayat e faqih system of government took place on September 22, 1980, when Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Iran. Khomeini seized the invasion as an opportunity in the name of national security to get rid of Banisadr and his government and to consolidate his own power. On June 10, 1981, Khomeini removed Banisadr as Commander-in-Chief and assigned the office to himself. Eleven days later, Banisadr was impeached by Parliament and the order was signed by Khomeini the following day. The war had a devastating effect on Iran. Iranians suffered more than 300,000 casualties and were subjected to Iraqi mustard gas attacks. The eight-year war came to an end when a ceasefire was reached on August 20, 1988. Iranian national pride and the need for unity in facing Iraq’s assault muted the reformers’ voices and effectively barred them from openly challenging the system. On the other hand, Khomeini and his conservative allies seized this opportunity to consolidate their hold on power.

Pendulum Swing
The two most powerful Ayatollahs in Iran were still Ali Khameini and Akbar Rafsanjani. Khomeini appointed Ali Khameini to succeed him as supreme leader upon his death in 1989. This presented an opening to Rafsanjani and his followers. With Khameini lacking the charisma and popular stature that Khomeini enjoyed, Rafsanjani worked diligently to position himself as the other “pole” of power in the Islamic Republic. He took the lead in pushing political and economic reforms, giving Parliament and the Presidency a greater role in governance, in an attempt to position those offices as counterweights to the office of the supreme leader. The 90’s was an important period led primarily by Rafsanjani with the pendulum starting to swing in a direction away from the supreme leader. This was a critical juncture for the reformers. They had drawn an important lesson from the Iran-Iraq war. As long as Iran was besieged by the outside world with sanctions, embargoes, and calls for regime change, Iranian domestic reforms could not go far for two major reasons:

a) Foreign investment in Iran’s infrastructure and industrial base, including oil and gas, were desperately needed to help them move the country forward. In the absence of normalized relations with the United States that would not be possible.
b) The push by the reformers for change in the regime’s power structure while the country is under international siege will most definitely be labeled by Khameini and his conservative allies as undermining the national security of the country. Conservatives would then exploit Iranian pride and nationalism to undermine their reform efforts.

With that in mind, as soon as Rafsanjani assumed the Presidency in 1989, he seriously explored ways to start a dialogue with the United States aimed at normalizing relations between both countries. The United States, however, was pre-occupied with an increasingly belligerent and aggressive Iraq threatening its small and powerless neighbor Kuwait and testing US security commitments in the region. The George Herbert Walker Bush Administration decided this wasn’t the time for discussing normalization of relations with Iran. Saddam invades Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The United States with the full support of the United Nations and key Arab states led a multinational force and launched Operation Desert Storm aimed at liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. The war was successfully executed and on February 26, 1991, Kuwait was liberated. Iran remained isolated.

Iranian reformers had then hoped that President George H.W. Bush, when and if re-elected, would be ready and willing to engage in normalization talks. In their calculus, given Iraq’s war waging against its neighbors and the need for long term security and stability in the Gulf region, the United States would be willing to see a potential positive role to be played by Iran in this equation. Furthermore, Iranian reformers were very aware of the political and cultural pressures the Saudi government would be subjected to by Wahhabis and Salafis due to the heavy presence of American troops on Saudi soil and in the region. Hopes were pinned by Iranian reformers on Bush’s re-election, but William Jefferson Clinton was elected President in 1992.

Second Setback for Reformers
The election of Bill Clinton as President of the United States was seen as a setback by Iranian reformers. In their eyes, President H.W. Bush was a realist and pragmatist who put the US national interest above special interest such as that of Israel supporters in Washington. The Clinton Administration, on the other hand, made Israeli security a primary objective and pursued a two-prong policy to achieve it.

Firstly, the Clinton Administration believed that peace with the Palestinians would better serve Israel’s long term security. Efforts were exerted to promote an Israeli-Palestinian peace accord through direct negotiations between Israel and the PLO. The Oslo Agreement of 1993 was signed and the Clinton Administration invested a lot of time and energy in managing the conflict between both parties and trying to bring them closer to one another through intense sets of negotiations.

Secondly, in the eyes of the Clinton Administration, the security of Israel also required a) containment of Iranian influence rather than an accommodation of Iranian concerns; and b) containment of Iraq’s rising influence and belligerence within the Arab world in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War (war to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation during which Iraq fired Scud missiles on Israel). In order to achieve this security objective, the Clinton Administration announced its dual containment strategy.

With the priorities of the Clinton Administration set as described above, attempts in the 90’s by Rafsanjani to open up to the United States went nowhere because they ran counter to the Clinton Administration’s strategy of dual containment and its regional security policy framework. This represented the second major setback to the reformers in Iran.

Opportunity Knocking
The terrorist attacks of September 11th against the United States sent political shockwaves through the US security and foreign policy establishments. With Al Qaeda and Sunni Wahhabi/Salafi inspired Islamism striking at the United States, the Iranian reform establishment saw an opportunity for a possible rapprochement with Washington that could ultimately lead to normalized relations. In their thinking, as explained earlier, improved relations with the US were necessary to help them push system reforms more successfully. Under the leadership of Ayatollah and President Mohammad Khatami, a leader among the reformers and a close ally of Rafsanjani, Iran seized on the attacks of 9/11 and took the following steps all aimed at sending positive signals to Washington:

•    Condemnation of Al Qaeda: Iran was the first Moslem country to condemn the terrorist attacks of September 11th. Furthermore, the only candlelight vigils to take place in a Moslem country expressing solidarity with the victims of 9/11 were held in Iran on September 18, 2001.
•    Cooperation on Afghanistan: Iran played a very constructive role in assisting the United States during Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 aimed at removing the Taliban from power. It also played a pivotal role in supporting the establishment of a new democratically oriented government in Afghanistan.
•    “Facilitating” the Invasion of Iraq: The United States invaded Iraq on March 19, 2003, launching Operation Iraqi Freedom aimed at the removal of the regime of Saddam Hussein and the establishment of a pro-American and more democratically oriented government in Baghdad.   The invasion came from the south with US forces traveling northward towards Baghdad. There was practically no resistance from Shiite Iraqis who constitute the majority of the population in southern Iraq. “Understandings” had been reached prior to the invasion between US officials and exiled Iraqi Shiite religious leaders such as Khoi (Khu’ee) and Hakim, two of the three most prominent Iraqi Ayatollahs at the time (the most influential being Grand Ayatollah Sistani).
•    Nuclear Program Freeze: Iran froze its nuclear program in yet another goodwill gesture towards Washington and Khatami sent a message to the George W. Bush Administration expressing Iran’s desire to have talks aimed at normalizing relations between both countries.

Divisions within the Bush Administration regarding US policy towards Iran paralyzed American response and by 2004, “hawks” within the Administration were advocating regime change in Iran. The opportunity that the reformers had sought in the aftermath of 9/11 was missed. Furthermore, conservatives in Iran capitalized on the US’s negative response to overtures by Iranian reformers likening it to a “kick in the butt” and presenting it to the Iranian public as unambiguous proof that Washington’s real objective was the destruction of the Iranian nation. Given this national security perception, past negative experiences with the United States (refer to a Security Debrief on Iran published on May 29, 2009), the deteriorating security situation in Iraq with potential spillover effect into Iran, and the failure of the reformers over 15 years to produce substantial changes to the system, Ayatollah Khameini and conservative mullahs were able to “facilitate” the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President of Iran in August 2005.

Countering Regime Change
The Iranian government led by Ahmadinejad became very aggressive and quite belligerent in response to what they perceived as Washington’s aim of regime change in Iran. From 2005 through 2008, conservatives rallied behind Ahmadinejad and exploited to the fullest advantage the policies of the Bush Administration’s second term (see Security Debrief on Iran published of May 29, 2009); capitalizing on Iranian pride and sense of nationalism. During this period of heightened US-Iranian tensions, the region became quite unstable with violence reaching new heights.

•    Religious strife between Sunnis and Shiites erupted in Iraq in 2006 threatening the Bush Administration’s stated goals in that country.
•    A 33-day war between Israel and Hezbollah was fought in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 causing numerous civilian casualties and leaving in its aftermath Hezbollah in a much stronger position. Arab popular opinion rallied behind Hezbollah posing a threat to the credibility and legitimacy of the governments of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan.
•    A war between Israel and Hamas was fought in Gaza in November 2008 that ended with Hamas retaining power in Gaza and winning greater sympathy from Arabs and Moslems worldwide. The war also put President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority between “a rock and a hard place” and threatened his credibility among Palestinians.
•    Iranian calls for the destruction of Israel and anti-Semitic rhetoric became quite intense.
•    Iran resumed its nuclear program much more aggressively in defiance of the United States and the international community.

During those very tense years, the reformers in Iran could not be seen as challenging their own system of government for fear of being undermined by the conservatives as ‘puppets’ of America. The conservatives were very successful in painting a very bleak picture to the Iranian public wherein Iran’s existence was being actively threatened by the United States and Israel. Given this environment, reformers in Iran got busy regrouping their forces quietly awaiting their “next opportunity”.

New Opportunity Knocking
The election of Barack Obama as President of the United States provided the reformers in Iran with another golden opportunity. His rhetoric during the campaign, and more importantly, his actions since assuming the Presidency all pointed to his willingness to establish a dialogue with Iran. His message to the Iranian government and people on March 19, 2009, on the occasion of the Persian New Year (Nowruz or Norouz) went a long way to point to Iranians that the United States was willing and ready to open a new chapter in US-Iranian relations based on mutual respect and dialogue. Furthermore, President Obama delivered an address to the Moslem World in Cairo, Egypt on June 4, 2009, which was a resounding success from a public diplomacy perspective. When the Obama Administration decided to engage Iran after and not before the June Presidential elections, a major race erupted between the reformers and conservatives in Iran. Who would be in power to negotiate with the United States?

To the reformers, winning the Presidential elections would enable them to quickly engage the United States and normalize relations more expeditiously. This would then give them the needed boost to pursue the reforms of the system of government and the role of the supreme leader in the Islamic Republic. To the conservatives, Ahmadinejad’s retention of the Presidency would enable them to negotiate with the United States from a position of strength and help them contain and/or manage internal reforms more effectively. All surveys and public opinion polls conducted about two weeks prior to the election were showing Ahmadinejad winning by a comfortable margin. Reformers, on the other hand, made a major last minute push using modern technology and electronic social networks to rally support and enthuse the younger generation to participate in greater numbers in the election. While no one can, at this point, assert with full knowledge who really won the election, one can safely state that the authorities working under Ahmadinejad did manipulate the election results (at least in Teheran) where the margin of victory (whether for Ahmadinejad or Mousavi) should have been very small.

What happened next? Conservatives underestimated the resolve of the reformers and their determination to score a Presidential victory. The reformers, having suffered repeated setbacks in the past, were determined this time around to go all the way pitting all their hopes on the persona of Barack Obama; who appears to them as more genuine and serious about a frank and open dialogue with Iran. They chose to defy the results as announced by the government and Mir Mousavi called for street protests and demonstrations. Ahmadinejad and his conservative allies pressed Khameini to side with them in order to put an end to the protests. Khameini, after much hesitation, came down on the side of Ahmadinejad with the hope that his stature would be sufficient to bring an end to the “chaos” and did so with the full realization that he might jeopardize the “Office of the Supreme Leader” by having it painted as “partisan” when it is supposed to be above all politics. With Khameini taking sides with Ahmadinejad, the reformers decided to openly and publically challenge the legitimacy of the system and the power of the supreme leader.

“Those responsible for organizing the elections have obligations to the people. Unfortunately, events that have taken place after the election have caused turmoil in the Islamic Republic. We should not use force to pacify the protests. The issue must be resolved in a different manner,” stated Ayatollah Ardebili on June 27, 2009.

On July 17, 2009, Ayatollah and former President Rafsanjani spoke at Teheran University on the occasion of Friday mosque prayers and heavily criticized the government’s actions. “Today is a bitter day,” he said at Tehran University. “People have lost their faith in the regime and their trust is damaged. It’s necessary that we regain people’s consent and their trust in the regime.”

This prompted a reply on Saturday, July 18, 2009, by conservative Ayatollah Yazdi: “Legitimacy and acceptance are different in Islamic government,” Ayatollah Yazdi told the semi-official Fars news agency. “Votes alone do not create legitimacy.”

On Sunday, July 19, 2009, Ayatollah and former President Khatami called for a referendum on the legitimacy of the Iranian government stating that millions of Iranians had lost faith in the electoral system.

The lines have been drawn. The real dispute is among the Ayatollahs over the power of the Supreme Leader and the velayat e faqih system of Islamic government with Rafsanjani and Khatami leading the charge. Furthermore, the “weakening” of Khameini’s stature as Supreme Leader may boost among the clerics in Iran the influence of Grand Ayatollah Sistani (Najaf, Iraq) who had consistently opposed the velayat e faqih system of government.

Constitutional Reforms
The objective of the reformers at this stage is to keep pushing as far as they can with the final aim of ridding the system of the velyat e faqih and replace it with an Islamic system governed by three branches – Parliament, Presidency and Judiciary – wherein the Supreme Leader is stripped of his political powers and acts only as the spiritual leader of the faith. This change would conform to the teachings and jurisprudence of Shiite traditions as advocated by the Hawza of NajafIraq and would radically transform the nature and operations of the Iranian government. In reality, this has been the “secret” aim of the reformers among the Ayatollahs, especially Rafsanjani and Khatami. They both experienced the Presidency and tried to steer the country down a progressive path to find the Supreme Leader blocking them at every turn. They became fed up with the system and sought ways to change it but acted with a lot of prudence. This explains why in the early days of the protests, they did not challenge the system directly (they let Mir Mousavi, a non-cleric, do so) and waited for the right moment. The opportune moment came when Ayatotallah Khameini took sides favoring Ahmadinejad. He was no longer “above politics” or “untouchable” as supreme leader. Rafsanjani and Khatami decided then to openly challenge the system and the authority of the Supreme Leader.

What Should the United States Do?
Firstly, President Obama must be commended for exhibiting prudence and wisdom in his measured response to the developments in Iran since the June elections. Many in Washington have been advocating a tougher stance by the United States to show solidarity with the demonstrators. Some have even advocated to have the United States seize this moment to strike at Iran’s nuclear facilities or allow Israel to do it. President Obama has wisely resisted these pressures because the stakes are very high for the United States and a “wrong” move at this juncture could, in time, do irreversible damage to American national security interests. Let me explain.

Non-Interference
The reformers in Iran do not want the United States, and definitely not Israel, to appear as directly interfering in this crisis. As long as the US remains out of it, the reformers have greater chances for success. As I explained earlier, conservatives in Iran have always exploited US calls for regime change, containment and tougher sanctions to undermine any serious effort for reform through open debate in the name of national security (i.e., this is not the time to show divisions when confronted by US anti-Iranian aggressive measures). The reformers want the United States to stay out of this crisis and are betting on President Obama to help them carry the day by not interfering. The conservatives cannot use President Obama as an excuse given his speeches and moves regarding US-Iranian relations.

Engage?
Should the Obama Administration engage Iran at this stage? How? When and under what circumstances? These are very critical questions that demand serious answers especially in light of the September 28th deadline given to Iran on the nuclear issue (prior to the next G-20 meeting). The inclination by many in Washington is to have the United States push for tougher sanctions through the UN Security Council if Iran fails to meet the nuclear conditions by that deadline. That is exactly what the conservatives in Iran are hoping for, given the current crisis they’re facing domestically, and that is exactly what the United States should avoid doing. The United States has too much to lose this time around if the Obama Administration falls into the same old cycle of “speaking tough” and advocating sanctions. What is the alternative? Before answering the questions above, it is important to analyze further the dynamics of the current situation on the ground in Iran.

The reformers having by now put everything on the line are trying to form a more solid coalition made up of them (clerics), prominent civilians, respected revolutionary leaders, representatives of the middle class, intellectuals, and students (18-25 years old). This coalition is not yet in place and lacks a clear vision. No one can predict whether, when and how this effort may succeed because the situation is very fluid and must be monitored on an hourly – not even daily – basis. What is certain, however, is that the system has suffered irreparable damage to its credibility and legitimacy. The reformers hope to force a referendum on the legitimacy of the current government which they foresee winning. The conservatives, on the other hand, have already recognized that damage was done and are desperately trying to contain it. I say contain it, because the conservatives are very weary of using deadly force against the reformers; they know that the rank and file of the Revolutionary Guards are divided over the current state of affairs in the country and may risk division or possibly rebellion within the Guards if they were to order them to use deadly force. In summary, there is an internal dynamic in Iran that is very fluid and may produce mutations in different directions.

Secret Diplomacy
Given the uncertainty of the direction that events may take on the ground in Iran, the one most important fact for the United States is that it faces now an Iran that has a weaker government in place being challenged by a growing opposition. The United States should seize this opportunity to engage in “secret” diplomacy. Silence is gold in such circumstances. Messages should be conveyed to both sides that the United States remains committed to engaging Iran on the basis of respect and mutual interests (refer to Security debrief on Iran dated May 29, 2009) and would like to do so as soon as possible. This move by the United States would be welcomed by the reformers because it would limit the current government’s maneuverability against them. It would also be welcomed by Ahmadinejad and Khameini (not all the conservatives) who would use it to contain the reformers’ final push at this time.

The United States has everything to gain and almost nothing to lose in engaging NOW in secret diplomacy with both sides. Some may argue that, given these divisions within Iran, the United States would be better off having the situation in Iran deteriorate on the security level even to the point of civil war. This would make it easier for the US military to take out the nuclear facilities with Iranians busy fighting among themselves. At a first glance, this option may appear appealing as serving to fulfill the objective relating to Iran’s nuclear program. It will, however, make Iran an unstable country with unpredictable and possibly devastating consequences to American national security interests in the Gulf region. In other words, a stable Iran with better relations with Washington serves best the national security interest of the United States; an unstable Iran would most definitely be exploited by radical Islamists to spread chaos in the region and would present a clear and present danger to the United States.

Cultural intelligence matters!

Posted in Congress, Politics & PR, Featured Feed, Homeland Security & the Internet; Gov't 2.0, Homeland Security Industry & Private Sector, Ideology & Public Diplomacy, Intelligence, International, Management & Administration, Terror Finance, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

Targeting Taliban’s Bankroll

Thursday, June 25th, 2009

Armen Keteyian of CBS News did a piece on the intersection of terror finance with international drug trade. Only just recently, the DEA put more agents on the ground in war zones to crack down on the funneling of drug money to key terrorist operatives.

Targeting Taliban’s Bankroll

The U.S. military tried to cut the Taliban’s money supply by destroying Afghanistan’s poppy fields. Now the U.S is targeting heroin traffickers who bankroll the Taliban. Armen Keteyian reports.

Posted in Immigration & Visa Policy, Intelligence, International, Management & Administration, Narcotics, Smuggling, Terror Finance, counterterrorism | Comments

Long sentences for Holy Land Foundation terror finance operators

Thursday, May 28th, 2009

Counterterrorism Blog: HLF Judge Imposes Long Sentences

A federal judge imposed what could amount to life sentences on three former leaders of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) on Wednesday for illegally routing more than $12 million to Hamas.

“The purpose of creating the Holy Land Foundation was as a fundraising arm for Hamas,” said U.S. District Judge Jorge Solis.

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Where is Saudi Aid to Victims of the Taliban?

Thursday, May 14th, 2009

The Terror Finance Blog: Where is Saudi Aid to Victims of the Taliban?

Conspicuously neither Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz nor the rulers of any Arab or Muslim state are holding special national telethons to help raise funds for some 400,000 new Pakistani refugees. Many fled their homes after the Taliban took over the Swat valley, and others were forced to leave amid the fierce fighting between the Taliban and the Pakistani military.

Posted in Ideology & Public Diplomacy, International, Radicalization, Terror Finance, counterterrorism | Comments

Mexican Drug Cartel Threatening to Take on U.S. Law Enforcement

Wednesday, May 6th, 2009

Tickle The Wire » Mexican Drug Cartel Threatening to Take on U.S. Law Enforcement

As if we needed more evidence of the threat the Mexican cartels pose to the United States, here’s the latest. Don’t be surprised to see more DEA agents in Mexico and possibly other U.S. personnel from other agencies– and even the military.

Posted in Border Security, International, Law Enforcement, Narcotics, Smuggling, Terror Finance | Comments

Hezbollah: Narco-Islamism

Saturday, May 2nd, 2009

Hezbollah: Narco-Islamism (Washington Institute for Near East Policy)

Despite the differences between U.S. and European perceptions of and policies toward Hezbollah, there is one critical area where all parties’ mutual interests converge, namely law enforcement. Regardless of divergent political considerations or definitions of terrorism, combating crime and enforcing sovereign laws are straightforward issues. More than any other Islamist group, Hezbollah has a long record of engaging in criminal activity to support its activities. The United States and its European counterparts have a particularly strong shared interest in combating the group’s increasing role in illicit drug trafficking.

Just this past week Admiral James G. Stavridis, the Commander of U.S. Southern Command who has now been nominated to head NATO troops as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, testified before the House Armed Services Committee about the threat to the United States from the nexus between illicit drug trafficking — “including routes, profits, and corruptive influence” — and “Islamic radical terrorism.” While Hezbollah is involved in a wide variety of criminal activity, ranging from cigarette smuggling to selling counterfeit products, the connection between drugs and terror is particularly strong. According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 19 of the 43 U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations are definitely linked to the global drug trade, and up to 60 percent of terror organizations are suspected of having some ties with the illegal narcotics trade.

Posted in International, Law Enforcement, Narcotics, Smuggling, Terror Finance, counterterrorism | Comments

European Union Funding and the Push to Legitimize Hizballah

Wednesday, April 29th, 2009

The Terror Finance Blog: European Union Funding and the Push to Legitimize Hizballah

Recent attempts by Britain to dialogue with Hizballah, and a planned address by Khaled Mashaal to Britsh MPs, may well be the result of a lobbying effort funded by the European Union. Jonathan Spyer, in an article yesterday, reports that The Conflicts Forum, which openly acknowledges attempts to legitimize Hamas and Hizballah, received a 500,000 Euro grant from the European Union in 2007.

Posted in Congress, Politics & PR, Ideology & Public Diplomacy, International, Radicalization, Terror Finance, counterterrorism | Comments

Pakistan: A Failed State?

Wednesday, April 29th, 2009

Time Is Running Out

In several Security Debrief posts published on this site in 2007 and 2008, I discussed the great urgency required by the United States to adopt a different strategy towards Pakistan and I also articulated the options and steps necessary to stop Pakistan’s fast slide towards instability. Unfortunately, the United States has already missed the boat and time has run out for any “catching up” in policy and tactics. Today, the world faces the stark and real possibility of Pakistan becoming a failed state and a haven for terrorism with potential nightmarish consequences. Can this be stopped and what should the U.S. do about it?

What Went Wrong?

US policies towards Pakistan have failed and security has deteriorated dramatically in Afghanistan and Pakistan because the United States did not keeping its eye on the ball! The source of terrorism and the threat to the world’s security has been, still is, and will remain for the foreseeable future, Wahhabi Sunni fundamentalism which has produced the Taliban, Al Qaeda and their likes, and has established bases of operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is not Iran.

Instead of focusing on developing strategies to curb and marginalize over time the influence of Wahhabi Sunni fundamentalism (the root cause of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the source of religious extremism that had inspired suicide bombings in Iraq, Israel, India, and Spain for example), the Bush Administration’s main efforts in its second term in office were aimed at isolating and destabilizing Iran while fighting Al Qaeda-in-Iraq. The shift in focus produced confusing policies towards Pakistan and Afghanistan and provided the breathing space for Wahhabi Sunni extremists, the Taliban and Al Qaeda to reorganize their forces and restructure their tactics and engineer a major comeback in both countries.

Mission Focus: Defeat Wahhabi Extremism

Security conditions on the ground in both Pakistan and Afghanistan have reached a critical stage and time is running out. Unless the United States switches gears immediately and adopts an aggressive policy aimed like a laser beam at defeating Wahhabi extremism in both countries, the world better brace itself at having to face two failed states – Pakistan and Afghanistan - in the very near future. The “key” to success will depend on having one integrated regionally-based comprehensive strategy towards both countries, otherwise failure is most certain.

Pakistan

The development of a new integrated strategy requires greater cultural intelligence. In this case, religion plays a paramount role in identifying the solution to the problem. Let me explain.

The overwhelming majority of the people of Pakistan are Moslem or follow Moslem traditions. It is important to note that Islamic values and practices color virtually all aspects of Pakistani life and society with most Pakistanis being Sunni Moslem (there is a Shiite minority comprising approximately 14% of the population). The majority of Sunni Moslems in Pakistan adhere to the Hanafi School of Sunni Islam. There are four major schools of Sunni jurisprudence in Islam namely Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali. The Hanafi School of Islam is “relatively” the most liberal of the four. In addition, many Moslems in Pakistan are influenced by Sufism, a more mystical form of Islam. Although Islam plays a central role in the life of most Pakistanis it was not subverted by violent extremists because of its Hanafi and Sufi influences.

The real problem lies with the spread of the Wahhabi Sunni movement (founded in Arabia) more particularly, among the Pashtun tribes located along the border with Afghanistan. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Saudi Arabia provided relief and humanitarian assistance to Pakistan in order to care for the large number of Afghani refugees who crossed the border into Pakistan in search of safety and shelter. In addition, Saudi Arabia funded the construction of thousands of “madrassas” (religious schools) in those areas which indoctrinated the local population in Wahhabi Sunni Islam. Over time, these schools became the breeding grounds for fanatical ideologies espoused by extremist groups (notably Al Qaeda and the Taliban) in the region of Baluchistan, the North-West Frontier Province, and other parts of the country.

Any strategy aimed at eliminating the threat of Wahhabi Sunni fundamentalism must have a religious component at its core in order to be effective. The United States should do the following:

•    United Pakistan Against Wahhabism: the United States should encourage the formation of a national unity government in Pakistan that represents all non-Wahhabi Moslem components of society including the Pakistan Muslim League (N) led by Nawaz Sharif and declare war on a sect that has infected Pakistani society and is threatening the noble soul of Islam. Under the banner of Pakistani Islam, the country may be better enabled to unite itself and mobilize its population and resources in defense of Pakistan and the Pakistani way of life.
•    US Lower Profile: the United States should lower its military profile and refrain from making statements that are interpreted by Pakistanis as undue interference in their internal affairs. The struggle against Sunni Wahhabism must be based on Pakistani nationalism and driven by Pakistani society and forces. Furthermore, while the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is of real concern to the United States and the world, it is recommended that the Obama Administration address these concerns very quietly with the Pakistani military in order to avoid embarrassing Pakistan on an issue that is of great pride to the Pakistani people.
•    India’s Support: the Obama Administration should discretely secure an understanding with India that provides full support to a national unity government of Pakistan in its push against Sunni Wahhabism. After all, a ‘failed state’ in Pakistan is of greatest concern to India, given the protracted conflict over Kashmir and the infiltration of Wahhabi Sunni fundamentalism in Indian Moslem society. This arrangement would free the hands of the Pakistani government enabling it to employ all of its resources against the Taliban and their allies in the North-West Province and Baluchistan regions of the country.

Afghanistan

The second major part of a new integrated and comprehensive strategy to defeat the real enemy – Sunni Wahhabi fundamentalism – centers on Afghanistan.

Virtually all the people of Afghanistan are Moslem with a 75% majority adhering to the Hanafi School of Sunni Islam and approximately 24% of the population are Shiite Moslems, particularly the Hazara and Kizilbash. Sufism is also widely practiced among Sunnis and Shiites alike in Afghanistan. While at first glance one may be tempted to think that since the majority religion is Hanafi Sunni, maybe a strategy similar to the one being proposed for Pakistan could also be adapted to Afghanistan. The answer is no because conditions in Afghanistan are much more complex than in Pakistan. Although religion holds an important position in the daily life of most Afghanis, divisions along cultural and ethnic lines are quite dominant. Let me explain.

The Pashtun ethnic group heavily centered in the southern province of Kandahar comprises less than two-fifths of the population and does not constitute a majority. Tajiks account for approximately 25 percent of Afghanis, the Hazara comprise nearly 20 percent, and Uzbeks and Chahar Aimaks each account for slightly more than 5 percent of the population. Furthermore, the official languages of Pakistan are Pashto and Persian (Dari). Approximately two-fifths of the population speaks Pashto (the language of the Pashtuns) but more than half of the population speaks some dialect of Persian (Dari).

The complex religious, ethnic and linguistic mosaic of Afghanistan makes the development of a more coherent strategy against Sunni Wahhabism more difficult but not impossible. We need to first understand the status of the Taliban in this complex picture.

The Taliban, whose ranks came originally from the Saudi funded Sunni Wahhabi madrassas in northern Pakistan, became a real force in Afghanistan in 1990’s following the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Their main power base within Afghanistan is in the southern province of Kandahar among the Pashtun ethnic group. Having taken over the government of Afghanistan in the nineties, the Taliban provided a safe haven for Sunni Wahhabi militants from around the world, including Al Qaeda headed by exiled Saudi Arabian Osama Bin Laden. Resistance to Taliban power in Afghanistan came primarily from non-Pashtun ethnic groups such as the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, whose power bases are in the north, west, and central parts of the country. The Northern Alliance, led by Ahmad Shah Massoud (assassinated by Al Qaeda on September 9, 2001, two days before 9/11), grouped local leaders from those regions and ethnic groups of the country in opposition to the Taliban. The alliance was supported: by India because of their rivalry with Pakistan; by Iran because of their opposition to a strong Sunni Taliban government; and, by Russia and Tajikistan because of the growing Islamic movements in Chechnya and Central Asia.

Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Operation Enduring Freedom was launched by the Unites States and NATO aimed at removing the Taliban from power and going after Al Qaeda. Having succeeded in toppling the Taliban government and establishing a new government in Kabul, the Bush Administration ‘lost’ focus in its second term. Instead of pursuing an aggressive policy aimed at neutralizing the long term impact of the Taliban and their Sunni Wahhabi extremist allies, the United States shifted its attention to neutralize Iran’s rising regional influence. This change in policy focus caused a major setback to U.S. interests in Afghanistan and led to the gradual re-emergence of the Taliban as a power and a major threat to stability in that country.

As in the case of Pakistan, the Obama Administration needs to adopt a strategy that has the single aim of defeating Sunni Wahhabi fundamentalism in Afghanistan. Given all the background information provided above, the recommended strategy is as follows:

•    New “Northern Alliance” Against Wahhabism: the United States should encourage the formation of a new ‘Northern Alliance’ made up of all non-Pashtun ethnic groups who are vehemently opposed to the Taliban. A new national government would be formed that brings on board non-Wahhabi Pashtuns and that has at its core this new Northern Alliance. The defeat of the Taliban and Sunni Wahhabism must take precedence and should not be sacrificed for the sake of seeking greater accommodation with the Pashtuns.
•    India and Tajikistan: India and Tajikistan have provided military and logistical support in the past to the old Northern Alliance in its resistance to the Taliban. The Obama Administration should reach out to these two countries and develop a coordinated effort to support the new Afghani government’s policy to defeat the Taliban. It is in both countries’ national interest, and even most especially India, to have Sunni Wahhabism defeated in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
•    Iran: Iran was the one country most actively engaged in supporting the old Northern Alliance in its resistance to the Taliban during the nineties. Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom with the aim of removing the Taliban from power and destroying Al Qaeda. Iran was quite supportive of the American effort:
o    Military and Rescue Support: Iran continued providing weapons to the opposition Northern Alliance, closed its border with Afghanistan, and in response to a request from the Bush Administration, agreed to rescue any American military personnel in distress in its territory.
o    Formation of new Afghanistan Government: after the toppling of the Taliban government, U.S. and Iranian diplomats met together in Bonn to discuss the formation of a new government and constitution for Afghanistan. “None was more [helpful] than the Iranians,” said James Dobbins, the U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan at the time, writing in the Washington Post. “The original version of the Bonn agreement … neglected to mention either democracy or the war on terrorism. It was the Iranian representative who spotted these omissions and successfully urged that the newly emerging Afghan government be required to commit to both.”

The United States should build on this constructive past experience and engage in a serious dialogue with Iran because the defeat of the Taliban and Sunni Wahhabism are in the interest of both countries, especially Iran.

The Iraq Challenge

An intensified and well-focused effort on defeating Sunni Wahhabism in Pakistan and Afghanistan requires, as stated earlier, the active involvement of regional powers such as India and Iran but also requires a U.S. shift in military, logistical and economic resources away from Iraq towards the Pakistani-Afghani theatre of operations. An orderly and effective drawdown of U.S. military assets in Iraq necessitates a region-based security arrangement with Iraq’s key neighbors namely Iran, Turkey and Syria. Of the three, Iran is most important in order to secure stability in Iraq, post U.S. withdrawal, and to insure the non-resurgence of Sunni Wahhabi fundamentalism and Al Qaeda.

Iran and the Netanyahu Opportunity

In this long term war against Sunni Wahhabism Iran could potentially be one of the most reliable regional partners for the United States. But how can the U.S. engage Iran given past hostilities, the nuclear agenda, Iran’s support to Hamas and Hezbollah, and Iranian leadership threatening to “wipe Israel off the map”?

Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has effectively facilitated the opening for the United States to engage Iran. Let me explain.

On March 29, 2009, two days before he was sworn in as the new Prime Minister of Israel, Binyamin Netanyahu in an interview with the Atlantic was quoted as saying “The Obama Presidency has two great missions: fixing the economy, and preventing Iran from gaining nuclear weapons.” Netanyahu also said in the same interview that he would support President Obama’s decision to engage Iran, so long as negotiations brought about a quick end to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. “How you achieve this goal is less important than achieving it,” he said.

The Washington Post published an article on April 22, 2009, in which it stated that Israel would not move ahead on the core issues of Palestinian peace talks until it sees progress in U.S. efforts to stop Iran’s suspected pursuit of nuclear arms and to limit Tehran’s rising influence in the region. “It’s a crucial condition if we want to move forward,” Deputy Foreign Minister Daniel Ayalon, a former ambassador to the United States, told The Washington Post. “If we want to have a real political process with the Palestinians, then you can’t have the Iranians undermining and sabotaging.”

When asked about those Israeli comments at a testimony hearing in front of the House Appropriations Committee on April 23, 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton stated “For Israel to get the kind of strong support it’s looking for vis-à-vis Iran it can’t stay on the sideline with respect to the Palestinians and the peace efforts, that they go hand-in-hand.”

Some analysts have interpreted Secretary Clinton’s remarks as implicitly rejecting the emerging position of Netanyahu’s government and others have predicted that American and Israeli priorities were no longer in sync. In reality, however, by putting Iran ahead of Palestinian peace talks on Israel’s list of top priorities, Prime Minister Netanyahu has opened the door for the Obama Administration to move as quickly as possible towards engaging Iran in a serious dialogue that may bring peace of mind and security to Israel.

While it is true that Iran is providing support to Hamas, it is important to keep in mind that this support is based on convenience much more than anything else. Hamas was cut off by Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt after it seized power in Gaza through a military coup and sought support from anywhere, including Iran. This support, can easily end if and when circumstances, vis-à-vis Hamas, were to change. The real long term problem for Israel, however, is the ideology of suicide bombing aimed at killing innocent civilians, which is espoused by core elements of Hamas and other extremist Islamist Palestinian factions.

In other words, while Israel considers Iran’s nuclear agenda its top immediate security priority, Israel also knows that the long term threat to its security comes from the ideology of Sunni Wahhabi fundamentalism that rejects any accommodation with Israel and indoctrinates the hatred of the Jews in its teachings. It is this ideology, and not Iran, that has produced suicide bombings in Israel, Iraq, India, Spain and the United Kingdom.

In summary, the opening presented by Prime Minster Netanyahu must be seized by the Administration with the goal of reaching an arrangement with Iran on multiple fronts that are all inter-related, namely Israel’s security, Iraq’s stability, Pakistan’s recovery and Afghanistan’s liberation.

Eye on the Ball

Stopping Pakistan’s slide into chaos depends on adopting this new integrated comprehensive strategy, and the success of this new strategy depends on keeping two factors constant: preserve mission focus (the defeat of the real enemy – Sunni Wahhabi fundamentalism), and secure regional engagement.

Cultural Intelligence matters!

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Counternarcotics Offers Chance to Cooperate with Tehran

Wednesday, April 29th, 2009

On March 31, Washington took its first step toward engagement with Tehran through a diplomatic encounter with the Iranian government at the Afghanistan conference in the Hague. Even though the initial contact was awkward, it was clearly a step forward for the Obama administration, and both countries agreed that the opium/heroin trade was a destructive force in both the region and the world. As such, the United States should consider using collaboration on counternarcotics as an effective means to jump-start diplomacy with Iran. Although such an approach would be difficult, it could succeed if both sides focused solely on law enforcement, without the intrusion of politicians, intelligence operatives, and diplomats.

Background

Afghanistan produces roughly 90 percent of the world’s opiates — principally opium and heroin — and the resulting drug trade fuels the Taliban’s war effort. The Taliban is becoming increasingly reliant on this illicit multibillion-dollar industry to fund its operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and there is evidence of growing al-Qaeda involvement.

The UN’s 2008 World Drug Report states that more than half of the world’s opiate users — over 9.3 million people — reside in Asia and are found mostly along the major drug trafficking routes from Afghanistan. More than 2.3 million of the users live in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, many in Afghanistan and Iran.

Estimates for the number of Iranian users vary widely. Iranian government sources report that between 1.2 million and 2 million Iranians are addicted to opiates, while other estimates are generally higher, especially when frequent users are added to the figures. In other words, at least 2.5 percent of the adult population is addicted, and since 90 percent of Iranian users are male, 5 to 8 percent of adult men in Iran are using opiates regularly.

Opiates are the traditional intoxicant of choice in Iran, with opium use well established in tradition, in contrast to the negative social image of alcohol consumption. Opium was a significant problem in Iran before World War II, when it was the drug’s leading international producer. In the decades before the revolution, much progress was made in addressing drug addiction, but the problem roared back after 1979.

Part of the problem was government attitude, since not all clerics disapproved of opium. The problem is compounded by geography, since Iran has served for many years as a major transshipment route for opium and heroin to Turkey, Europe, and other international destinations. As in many other countries, outside traffickers, in this case Afghans, work with Iranian organized crime to create the infrastructure necessary within Iran to support the transshipment of Afghan opiates to Western markets. The Afghan traffickers pay their Iranian partners with product rather than cash, thus contributing to the development of markets and increased demand inside Iran.

Not only is the Iranian addiction rate extremely high, a number of Iranian military personnel have been killed in the line of duty as a result of drug-related violence. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), whose al-Quds Force is the country’s primary support organization for regional terrorists, is at the same time a main actor in the fight against drug trafficking. A number of IRGC units appear to be involved in both tasks, which poses a significant problem for U.S.-Iranian counternarcotics cooperation.

Another potential obstacle for a collaborative effort is the perception that Washington supports at least one of the major organizations smuggling opiates into Iran, Jundallah, an ethnically Baluch “political” group also known as Iranian People’s Resistance Movement. This organization has engaged in acts of terrorism against the Iranian government, and its leader has spoken on Voice of America.

The Way Forward

The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) should be allowed to establish direct communication and cooperation with its Iranian law enforcement counterparts. Iranian officials have sought this kind of arrangement in the past, and some senior U.S. State Department leaders have even lobbied for it; however, previous administrations have prohibited the DEA from moving forward.

This year the DEA is cohosting — with its Mexican counterparts — its twenty-seventh annual International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC) in Cancun, Mexico. The IDEC has grown from a five-country, Western-hemisphere-centric endeavor, to a global effort involving approximately one hundred nations. Ninety-one countries participated in the 2008 event in Istanbul, Turkey. The IDEC venue could provide an ideal opportunity to open relations between the DEA and Iranian law enforcement, as well as other law enforcement agencies from around the globe, ultimately paving the way for a new era of cooperation between the United States and Iran.

After initial exchanges, the next step is to share intelligence and evidence, ideally though the establishment of a DEA office in Tehran. The DEA has the largest U.S. law enforcement presence abroad (eighty-six offices in sixty-seven countries), made possible only by the acceptance of DEA agents as federal narcotics officers, not spies. Gaining that acceptance in Iran will be a great challenge, and it certainly would not happen overnight. But it is important to set long-term goals. Although no foreign government has succeeded in working with Iran in this manner — and the recent conviction of a foreign journalist as a spy is alarming — the DEA has been extraordinarily effective in sharing related leads and sensitive drug intelligence with their counterparts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries throughout the region and the world.

The Challenge

Policing is a science, and complex counternarcotics policing is even more challenging. Senior politicians from both countries becoming involved in police business could be disastrous. Since the problem will be compounded by the role of the IRGC, a reflexively anti-American force, the challenge will be to find a way for cooperation among senior law enforcement leaders, working at a “cop-to-cop” level.

From there, law enforcement officials could conduct collaborative work on efforts to address drug demand reduction and treatment, with professionals from those disciplines taking the lead. In this context, it is discouraging that Iran arrested two brothers, Arash and Kamiar Alaei, as they were heading to the 2008 international AIDS conference where they were due to be awarded a prize for their work with mostly drug-addicted AIDS victims. The brothers were convicted as spies on the charge that their foreign collaboration was promoting the “soft overthrow” of the Islamic Republic — a preoccupation of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who sees cooperation with foreigners as potentially dangerous to his regime.

To succeed, any U.S. effort to cooperate with Iran on counternarcotics efforts must draw upon the DEA’s successful and decades-long experience with law enforcement partners from around the globe. Although Iran does not subscribe to U.S. terrorist designations of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, it is nonetheless in Iran’s interest to work aggressively with the United States to target the drug-trafficking activities of these groups, which destabilize Iran and the region.

Michael Braun retired recently from the Drug Enforcement Administration, after a twenty-three-year career with the agency. From 2005 until his retirement, he served as the DEA’s assistant administrator and chief of operations, overseeing the agency’s 227 domestic and 86 foreign offices.

This piece was originally posted Policy Watch/Peace Watch at The Washington Istitute for Near East Policy.

Posted in Intelligence, International, Management & Administration, Narcotics, Smuggling, Terror Finance | Comments