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Chertoff’s New Book: A Review

Wednesday, June 3rd, 2009

By Guest Contributor John Solomon
Editor: In Case of Emergency, Read Blog

In his forthcoming book, former Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, warns about the U.S. becoming complacent and returning to a “September 10 mindset.” But he is equally cautionary about going too far in the other direction. “There are two opposite extremes that must be avoided,” he writes in the book, Homeland Security: Assessing the First Five Years (University of Pennsylvania Press), “one, hysteria and fear, and the other, complacency and almost blithe disregard of the threats we face.” In fact, much of the book attempts to find the right balance in policies and attitudes to keep the nation safe.

I was given the ‘uncorrected page proofs’ of the book this weekend at the 2009 Book Expo held here in New York City. It is scheduled to be released in September. (The former Secretary now runs a security and risk-management consulting firm, The Chertoff Group.)

In Homeland Security: Assessing the First Five Years, Chertoff offers substantive policy recommendations on a range of homeland security issues. Actually, the title sells the book a bit short. It is as much, if not more, prospective as retrospective. And he does so in a tone that is generally bipartisan and constructive.

The bipartisan approach is signaled from the beginning (former Democratic Congressman Lee H. Hamilton, wrote the book’s Foreword) and at the very end (the book’s final paragraph: “As my successor, Janet Napolitano, assumes the challenging task of protecting the homeland, it is my hope that when her tenure has ended, she will pass on to her successor an even stronger, better department, one that has served our country well.”)

Many of the themes he strikes in the book will be familiar to those who have followed Chertoff’s public statements during his time as Homeland Security Secretary. In fact, one of his major aims in writing the book seems to be to educate – and sometimes try to persuade – the public and in turn their elected representatives. (The decision to have a university press publish the book underscores that objective.) Chertoff argues throughout the book that the government needs to communicate with the citizenry early and often on homeland security issues.

I know Chertoff would readily acknowledge (and he did in a couple interviews I had with him last year) that he did not accomplish nearly as much as he might have liked in this particular area. There were a number of reasons, including a lack of trust between the government and much of the governed on homeland security (which began before Chertoff took over DHS but was exacerbated by the government’s response to Katrina) as well as a concern about being accused of scaring people by bringing up potentially frightening scenarios. I would also argue that there is not yet a clear consensus on how best to communicate these new and delicate preparedness issues (ie. how and how much to brief the public on WMD threats) that will educate and engage citizens in a useful and non-scary way. But the Obama Administration has the opportunity to start its public education and engagement efforts with a clean slate. And Chertoff clearly thinks they should take advantage of it.

“It seems that only when we crystallize a problem around an individual circumstance can we ensure the kind of emotional commitment that inspires people on every level to make the necessary and prudent investments to secure the nation,” Chertoff writes. “That is why frank discussion about past terrorist attacks is not, as some would claim, fear-mongering. Rather it is a necessary antidote to the inertia that arises when individuals do not want to be inconvenienced by the short-term impact of policies or programs that prevent further attacks from occurring.” He adds that future Administrations should be “candid with the American people, sharing as much information as possible about the dangers we face and the nature of our enemies.”

Chertoff raises important questions about bio-preparedness that have really yet to be discussed directly with the public (though the recent H1N1 flu did at least provoke some discussion), such as how to distribute medicine quickly, when to use isolation and quarantine as well as how businesses and schools should deal with those long-term distancing situations.

“It is essential that they be discussed and deliberated upon before, not after, a national emergency arises,” writes Chertoff. “Clearly the time to have thorough, candid and public conversations about these issues and tradeoffs is today, before anything happens tomorrow. This is true not only of legal matters, but also of every aspect of the threat and how we should respond.”

The target of much of Chertoff’s criticism in the book are interest groups he believes have worked against the nation’s overall homeland security interests. In a provocative chapter, “Why Washington Won’t Work?” Chertoff explains his frustration about the obstacles that the political system throws in the way of implementing long-term changes that benefit the whole nation but which might come at the expense of a smaller interest: “Measures designed to promote the general good of the country are countered by small but highly concentrated, well-organized activist groups that perceive their own individual interests to be adversely affected by new proposals or ideas.”

He continues: “Unfortunately, the predictable – yet perverse – result of success is that it has fostered the kind of complacency that enables structural obstacles to begin reasserting themselves. We seem to be turning back to business as usual, the way things were before 9/11.” As examples, Chertoff mentions the opposition from landowners in the Southwest to the construction of a fence on the Mexico border and the chemical industry’s resistance to security regulations on propane.

He also cites the unwillingness of local residents concerned about their views of Lake Pontchartrain to support the construction of a barrier, which would have allowed the Army Corps of Engineers to drop a steel gate to prevent surging water from entering the 17th Street Canal in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina. ”The obvious question is why this barrier wasn’t in place years ago. Had it been there when Katrina came, the Corps would have dropped the gate, and an enormous amount of devastation could have been averted. In fact, a decade ago, the Army Corps of Engineers proposed precisely that at the canal. It was vociferously opposed by local residents who felt it would spoil their view of the lake, and by environmental groups concerned about its effect on the area’s ecology.”

Some other excerpts from the book:

On how to address Muslim extremism: Chertoff believes the U.S should “combat the ideas that drive the terrorists” by pointing out the “connection between today’s extremists and their early and mid-twentieth-century intellectual cousins who advanced totalitarian ideologies such as communism and fascism.”
On the failure to pass immigration reform: “We need to continue to show the American people that we can secure our borders, enforce the law, and protect and defend the homeland. If we do that there will come a time in the future where the public may trust the government to expand temporary immigration.”
On the importance of using ’soft power’: “To prevail, we must not only work hard to prevent terrorists from attacking, but also expend equal effort to prevent people from becoming terrorists in the first place.” He adds: “In the battle of ideas, words matter. Good deeds, while crucial, are not enough. Actions can speak more loudly than words, but it would be sheer folly to neglect the power of words to explain our actions and defend our actions and defend our message.”
On Risk: One of Chertoff’s priorities as Secretary was trying to inculcate more risk management principles into homeland security decision making and explaining that to the nation. He writes: “Eliminating every risk to the country’s infrastructure is impossible. If implemented, the kinds of security measures required to pursue such a strategy could destroy what we are trying to protect, namely, the normal, daily commerce of the United States.” Chertoff’s prime example is the effort by some in Congress to mandate that U.S. Customs officials to inspect every shipping container before it enters the country: “It could grind commerce to a halt, effectively handling the terrorists the victory they desire.” He believes that more the nation knows about the tradeoffs the better: “I believe strongly that the more informed they become, the more likely they will back sensible risk-based security measures.”

Since homeland security as a cabinet department and as a subject is so relatively new and some of the challenges are still unfamiliar, there is a real need to educate the nation. “Preparing by word and deed for the unthinkable is hardly a pleasant exercise, but if we engage in it today, we can prevent far greater harm from befalling us tomorrow. If we plan for the worst, we just might avoid some and maybe even all of it.”

Anyone interested in homeland security (and for that matter public policy) will find the 192-page book worth reading. Chertoff’s perspective – not only was he of one of three Homeland Security Secretaries in the nation’s history, but he also headed U.S. Justice Department’s Criminal Division post-9/11 and served as a federal judge – is unique.

“These are excruciatingly difficult questions with no perfect answers,” Chertoff writes. “The more thoughtful deliberations we have about them in advance, the better off we will be.” Homeland Security: Assessing The First Five Years makes a significant contribution to thoughtful deliberations towards answering those difficult questions.

John Solomon is the editor of the blog “In Case of Emergency, Read Blog” and is writing a book titled “In Case Of Emergency, Read Book: Simple Steps To Prepare You and Your Family For Terrorism, Natural Disasters and Other 21st Century Crises.”

Posted in Congress, Politics & PR, Essential Reading Series, Featured Feed, Management & Administration, counterterrorism | Comments

There Is Still Much Work To Be Done

Wednesday, January 21st, 2009

While reflecting on the inauguration and seeing Secretary Napolitano and Admiral Allen behind President Obama during the swearing in ceremony, I picked back up my copy of Edward Alden’s terrific new book, The Closing of the American Border, and mused how it should be required reading for those assuming new positions of responsibility for homeland security this week.

Exhaustively researched and brilliantly penned, this page-turner provides a thorough account of the country’s border policies since 9/11. This important book is the unofficial history of how overnight border security transitioned from an almost afterthought to a bureaucratic tug of war, sometimes carried out in the oval office, between “the cops” and “the technocrats” struggling to balance protecting the country with civil liberties in a new age of counter-terrorism.

Unlike many serious policy books, The Closing of the American Border is actually a terrific read, written with a combination of serious analysis and gut wrenching anecdotes of detained immigrants whose only crime was their place of birth, unlucky timing, and desire to invest their considerable talents in the United States. The book tells harrowing stories of lives destroyed after being snared in blunt security initiatives aimed at foiling the next major attack. Although, while it is impossible to prove a counterfactual why there hasn’t been another terrorist incident, the book details how the closing of the American border has come with considerable cost to America’s image abroad and economic competitiveness at home.

Immigrants, whose sweat literally and figuratively built America, have run up against an administrative buzz saw from a government still reeling from Al Queda’s surprise attack. As the book chronicles, Bush administration officials in a politically charged and risk adverse environment have been at almost every corner willing to sacrifice efficiency and open borders for tighter, if imperfect, border security. The personal stories of individual disaster the book relays put human faces on what often just seem like steely, impersonal policy decisions. The book reads like a combination of the Warren Report and a reality TV series turned horror show.

New DHS officials, incoming National Security Council staff, and citizens interested in the perennial tensions between freedom and security should carefully read The Closing of the American Border and keep it near their desks. This book provides critical strategic lessons gleaned from seven years of hindsight for Americans and their leaders. Today, we witnessed the first presidential transition since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The policy choices to protect America remain difficult ones, and as this book makes clear, there is still much work to be done.

Posted in Border Security, Essential Reading Series, Immigration & Visa Policy, International, counterterrorism | Comments

Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming

Monday, January 19th, 2009

Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming

SUMMARY:

Thanks to global warming, the Arctic icecap is rapidly melting, opening up access to massive natural resources and creating shipping shortcuts that could save billions of dollars a year. But there are currently no clear rules governing this economically and strategically vital region. Unless Washington leads the way toward a multilateral diplomatic solution, the Arctic could descend into armed conflict.

To read more, click here.

Posted in Essential Reading Series, Featured Feed | Comments

CRS: Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai, India, and Implications for U.S. Interests

Friday, January 9th, 2009

Congressional Research Service: “Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai, India, and Implications for U.S. Interests”

Summary

On the evening of November 26, 2008, a number of well-trained militants came ashore from the Arabian Sea on small boats and attacked numerous high-profile targets in Mumbai, India, with automatic weapons and explosives. By the time the episode ended some 62 hours later, about 16 people, along with nine terrorists, had been killed and hundreds more injured. Among the multiple sites attacked in the peninsular city known as India’s business and entertainment capital were two luxury hotels-the Taj Mahal Palace and the Oberoi-Trident-along with the main railway terminal, a Jewish cultural center, a café frequented by foreigners, a cinema house, and two hospitals. Six American citizens were among the 26 foreigners reported dead. Indian officials have concluded that the attackers numbered only ten, one of whom was captured.

The investigation into the attacks is still in preliminary stages, but press reporting and statements from U.S. and Indian authorities strongly suggest that the attackers came to India from neighboring Pakistan and that the perpetrators likely were members and acting under the orchestration of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorist group. The LeT is believed to have past links with Pakistan’s military and intelligence services. By some accounts, these links are ongoing, leading to suspicions, but no known evidence, of involvement in the attack by Pakistani state elements. The Islamabad government has strongly condemned the Mumbai terrorism and offered New Delhi its full cooperation with the ongoing investigation, but mutual acrimony clouds such an effort, and the attacks have brought into question the viability of a nearly five-year-old bilateral peace process between India and Pakistan.

Three wars-in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971-and a constant state of military preparedness on both sides of the border have marked six decades of bitter rivalry between India and Pakistan. Such bilateral discord between two nuclear-armed countries thus has major implications for regional security and for U.S. interests. The Administration of President-elect Barack Obama may seek to increase U.S. diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving conflict between these two countries. The Mumbai attacks have brought even more intense international attention to the increasingly deadly and destabilizing incidence of Islamist extremism in South Asia, and they may affect the course of U.S. policy toward Pakistan, especially. The episode also has major domestic implications for India, in both the political and security realms. Indian counterterrorism capabilities have come under intense scrutiny, and the United States may further expand bilateral cooperation with and assistance to India in this realm. For broader discussion, see CRS Report RL33529, India-U.S. Relations, and CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations. This report will not be updated.

Introduction 1

Attack Overview 1

U.S. Response 2

Suspected/Accused Culprits 3

Lashkar-e-Taiba 3

Suspected Links With Pakistan’s State Apparatus 4

Indigenous Indian Suspects 5

Possible Motives 6

Background 6

Domestic Indian Terrorism 6

India-Pakistan Tensions 7

The Kashmir Issue 8

Implications for India-Pakistan Relations 8

New Delhi’s Response 8

Islamabad’s Response 10

Outlook for Bilateral Relations 11

Implications for India 13

Political Recriminations 13

Anti-Terrorism Law and Capacity Reform 14

Implications for Pakistan 15

U.S. Policy 16

U.S.-India Relations 17

U.S.-Pakistan Relations 18

Read the full report: Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai, India, and Implications for U.S. Interests

Posted in Essential Reading Series, International, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

FBI Congressional Testimony on Mumbai

Friday, January 9th, 2009

FBI Congressional Testimony on Mumbai

Threats Posed by Suspected Sponsors of Mumbai Attackers

The surviving Mumbai attacker has claimed that the Pakistan-based terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) provided him training and direction for the attack. The FBI assesses that LT, which is well known to the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC), remains a threat to U.S. interests in South Asia and, to a lesser extent, the U.S. Homeland. We have no current intelligence indicating that there is an organized LT presence in the United States or that LT senior leadership is seeking to attack the U.S. Homeland. LT does maintain facilitation, procurement, fundraising, and recruitment activities worldwide, including in the United States. For example, in the last few years, US courts convicted several followers of the “Virginia Jihad” Network of providing material support to terrorism relating to their training at an LT-sponsored training camp in Pakistan, with the intention of fighting against Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. In addition, the FBI is investigating a limited number of individuals across the United States who are linked in some way to LT—primarily through witting or unwitting fundraising for the group, as well as the recruitment of individuals from the United States to attend LT camps abroad.

Lessons Learned from Mumbai Attacks

The principal lesson from the Mumbai attacks reinforces the notion that a small number of trained and determined attackers with relatively unsophisticated weapons can do a great deal of damage. Other terrorist groups, to include al-Qaida and its affiliates, will no doubt take note of the Mumbai attacks and attempt to emulate them. What this means for the FBI is that we must continue to maintain a high level of vigilance for all indications of developing terrorist activity. The planning for the Mumbai attacks probably unfolded over a fairly long period with careful surveillance of the target sites and transportation routes. The FBI must continue to work closely with its state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners, especially in our Joint Terrorism Task Forces to follow up on indications of suspicious activity that could potentially be related to terrorism. Similarly, we must carefully monitor travel to participate in terrorist activities or fighting overseas, such as that recently reported by ethnic Somalis traveling to fight in Somalia. As the experience of the United Kingdom indicates, individuals who receive terrorist training or experience overseas clearly represent a threat. In addition, we need to continue to heighten the public’s awareness to the continued threat of terrorist attacks and the need to report suspicious incidents.

As an example of how we have already begun implementing these lessons learned, the FBI worked immediately after the attacks to identify any U.S. links to the planners and attackers. Whenever possible, all information was shared with the Indian government to aid in its investigation. The FBI disseminated more than 15 intelligence reports to the USIC based on information collected in Mumbai from both interviews and physical evidence. These classified reports are available to cleared state, local and tribal law enforcement personnel in Joint Terrorism Task Forces and in State and Local Fusion Centers. In addition, the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) jointly issued an unclassified alert about the attacks to state, local, and tribal officials on November 27, 2008. The FBI and DHS also issued an Intelligence Bulletin on December 3, 2008, to building owners and operators, as well as the U.S. law enforcement community, to alert them to preliminary findings regarding the techniques and tactics used by terrorists in the Mumbai attacks. The bulletin indicated that the FBI and DHS had no credible or specific information that terrorists were planning similar operations against similar buildings in the United States, but urged local authorities and building owners and operators to be aware of potential attack tactics .

Another lesson learned from the Mumbai attacks is that terrorist groups that appear to be primarily a threat to their surrounding localities can sometimes have broader aspirations. Although LT has historically focused its attacks against Indian forces in the Kashmir region, the Mumbai attacks reinforce the reality that LT has the capability to operate outside its home base. The group did so in 2001 with an attack on the Indian Parliament building in New Delhi and is suspected of having been involved in the 2006 Mumbai train bombings. These actions highlight the need to examine other groups that appear to be active only locally and determine whether they have the operational capability and strategic intention to undertake a more regional or global agenda.

A great deal of work by federal, state, and local governments has contributed to preventing another attack in the U.S. Homeland since 9/11, but the threat, while somewhat lessened as a result of the successes in the global war on terror, remains.

Read the full FBI congressional testimony on Mumbai

Posted in Essential Reading Series, Intelligence, Law Enforcement, Radicalization, Terror Strategic Analysis, counterterrorism | Comments

Read the report by Commission on Prevention of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism

Friday, December 5th, 2008

There has been quite a bit of news and public commentary and reaction to the just released report by the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism. Read the report for yourself.

Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism :: Report

WORLD AT RISK: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism

Posted in Emergency Preparedness & Response, Essential Reading Series, Terror Strategic Analysis | Comments

Security Debrief Named One of Top 50 Homeland Security Blogs

Friday, November 14th, 2008

Top 50 Homeland Security Blogs by e-Justice Blog

From immigration laws to cyber-security to emergency preparedness to foreign policy, these blogs will bring you the latest discussions and research taking place with homeland security experts and novices alike. These blogs represent the government, researchers, professionals in the field, and every-day citizens and their offerings on the ever-evolving and important topic of homeland security.

Posted in Essential Reading Series | Comments

Essential Reading Series: Ghost Wars by Steve Coll

Saturday, November 1st, 2008

We have on Security Debrief attempted to pass on suggestions for “essential reading” to anybody attempting to understand the evolution of homeland security and our current struggles against violent jihadists and radical Islamists. (The phrase “war on terror” seems a bit too vague to be of real value. When folks use that term, particularly in this Administration, they aren’t really referring to terrorism in general. They aren’t referring to the kidnappings and murders of the FARC in Colombia, for example, even though that organization is every bit the lethal terrorist organization as its counterparts in the Middle East.)

Randy Beardsworth and Stewart Verdery, for example, recently offered their thoughts on Ted Alden’s recent book on the evolution of border security policy – “The Closing of the American Border” – which both suggested was critical reading if you want to understand the successes and failures of American border security policy to date.

If, however, you are looking for an insightful and exhaustively researched work on the direct conflict between America and violent Islamism, then you must read Steve Coll’s book “Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001.”

Yes, the length of the title does directly correspond to the length of the book. It’s a long book. But don’t let the narrowness of the title – the focus on the CIA and Afghanistan – deter you if you are interested in the big picture. The simple truth is that you cannot understand the big picture of the terrorist environment today if you do not understand Afghanistan. And you cannot understand Afghanistan if you do not understand the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which became the catalyst for armed revolt against not only (initially) foreign invaders but (over time) against Muslims and non-Muslims – individuals and governments — anywhere in the world. And you cannot understand how all of this applies to the United States, specifically, without understanding the intense involvement of the CIA in helping to arm and support Afghani (and, later, Pakistani) mujahedeen against the Soviets as a way simply to hand the Soviet Union its own version of Vietnam. All of these things led at first indirectly and then quite directly to September 11^th, and Coll does a commendable job of laying down the history.

Indeed, I would place Coll’s book along side Lawrence Wright’s “The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11″ as indispensable books for anybody wishing to understand what led to al Qaeda’s murderous attacks on the United States in 2001. (Not to mention the 1993 forerunner attack on the World Trade Center, the 1996 Khobar Tower bombing and the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole.)

While Wright’s book provides a stronger ideological and cultural history of the lead-up to 9/11, Coll’s provides the stronger history of actions and events. Read them both and you will have most of what you need to know about the existential struggle of our generation. Additionally, you will come to understand that you cannot understand al Qaeda without understanding the critical involvement of our ambiguous allies Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

The only government funder of the Islamist war against the Soviet Union with deeper pockets than the United States (via the CIA) was Saudi Arabia. And both laundered their money through Pakistan, which became the command central for funding, training and organizing the mujahedeen against the Soviets and, then, doing the same for the Taliban. (All of those al Qaeda training camps we here about today? The training camps were started by the Pakistanis during the war against the Soviets.)

The third great financier was one Osama bin Laden, the J.P. Morgan of the Islamist world. Despite his reputation today as the most dangerous terrorist of our time, he started out as simply a deep (deep, deep) pocketed financial supporter of other more assertive, innovative and charismatic leaders of Wahbabi-inspired organizations seeking to overthrow non Islamic governments in the Middle East (such as Nasser and Sadat’s Egypt) and the destruction of Israel. Like America’s Morgan, entire governments approached the Bin Laden family for financial support and backing, including the Kingdom of Saud prior to the oil riches. The Taliban Government, during its rapid rise and brief, violent and repressive rule, owed much to Bin Laden’s money.

Coll does an impressive job of bringing all of this research and history to life with a lively narrative, particularly during the first two-thirds of the book through the Reagan and Bush I administrations. Perhaps because of the treasure trove of primary documents and previously classified information that was set loose by the 9/11 Commission hearings and investigation, Coll gets bogged down in the Clinton years, detailing in excruciating detail the internal squabbling between the CIA, the NSC, the Pentagon and the other players in crafting (or failing to craft) policy to deal with Bin Laden as he grew from simply a dangerous financier of terrorists to himself becoming the organizer and leader of the most dangerous terrorist network of the age.

In Coll’s mind, the great failing of American policy was the decision to abruptly abandon Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. And he provides a lot of evidence to support his view. During the Cold War era, the only threat to really mattered was the Soviet Union. American policy in Afghanistan went only so far as to humiliate the Soviets; after their withdrawal no thought was given to the wasteland of warring tribes and militarized and radicalized jihadists left in the wake. America largely delegated its own Afghani policy to another country – Pakistan. One need only look to Islamabad today to understand why this was short-sighted.

Even after the end of the Soviet Union, and the early signs of rising Islamic extremism and militancy, the United States seemed unable to address the threat head-on. The Clinton Administration did not fully trust the CIA and ignored the rising sense of urgency over the Bin Laden threat, focusing more on the admittedly dire concern of stability in the nuclear-armed Pakistan and that nation’s tensions with the also nuclear-equipped India. Coll does an excellent job of outlining the near hysteria of the CIA in the first months of the Bush II Administration, and the frustration that developed as the Administration took its time in settling into place and developing a new policy. To its credit, the Bush Administration did indeed reverse the course of the Clinton Administration and began to craft a policy to take on Bin Laden and the Taliban directly. Ironically, this decision took several months (after several years of inaction on the part of the Clinton Administration) and at almost the exact time it made the official decision to take action, Bin Laden struck first.

We know the rest.

Posted in Congress, Politics & PR, Essential Reading Series, Ideology & Public Diplomacy, Radicalization, Terror Finance, Terror Strategic Analysis | Comments

A Review of The Closing of the American Border, by Edward Alden

Friday, October 17th, 2008

A Review of “The Closing of the American Border: Terrorism, Immigration, and Security Since 9/11,” by Edward Alden

By Randy Beardsworth and Theophilos Gemelas

Note: This review was originally published in Homeland Security Affairs; The Journal of the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security

No one should be surprised with the current state of the U.S. border security system. After all, it reflects a neglected effort on behalf of the U.S. government to manage its border prior to the events of September 11, 2001 and scrambled efforts to patch programs and implement new ones shortly after 9/11. It shows what can happen if a government does not have a vision for the future. It shows how the government may make it harder for terrorists to enter the country but makes it harder for everyone else as well. It reflects a government that desperately needs to come to some decision about the kind of border security system that is necessary to help it manage the overall harmful risks to the nation’s security. And it reflects the tensions between government efforts to enforce immigration laws and implement counterterrorism policies, two very distinct efforts that need to be separated.

These conclusions are fairly evident in The Closing of the American Border: Terrorism, Immigration, and Security Since 9/11, by Edward Alden, Bernard L. Schwartz senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. A journalist by profession (Alden has held several positions at the Financial Times), Alden has captured all of the issues pertaining to border security through interviews with senior government officials and immigrants that have fallen victim to an imperfect and at times dysfunctional system. Alden nicely weaves together debates among the departments of State, Justice, and Homeland Security on how to secure borders, effect visa policy, and use immigration law to counter terrorists. The book goes on to expose shortcomings in the enforcement efforts of the old Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and highlights the relationship between the U.S. and Canada and the U.S. and Mexico on border control and trade. Amazingly, it is the first book, since that of the 9/11 Commission, to attempt to examine comprehensively the set of issues and problems confronting border security.

Alden brilliantly frames for the reader the struggles between what he calls the “Technocrats” (Chapter 3) and the “Cops” (Chapter 4). The technocrats are those who champion the position of taking a risk management approach to border security, adhering to constitutional principles and the rule of law, and the appropriate use of technology, information, and intelligence for security purposes so that restrictions or controls do not impede the free flow of people and commerce. These advocates included Tom Ridge, the first assistant to the president for homeland security and the first secretary of homeland security. They also included Admiral James Loy, former deputy secretary of homeland security, and to some extent former Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Robert Bonner.

On the other side of the debate are the “Cops.” The cops are those who champion the use of laws and regulations to potentially head off any terrorist attacks. They include former Attorney General John Ashcroft, who advocated for aggressive use of immigration laws. For Ashcroft, “If a terrorism suspect committed any legal infraction at all, regardless how minor, we would apprehend and charge him” (p. 81). Ashcroft and others interpreted immigration law not as a constitutional protection but as a regulation that allowed the government to charge someone suspected of an immigration violation and detain him or her without charge almost indefinitely without bond. They believed detentions would “help to prevent another attack,” help to intimidate a detainee into “cooperating with the government,” or cause a disruption in terrorist plans (p. 84).

But other cops, most notably Jim Ziglar, former commissioner of the INS, pushed back against Ashcroft. They believed that “the aggressive and often indiscriminate use of immigration laws and visa rules to keep out foreigners or to punish others on technical violations was self-defeating” because it would alienate those groups willing to cooperate, anger foreign governments, and waste government resources by trying to find the “needle in a haystack” (p. 88). In the end, as Alden notes, the cops’ approach blurs the distinction between anti-terrorism enforcement and immigration enforcement.

For those readers who follow bureaucratic politics, dynamics in organizational change, the recent history of immigration and visa policy, or the experiences of immigrants and ordinary people traveling to or hoping to work in the United States, Alden’s book will not disappoint. Alden gets the insider debates just about right. His painstaking interviews and ability to create a broad mosaic from those interviews is uncanny. The Closing of the American Border is a superb text for policy makers who must wrestle with the challenges of border security and immigration policy.

If there are shortcomings in the book, they might be with the limited conclusions offered by the author. After reading this book, one properly cries out for policy prescriptions that start with the need to create a vision for border security. The author shares with us the attempt by Tom Ridge and Richard Falkenrath, former deputy homeland security advisor to the president, to craft a vision for the future, called “The Border of the Future” (p. 137). It was a vision that embraced a “risk-based decision making” (pp. 138-139) approach, distinguished between “high-risk and low-risk traffic” (p. 139) based on intelligence, cooperation with other governments in developing standards and procedures, intelligence information organized and managed to get to front-line inspectors in a timely manner, and constant threat assessments.

As discussed in Alden’s book, we know that vision was criticized and rejected by the Cabinet. But this is where the president should have taken a leadership role to push his administration to think through a border security strategy rather than just haphazardly realigning all of the border security and relevant law enforcement agencies into the Department of Homeland Security with responsibilities for disaster planning and response, protecting the president through the Secret Service and other missions. Alden’s book should be required reading for U.S. presidential candidates and those eventually charged with executing the border security enterprise. Alden shows what happened without a common vision. Alden’s book can show the next president and his team that they have an opportunity to learn from history and craft a common vision.

Randy Beardsworth is a principal at Olive, Edwards and Cooper and former assistant secretary of strategic plans at the Department of Homeland Security. Theophilos Gemelas is senior advisor to the director at the Homeland Security Institute, a federally-funded research and development center and former associate director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. They can be reached at rbeardsworth@olive-edwards.com and tgemelas@yahoo.com, respectively.

Posted in Border Security, Essential Reading Series, Immigration & Visa Policy, Law Enforcement, Terror Strategic Analysis | Comments

Closing of the American Border

Friday, September 26th, 2008

There haven’t been many “insider” books about how DHS has functioned but a good one has appeared. The Closing of the American Border was published last week by Edward Alden of the Council on Foreign Relations and formerly with the Financial Times. It’s a detailed look at the policies and programs deployed after 9/11 to deter and detect terrorists hoping to use our transportation systems against us. If the acronyms NSEERS or PNR mean anything to you, you’ll enjoy the recounting. Some of the book relates to the period before DHS was created, including the legislative debate about the department’s scope and missions. But most relates to how DHS struggled within its new structure and within interagency policymaking to fix holes in immigration and aviation systems, and the negative impacts on legitimate trade and travel.

Of course, the personalities who worked together most of the time, and butted heads on occasion, are highlighted. While the recounting of turf wars is not pretty in the rear-view mirror, it is encouraging that Alden makes a real effort to understand the stresses DHS was under and the fact that its officials put in herculean efforts to do what they thought was best for the country.

My only compliant about the book is that its narrative ends too soon, essentially around the time Secretary Ridge departed in 2005. Some of the problems, like student visa enrollment, visa wait times and privacy fears, have improved. New programs, like Global Entry and WHTI, are using advanced technology to move low-risk travelers through the border. Significant challenges – US-VISIT exit, Visa Waiver expansion, etc – remain so there is no reason to reflect 2004 facts to describe the current state of border facilitation.

All in all, though, for anybody reading this type of blog, The Closing of the American Border is a must-read.

Tags: Council on Foreign Relations, DHS, Edward Alden
Posted in Aviation and airport security, Border Security, Critical Infrastructure, Essential Reading Series, Homeland Security Industry & Private Sector, Immigration & Visa Policy, Management & Administration | Comments

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