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Archive for January, 2009

The Best Investment in Homeland Security

Friday, January 30th, 2009

Following the 9/11 and Anthrax attacks, we as a nation were forced to make a number of investments that were not on any of our national shopping lists. We made drastic improvements to our aviation security; initiated new biological surveillance capabilities and countermeasures; upgraded first responder equipment and interoperability; overhauled the missions of the FBI and US intelligence agencies, and made countless other high-tech expenditures. Nearly eight years after those events, the incoming Obama Administration, Congress, media and taxpayers are asking, “What are we getting for our money?”

While we’ve established a new cabinet-level department – DHS, and spent over $300 billion since 9/11 on homeland security efforts in the public and private sectors, there are few metrics available to measure our success.  The fact that we’ve not had another successful terrorist attack in the US since 2001 is one performance measure to herald but crediting all of our expenditures to date as the reason that something hasn’t happened can never be proven. Could we have achieved the same with less? Can we cut back, or tighten our focus over the next eight years?

That’s the call the new Administration and Congress are going to have to make in the worst federal budget environment since the Great Depression. As DHS and other federal components assemble and defend their requested budgets to the White House and Congress, the challenge before them will be proving their value. From advocating for new programs and reinforcing current ones, to developing and testing new technologies, many promises will be made but few will provide any immediate return.

But what will give us payoff now?

New police radios and other emergency equipment bought with homeland security money certainly provide an investment return every time they answer a distress call. New airport baggage screening equipment and the still under-construction fence along the Southwest US Border also offer their measure of a return as well.

While all of these items and others provide some form of return, the longest-term dividend available in homeland security has nothing to do with current or next generation technologies, legacy operations or cutting edge programs that prevent terror attacks and other disasters.  This dividend is often the least recognized or heralded investment we make in homeland security.

Training–the active learning and ‘hands-on’ practice that enables us to know what to do, when to do it, and how it should be done, provides more return than any other homeland security investment today. Ranging from table-top exercises, classroom sessions and fullscale exercises, homeland security training allows decision-makers, first responders, elected officials and others to build the active knowledge base and capacities necessary to allow our communities to respond and recover from emergencies whenever and wherever they occur.

Training investments accomplish this by helping to establish critical relationships, confidence in one’s methods, and the collaboration and communications necessary between very distinct groups that often see and approach the world (and its emergencies) in very different ways.

There are numerous examples of the return that training offers but one of the best examples of its rewards was in Minneapolis, MN.  On August 1, 2007, the westward span of the I-35 Bridge collapsed into the Mississippi River killing 13 and injuring 121 others. Almost immediately, city, regional and state emergency personnel responded.

With emergency operations underway, they were quickly joined by other federal emergency personnel (FEMA, USACE, USCG) looking to assist.  Rather than getting in one another’s way, each responder played their particular role and worked cooperatively and cohesively with the other.

As shocking as the bridge collapse was, the skill and effectiveness of the response was also cause for attention. Following the well-chronicled dysfunction of emergency response in New York City on 9/11 and New Orleans during Katrina, the level of chaos and confusion experienced in the past had become the anticipated performance expectation. To the welcome surprise of many, such a poor performance metric was not achieved.

Police, emergency/rescue personnel, transportation officials, regional elected leaders, state agencies and other responders to the I-35 Bridge collapse, all pointed to the training and exercises that they had done together as the key to their seamless response. As a result of training investments, they had forged the necessary relationships to work together; they understood what each brought to an emergency and were able to put into action the plans and skills they had developed and refined together to make the difference their community needed.

Without it, many attested that more lives would have been lost, additional injuries incurred and community recovery further delayed.  While training and exercises will never provide the photo ops that many elected officials want when they bring homeland security dollars ‘home,’ they do enable the metric and dividend taxpayers expect – performance when it matters. Knowing what to do, how to do it and who is ready to assist during an emergency makes the difference every time. Metrics of saved lives, coordinated actions and improved response prove training a worthy investment. No technology investment will ever encompass all of those capacities but training will.  It is the investment with constant and assured return.

This article was originally published in the January issue of Homeland Defense Journal.

Cyber Warfare & the United States – A Call to Arms

Friday, January 30th, 2009

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice and the Obama Administration should press the United Nations to join the 21st century and address head on the issue of cyber warfare.

Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides that a country has the right to engage in self-defense when it suffers an armed attack.  The extent of such a response is guided by the Geneva Conventions and their attendant protocols, which define, among other things, the ways that a war may be fought and the protection of individuals.

These protocols also provide measures that can be taken to prevent or end “grave breaches,” defined as “willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment . . . willfully causing great suffering . . . and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.”

But what about cyber warfare?

When the laws of war were written in the Geneva Conventions in 1949, and even in the protocols that followed in the 1970s, the possibility of a cyber attack was not part of the arsenal of warfare.  Today, however, cyber warfare is a very real and powerful threat.

Just prior to Russia’s deployment of tanks and war planes into the former Soviet Republic of Georgia in the summer of 2008, cyber attacks were reported as having been perpetrated by Russian state-run businesses against Georgia.  Internet traffic was blocked, and Georgian web pages turned spoof, featuring misinformation and propaganda.

In December 2008, there was a cyber attack on a U.S. military classified computer network.  The attack led the Pentagon to ban the use of external hardware devices because that was the source of the breach.  Although it is not publicly known if this attack was “state sponsored,” media reports attributed the attack to either the government of China or Russia.  Regardless of who perpetrated the attack, there was little that the U.S. could do to respond.

The question that must be asked is what redress exists in the international community to deal with state sponsored cyber warfare?  The answer to this question is quite simple: none, because there is no international rule of law that expands the laws of war to cover cyber-attacks.

The U.N. should not wait for a cyber attack of epic proportions – on par with 9/11 – to mobilize the international community.  Indeed, a major cyber attack could be more destructive than a conventional attack, as the affects of such an attack could literally shutdown the target country’s government and ruin its economy.  As a result of the interdependence of the world economy, the cascading affect would be felt worldwide.

The Obama administration should bring this issue to the forefront of its U.N. agenda and prompt the international coalition to address the reality of cyber warfare and its potential debilitating consequences.  Warfare must be viewed in a new way because the old definitions and framework are impermissibly limited.

First, we must derive a definition to determine when a cyber attack is an act of war.  Second, we need a broad definition of whom (including individuals, nations and groups) can be held accountable for such acts.  Based on the current framework, only States may become parties to international treaties.  Currently, almost all the world’s States (192 to be exact) are parties to the Geneva Conventions.  So the Geneva Conventions and its Protocols are enforceable simply by virtue of a State’s membership.  However, one dilemma involving cyber warfare is that its perpetrators are not necessarily states, but may be terrorist groups.  International law ought to specifically include terrorist groups and organizations.  Finally, a method of redressability, or punishment, for such acts must be determined.

As the Obama administration looks to instill change and meet the demands of a new age, it should press for the U.N. to meaningfully address the issue of cyber warfare.  The U.N.’s condemnation of “terrorism in all its forms and manifestations” is insufficient.  The United Nations must work to deter countries and their insurgents from engaging in cyber warfare and provide a forum and means to punish those who do.  This will likely be a protracted process and, therefore, we cannot in the meantime let our guard down.

Don’t Forget Rita

Thursday, January 29th, 2009

If anyone thought new Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano was going to take the go slow approach to taking the reigns of the Department, they were really mistaken.  In office for just over a full week, she has rifled off a series of Action Directives in a number of critical areas.  From critical infrastructure protection, information sharing with state and local governments, cyber security, the Northern Border, etc., the Secretary is asking all the right questions on all the right subjects as she begins to get a handle on the issues at hand and mechanisms at her disposal to address them.

While I agree with all of the issues she has asked to be briefed upon, in the spirit of the NFL Challenge Rules I am going to reach for my red challenge flag and throw it onto the field for her to go a booth review on one of her most recent Action Directives.

Yesterday (January 28th), she issued a Directive on Hurricane Katrina asking for an update on the Department’s efforts on Public Assistance, Hazard Mitigation, Housing and other recovery efforts underway in the Gulf Coast.  It is more than appropriate for the new Secretary to ask for an update on these efforts, but unfortunately she’s forgotten about the other named nightmare of the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricane Season: Hurricane Rita.

Striking almost a month after Katrina, Rita struck the Gulf Coast on September 24, 2005 between Texas and Louisiana as a Category 3 storm bringing tremendous destruction and disruption to the region.  While the storm only killed seven people compared to the nearly 2,000 killed by Katrina, Rita’s impact and devastation to the Gulf Coast area was also significant.  Unfortunately, the impacts of this storm are often overlooked and forgotten, and I fear that is the case with Sec. Napolitano’s recent Action Directive.

The worlds of Southwest and Southeast Louisiana have always been distinct, and their performance during the respective storms demonstrated that as fact.  As Katrina revealed, the relationships between elected state, city and parish leaders and public safety units in Southeast Louisiana was anything but productive and functional (non-coordination of radio communications, no back-up plans, poor support to emergency shelters, etc.).

In contrast, elected state, city and parish leaders in Southwest Louisiana as well as their respective public safety units did have positive, productive relationships and plans with another. Their end results during and immediately following Hurricane Rita proved it.

Unfortunately their successes (improved evacuations, smaller loss of life, etc) when compared to the tragic debacles on the other portion of the State has meant that they have been often overlooked and forgotten when it comes to attention and assistance.

All of us recognize that Katrina is a scar that DHS, FEMA, Louisiana, the Gulf Coast and the nation will always have.  Scars are reminders of traumas that hopefully spur us to take action so that they don’t occur again.  Rita also left scars, and we should not forget about them either.

I applaud Sec. Napolitano for asking for updates on what is happening with Katrina.  God knows she doesn’t want to replicate former DHS Sec. Chertoff’s Katrina experiences.  As evidenced this past summer during Hurricane Gustav, huge strides have been made by DHS, FEMA, the State of Louisiana and its 2005 hurricane-ravaged regions in how they prepare and respond to disasters.

I hope that when the Secretary is briefed by FEMA and other DHS leaders on those improvements they will be clearly visible to her and her assembling leadership team who will in turn built upon them further.  What I also hope is visible to her and her team is the impacts of Rita and the needs and challenges that remain as a result of her fury.

Too often we only remember the big name, television centric images of disasters such as Katrina at the expense of others that don’t garner such recognition.

Madame Secretary, please don’t forget Rita.

Or Wilma…

Or Greensburg, KS…

Or Ike…

Secretary Napolitano Issues Action Directives on FEMA State and Local Integration and National Planning

Thursday, January 29th, 2009

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano announced today two action directives, on Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) integration with state and local partners and national planning.

These directives instruct specific offices to gather information, review existing strategies and programs, and provide oral and written reports back to her in February. Secretary Napolitano has already issued seven action directives: cybersecurity; northern border strategy; critical infrastructure protection; risk analysis; state and local intelligence sharing; transportation security; and state, local and tribal integration. She will continue to issue additional action directives in the coming days focused on the missions critical to the department: Protection, Preparedness, Response, Recovery and Immigration.

To read the two directives, click here.

Opportunity Knocking

Thursday, January 29th, 2009

Here’s a statement that should be obvious by now: Our economic stability and national security are conjoined twins – one can’t exist without the other.  As this administration focuses on economic stimulus packages to respond to our country’s economic crisis, it is easy to lose sight of Homeland Security priorities. This would be unwise. Right before us are opportunities to use the same resources for both economic growth and Homeland Security concerns.  The business case for security is now also the nation’s case for security.

Companies have had a historically hard time building the business case for security. In this economic downturn, it is arguably even harder to justify adopting security practices that require precious resources to mitigate an unknown security risk.  And yet, the business case is already here, undercover. The same processes that companies need to adopt to improve security would also improve supply chain safety, improve IT security, reduce products liability risk and address other vulnerabilities. And in the aggregate, this improves national security. Certainly, the latter issues should be top of mind.   With headlines such as:

Fake Internet drugs risk lives, fund terrorism
Study finds that 62 percent of the prescription-only medicines offered on the Internet are fakes; some of the fake-drug schemes are operated by terrorist organizations as a means of raising funds.

Breach of federal jobs site highlights need for contractor liability, security observer says

Agencies should hold contractors liable for security breaches to encourage better protection of sensitive information upfront, said a director at a top computer security training organization in response to this week’s breach of the federal government’s primary Web site for job postings.

Product recalls at record high in Europe
Product recalls and notifications of dangerous merchandise reached record levels in the European Union last year, with the number of suspect goods reported more than double that in the US.

The rate of notifications was up by about 15 per cent and the total of faulty items reported was 1,546. That compared with 1,337 in the previous year, and more than 700 items in 2005.

It seems that DHS and the Homeland Security community at large are missing a significant opportunity of turning these vulnerabilities into corporate strengths.  While not the sexiest of topic areas and certainly not a “24” Jack Bauer type of discussion – the private sector is the center piece of our national homeland security strategy. And yet, our government efforts continue to focus on the headlines relating to terrorism and miss the opportunity to energize businesses around making this nation safer and at the same creating corporate value. Most companies will not relate to the terrorism argument at this point – they likely have little cash reserve to spend on protecting themselves.  But – it has been shown that protection and security can actually add value to a company.   If the government can recognize the linkage between financial stimulus and homeland security, then companies can be incented to investments that will be tied to value and collaterally, but most importantly, to our nation’s security.

Yes Mr. President, We’re wimps.

Wednesday, January 28th, 2009

As he was beginning a meeting with business leaders to discuss his proposed economic stimulus package, President Obama observed that his daughters were surprised to see their school (Sidwell Friends) was cancelled today on account of the weather.

As chronicled in the Shenanigans column of Politico:

Before meeting with business leaders this morning, President Obama made a little side remark about how his girls’ school was closed today “because of–what? Some ice?”

“As my children pointed out, in Chicago school is never canceled,” Obama said to laughter. “In fact my seven-year-old pointed out that you’d go outside for recess. You wouldn’t even stay indoors. So, it’s–I don’t know, we’re going to have to try to apply some flinty Chicago toughness.”

“Are you saying these guys are wimps?” a reporter asked the prez.

“I’m saying that when it comes to the weather, folks in Washington don’t seem to be able to handle things,” Obama clarified.

The President has again shown his adeptness as a communicator, but if a new era is indeed in Washington it would have been better for him to state the obvious about the DC area – we’re wimps.

Resilient we are not.  At the first hint of a bad weather forecast, thousands of DC area residents go into meltdown-mode, rushing to the grocery stores clamoring for bread, milk, eggs and toilet paper.

What are you going to do folks?  Have French Toast and go to the bathroom all day?

As a 20-plus year resident of Virginia, I have had more than my share of laughing fits at the behavior seen in the Nation’s Capital in response to winter weather.

Miniscule snow amounts, mere dustings and even forecasts of flurries send adrenaline rushes of panic coursing through the area.  Rampant school cancellations and semi-hysteric local media coverage (“Winter Storm Team coverage beginning at 4AM,” etc.) always make it appear that the four horseman of the Apocalypse have been sighted on the inner loop of the Beltway and are headed for each of our individual homes.

Maybe the region’s excessively cautious behavior has to do with the fact we have so many attorneys in the area that no one wants to risk getting sued.

Growing up in Western Pennsylvania, I was fortunate to see and learn firsthand how deal with winter weather; drive in it and go about regular life when it occurs.  I’m not alone in those abilities either. My wife and many of our friends, neighbors and colleagues who grew up in other places that experienced far more extreme winter weather acquired the same set of skills.

While many of us who are not native to the Washington area laugh at the “wussiness” of the region when it comes to winter weather (or any other weather pattern that comes this way), the time is well past for our national, state, regional and local leaders to point to this area’s wimpy behavior when it comes to teaching us about our own readiness and resilience.

Last year (February 12, 2008) when an ice storm brought the entire region to a literal stop
would have been a great opportunity for elected and public safety leaders to have asked the DC area citizens to put into action “Shelter in Place” and other preparedness plans.  By doing so, it would have allowed roads and bridges to be treated and made safe for traffic.  Instead, the region – almost on Pavlovian – cue went into panic, jumped in their cars to compound the traffic gridlock and making an already challenging weather and traffic situation even worse.

There have been some analyses and lessons learned as a result of last year’s ice storm and how we should respond to it, but in watching the coverage and email bulletins of the winter weather this week, I continue to shake my head in wonder and laugh at the simple lessons and heartiness that this region still has yet to learn.

I hope that next time, our new President won’t be as diplomatic in his assessment of the region when his girls and other kids don’t have school just because of a little snow and ice.. He should call like a lot of us see it, “We’re wimps.”

And if we’re wimps when it comes to dealing with Mother Nature’s brief winter visits to this area, what are we going to be like when something really bad occurs?

New Media’s Moment in Mumbai

Wednesday, January 28th, 2009

Al Qaeda’s propaganda and recruiting capability has obtained an almost mythical status. The group communicates worldwide via the Internet with a miniscule budget and deprived of the complex IT infrastructure available to the United States. There is no question that its brazen acts of violence and its new brand of terrorism that seeks not to negotiate but simply to kill has placed al Qaeda at the top of the list of terrorist threats. But while the national security apparatus in the United States has acknowledged the new operational tactics put into play by al Qaeda, there is a disconcerting lack of recognition of the group’s unprecedented use of intelligence, communications and propaganda online. This is a critical failure given that the real power of any terrorist act is not the act itself but the capability to transform that act into a powerful message to advance an agenda.

Psychological and ideological wars are taking place online even as hot wars erupt in Gaza and violence emerges in places like Mumbai.

In fact, as tragic as it was, Mumbai may finally serve as a catalyst to overcome the government’s inertia and skepticism regarding the role of New Media as a valuable tool to be used, rather than feared.

Some of the first communications out of Mumbai, came via sources like Twitter, an online social networking site that allows people to share short bursts of information about what they are doing.

Some of the first photographs of what was going down, also in real time, were posted to the online photo-sharing site Flickr, where a Mumbai resident began snapping pictures only moments after the terror began.

The same technologies that allowed the attackers of Mumbai to meticulously and accurately map out their operations – online satellite technology, online mapping tools and vast databases of information detailing down to the local Starbucks on the corner of K and 16th streets in Washington, DC – is available for relief efforts. In fact numerous sites coordinating aid to the victims and families in Mumbai popped up almost immediately, before the standoff was even complete.

The real value New Media offers in the homeland and national security environment, however, will lie less in the reporting and eyewitness accounts that garnered such attention during the attacks in Mumbai; its real value will fall into three broad categories:

1. Emergency response
2. Open-source intelligence gathering
3. The ideological struggle for hearts and minds.

Read the full analysis: “New Media’s Moment in Mumbai” in Foreign Policy Journal

Homeland Security Secretary Asks—Here Are Answers!

Tuesday, January 27th, 2009

On day one, new Secretary for Homeland Security Janet Napolitano issued a directive requiring her staff to report to her by the end of the month on five top issues. The directive covered:

  • State and local intelligence sharing (law enforcement’s ability to “connect the dots” in looking for terrorist threats);
  • State, local, and tribal integration (ensuring governance at all levels works together);
  • Transportation security (assessing what is being done to safeguard air, surface, and maritime transportation);
  • Risk analysis (determining the most efficacious means to reduce threats and vulnerabilities); and
  • Critical infrastructure protection (reducing the danger terrorists might destroy or degrade important assets from bridges to computer networks).

The secretary wants answers by January 28.

Napolitano is right to ask tough questions. While the department has done much to make America safe, more can be done to improve the efficacy of programs. In many cases, the department has been saddled with unworkable congressional mandates. In other instances, Congress failed to give the department the necessary authority or direction. If the staff does its job correctly, there are issues in each area that ought to be highlighted to the secretary, issues that, consequently, she should work with Congress to resolve.

Solving State and Local Intelligence Sharing Snafus

Congress required establishing the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, but subsequent efforts to increase governmental information sharing have been inadequate. The ISE program manager has detailed the many shortcomings: overlapping roles and responsibilities; cultural, policy, and technological differences among organizations; policy, process, and procedural differences; and the absence of universal standards. The result of these shortcomings is the stubborn persistence of multiple uncoordinated information products across the federal government, impeding a concerted and effective information sharing effort. Meanwhile, the lack of a rapid, uniform government process to obtain clearances for non-federal partners is undermining all efforts to improve sharing. Working with the Director of National Intelligence and the Congress to make ISE a success should be a priority.

Encouraging State, Local, and Tribal Cooperation

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 required the department to set a regional homeland security framework. It never did. And Congress never followed up–that is a problem.

A regional network is an essential next step in building the kind of homeland security enterprise that the nation needs. This network will require state-based regional programs that focus on ensuring that states are prepared to sustain themselves and that facilitate cooperation among federal, state, and local efforts. Regional offices should be required to strengthen state and local capabilities; facilitate regional cooperation among governments, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations; and prepare and exercise with federal entities that support regional plans. Such offices would enable regions to access and integrate their capabilities quickly and to improve integration.

Resolving a Real Transportation Nightmare

In the area of transportation security, Congress’s greatest blunder was establishing a mandate for 100 percent scanning of all cargo containers inbound to the United States. Certainly, no semi-intelligent terrorist would put a bomb in a shipping container. Containers are routinely lost, pilfered, crushed or waylaid. What’s more, 100 percent scanning is wholly impractical. Before Congress mandated scanning, it mandated a test called the “Secure Freight Initiative.” This mandate demonstrated that 100 percent scanning of containers bound for the United States from low-volume, “high risk” ports such as Qasim in Pakistan was feasible, but it also raised serious questions about the costs and delays that would be caused by implementing the measure at larger ports. The Government Accountability Office concluded the much the same, raising nine major problems. Obtaining a repeal of this unworkable mandate should be a priority.

Reducing Risks to Risk Analysis

Risk “analysis” has become a congressional codeword to throw money at pet projects or force new regulatory requirements on the private sector. If the secretary wants to start looking at the problem of “risk reduction gone wild,” her staff should start with the 2007 provision requiring federal authorities to reroute rail cars carrying hazardous material. Federally mandated rerouting will be extremely costly and cause significant delivery delays. Furthermore, the security benefits to be gained are vague, since rerouting simply transfers risk elsewhere. There are far less burdensome alternatives, including enhancing private sector, law enforcement, and emergency responder coordination and training. The secretary must convince Congress that rerouting by Washington is not the answer.

Thinking Critically About a Critical Threat

One area of critical infrastructure protection has received scant attention–the threat of Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) from a ballistic missile detonated high above an American city. An EMP is a high-intensity burst of electromagnetic energy from a nuclear explosion that could wreak havoc on the nation’s electronic systems–shutting down power grids, snapping supply chains, and silencing phone networks. Congress chartered the Commission to Assess the Threat of EMP Attack to the United States but ignored its recommendations. This failure is tragic.

Developing an EMP response would also make national systems more robust and resilient against other natural and manmade disasters. For starters, Napolitano’s staff should propose incorporating EMP attacks into National Planning Scenarios. These are 15 all-hazards planning scenarios used by federal, state, and local officials in disaster response exercises. The exercises determine capabilities and needs while addressing problems before a disaster strikes.

Report and Act

While the secretary needs to get these answers from her staff, she will have to work with Congress to make substantive changes a reality. Focusing the department on the “achievable” and “necessary,” as opposed to congressional whims, should be job one.

Secretary Napolitano: The First Week, Seven Directives

Monday, January 26th, 2009

By Christopher Krebs

The day after the Obama Administration posted its homeland security agenda on the White House website, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano released five action directives concerning the Department’s “protection” activities.  Later the same week, she issued two more “protection” related directives.

The first series of directives focuses on (1) critical infrastructure protection; (2 )risk analysis; (3) state and local intelligence sharing; (4) transportation security; and (5) state, local, and tribal integration (and presumably territorial).  The sixth and seventh directives relate to (6) cyber security and (7) the northern border strategy.

The first directive pertains to DHS’s critical infrastructure protection activities (full disclosure – the Office of Infrastructure Protection is my old stomping grounds). The Secretary will need to immediately deal with the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (aka CFATS) final tiering determinations, as well as the October expiration of the program’s legislative authority.   In addition, the White House homeland security agenda calls for the creation of a “National Infrastructure Protection Plan…[that will provide an] effective critical infrastructure protection and resiliency plan for the nation.”  As the NIPP has been out for a two or so years now, Secretary Napolitano may need to brief up Deputy Nation Security Advisor for Homeland Security John Brennan on the Department’s existing programs.  Speaking of Brennan, his title pretty much seals the fate for the Homeland Security Council.

For the second directive, intelligence sharing, the big ticket items will probably include the status of the oft-maligned Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) and the role of DHS in State and local Fusion Centers.  Given her new boss’s commitment to “work with…the private sector as a true partner in prevention, mitigation, and response”, I expect Secretary Napolitano to be particularly interested in the status of HSIN-Critical Sectors – an piece of HSIN developed with specific private sector requirements in mind.

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) will be called to the carpet on the status of a number of transportation security programs, in all probability including the recently delayed (again) Rail Security Rule, TSA’s use of the Terrorist Screening Database, and who knows, maybe even the implications of security screener unionization.

The state and local integration directive is a bit of a departure from the other directives – instead of providing status reports to the Secretary, the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs (the fifth directive mistakenly identifies the Office of Intergovernmental Programs (IGP) as the “Office of Intergovernmental Affairs”) is to immediately work through its State, Local, and Tribal phone tree to inform them that a new sheriff is in town.  Napolitano promises that future engagements with those jurisdictions will be more robust than the previous administration’s efforts.  Perhaps the Secretary’s previous stint as Governor of Arizona and the associated experiences with the Department (whatever they may have been) are coming back home to roost?

The Secretary’s reaction to the risk analysis directive response should be fairly interesting.  In a May 2008 hearing concerning the Department’s risk management approach, House Homeland Security Committee, Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee Chairwoman Sheila Jackson-Lee questioned the efficacy and even the authority of the DHS Office of Risk Management and Analysis (RMA).  Since that hearing, RMA has managed to make some progress, issuing a Department-wide risk lexicon, as well as a draft Integrated Risk Management Framework.  A number of congressional members and staffers will closely monitor RMA’s fortunes under the Napolitano years.

In her sixth directive, Secretary Napolitano requests for a briefing on the Department’s cyber security efforts.  Considering the White House’s call for a cyber security czar that reports directly to the President, I would imagine that the Secretary and her executive branch counterparts aim to have their cyber security responsibilities well in hand before the czar comes calling.  Over the next year or so, I expect the czar to work with the Department to overhaul the cyber security operation.

The seventh directive pertains to the Northern Border Strategy.  The directive requests the run down on what activities are underway with respect to reducing our vulnerabilities along the US/Canada border.  I imagine this issue will be at the top any congressional priorities list given the November 2008 GAO report on the very same subject, so at the very least the Secretary’s staff will have a jump on talking points.

Several DHS principals flew out to Arizona the week after Christmas to provide briefings on a number of key programs. Perhaps those briefings raised more questions than they answered?  Or maybe the Secretary is building a case for dismantling or otherwise restructuring portions of the Department right out of the gate.  Due to legislative bars, Napolitano is unable to reorganize her new charge absent congressional approval.  In some instances, however, it’s unlikely that congress would need much convincing for a restructuring or reassignment.

A plethora of questions will be asked and answered (to varying degrees of satisfaction) in the coming weeks and months.  As Secretary Napolitano navigates the mountains of paperwork and briefings brought on by these directives, one thing will certainly be on her mind: how to reconcile the Bush-era DHS with the Obama Administration’s Homeland Security agenda.

Chris Krebs currently serves as Vice President at Dutko Worldwide where he focuses on providing homeland security, critical infrastructure protection, and risk management consulting services to both the private and public sector.  Prior to his current position with Dutko, Chris served as Senior Policy Advisor to the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, US Department of Homeland Security.  Chris provided policy analysis, counsel, and support to the Assistant Secretary on all matters related to the protection of the Nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources.

Obama’s Africa Policy – Hope or Change?

Monday, January 26th, 2009

So much has been written about President Barack Obama’s paternal roots to Kenya.  In Kenya and all across the African continent, Obama’s victory was a momentous occasion that brought forth excitement, euphoria, and celebration.  And because of Obama’s heritage, in Africa as well as the United States there was and remains a perception that U.S. policy toward the continent will be somehow unique or different than his predecessor’s.  America’s foreign and defense policy priorities, however, reveal this perception about Obama’s Africa policy to be fanciful – more hope than reality.

“Common security” is the central theme of Obama’s foreign and defense policy.  Through the use of “smart” diplomacy and other nonmilitary instruments of national power (like foreign assistance), it is believed that America will be made more safe and secure.  Applying these concepts to the African continent, the United States will note its shared security concerns with Africa and consult with Africans more closely, perhaps even allocating more than the $5 billion in annual aid that former President George W. Bush’s administration allocated.  The new administration may alter Bush’s PEPFAR (the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) and direct more funds for agricultural aid in Africa, but the bittersweet reality is that little will change in U.S. policy toward Africa under President Obama.

The list of foreign and defense priorities above Africa includes wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Venezuela, not to mention the global jihad against the West led by Al Qaeda and its associated movements.  To be sure, Obama’s national security team has capable and interested personnel who know Africa, such as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice and National Security Advisor James Jones, who was former commander of U.S. European Command (which had most of Africa in its area of operations prior to the activation of U.S. Africa Command in 2008).

For the sake of global freedom and democracy, we may hope that Africa rises in order of priority.  But how will smart diplomacy and foreign assistance solve conflicts as diverse as the on-going genocide in Sudan’s Darfur, an Islamic extremist-inspired insurgency in Somalia, and organized ethnic violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?  Change may be needed, indeed.

The unsung heroes of Inauguration Day

Saturday, January 24th, 2009

In my last posting, I tried to explain the need for the high amount of security that was implemented for the Inauguration on Tuesday.  That posting was largely due to the amount of grumbling in the media and elsewhere that the levels were expensive overkill that would bring the city to its knees in terms of crowds, traffic and general congestion.

I think that those who watched on TV as well as those in attendance will confirm that we had a very historic event that included record crowds – and all still went well.  Even for the large number of people in a relatively small space, it came off without a hitch.

Certainly there are those that might consider themselves Monday morning quarterbacks who will say that there was too much security – but I would ask them to define “too much.”  Didn’t people get into and out of the city safely?  Weren’t there record numbers of people on the Mall and in the city without a terrorist event or even a significant crime? Was it “too much” when no one was hurt or worse?

As Americans, we place no limit on the value of a life.  We are a resilient nation that recovers quickly from disasters but is still humble enough to learn from mistakes.  We did learn from September 11th (what a new generation of international terrorists is capable of ); we did learned from the death of 168 innocent people in Oklahoma City (what two sadistic domestic criminals are capable of).  And we adjusted  based upon these lessons learned.

Sadly, we are not as free and open as we once were, and we do a great many things differently that we once did.  But most have been for the better.  We do not live in the same world that our forefathers fought for.  This is now our country to protect, and we must make sure that when we are considered forefathers,  that we did all that we could to make life better and safer for those that followed us.

So with that said, I would now ask two important questions.  Did we really have too much security?   And the most important question, one that is always overlooked unless something goes wrong: To whom do we owe the credit and thanks?

As a person who always has an opinion on things, I would say the answer to question one is, no, we did not have “too much” security.  Security was at an appropriate level for the historic nature of the event, and the record-sized crowed.

My answer to the second question would be that the credit and thanks goes to great men and women of both law enforcement and EMS.   While we certainly always see them in the news when things go wrong, in my heart the folks in the US Secret Service; Metropolitan Police Department; Capital Police; Park Police; the Virginia and Maryland local police agencies; and the great law enforcement agencies where I am from – the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice – are all unsung heroes.  They worked long hours, got blamed for too much security prior to the events and were the focus of the commuter grumblings.  Yet, despite it all, they made the day safe and one to remember for all those involved.

So although I am only one person, I cannot send enough thanks to the folks in law enforcement and the military, who protect us and our freedoms, that allow us to grumble about whatever the day presents.

Jane Holl Lute picked for deputy secretary of the Homeland Security Department

Saturday, January 24th, 2009

U.N. exec picked for No. 2 at Homeland Security – USATODAY.com

A top United Nations official who once served on the White House National Security Council has been picked for deputy secretary of the Homeland Security Department, a move that would place two women at the top of the department for the first time.

President Barack Obama’s nomination of Jane Holl Lute, a retired Army major who worked on the NSC under President Bill Clinton, was announced Friday by Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano.

New RAND Report on the Lessons of Mumbai

Friday, January 23rd, 2009

New RAND Report on the Lessons of Mumbai

The Lessons of Mumbai

“This study of the Mumbai terrorist attack of November 2008 is part of the RAND Corporation Occasional Papers series. The research for this report was completed in December 2008 and updated as of January 9, 2009. Much of the information available for this necessarily preliminary analysis comes from reporting by the news media, which in such circumstances is often inaccurate, and from information provided by well-placed Indian and U.S. government sources, which sometimes is incomplete. For a thorough, and hopefully accurate reconstruction of events, we must await an official inquiry or government-sponsored independent investigation. [...] The goal of the study is to develop findings that may be helpful to counterterrorism authorities in India and elsewhere in preparing for or countering future terrorist attacks on urban centers.”

Napolitano’s decision to keep DHS Old Hands exudes confidence

Friday, January 23rd, 2009

Secretary Napolitano has decided to keep a number of DHS non-career employees on board at the Department through an extended transition phase. It’s a wise move, and one that highlights the confidence the former Arizona Governor brings to her role. As Washington Post writer Spencer Hsu points out, Napolitano’s decision runs contrary to typical approaches.

The attempt at continuity is unusual in presidential transitions between parties, which typically lead to wholesale purging of politically appointed personnel. At the Justice Department, for example, almost no Bush holdovers remain beyond Deputy Attorney General Mark R. Filip, who is acting as attorney general pending confirmation of Obama nominee Eric H. Holder Jr., and Filip’s two top aides.

By contrast, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano has retained the department’s second-ranking official, Deputy Secretary Paul A. Schneider, and its top border security official, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Commissioner W. Ralph Basham, as well as its operations director and the assistant secretaries responsible for policy and private sector coordination. The heads of the Coast Guard and Secret Service, who are not political appointees, and DHS Undersecretary for Management Elaine C. Duke, whose tenure is set by law, also remain.

Many incoming heads of departments might let heightened partisan feelings or insecurity — a need to prove that theyknow what they’re doing and don’t need any help — stand in the way of maintain political appointees from a previous administration. This is true of transitions between the same party, let alone a switch from one party to the other.

Clearly, Napolitano doesn’t feel that she has to prove anything to anybody, which is a clear sign that she is comfortable in her new leadership role. It’s unclear whether she will keep these individuals in their positions permanently. Some, like Commissioner Basham, have a previous relatinship with the new Secretary and may stay through her tenure. For others this is unlikely, but they will stick around long enough to help their successors adapt to their new environments.

Anybody who has worked at The NAC — the Nebraska Avenue Complex, an old Navy facility where DHS Headquarters is house — this is an act of public service. The NAC is a cramped and bleak campus, nowhere near decent public transportation and lacking enough parking for employees. Supplies are low due to limited storage, and office space is … well, it’s a little like trying to rent an apartment in downtown New York: you’re lucky if you get an office in the first place, so don’t whine about it being the size of a broom closet. Moreover, most of the political appointees still at DHS are quite frankly tired. They’ve spent years working outrageous hours with little thanks — indeed much criticism from the media and political opportunists.

Political appointees also work under the burden of the current media caricature, that of being unqualified campaign types who have no business  government. The caricatures, of course, aren’t limited to political appointees, of course. The stereotype of career staff being bureaucrats and clockwatchers is as unfair and misguided as those about the political appointees. You’ll find plenty of exceptions who do fit the caricatures, but most of the men and women working in the federal government, including DHS (and, yes, DOJ) are committed and dedicated to their mission, and deserve our thanks.

I have spoken with some of the political appointees who have been asked to stay at DHS for a while. They are tired, they are ready for change, they are ready for sleep. But they are happy to stay on for a while and make sure that Secretary Napolitano’s team is as prepared as possible when that first crisis hits, which it will — and soon. That is the nature of DHS.

And I believe that they are all the more happy to stay on knowing that the woman in charge is confident in her role, and understands that all the experience in the world doesn’t change the fact that the Department of Homeland Security is still a new, chaotic and evolving environment. As a matter of national security, bipartisanship has never been more important.

Should the HSC be merged with the NSC?

Thursday, January 22nd, 2009

As President Obama takes leadership in Washington, he is immediately faced with a host of urgent matters affecting the nation’s economic, national and homeland security. As he and his staff struggle with the big decisions – how to get our economy back on track, how to judiciously balance combat resources in Iraq and Afghanistan – he must also address a host of seemingly less pressing administrative matters, a number of which lie in the homeland security realm.

For example, should the President leave FEMA in the Department of Homeland Security, or cut it out and make it a stand-along agency as some have suggested? Should he merge the White House Homeland Security Council (HSC) with the National Security Council (NSC), as a growing chorus of voices are urging? These matters may seem more related to management and infrastructure, and therefore less critical than some of the big questions raised above. I would submit, however, that in some ways they are more important because they will significantly influence the answers to the large questions.

If FEMA is isolated from the rest of DHS, it’s emergency response efforts to a crisis (whether a hurricane or a terrorist attack) will be quite different than if it is working hand-in-hand with other first-responders at DHS. Similarly, while there are credible arguments for merging the HSC with the NSC, doing so would certainly affect the decision-making process for homeland security matters.

Indeed, one of my concerns with such a merger is the potential for decision making paralysis. The National Security Council coordinates the responses of various federal agencies to our most urgent external threats. General Jones, the president’s national security advisor, must facilitate and find consensus among the government’s most powerful leaders – from the Secretaries of Defense, State and Treasury to the Joints Chiefs of Staff and the National Director of Intelligence. Their first day on the job, these individuals must come to grips with, and provide strategic planning for, America’s involvement in Iraq, our battle against al Qaeda and a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan, the current tensions between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea, and the worrisome implications of an increasingly authoritarian Russia. These are just a few of the major issues sitting on the table today at the NSC.

If the Homeland Security Council were merged into the NSC infrastructure, there is a danger that it would become a secondary voice unable to compete with those that are first and foremost concerned with breaking international crisis. Distracted by conflict between Pakistan and India and alarming Russian troop movements near the Georgian border, for example, would the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State be as concerned with, say, wildfires in California or new intelligence linking certain European banks to terrorist money laundering schemes? These are critical matters related to our homeland security, not the purview of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unless the HSC adviser had the ear of the President, there would be a significant risk that urgent matters related to the homeland would be put on the backburner while urgent matters related to the national security abroad were addressed. Critical decisions might be presented to the President without the necessary vetting and predecisional debate.

On the other hand, if you have strong leadership at the Department of Homeland Security, there might be the temptation to move forward with policy that hasn’t been fully vetted by the White House. Created by the merger of 22 formerly different federal agencies, DHS’s jurisdiction and reach spans across the government. It’s policies don’t affect DHS only; they affect numerous other federal agencies. It’s imperative that the White House provide oversight. However, if the NSC is distracted with multiple international crises, the Secretary of Homeland Security may feel the need to act if her urgent policies are not getting the focus they need at the NSC. As we learned with Hurricane Katrina, DHS is also dealing with life and death matters that require prompt attention and clear decisionmaking – decisionmaking that cannot be put on the backburner.

In the end, either model – separate councils for national security and homeland security or a merged and expanded NSC – can work. However, if a merger were to occur, it is critical that the decisonmaking process is clear; that proper vetting and oversight can occur; and that there is an unobstructed avenue direct to the president’s ear.

Oscar Grant Shooting – Was the Failure in Personnel Selection, General Training or the Taser Training

Thursday, January 22nd, 2009

That Oscar Grant, the young man fatally shot by a police officer on a BART platform on New Years, died is a tragedy.  It is unacceptable in every sense of the word, and the condolences of every rational person must be with his family.

The officer responsible, Johannes Merserle, resigned on Jan 7 and will be charged with murder – which category remains unclear.  The Alameda County District Attorney, Tom Orloff, has stated that there is evidence that the killing was intentional.  The family is suing BART for $25 million in a wrongful death suit.  Even the attorney representing Grant’s family, John Burris, acknowledges that the officer may have believed that he was reaching for his Taser, in which case Merserle would be guilty of negligent homicide, rather than murder.

This is a regrettable incident all round; there are no winners here.  Grant is dead, Merserle will do jail time, no amount of money can recompense the Grants for the loss of a loved one.  However, that must not be where the investigation stops.

Something went horribly wrong on that platform.  Occam’s razor suggests that the simplest explanation is the most likely; in this case, and certainly looking at Merserle’s reaction to the shot, it is most likely that the officer thought he was about to do something other than shoot the suspect with a live round.  The likeliest explanation may be that he thought he was going to Taser the suspect, even though he was not wearing a Taser at the time.  The Taser is worn on the other side of the belt, feels different and has bright yellow pieces on it so that it is clearly identifiable.

It’s incredibly relevant that, reportedly, BART police only started carrying the weapon in December, suggesting that the officers were not yet completely comfortable with carrying the weapon.  An incident of this seriousness should mandate a full investigation of the regime surrounding the use of Tasers, and in particular the training the officers receive.  That idea that Grant was struggling is absolutely true, but, it appears from the video, he was under the control of the officers – even the use of Taser in that instance would have been extreme.

If Merserle used his pistol instead of the Taser, what he may have thought he was going to use is very strong evidence that there is a systemic lapse in the adoption of the Taser by BART police somewhere – did the drills for Taser use include a visual check of the weapon system to ensure that it was the correct weapon before using it?  That the drill is written down as Standard Operating Procedure is almost irrelevant; more important is whether the training was successful in ensuring that the officer, in the heat of a stressful situation, still checks the weapon system before operation – clearly that did not happen, regardless of which weapon he thought he was going to use.

It is difficult to suggest a reason why Merserle would commit murder at this time, at this place, during this incident; this was not the first of its nature he was involved in, not the first opportunity to kill someone.  If he did deliberately intend to shoot Grant with a live round, then clearly the BART police recruited the wrong personality type into their force.  The BART police give their officers the capability and opportunity to use lethal force, and their selection procedures must reflect that; if they intend to suggest that Merserle committed murder, then that suggests the selection system is broken.

There will either be a political whitewash that sends Merserle down the river, or a responsible reaction to this incident.  That the District Attorney is already openly talking about murder charges suggests that a full-blown internal investigation will heap the blame on Merserle, as the trials of the NYPD officers who shot Sean Bell did, rather than openly accept that there may have been systemic problems, engage with those problems and resolve them.

A member of the public died needlessly.  There must be an investigation that goes far beyond concluding ‘operator error’ – the BART police have accepted a risk that is unnecessary, and must now identify what that risk is, and act to close it, or at least address it properly.

Whether or not Merserle did intend to kill Grant does nothing to affect the need for the BART police to openly review their selection procedures, their basic training procedures and their Taser policies and training effectiveness.  The review is worth it if only to prove that these weren’t contributory factors, and to demonstrate their professionalism in protecting the members of the public from future harm, and in protecting their own officers.

There Is Still Much Work To Be Done

Wednesday, January 21st, 2009

While reflecting on the inauguration and seeing Secretary Napolitano and Admiral Allen behind President Obama during the swearing in ceremony, I picked back up my copy of Edward Alden’s terrific new book, The Closing of the American Border, and mused how it should be required reading for those assuming new positions of responsibility for homeland security this week.

Exhaustively researched and brilliantly penned, this page-turner provides a thorough account of the country’s border policies since 9/11. This important book is the unofficial history of how overnight border security transitioned from an almost afterthought to a bureaucratic tug of war, sometimes carried out in the oval office, between “the cops” and “the technocrats” struggling to balance protecting the country with civil liberties in a new age of counter-terrorism.

Unlike many serious policy books, The Closing of the American Border is actually a terrific read, written with a combination of serious analysis and gut wrenching anecdotes of detained immigrants whose only crime was their place of birth, unlucky timing, and desire to invest their considerable talents in the United States. The book tells harrowing stories of lives destroyed after being snared in blunt security initiatives aimed at foiling the next major attack. Although, while it is impossible to prove a counterfactual why there hasn’t been another terrorist incident, the book details how the closing of the American border has come with considerable cost to America’s image abroad and economic competitiveness at home.

Immigrants, whose sweat literally and figuratively built America, have run up against an administrative buzz saw from a government still reeling from Al Queda’s surprise attack. As the book chronicles, Bush administration officials in a politically charged and risk adverse environment have been at almost every corner willing to sacrifice efficiency and open borders for tighter, if imperfect, border security. The personal stories of individual disaster the book relays put human faces on what often just seem like steely, impersonal policy decisions. The book reads like a combination of the Warren Report and a reality TV series turned horror show.

New DHS officials, incoming National Security Council staff, and citizens interested in the perennial tensions between freedom and security should carefully read The Closing of the American Border and keep it near their desks. This book provides critical strategic lessons gleaned from seven years of hindsight for Americans and their leaders. Today, we witnessed the first presidential transition since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  The policy choices to protect America remain difficult ones, and as this book makes clear, there is still much work to be done.

CHANGE I Want to Believe In – The Obama Homeland Security Agenda & Aging Infrastructure

Wednesday, January 21st, 2009

With blistering speed out of the starting gate, the Obama Team is off and running.  While just beginning its running stride for the next four years, they’re already using and supercharging the very communications apparatus that took an upstart, outsider campaign operating in Chicago to occupying the Oval Office and all of its bully pulpit powers.

In case you haven’t seen it, the entire White House website as been given an overhaul and while there are a few kinks to be worked out (i.e., registering for email updates), they’re off to a good start in detailing their priorities and the agenda they have in mind for the next four years.

While some of the presented agenda details aren’t new or groundbreaking to anyone who has followed the Transition closely, the items listed under ‘Homeland Security’ are worth reviewing.

There may be differences in their approach, each of the detailed areas were items that were on the Bush Administration’s agenda – many of which a good solid start is available as a foundation for the new Administration to build upon.  Several of them are certainly of the ‘Mom and Apple Pie’ variety (Improve Airline Security; Secure Our Chemical Plants; Safeguard Public Transportation, etc.) – all items that we can all agree upon as good things that deserve attention and resources.

What I found most promising on the new Administration’s posted agenda for Homeland Security was its section, “Modernize America’s Aging Infrastructure.”  It details three priority areas – Build in Security; Create a National Reinvestment Bank; and, Invest in Critical Infrastructure Projects.

None of these points are new (they were part of various Obama’s Campaign documents and released Transition Team materials) but the fact they are listed on the new White House website on DAY ONE of the Obama Administration gives me hope that they will apply energy to their rhetoric to make these points a reality.

Under these three areas, the Obama Team is proposing a radical departure to how we as a nation have long decided, invested and designed our nation’s infrastructure.

For too long we have relied on traditional paradigms when it comes to making infrastructure decisions.  Politics, pork barrel projects, outdated and arcane funding formulas and probably Magic 8 Balls have all been employed to make these decisions for the past several decades.

In the wake of 9/11, devastating hurricanes, floods and fires, power blackouts, collapsing bridges and overcapacitizing just about every infrastructure we have in this country, it is time to take a new hard look at what we fund; how we do it and the criteria that makes these decisions sound.  As such, the new Administration’s three points on this major issue deserve serious and immediate consideration.

In the coming days and weeks, the Congress is going to debate an estimated $850 billion spending package, much of it dedicated to starting shovel-ready infrastructure projects around the United States to create jobs and get the economy moving again.  While I shudder at that spending figure and the fact that it is “imaginary money” (it doesn’t really exist but we’re going to spend it any way), our need for infrastructure investment is real and necessary.

As a taxpayer I’m willing to take a deep breath and bite the bullet on an expenditure such as this, but before we give a collective thumbs up on this type of spending package, we need to seriously consider how these infrastructure projects are selected and designed for national, regional and local resilience.

Our new President spoke in his Inaugural Address about the need for “hard choices” and “a new era of responsibility.”

He’s right and here’s a great way to start.  Before we commit to spending $850 billion or any other amount of billion dollar packages for our nation’s infrastructure we need to see “risk” and “resilience” as part of our investment decisions.

As CNN and other media outlets have already revealed, some of the submitted shovel-ready infrastructure project lists offered by various Mayors, Governors and other associations have included such meritorious investments as upgrades to a zoo’s polar bear exhibit as well as a Minor League Baseball Hall of Fame.  With all due respect to great minor league baseball players of yesteryear and the polar bears (who I believe are an endangered species and worthy of protections), these are not representative examples of “new era of responsibility.”  Rather, it’s more of the same old, same old and it is time for this to CHANGE as well.

The Obama Administration has laid out three key points on modernizing our aging infrastructure.  With any luck, I hope we see these points applied in the weeks ahead because in the end it’s you and I that will be stuck with the bill.

Wouldn’t it be nice for a change to see a bill that had some wisdom and merit to its expenditures?

That would be CHANGE I could believe in and get behind.

President Obama’s Homeland Security Agenda Posted on New White House Website

Wednesday, January 21st, 2009

The White House website has been overhauled to reflect the priorities and management of President Barack Obama’s new administration. Of particular interest to Security Debrief readers is the page dedicated to the President’s homeland security priorities.

The page lists several broad priority categories. The new Administration’s focus on ending combat in Iraq and turning its focus to Afghanistan stands out as a bold departure. It’s focus on shoring up the nation’s critical infrastructure also signals a new approach.

What also stands out is what is not given much attention — key among such issues being immigration policy. The plan outlined by the White House offers no sense of how it will tackle this critical matter; indeed, immigration is strangely buried with aviation and transportation security under the catch-all category of “critical infrastructure.”

Below are the primary homeland security categories of focus outlined by the White House:

Defeat Terrorism Worldwide – a focus on ending the war in Iraq and focusing on Afghanistan in an effort to “destroy” Al Qaeda. Encouragingly, winning the “battle of ideas” is also a prominently listed.

Prevent Nuclear Terrorism — A pledge to “secure all nuclear weapons materials at vulnerable sites within four years; a call for ending Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programs via “tough diplomacy,” which is a bit vague; establishment of a nuclear security coordinator within the NSC.

Strengthen American Biosecurity — While a valuable goal, the specific agenda is very vague, such as “prevent bioterror attacks” and “build capacity to mitigate the consequences of bioterror attacks.”

Protect Information Networks — The cybersecurity agenda includes the creation of a cybersecurity czar who will report directly to the president; an interesting focus on the prevention of corporate cyber espionage; mandate cross-sector security requirements for protecting personal data.

Improve Intelligence Capacity and Protect Civil Liberties — Obama proposes creating a “senior position to coordinate domestic intelligence gathering. This is interesting, if a little unclear. Isn’t that what the Director of Central Intelligence was supposed to be? Or is this a step in the direction of MI5? A single coordinator would hardly have such authority, though. Would this coordinator operate out of the Office of the National Director of Intelligence, the CIA, the FBI, DHS or the White House?

Protect Americans from Terrorist Attacks and Natural Disasters — Basically the grants program, based on risk. There is also a plank for accomplishing the holy grail of first responders — interoperability. There is also a plank for improving partnerships with state/local governments and the private sector. This is indeed a critical step, but those words have been tossed around since the creation of DHS. Indeed, there are actual offices dedicated to coordinating with the private sector as well as state/local governments; however, we have not made this important goal a legitimate priority. It remains to be seen whether the Obama Administraiton will do better.

Protect Critical Infrastructure — This category is perhaps the most bizarre of the Obama plan. It touches upon what has traditionally be considered critical infrastructure, such as securing chemical facilities, but then includes the entire scope of border and transporation security, with plans covering “airline security,” “port security,” and “border security.” These areas have been the primary focus of the entire Department since its establishment. It is unclear what the new Adminstration is stating by burying these security components under “critical infrastructure.” The plan offers no details whatsoever on how it would improve aviation, border or public transporation security. Only in the area of port security is there a hint of specifics, asserting the need to implement radiation detection technology in the maritime transportation industry. It is unclear whether the new Administration will pursue the 100 percent scanning regulation mandated by Congress any more aggressively than the Bush Administration, a conflict that had caused quite a bit of public sniping between members of Congress and DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff.

Modernize America’s Aging Infrastructure — While some of  the more specific and innovative of the Administration’s ideas, the planks listed under this category are what one might expect to find under the above category of “protecting critical infrastructure” — such as creating a “National Infrastructure Reinvestment Bank” capitalized at $60 billion over ten years.

Can the government compete in today’s underworld of terror and criminal finance?

Tuesday, January 20th, 2009

As the Special Agent in Charge of the Department of Homeland Security’s ICE New York field office from 2003 to 2007, I had the privilege of participating in the supervision of the El Dorado Task Force.  The El Dorado Task Force is the largest multi-agency financial crime task force in the United States.  It has conducted, and continues to conduct, some of the most important money laundering investigations in the world.  Some of my fondest law enforcement memories are associated with El Dorado investigations.

And as good as that task force is, due to the skill and commitment of the agents and law enforcement officers working it, I worry that it’s not enough.

When I managed the task force, I had a nagging belief that some of the criminal and terrorist organizations we were up against were conducting sophisticated money laundering schemes that the federal government lacked the capacity to identify, investigate and neutralize.  Simply put, the government lacked the necessary resources and expertise to compete with the criminal and terrorist minds set on exploiting the ever-evolving complexities of the financial world.

Jeff Stein’s “Spy Talk” article in CQ Politics on “terror finance tracking priorities” this week brought this concern back to mind.

Stein reviewed a recent article in the New York Times by Vikas Bajaj and John Eligion outlining significant Iranian money laundering schemes conducted with the knowledge and collusion of well-known financial institutions in Europe to deceive American financial institutions and law enforcement authorities.  Extraordinary and complex efforts were made to conceal this money, much of which could be directly connected to the support of Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.  The article concludes that “Iran, with years of experience in the game, is unlikely to be knocked much off its stride in the acquisitions game.”

I remain concerned that we (after 33 years as a Special Agent, I still use “we” when referencing federal law enforcement) lack the expertise necessary to compete in this venue.  Because money is the lifeblood of a criminal and terrorist organization, these shadowy and sophisticated organizations will continue to make extraordinary efforts to conceal their assets by developing schemes that they believe are beyond the capacity of law enforcement to investigate.

The federal government must remain competitive.  We need to assess our resources and capabilities in light of each “new” money laundering scheme discovered.

We must develop the necessary investigative expertise by recruiting, training, and maintaining the “best and the brightest” investigators in the complex underworld of money laundering and financial crime.

We must strive to develop closer partnerships with the financial industry to exchange intelligence on emerging money laundering patterns.

Even then, because of changing priorities and resources in the United States, I remain concerned it may not be enough.

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